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Summary 
Alienation, or estrangement, is a concept of considerable antiquityo 
It has ahTays been coterminous ,dth the problem of faith. Indeed, it 
has been argued that the sole function of religion is to prevent that 
al ienation. Yet the metaphysical origins of the concept have been 
veiled in the course of time by the progressive secularisation of Western 
thought, especially after Feuerbach and Marx. However, this study of 
the phenomenon of alienation considers it in connection with the problem 
of faith, for it was through the loss of faith in the Bible and God 
that man's history as well as culture was secularised. The basis of 
Arnold's argument is the belief that man's entire life, if not history, 
depends on his concept of God, and that from this concept there develops 
an immense system of institutions, roles, and values o 
Societies in order to continue in time have to transmit their 
insti tutions as .. rell as ro les and values from one generation to the next o 
The ne~'T generation is initiated into the meanings of the culture by 
means of family, school, church, and state, and learns to participate 
in its established tasks and to accept the ro les as vTell as the iden-
tities that make up its social structure, but the process is not easy. 
EVery nON and then it faces difficulties such as that of the first half 
of the nineteenth century. To this effect Arnold IITites: 
Modern times find themselves with an immense system of 
institutions, established facts, accredited dogmas, customs, 
rules, which have come to them from times not modern. In 
this system their life has to be carried forl'iard; yet they 
have a sense that this system is not of their ovm creation, 
that it by no means corresponds exactly with the wants of 
their actual life, that, for them it is customary, not 
rational. The al'iakening of this sense is the al'Takening of 
the modern spirito The modern spirit is no liT al'Take almost 
every'tThere; the sense of TiTan t of correspondence betw'een 
the forms of moder-.l Europe and it s spirit, beh'ieen the ne,'i 
,dne of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and the 
old bottles of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, or 
even of the sixteenth and seventeenth, almost everyone 
ii 
now perceives; it is no longer dangerous to affirm that this 
want of correspondence exists; people are even beginning 
to be shy of denying it. To remove this ''ian t of corres-
pondence is beginning to be the settled endeavour of most 
persons of good sense. Dissolvents of the old European 
system of dominant ideas and facts Ive must all be, all 
of us '\'Tho have any pmver of working; Nhat 'Ire have to study 
is that 've may not be acrid dissolvents of ito 
(tlHeinrich Heine, tI CP\'l., III, pp 0109-10) 
Alienation, here, is not held to be inherent in man's being in 
the world, but rather in his being in a particular historical epoch 
"Thich asserts itself vri th special force "rhenever a particular so cial and 
cultural integration fails to satisfy the people in a given societyo 
It appears "Then a particular generation faces structures (religious or 
secular) whose permanent features are indifferent to that generation's 
desires and aspirations. This brings the argument to the begi~~ing of 
t~e ?r8CeSS~ all concepts originate and are rooted in the subjective 
:::onsci,)1J.sness of human beings. This subjective consciousness, 
8.ccording to Arnold, consists of instincts. To this effect Arnold writes: 
Human life and human society arise out of the const~Dt 
endeavour of these instincts to satisfy and develop 
themselves. ide may briefly sum them up, these needs or 
instincts, as being, first and foremost, a~eneral instinct 
of expansion L;nd another of concentration/, then, as 
being instincts following diverse great lines, ",qhich may 
be conveniently designated as the lines of conduct, of 
intellect and knowledge, of beauty, of social life and 
manners. Some lines are more in vievr and more in honour 
at one time, some at another. Some men and some nations 
are more eminent on one line, some on another. But the 
final aim, of making our O'tffi and of harmoniously combining 
the powers to be reached on each and all of these great 
lines, is the ideal of human life. And our race is for 
ever recalled to this aim, and held fast to it, by the 
instinct of self-preservation in humanity. 
(tlA Speech at Eton,tI CpT,T., IX, FP.26-7) 
The interaction between the human instincts, of expansion and 
concentration, and the social institutions, religious and social, 
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discloses a mechanism of causation that asserts itself with the relentless 
force of natural lal'l. The discrepancy between them is bound to be 
intensely felt by men of sensibility, - poets. The masses feel it as 
,'Tell, but "That appears at one level as the disintegration of traditional 
a 
VlaYs of life is reflected at/different level in the dichotomy of facts 
and valueso Since intellectuals as a group form a stratum of society 
in which material tension is immediately experienced in theoretical 
terms, their role in developing concepts which reflect the time-spirit 
is crucial. And the poets are more crucial. i/Thy? Be cause, 0 f the 
various modes of manifestation through ,'Thich the human spirit pours its 
force, theirs is the most adequate. And most importantly is their role 
in imparting a corresponding state of feelings and attitudes to their 
readers. For this reason Arnold never tackled a problem vIi thout 
discussing the a?propriate poetic method 0: handling ito 
Arnold asp ired to see a so ciety in ,'Thich man! s facu, 1 ties are 
developed to a totality and whose conflicting elements are held in 
harmonious balance. His solution envisaged a recovery of the lost 
harmony between man's Hellenic po"Ter and Hebraic one in the spheres 
of culture o He made it his line of endeavour and life's careero 
The argument in this thesis falls into hIO parts: a theoretical 
and a practical one. The first part, Natthe"T Arnold's Poetic Theory, 
according 
is arranged/to the following scheme: 
Chapter One, "The Nature of Poetry and Its Function," attempts to show 
the unity and continuity of Arnold's critical attitudes by exploring the 
interconnections among his concerns as they develop in response to the 
need of his mill career and his grol'ling perception of the cultural 
impasse in the first half of the nineteenth century. 
Chapter Two, "The Poetic Process," shows that Arnold's poe tic process 
is conscious, voluntary, purposive, and rational. 
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Chapter Three, "Varieties of Poetic Vision," shows that Arnold rejects, 
in part, the Romantic personality as vTell as the Romantic theory of 
poetry as inadequate to cope with social, religious, and philosophical 
problems of a progressive, sceptical, and scientific age. It shows 
as well his own conception of the appropriate poetic vision and the 
kind of poetry that ought to be written in that ageo 
Chapter Four, "On Poets," shows that though Arnold sees the being of the 
poet as ondoyant et divers: balancing and indeterminate, the plaything 
of cross motives and shifting impulses, swayed by a thousand subtle 
influences, physiological and pathological, he insists that poets should 
,'/Tite primarily about the external 'florld rather than their O'ITn subjective 
experienc e. 
Part bro, Ha ttheN .A.rnold' s Poet i c Practice, shoTtTS hOYT Arnold 
in his poet~J and prose 'tTritings alike, interprets the phenomenon of 
alienation through a number of its manifestations. Three forces 
especially contribute to the alienation ,.Thich Arnold's characters 
experience: the breakdmm of faith, the rise of the city and its chaotic 
atmosphere, and finally the gro'rlth of knol'Tledge and consciousness 
of the masses i'li thout a corresponding change of the institutions that 
govern their life. Wha t Arnold did ltTaS to interpret his society by 
applying ideas to the existing social and religious institutions. He 
even went as far as to give a plan to poets to f ollo,'/' in their inter-
pretation of their situation: "On God, on Nature, and on human life." 
Each is dealt 'ITi th in a chapter or hlO as the argument requires. Thus 
this part is arranged to the follmdng scheme: 
Chapter five, "Prologue: The Idea of God and Its Relation to the 
Phenomenon of Alienation," ShO'iTS Arnold's diagnosis of the Time-Spirit 
and the role of historical perspective in the task of ordinary man's 
past and present experiences. In this chapter Arnold comes to the 
conclusion that in the light of the historical development of man's 
spiritual life and the changes wrought on man's consciousness by the 
advance of science, religion must be recast to meet the changing needs 
of man: 
"Leave then the Cross as ye have left carved gods, 
Bu t guard the fire within. II 
Chapter six, "On God Continued," shows Arnold's attempts to deal with 
modern religious problems from a naturalistic point of view "Those basis 
is the distrust of anthropomorphic conceptions of God's nature. 
Chapter seven, "On Nature," tries to clarify the paradoxes in Arnold's 
concent of nature. It ShO'tTS that .i\..rnold is attempting (1) to clear 
ai-laY the anthropomorphic tendencies of thought that had filtered cio\'ffi 
from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as 'dell as (2) the mystical 
glorification of nature in the early nineteenth century poets, and 
(3) to recommend a modern concept of animism o 
Chapter eight, "On Human Life: (A) General Life o " In this chapter 
I have tried to reinterpret Arnold's thought by placL~g his idea of 
human life in its social context, beginning with his views of the family 
and ending with his ideas of good government and the role of the state. 
I argue that Arnold's thought in these matters advanced gradually and 
pragmatically)rather than by sudden leaps or mutations as some of his 
critics have maintained o 
Chapter nine, "On Human Life: (B) The Emotions o " This chapter d is cusses 
Arnold's examiP2tion of the impact of the loss of faith on his fellow-
men~ in particular its desiccating effect on their emotional life o 
v> 
vi: " 
In conclusion the "Epilogue" takes "Dover Beach" and "Obermann 
Once More" as charting the main itinerary of Arnold's thoughto Ny 
principal argument in the dissertation is that Arnold is not preoccupied 
with his OvTn personal dilemma but takes as his chief subject the diffi-
culties of his fellow-men in understanding the age they live in, and then 
undertakes the further task of proposing a method of reintegration o 
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Introduction 
In this work, I have tried to interpret and to examine Arnold's 
interpretation of the phenomenon of alienation by attempting to answer 
the following questions. Can we point to something called alienation 
in Arnold's poetry? If so, how can we reconcile this with his 
insistence on the poet's need for sympathy and the role of poetry as the 
complete magister vitae? Can all this be represented as a single two-
stage account of the process of artistic creation: immersion in experience, 
followed by withdrawal and disinterested contemplation of it? Is Arnold 
unable to share in the experience of his society, or having experienced 
it does he reject what he finds? Is the poetry written about this 
abQut 
rejection or/failure of engagement? Is the phenomenon of alienation 
typical of all poets and men of sensibility, or symptomatic of a more 
widespread failure of integration in Victorian Britain as a whole, or 
an inevitable part of the human condition? In addition to these questions, 
there are other questions pertaining to the controversy over Arnold's 
reputation as poet-critic. Was Arnold a powerful and poetic spokesman, 
sensitive to the changes wrought upon society by the new ideas, or was he 
a second-rate poet and a self-contradictory critic with his face turned 
to the past? 
To find a clear framework for displaying the full meaning of these 
questions and suggesting the answers to them, I found it necessary to 
start with Arnold's poetic theory. What we still lack is a view of 
the unity and continuity of Arnold's critical attitudes: to show a real 
correspondence between his theory and poems, and to show that the theory 
gives an adequate ac·count of the poems. In other words, part one is 
concerned with the following question: how far does Arnold's theory of 
poetry square with his poetic practice? This part is arranged according 
to the following scheme: 
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Chapter one: "The Nature of Poetry and Its Function", attempts to 
show the unity and continuity of Arnold1s critical attitudes by showing 
the interconnections among Arnold's concerns, as they develop in response 
to the needs of his own career and his growing perception of the cultural 
impasse in the first half of the nineteenth-century. In other words, the 
study shows that it is a theory of commitment and not of escape. His 
poetry has an immense task to perform which ultimately determines all 
the element of his poetic. His poetry is pragmatic in a sense that 
it has a serious purpose. 
Chapter two, "The Poetic Process", shows that Arnold I s poetic 
process is conscious, voluntary, purposive, and rational. There is effort 
as well as sacrifice involved in it; it is racking and painful. It 
involves a thorough knowledge of 'theology, philosophy, history, art, 
and science.' This concept regards literature as verbal discourse, not 
merely as verbal' artifact. 
Chapter three: Varieties of Poetic Vision. The question which is 
presented in this chapter might be phrased as follows: How does the 
poet relate himself to the external world; bow does he perceive the 
world objectively and partake of experience and yet retain his own 
integrity and individuality? The study shows that Arnold rejects, in 
part, the Romantic personality as well as the Romantic theory of poetry 
as inadequate to cope with social, religious, and philosophical problems 
of a progressive, sceptical, and scientific age; it will show as well 
his own conception of the appropriate poetic vision and tbe kind of 
poetry that ought to be wl.'itten in that age. 
v 
Chapter four, On Poets, shows that though Arnold sees the being of 
the poet as ondoyant et divers balancing and indeterminate, the plaything 
of cross motives and shifting impulses, swayed by a thousand subtle influences, 
physiological and pathological, he insists that poets should write primarily 
about the external world rather than their own personal experience. 
Alienation defined. The meanings of the term "alienation" are 
legion, and as this term has become more fashionable, it has become 
synonymous with whatever the writer believes to be the central evils of 
modern society. In practice, the term has become an increasingly 
rhetorical and at times entirely emotive concept, often synonymous 
merely with the feeling that something is wrong somewh~re, and that 
~ have lost something important. Most usages of the term share the 
assumption that some relationship or connection that once existed, that 
is 'natural,' desirable, or good, has been lost. The term, however, 
remained ambiguous and became increasingly devoid of any specific meaning. 
This state gave rise to many attempts on the part of varwus sociologists, 
psychologists, and philosophers to seek for operational definitions of 
the concept, so that itmightbe subjected to the usual processes of 
t ' d' f' t' 1 measuremen , comparlson, an verl lca 10n. 
Alienation is not, however, a uniquely modern phenomenon. In every 
era and society, at least a few exceptional individuals have spurned 
their societies. But what is peculiar about the phenomenon in modern 
the 
time is that it affects not only those at the top of/intellectual ladder 
but those at the bottom of it too - the masses. In other words, while 
alienation in the past was chosen by the top minority as a response to 
society, now it is imposed upon the masses as a result of overwhelming 
cultural change. Increasingly, the vocabulary of social commentary is 
dominated by terms that characterise the sense of growing distance 
between men and their former objects of affection: alienation, estrangement, 
dissaffection, anomie, withdrawal, disengagement, separation, apathy, 
non-involvement, indifference, and neutralism -- all of these terms 
point to a sense of loss, a growing gap between men and their social 
world. 
The studies amounted to two main traditions: psychological and 
social, in addition to a third attempt to hyphenate these two traditions: 
psycho-social, or socio-psychological. Kenneth Keniston, in his comment 
on the psychological approach to alienation, says: 
A purely psychological account of alienation implies 
that its only causes lie in individual life and 'personal' 
pathology. Once we discover psychodynamics and dis-
tortions of development that 'prevent' a youth from 
committing himself to his adulthood and his society, we 
have discovered all we need to know. Aliented youths 
themselves often unwittingly support this view by their 
readiness to discuss their childhoods, their intense 
interest in their own psychology, and their articulate 
insight into the personal origins of their beliefs ••• 
(Being) exposed and over exposed to psychological thinking, 
they often tend to interpret their own behavior as 'merely' 
a reaction to an unfortunate past. 2 
The other tradition sees alienation in the economic conditions of 
capitalistic societies. 3 This tradition views alienation as a reaction 
to the stresses, inconsistencies, or injusticesin the individual's 
social order: the alienated man is seen as the inconscient victim of 
his society; his alienation is imposed upon him by the unjust economic 
system, by politicians who ignore his interest, or by employers who 
exploit his labour: 
The role of individual personality and personal pathology 
is largely ignored, except as a system of social problems: 
the focus is on the 'big picture.' In practice, however, 
a sociological approach to alienation can lead to very 
different evaluations of it. Those who start from opposition 
to our social order naturally sympathise with its victims and 
detractors. Those who are favourably impressed with our 
society's stability, capacity for growth and change, and 
its high degree of organization, view alienation as an 
inevitable and minor growing pain of a society whose 
benefits we should daily count. But in either case, the 
experience and life of the individual are of interest 
primarily as they reflect society. 
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(K.Keniston, The Uncommitt~~, pp.6-7). 
So far there is no cooprehensive study on the cultura14 aspect of the 
phenomenon, that is, as a crisis in man's spiritual life produced by 
the totality of conditions in modern mass society and man's self-
consciousness. Tba t is the aspect that concerns .Arnold. 
Arnold, in his essay on Heine, gives "That could be accepted as 
the essence of the phenomenon: 
Nodern times find themselves with an im..rnense system of 
institutions, established facts, accredited dogmas, 
customs, rules, T'Thich have come to them from time s not 
modern. In this system their life has to be carried 
fonmrd, yet they have a sense ••• that it by no means 
corresponds exactly l'Ti th the I·rants of their ectual life, 
that, for them, it is customary, not rational. The 
e'Vrakening of this sense is the m-ra2.'(ening 0 f the modern 
spir it •••• To remove this ,{ant of corres-pondence is 
beginning to be the settled endeavour of most persons 
of good sense. Dis3017ent3 of t~le old European system 
of domin8.nt ideas 821cl fac-:3 ~:e mus t all be (OF,!., III, 
-01;. 159-60). -
Again he 'irri te: 
In an e-poch of clissolutio:'l and tr::L.'lsformation, such as 
that on '·Thich T;Te are nor.·i entered, habits, ties, and 
essocia tions are inevi taoly broke~ up, the action of 
individuals becomes more eli stL:ct, tl'..e shortcomings, 
errors, heats, disputes, ~'ihich necessarily ettend 
indivio.ual action, ere brought into f,Teater prominence 
(tpreface to Essays in Criticism, II CP~I; III, p. 288). 
lim-Jever, seys Arnold in liOn the Eodern Element in Literature, It I'The 
predominance of thought, of reflection, in modern epochs is not ,'ii thout 
vii 
its penalties; in the Q~sound, in the over-tasked, III the over-sensitive, 
it has produced the most -painful, the most l2.ffientable results; it has 
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produced a state of feeling unknown to less enlightened but perhaps 
healthier e.pochs - the feeling of depression, the feeling of ennui. 
Depression and ennui; these are the characteristics stamped on how many 
of the representative works of modern times,l (CPW., I, p. 32). 
Alienation, in these lines, can be understood as a state of 
awareness of this want of correspondence: it is a mode of experience 
that involves mind as well as feeling. In other words, the term designates 
a state which is simultaneously both cognitive and affective in character. 
It involves an awareness of the situation and a feeling of estrangement 
from it. The very awareness of it is in a sense alienation. This 
dialectics between the self and other provides the clue to the understanding 
of alienation in all its aspects and all its forms. nA particular thinker 
or group or age,n says Daya Krisha, "might focus attention on one 
aspect or form to the exclusion of others. But the others are always 
there potentially, either as recessive or subordinate, ready to arise 
into focal awareness once the previous form of alienation has been 
tackled to a certain extent. The history of humanity may be written 
in terms of the forms of alienation that have dominated successive 
civilizations and cultures. II5 
Thinkers are apt to be the first to feel the change and respond to 
the 
it. They would feel alienated especially when they step beyond/intellectual 
framework and cultural structure of their age. Their sense of alienation 
is bound to be acute when they feel powerless to achieve the role they 
have determined to be rightfully theirs in a specific situation. Arnold, 
in his analysis of this situation, says: 
Therefore, when we speak of ourselves as divided into 
Barbarians, Philistines, and Populace, we must be understood 
always to imply that within each of these classes there are 
a certain number of aliens, if we may so call them, - persons 
who are mainly led, not by their class spirit, but by a 
general humane spirit, by the love of human perfection; 
and that this number is capable of being diminished or 
augmented. I mean, the number of those who will succeed 
in developing this happy instinct will be greater or 
smaller, in proportion both to the forces of the original 
instinct within them, and to the hindrance or encourage-
ment which it meets with from without. (Q,1J.lture and Anar~hy --, 
CWP., v, p.146). 
What matters here, is whether the poet is speaking only about his own 
dilemma or about the predicament of his society. This could be found out 
by studying the poet's mode of alienation: alloplastic or autoplastic. 
Alloplastic alienation is expressed primarily as attempts to effect a 
change: to remove this want of correspondence, to dissolve the old 
system of dominant ideas and facts. The other mode, autoplastic 
alienation, is expressed through the attempts of self-transformation. 
All indications show that Arnold's sense of alienation belongs to the 
alloplastic mode. 
From Arnold's lines one feels that alienation is conterminous 
ix 
Tlii th liv ing in 
with awareness as well as/modern times: 
and such an existe::we 
it is a price for such a'ilarenes$"'. 
Hence, alienation could be defined as: a general syndrome made up of a 
number of different objective conditions and subjective feeling - a 
situation which emerges from certain awareness in the context of historical 
changes. Keniston, in his study of The Uncommitted, says that each type 
of alienation should be subjected to at least four questions: 
1 - Focus: Alienated from what? 
2 - Replacement: What replaces that situation? 
3 - Mode: How is the alienation manifested? 
4 - Agent: What is the agent of the alienation? 
These questions, however, are still vague, for one could be alienated 
from almost anything. Arnold, who studied this phenomenon, offers a plan 
to poets to follow in their interpretation of their situation: 
"On God, on Nature, and on human life." 
The line is Wordsworth I s though the original is "On _man, on Nature and 
6 
on human life." Arnold changes the order: this is not out of carelessness 
but it has its logical justification which I shall try to elucidate in 
the following pages. 
Alienation, as one has shown here, is a state of consciousness: the 
relation of "I-Other" constitutes the very essence of it. But the Other, 
it should be remembered, is not all of one piece or of one level. It 
includes what, in general, may be called ·J:he Absolute 'Other, or God 
in popular language; Nature, and Man himself. These constitute the only 
three possible levels of consciousness. 
To begin with the first level of consciousness, ManIs entire life, 
if not history, depends on his concept of God. From this concept there 
develops an immense system of institutions, established facts, accredited 
dogmas, customs, rules etc. In all religions, the possibility of man's 
estrangement from the Divine Order is fundamental; indeed, perhaps the 
central function of religion is to prevent this estrangement of man from 
God. What brings about or prevents this estrangement is manls idea of 
God. This is the topic that will be discussed in chapters five and six 
in part two of this work. 
If God, for instance, is conceived as a 'Transcendent Other) Nature 
would appear as indifferent and make men feel lost in the empty spaces 
of the vast universe. Man will see his life on Earth as a short time spent 
in a physical world with inscrutable void on the other side, -alife 
without inherent meaning or purposes, a time unconsciously felt to involve 
a Fall an exile from purpose, warmth, and meaning. Central to this 
outlook is a sense of existential outcastness, of thrown ness into a 
x-
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world not made for man and indifferent to his fate: this view involves 
the death of God. But, psychologically speaking, it is not easy to accept 
the death of God and of all the structures premised on his existence 
without a feeling of deprivation. Freud, in his comment on this situation, 
says that "most educated people do not believe in God, but they fear Him.,,7 
The alternative is that though God exists yet he is indifferent to man's 
fate: the conclusion is the same (see Arnold's Mycerinus). 
If God is conceived as Immanent, Nature would seem alive. In 
this case, man would try to make an effective relationship with it. To 
a certain extent this is made possible by the fact that Nature and the 
universe are governed by a very strict law that governs their motions, 
and that even the so-called inanimate nature is not entirely inanimate, 
as motion is its inherent property. It can always give rise to the 
semblance of something which moves. In this vision the subjective and 
the objective become identical; and that the whole is contained in the 
part. A modern exponent of this trend, Reich, writes: 
Man cannot feel or phantasy anything which does not 
actually exist in one form or another. For human 
perceptions are nothing but a function of objective 
natural processes within the organism •••• 
The most general functioning principle is contained 
in the smallest, special functioning principle. 8 
This seems to be a pseudo-scientific version of Blake's assertion 
that the innocent can see a world in a grain of sand and a heaven in a 
wild flower. This starts from the assumption that phenomena, including 
persons, are not discrete entities, complete and comprehensible in 
themselves but are parts of larger wholes. A s Arthur Koestler 
postulates in his The Ghost (London, 1967) all phenomena can be 
arranged in a hierarchy of holons (e.g. electrons, atoms, molecules, 
cells, organs, organisms, etc.) each of which can be regarded both as 
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entity in itself and as part of a larger, more complex controlling super-
entity. This is the topic to be discussed in chapter seven - "On Nature. II 
On the other hand~ \'Then the Absolute Other , - God - is conceived 
as transcendent, the v,hole range of relationships bet'ween one person 
and another can be developed ,'rithin that context too o Thus throughout 
chapters eight and nine: "General Life" and "The Emotions", I Hork from 
the asstlffiption that the purpose of any society should be the greatest 
possible fulfilment of its individual menbers: fulfilment usually 
requires the greatest possible integration of all pOHers of mano 
Fulfilment and integTation are ideals against ,·rhich failures of human 
developments can be judged. The goal of integration entails, according 
to Arnold, the balanced development and harmonious cooperation of all 
man IS pOTITers: I the power of conduct , the pOl'Ter of i:rJ.tellect and knowledge, 
the povrer of beauty and the pOi-rer of social life and marmerso' To this 
effect Arnold. 'in'i te in C1..1.l ture ":.!lct .A....YJ.arclw tVA t: 
-;Tr"at ';Je ';'rant is a fuller harnonious developme:-:. t of our 
humanity, a free play of thought upon routine notions, 
spontaneity of consciousness, S\'leet:c.ess and light, and 
these are just iThat culture generates ond fosters. 
( CP;'l, iT, po 1 9 1 ) 
l-Iy argtlffient Hill there:c'ore be that nineteentil century English society, 
by encouraging one side of man, i.e. the religious and puritan side, 
has systematically split man I s life in to parts and made \',holeness 
hard to attain. This, hmrever, needs some clarificationo 
The main thesis of this argument starts by the assumption that the 
rela tioY'~ship behreen man and God is dialectical. Once man projects 
himself in a certain concept of God, the concept starts to work back 
agaDl through the mediation of various social institutions, notably the 
family. If it happened that tile concept is transcendental, the mediation 
would be through the authoritarian family, the authoritarian school and 
the religious institutions and finally the state. Within this concept, 
work would be conceived as a duty. This in itself detracts from the 
natural enjoyment of work as an activity for character fulfilment. 
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This formulation of the relationship between the character of the 
individual, the structure of the family, and the structure of society 
could be seen in the now everyday fact that a particular authoritarian 
mode of behaviour on the part of the parents ten~to produce a particular 
submissive, inhibited, one-dimensional kind of character in their children. 
The essence of this relationship is the suppression of spontaneous feelings 
by the oppressive and repressive use of power by the father. This type 
of fami~' only occurs in societies whose concept of God is Transcendental. 
It is also one of the techniques devised by such societies to produce a 
submissive population incapable of rebelling against its oppressive 
rulers. 
This sort of environment, in addition to the religious reflection 
of man upon his nature and destiny, would make man self-conscious and 
impair, or at least modify, his capacity for direct animal, childlike 
enjoyment of living. By becoming conscious and, furthermore, conscious 
of his capacity to be conscious, man begins to treat himself as an object 
and to regard his urge to fuse with the beyond as a threat to his .capacity 
to be conscious. Of this situation Reich says: "In thinking about his 
own being and functioning, man turned involuntarily against himself; 
not in a destructive fashion, but in a manner which may well have been 
the point of origin of his armoring" (op.cit., p. 532). 
The concept of the term, alienation, implies that something 
desirable, natural, or normal has been lost, that is, a positive 
relationship has ceased to exist. But one needs to specify what 
xiv 
replaces the lost relationship •. Entering into a positive relationship 
of feeling with the 'pther, who is conceived on the pattern of person, 
is an attempt to overcome alienation through the sentiment of~. "In 
this world from which Faith has retreated there is only one resource 
suggested -- 'Ah, love, let us be true / To one another! I 119 For without 
love there would be no justice and similar ideas like the common good. 
This is the topic to be discus~ed in chapter nine of this work, liThe Emotions". 
In conclusion the "Epilogue" takes "Dover Beach" and "Obermann Once 
More" as charting the main lines of Arnold's thought. My principal 
argument in the dissertation is that Arnold is not pre-occupied with 
his own personal dilemma but takes as his chief subject the difficulties 
of his fellowmen in understanding the age they live in, and then 
undertakes the further task of proposing a method of reintegration. 
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CHAPrER I 
The Nature of Poetry and its Function 
The object of this chapter is to show that, almost from the beginning 
of his poetic career, Arnold did not think of himself as writing a poem 
only for its autonomous aesthetic value, but as a reformer in poetical 
matters. In an undated letter (probably 1849) to l1rs Forster, Arnold 
says that "At Oxford particularly many complain that the subjects treated 
do not interest them. But as I feel rather as a reformer in Poetical matters, 
I am glad of this opposition. If I have health and opportunity to go on, 
I will shake the present methods until they go down".l 
\ofhat this chapter will t~J to show may be schematised as follo\{s:-
1. In Aroold's poetics, a poem is characterised by its 
instrumentality as a means of persuasion. 
an 
2. The poet is not only a seer but also a makeriactive 
craftsman. 
3. The paramount cause of poetry is, as in Aristotle, a 
formal cause, determined primarily by the human action 
and qualities. 
4. It is at the same time, as in neo-classic poetic, a final 
cause, the effect intended upon the audience. 
5. The process of poetic organisation is not a spontaneous 
association of images, words, situations, and emotions, 
all amazingly interwoven, without effort, through the 
unconscious activity. Poetic composition, in Arnold's 
poetic, however inspired, requires invention, judgement, 
often trial and rejection, and long contemplation. 
In other words, Arnold writes with a purpose. This can be inferred 
from the following questions which Arnold himself asks in "Literature and 
Science": "Have humane letters, then, have poetry and eloquence, the 
power here attributed to them of engaging the emotions, and do they 
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exercise it? And if they have it and exercise it, how do they exercise 
it, so as to exert an influence upon man's sense for conduct, his sense 
for beauty? Finally, even if they both can and do exert an influence 
upon the senses in question, how are they to relate to them the results, -
the modern results, - of natural science? All these questions may be 
2 
asked." 
Arnold, in his critical practice, takes these questions as guide-posts. 
Of the function of poetry, he writes to Clough, as early as March 1, 1849, 
that "there are two offices of Poetry - one to add to one's store of 
thoughts and feelings - another to compose and elevate the mind by a 
sustained tone, numerous allusion, and grand style.') Again, Arnold speaks 
of the effect, especially that of the ancient writers, upon the readers: 
A steadying and composing effect upon their judgement, 
not of literary Horks only, but of men and events in 
general. They tpoet~ are like persons who have had a 
very weighty and impressive experience: they are more 
truly than others under the empire of facts, and more 
independent of the language current among those with 
whom they live. They wish r.either to applaud nor to 
revile their age; they i·[ish to know what it is, what it 
can give them, and whether this is what they want. 'Nhat 
they want, they know very well, they want to educe and 
cultivate what is best and noblest in themselves; they 
know, too, that this is no easy task (uPreface 1853", 
CPW, I, p. 13). 
The key words, here, are "to educe" and "to cultivate". To educe means 
to bring out, develop, from latent or potential existence. This shows that 
poetry enlightens by bringing out something from within the best self. 
While to cultivate means, in the context of Arnold's thinking, making 
known the best that is known and thought in the world. 
From the previous quotations, one can say that poetry, according to 
Arnold, exercises its power on two faculties: the cognitive faculty of man 
and the affective one. But before going any further, a brief survey of 
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Arnold's modern situation, as he saw it, is necessary. For Arnold's 
concern has always been to analyse his situation and to explore the kind 
of poetry that should be written in that situation. The study indicates 
that Arnold is keenly aware of the philosophical, political, sociological, 
and economic condition of his age and how these helped to bring about 
and reinforce man's sense of alienation. 
Arnold, in his analysis of his situation, writes: 
Modern times find themselves with an immense system of 
institutions, established facts, accredited dogmas, 
customs, rules, which have come to them from times not 
modern. In this system their life has to be carried 
for'lIard; yet they have a sense that this system is not 
of their own creation, that it by no means corresponds 
exactly with the wants of their actual life, that, for 
them,it is customary, not rational. The awakening of 
this sense is the awakening of the modern spirit. The 
modern spirit is no
'
t/ m-rake almost ever~r.-rhere; the sense 
of want of correspondence between the forms of modern 
Europe and its spirit, bet1treen the new wine of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and the old bottles 
of the eleventh and t
'
t/elfth centuries, or even of the 
sixteenth and seventeenth, almost everyone now perceives; 
it is no longer dangerous to affirm that this want of 
correspondence exists; people are even beginning to be 
shy of denying it. To remove this want of correspondence 
is beginning to be the settled endeavour of most persons 
of good sense. Dissolvents of the old European system of 
dominant ideas and facts we must all be, all of us who 
have any power of working; what ',[e have to study is that 
we may not be acrid dissolvents of it ("Heinrich Heine", 
CPW, III, pp. 109-10). 
At the same time, the entire edifice of the Victorian Society threatens 
to collapse under the weight of contradiction, complication, and paradox 
(Laissez-fairism and socialism, racism and anti-racism, segregationism 
and desegregationism, militarism and pacificism, imperialism and 
anti-imperialism, JvIarxism and evolutionary socialism etc.). Arnold, in 
his poetic analysis of the situation, writes in ":Jover Beach": 
- 5 -
And vTe are here as on a darkling plain 
S,'Tept ,'Ti th confused alarms of struggle and flight, 
l,1here ignorant armies clash by night. 4 
Under these contradictions light seemed to thicken, or, to use Slmkespear's 
i'TOrds: •••• 0 Light thickens, and the crol'T 
Hakes wing to the rooky Nood; 
Goo d things of day begin to droop and drm'lSe, 
l'lhile night's black agents to the ir preys do rouse 0 
(Macbeth, Act III, sc. iii. 11.50-53) 
The black agents of the Victorian age vrere the ministers of doubt and 
discouragement. Of a situation similar to that, Shelley says, "At 
the approach of such a period, poetry ever addresses itself to those 
faculties vrhich are the last to be destroyed, and its voice is heard, 
like the footsteps of Astraea, departing from the i'Torld. ,,5 
To this effect Arnold says "the caIn, the cheerfulness, the 
disir.terested objectiviv! haye disa:9?3ared; the dialogLle of tile r:lind 
edith itself has cOlllIrlenced; modern problems have presented themselves; 
vre hear already the doubts, \'1e ,·ritness the discouragement, of Hamlet 
:md of Faust" ("Preface, 1853", CE'[, I, p. 1). This statement be it 
noted, is presented as an objective diagnosis of the central L.YJ.tellectual 
charac~eristic of Arnold's age, not an essentially emotional approach 
to life. For vTith his vision of contemporary man as a Faust or a 
Hamlet exhibiting the dialogue of the mind ,d th itself, Arnold foresaw 
the crisis of modern civilisation '\'Thile it ,vas in germ. He envisaged 
the emergence of the split man or '\'Tha t is cOI!lI:lonly called dissociation 
of sensibili tyo 
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Arnold, in his prose writings, gives his analysis of the 
phenomenon of alienation as both cognitive and affective. Of the cognitive 
aspect he ",rites, in a letter to Clough (February 13531, that "There is a 
po"ler of truth in your letter ••• congestion of the brain is what we 
suffer from" (CL., p. 130). In his poetry he gives the affective aspect 
of the phenomenon. Professor Drew has rightly terDed it as constricted 
situatio~ - "a limited, measured effect deliberately chosen to represent 
a constricted situation. Constricted is I think the right word to 
express the quality of the poet's unease." 6 The problem was too obvious 
for many thinkers. George Sand, for example, distinguished between the 
early Romanticism of \verther, which involved simply the conflict of the 
individual against the world, and the more complex modern attitude of 
Rene 2nd Obermann, ' . ;hich involved the individual against himself. Arnold 1 s 
analysis shows both types and adds the tormenting awareness of the 
situation: for him man is aware that he is 
Wandering between t\IO "rorlds, one dead, 
The other powerless to be born, 
With nowhere yet to rest Chis) head. 
(Poems, pp. 288-89) 
The reason behind this situation is that the social institutions, the 
established system, were based on certain facts ani now sciencB had shown that 
theywere not true. Goethe, commenting on a situation like that toward the 
end of Wilhelm }'leister's Travels, says that "In the study of the sciences, 
particularly those that deal with nature, it is as necessary as it is 
difficult to inquire whether that which has been handed down to us from the 
past, and regarded as valid by our ancestors, is really to be relied on to 
such a degree that we may continue to build upon it safely in the future." 7 
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Of the importance of poetry, in this situation, Arnold writes: 
But now, says Professor Huxley, conceptions of the 
universe fatal to the noti.ons held by our forefathers 
have been fcrced upon us by p~ysical science. Grant to 
him that they are thus fatal, that the new conceptions 
must and will soon become current every\>lhere, CL.'1d that 
everyone Vlill finally perceive them to be fatal to the 
beliefs of our forefathers. The need of huncane letters, 
as they are truly called, because they serve the 
paramount desire in men that good should be ever present 
to them, - the need of humane letters, to establish a 
relation between the new conceptions, and our instinct 
for beauty, our instinct for conduct, is only more 
visible ("Literature and Science", CP\o!, X, p. 66). 
The test of any poet in the nineteenth century, for Arnold, is his 
perception of this problem, and his fruitful response to it. He himself 
responded to it by analysing it. Knowing thist' li.·e was able to clalll in 
{ 
1869 that his poetry, if not obviously pragmatic, nevertheless e:nhodied 
one of the main currents of Victorian thought: 
t1y poess represent, on the whole, the main moyement of 
mind of the las t quarter of a century, 8..'1d thus they 
will probably have their day as people become conscious 
to themselves o~ Vlhat that movenent of mind is, and 8 
interested in the literary prodnctiors waich reflect it. 
Arnold saw in his age ~'1 intellectual ~~d moral ~'1archy because of the 
contradiction between science ~'1d theology. This crisis can only be 
ended by a mighty constructive and synthetic effort. He preached that this 
can be achieved through culture. It is precisely this attempt which 
makes it possible to regard him a central literary figure of his century -
of the century whose special problem Vias the reconciling of negation 
with affirmation, science Vlith re2.igion, the head with the heart, the past Vlith 
the present, order Vlith progress. Of the central problem of the age 
Arnold says: "Undoubtedly a period of transition in relir;ious belief, 
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such as the period in which we are now living, presents many grave 
difficulties. Undoubtedly the reliance on miracles is not lost without 
some danger; but the thing to consider is that it must be lost, and 
that the danger must be met, and, as it can be, counteracted" (itA 
Comment on Christmas", CPV!, X, p. 233). 
It is the poet's responsibility to assist the process of reconciliation 
between these two realms of thought. His function, at this stage, is to 
prepare the soil because knowledge and truth, in the full sense of the 
words, are not attainable by the great mass of the hum~~ race at all: 
The great mass of the human race have to be softened 
and humanised through their heart and imagination, 
before any soil can be found in them where knowledge 
may strike living roots. Until the softening and 
humanising process is very far advanced, intellectual 
demonstrations are uninforming for them; and, if they 
impede the working of influence: which adv~~ce this 
softening and humanising process, they are even noxious; 
they retard their development, they impair the culture 
of the world. All the great teachers, divine and human, 
who have ever appeared, have ~~ited in proclaiming 
this ("The Bishop and the Philosopher", CH1, III, p. 44). 
This process needs a collective effort of all intellectuals. For 
it is not an easy task: 
It is one of the hardest tasks in the ,/orld to make new 
intellectual ideas harmonise truly with the religious 
life, to place them in their right light for that life. 
The moments in which such a change is accomplished are 
epochs in religious history; the men through whose 
instrmnentality it is accomplished are great religious 
reformers. The greatness of these men does not consist in 
their having these new ideas, in their originating them. 
The ideas are in the world; they come originally from the 
sphere of pure thought; they are put into circulation by 
the spirit of the time. The greatness of a religious 
reformer consists in his reconciling them with the religious 
life, in his starting this life upon a fresh period in 
company with them. No such religious reformer for the 
present age has yet shown himself ("Dr Stanley's Lectures 
on the Jewish Church", CPH, III, p. 69). 
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The poet, in Arnold's poetics, is asked to be fully aware of his 
task in the modern time: to interpret human life afresh, and to supply 
a new spiritual basis to it. To this effect Arnold 'ITites: 
Dante's task was to set forth the lesson of the world 
from the point of view of medieval Catholicism; the 
basis of spiritual life was given, Dante had not to 
make this anew. Shakespeare's task was to set forth 
the spectacle of the world when man's spirit re-awoke 
to the possession of the world at the Renaissance. 
The spectacle of hum2~ life, left to bear its own 
significance and tell its own story, but shown in 
all its fullness, variety, and power, is at that 
moment the great matter; but if we are to press deeper, 
the basis of spiritual life is still at that time the 
traditional religion, reformed or unreformed, of 
Christendom, and Shakespeare has not to supply a new 
basis. But when Goethe came, Europe had lost her 
basis of spiritual life; she had to find it again; 
Goethe's task was, - the inevitable task for the modern 
poet henceforth is, - as it was for the Greek poet in 
the days of Pericles, not to preach a sublime sermon on 
a given text like Dante, not to exhibit all the Kingdom; 
of human life and the glory of them like Shakespeare, b1.. .. t 
to interpret human life afresh, and to supply a ne'll 
spiritual basis to it (nOn the Study of Celtic Literature", 
CPW, III, p. 381). 
But even more, the value of any poet or literature of an earlier age 
is the extent to which they could help the man of the nineteenth century 
live in the moder!1 world. rro this effect he asks: "And what past 
literature will naturally be most interesting to such an age as our own? 
Evidently, the literatures which have most successfully solved for their 
ages the problem which occupies ours: the literatures which in their day 
and for their own nation have adequately comprehended, have adequately 
represented, the spectacle before them" (nOn the Modern Element in 
Literature", CPW, I, p. 2l). So the literature of ancient Greece is 
an object of indestructible interest and it is for the present age 
a mighty agent of intellectual deliverance. It is so because it was 
a great, an adequate literature co-existing with a highly developed, 
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distinctively modern epoch. 
Arnold, given the conclusion of his modern situation, was convinced 
that the decline of belief in the old popular Christianity was inevitable 
and that as a result poetry would have to playa greater r~le by 
becoming a complete magister vitae, that is, "by including ••• religion 
with poetry, instead of existing as poetry only" (CL, p. 124). One might 
add science too, for in Literature and Dogma, Arnold quotes with epproval 
Goethe's saying: "He who has art and science has also religion" (CP'Il, VI, 
p. 177). Obviously this is no holiday art for art's sake. , but a 
mighty influence, serious in its aims, although pleasurable in its means. 
Arnold believed that poetry would raise humanity to its full powers. For 
this task, a net,., type of poetry is required: p'rhe language, style and 
general preceedings of a poetr-J vrhich has such an immense task to perform, 
must be very plain direct and severe and it must not lose itself in 
parts and episodes and ornamental work, but must press fon-lards to the 
whole" (eL, p. 124). For'\,.,ithout poetry;' says Arnold,"our science will 
appear incomplete; and most of what nOvl passes with us for religion and 
philosophy will be replaced by poetry •.• our religion, parading 
evidences such as those on Hhich the popular mind relies nOH; our 
philosophy, pluming itself on its reasonings about causation and finite 
and infinite being, what are they but the shadows and dreams and false 
shows of knowledge? The day will come when we shall wonder at ourselves for 
having trusted to them, for having taken them seriously; and the more we 
perceive this, the more we shall prize 'the breadth and finer spirit of 
knowledge' offered to us by poetry" (The Study of Poet~r", CF1lf, IX, pp. 161-2). 
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The future of poetry is immense, because in poet~J, 
where it is worthy of its hip,h destinies, our race, as 
time goes on, will find ar. even surer and surer stay. 
There is not a creed which is not shaken, not an 
accredited dogma which is not shown to be questionable, 
not a recei yed tradi tion .rhich does not threaten to 
dissolve. Our religion has materialised itself in the 
fact, in the supposed fact; it has attached its emotion 
to the fact t and now the fact is failing it. But for 
poetry the idea is everything; the rest is a world of 
illusion, of divine illusion. Poetry attaches its 
emotion to the idea; t~e idea is the fact. The strongest 
part of our religion today is its unconscious poetry 
(liThe Study of Poetry", CPl.-I, IX, p. 161). 
Professor l,.,rimsatt, in his comment on these lines, S2.ys that "poetry, 
as Matthew Arnold believed, 'attaches the emotion to the idea; the idea 
is the fact.' The objective critic, however, must admit that it is not 
easy to explain how this is done, how poetry makes ideas thick and 
complicated enough to hold on the emotion".9 This chapter attempts, 
among some other topics, to explain how this is done. 
I 
The Gognitive Function of Poetry 
1tlhen Goethe's death 'das told, '"e said: 
Sunk, then, is Europe's sagest head. 
Physician of the iron age, 
Goethe has done his pilgrimage. 
He took the suffering hRman race, 
He read each wound, each weakness clear; 
And struck his finger on the place, 
And said: Thou ailest here, and here! 
He looked on Europe's dyinR hour 
Of fitful dream and feverish power; 
His eye plunged dm'/'!l the weltering strife, 
The turmoil of expiring life -
He said: The end is eve~rwhere, 
Art still has truth, take refuge there! 
And he was happy, if to know 
Causes of things,and far below 
His feet to see the lurid flow 
Of terror, and insane distress, 
And headlong fate, be happiness. 
("J'lIemorial Verses", Poems, pp. 227-28). 
Poetry derives this power from the fact that "All people want to know 
life, above all the life which s'J.rrounds them and concerns them; and we 
- 12 -
come to the novel and to the stage-play to help us to what we want" 
(CPW, X, p. 135). The life man asks about is life in its concrete forms, 
It is that 
life as man lives it. / t he sort of life/Chaucer speaks about in "The Knight's 
Tale": 
What is this world? \fuat asketh men to have? 
Now with his love, now in his colde grave 
All one , with-outen any company. ( 1919-21) . 
And that of Arnold in his poem "Rugby Chapel": 
What is the course of the life 
Of mortal men on the earth? 
Nost men eddy about 
Here and there - eat and drink, 
Chatter and love and hate, 
Gather and squander, are raised 
Aloft, one hurled in the dust, 
Striving blindly, achieving 
Nothing; and then they die (Poems, p. 447) 
Arnold's lines might recall to the reader's mind Kant's concept of 
Abderitism. However, the task of poetry is to interpret it: 
I mean, not a power of (says Arnold) drawing out in black and 
white an explanation of the mystery of the universe, but the 
power of so dealing with things as to a'..,raken in us a wonderfully 
full, new, and intimate sense of them, and of our relations with 
them. 1dhen this sense is awakened in us, as to objects without 
us, we feel ourselves to be in contact with the essential 
nature of those objects, to be no longer bewildered and 
oppressed by them, but to have their secret, and to be in 
harmony with them; and this feeling calms and satisfies us as 
no other can ••• The interpretations of science do not 
give us this intimate sense of objects as the interpretations 
of poetry give it; they appeal to a limited faculty, and not 
to the whole man. It is not Linnaeus or Cavendish or Cuvier 
who gives us the true sense of animals, or water, or plants, 
who seizes their secret for us, who makes us participate in 
their life; it is Shakespeare ••• Wo.rdsworth ••• and Keats 
("Maurice de Guerin", CPW, III, pp. 12-13). 
Of the scientific interpretation and its implication in the nineteenth 
century, Professor Drew writes: 
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It is not hard to see how the geologist and the biologist 
destroyed the idea of special creation, or the way in which 
theories of evolution called in question the validity of 
ethical systems. But nothing seems to have offered such 
obvious ground for pessimism as the laws of thermodynamics, 
which have become so notorious in another context. For the 
obvious implication of the first law is that in every 
mechanical process, and indeed in every form of activity a 
certain amount of the energy involved will be converted into 
heat, which is the least defined form of energy. The second 
law, if generally true, describes a Universe in which energy 
once dissipated in the form of heat cannot be recovered 
except at the cost of an even greater quantity of energy 
of some higher kind. It seems to follow that the whole 
process of the Universe is one of gradual degeneration from 
an earlier state when all matter was charged with potentially 
useful energy has been converted to heat, everything is the 
same temperature, and no life or identifiable motion exists. 
Whether we call this a condition of maximum entropy, or the 
heat-death of the Universe, or a state of total randomness is 
not of any importance. The point is that if we have this 
view of the world we must see it as a clock that is running 
dovIn, indeed we may think of the gradual increase in entropy 
as itself a kind of measurement of time ("The Passage of 
Time ", p. 202). 
The implication of such an interpretation for the prospects of 
humanity are not encouraging. Humanity, in fact, is doomed in advance. 
But how is poetry to relate these results, the modern results, of natural 
science to man's life and yet remain a source of joy? Arnold does not 
say much directly in this connection. He just says that: 
Following our instinct for intellect and knowledge, we acquire 
pieces of knowledge; and presently, in the generality of men, 
there arises the desire to relate these pieces of knowledge 
to our sense for conduct, to our sense for beauty, -
and there is weariness and dissatisfaction if the desire 
is baulked. Now in this desire lies, I think, the strength 
of that hold which letters have upon us (P. 62) ••• we shall 
find that this art, and poetry, and eloquence, have in . 
fact not only the power of refreshing and delightingus, 
they have also the power, - such is the strength and worth, 
in essentials, of their authors' criticism of life, - they 
have a fortifying, and elevating, and quickening, and 
suggesti ve po\,er, capable of wonderfully helping us to 
relate the results of mOdeTIl science to our need for conduct, 
our need for beauty ("Literature and Science", CP1t!, X, pp. 62, 
68). 
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Arnold, more than once, quotes these lines as examples of poetry that 
give joy: 
"The fates have bes~owed 3Jl enduring soul upon men." 
("Iliad, XXIV, 49) 
"In la sua volontade e nostra pace." 
(In His will is our peace.) 
(Dante's Paradiso III, 85) 
" ••• Nen must endure 
Their going hence, even as their coming hither; 
Ripeness is all." 
(King Lear, V, ii, 9-11) 
One can say that the common denominator in these quotation is the word 
endure. It points to an effort and struggle that man should exert 
to maintain his hope unbroken. The word riueness , of the last quotation, 
does not igno~e the fact that the whole process of the Universe is one 
of gradual degeneration. But it gives an animating sense by directing the 
attention to an earlier state of incompleteness as opposed to another 
state of perfection. Had Shakespeare said 'decay instead of 'ripenes~ 
the meaning would not have changed, but there would be a complete 
difference in the spirit each communicates. Perhaps the difference could 
be sensed if one contrasts Shakespeare's lines with these lines of Shelley: 
Worlds on worlds are rolling over 
From creation to decay, 
Like the bubbles on a river 
Sparkling, bursting, borne away. 
Arnold realises that scientific knowledge answers the 'how' and not 
the ~ and~' of things. This is one of his main ideas in 
Literature and Dogma. Literature does not answer the what and why' of 
things too. But, as Epifanio San Juan puts it, "actually, when man 
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engages in the quest for the 'what' and of 'why' of things, he is 
searching not for the objective validity of knowledge but, rather, 
for an emotional asslxrance of the practicality of concepts that he wants to 
entertain. Pure cognition therefore, has little or no direct bearing upon 
what man should do or what he should feel." 10 In other words, Arnold, 
in the context of his thought, distinguishes, like Wittgenstein in this 
century, two distinct kinds of knowledge: that which can be said or 
demonstrated, and that which can be revealed or shown. This latter 
revelational knowledge is that of art and poetry. It is verifiable by 
experience. The first belongs to science. 
Life, as an experience, and as Arnold conceives it, is embodied in 
human action. So he puts it down in the Preface (1853) that the eternal 
objects of poetry, among all nations, and at all times, "are actions; 
human actions; possessing' an inherent interest in themselves, and which 
are to be communicated in an interesting manner by the art of the poet" 
( CPW, I, p. 3). The interesting marmer is the dramatic form "that exhibits, 
above all, the actions of man as strictly determined by his thoughts and 
his feelings; it exhibits, therefore, what may be always accessible, always 
intelligible, always interesting" CDn the Hodern Element in Literature", 
CPW, I, p. 34). The interesting manner includes, among many other things, 
c. 
the poetic language, but poetic language, as/Davy has rightly observed, 
and particularly of images is not to "illustrate ideas but to embody an 
otherwise indefinable experience." 11 In addition to that, actions, in 
themselves, embody ideas, concepts, and beliefs. 
Every representation, therefore, \;Thich is consistently dra\ffi, says 
Arnold, "may be supposed to be interesting, in as much as it gratifies this 
natural interest in knowledge of all kinds" (Cn/, I, p. 2). "'\ve all 
naturally take pleasure,' says Aristotle, 'in any imitation or representation 
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whatever: this is the basis of our love of poetry; and we take pleasure 
in them,' he adds, 'because all knowledge is naturally agreeable to us; 
not to the philosopher only, but to mankind at large' " (ibid., pp. 1-2). 
Poetry, in this sense, avlakens and enlarges the mind by rendering it the 
receptacle of a thousand unapprehended combinations of thought. The 
reward is an increased ability to sense transcendent reality behind all 
individual perceptions, to synthesize the fragmentary objects of everyday 
consciousness. Arnold, to this effect, says that "To arrive at a full and 
right conception of things, to know one's self and the world, which is 
knowledge; then to act firmly and manfully on that knowledge, - which is 
virtue; this is the native, the indestructible impulse of the spirit of man" 
("Ecce, Convertimur ad Gentes", CP\oJ, IX, pp. 4-5). 
The question that comes to one's mind is: what sort of knowledge does 
Arnold mean? It is not the function of poetry to furnish th2 reader 'IIi th 
any kind of knowledge whether it is philosophical, historical, or sociological. 
To this effect Arnold says that literature "does not principally show 
itself in discovering new ideas, that is rather the business of the 
philosopher. The grand work of literary genius is a work of synthesis 
and exposition, not of analysis and discovery; its gift lies in the faculty 
of being happily inspired by a certain intellectual and spiritual atmosphere, 
by a certain order of ideas, when it finds itself in them; of dealing 
divinely with these ideas, presenting them in the most effective and 
a ttracti ve comb ina tiom' ("The Function of Criticism", CPW, III, pp. 260-61). 
The idea of synthesis implies that, as part of the nature of poetry, 
there is no exclusion of opposites, there are also no negatives. In 
literature, as Susanne Langer puts it, "the words 'no', 'never', 'not' etc., 
occur freely; but what they deny is thereby created. In poetry there is no 
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negation, but only contrast." 12 This is true especially if one considers 
for instance, Dylan Thomas's "Refusal to 110urn the Death, by Fire,of a 
Child in London", or the last stanza of Swinburne's "The Garden of 
Proserpine", in which almost every line is a denial. 
Concerning the kno1,olledge that poetry may give, Cleanth Brooks writes 
that "The peculiar kind of knowledge that literature gives us is concrete -
not a generalisation about facts but a special kind of focusing upon facts 
themselves - not the remedy for a problem but the special presentation 
of the problem itself." 13 Brooks argues that literature is not generalisations 
of concrete problems - not remedies designed to solve these problems but 
rather diagnosds in which the problems are defined and realised for what 
they are. In other words, its function is setting down something perceived. 
To the sa~e effect Robert Frost, in a letter to John Barlett, writes that 
"it is our business to give to people the thing that Hill make them say 
'Oh yes I know what you mean.' It is never to tell them something they 
don't know, but something they kneH and hadn't thought of saying. It must 
be something they recognise." 1.:1 Brooks and Robert Frost explain exactly 
Hhat Arnold meant by saying that the: 
story on which the drama was founded stood, before he 
[spectator) entered the theatre, traced in its bare outlines 
upon the spectator's mind; it stood in his memory, as a group 
of sta tU2.ry faintly seen, at the end of a long and dark 
vista: then came the poet, embodying outlines, developing 
situations, not a word wasted, not a sentiment capriciously 
thrown in: stroke upon stroke, the drama proceeded: the 
light deepened upon the group, more and more it revealed 
itself to the riveted gaze of the spectator: until at 
last, when the final words Here spoken, it stood before him 
in broad sunlight, a model of immortal beauty ("Preface to 
Poems (1853)", CPW, I, p. 6). 
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ii 
The Affective function of Poetry 
And \vordsworth! - Ah, pale ghosts, rejoicel 
For never has such soothing voice 
Been to your shadowy world conveyed, 
Since erst, at morn, some wandering shade 
Heard the clear song of Orpheus come 
Through Hades, and the mournful gloom. 
. . . . . . . . . . .. 
He too upon a wintry clime 
Had fallen - on this iron time 
. .. 
Of doubts, disputes, distractions, fears. 
He found us when the age had bound 
Our souls in its benumbing round; 
He spoke, and loosed our heart in tears. 
He laid us as we lay at birth 
On the cool flowery lap of earth, 
Smiles broke from us and we had ease; 
The hills were round us, and the breeze 
Went o'er the sun-lit fields again; 
Our foreheads felt the wind and rain. 
Our youth returned. 
("I'Iemorial Verses ll , Poems, pp. 228-29) 
Of the affective aspect of the function of poetry, Arnold writes 
that "the right function of poetry is to animate, to console, to rejoice -
in one 'dord, to strengthen" ("A Deptford Poet", CPW, VIII, p. i). He 
had long believed that if consolation and joy were the products of religion, 
they were also the products of poetry. He quoted Hesiod's divination 'the 
Muses were born that they might be a forgetfulness of evils, and a truce 
from I cares. In addition to consolation, the best poetry offers 
joy. To this effect he quoted the dictum of Schiller in his Preface that 
rAIl art ••• is dedicated to Joy, and there is no higher and no more 
serious problem, than how to make men happy.' Arnold's poetry, in fact does 
not offer joy in the sense it is generally understood. It offers joy by 
telling the truth. ?The mind naturally loves truth, ~ Johnson says, and 
Arnold gives pleasure because he tells the truth: 
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A poetical work, therefore, is not justified when it has been 
shown to be an accurate, and therefore interesting 
representation; it has to be shown also that it is a 
representation from which men can derive enjoyment ••• 
It is demanded, not only that it shall interest, but 
also that it shall inspirit and rejoice the reader; that it 
shall convey a charm, and infuse delight ••• It is not 
enough that the poet should add to the knowledge of men, it 
is required of him also that he should add to their happiness 
("Preface to Poem' ,- jcpw, I, p. 2) 
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This is possible, in Arnold's view, by presenting the things that 
"appeal to the great primary human affections: to those elementary feelings 
which subsist permanently in the race, and which are independent of time" 
(ibid., p. 4). The universal object of poetry, then, is an action that 
has greatness or significance and ",hich appeals to ma.'1' s common and basic 
nature, that is, the affective side of man's nature. That is why he 
turned with such ferocity on men like H. Clifford, ,.,ho threatened to 
discredit all traditional modes of feeling in the name of science. But it 
sounds like a paradox lilhen Arnold, speaking of the dramatic situation, 
says that "the more tragic the situation, the deeper becomes the enjoyment; 
and the situation is more tragic in proportion as it becomes more terrible" 
(ibid., p. 2). No doubt, but Arnold does not really make his position 
clear. Perhaps the closest interpretation of this idea can be found in 
Shelley's essay "A Defence of Poetry": 
The great secret of morals is love; or a going out of our own 
nature, and an identification of ourselves with the beautiful 
which exists in thought, action, or person, not our own. A man, 
to be greatly good, must imagine intensely and comprehensively; 
he must put himself in the place of another and of many others; 
the pains and pleasures of his species must become his own 
("English Critical Essays", Ope Cit., p. 112). 
One is inclined to accept Shelley's words as an adequate interpretation 
of Arnold's vie'll about the dramatic situation for the follmofing reasons: 
1. Arnold's concept of dramatic poetry as the type of poetry 
in which the poet has to go out of himself and to create; 
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2. Arnold believes that the audience is to enter into what 
the poet creates; 
3. He believes that the misery "of the present age is not 
the intensity of men's suffering - but in their incapacity 
to suffer, enjoy, feel at all, wholly and profoundly -
in their having their susceptibility eternally agacee 
by a continual dance of ever-changing objects, and not 
having the power to attach it upon one, to expend it on 
that one, to absorb it in that one: in their being ever 
learning and never coming to the knowledge of the truth: 
in their having a presentiment of all things, a 
possession of a feeling, at the next moment the commencement 
of an imagination, at the next the commencement of a 
thought and the eternal tumult of the world mingling, 
breaking in upon, hurrying away all. Deep suffering is the 
consciousness of oneself - no less than deep en j oyment. 15 The dream of the present age is Divorce from oneself .'1 
The process can be schematised like that: the spectator finds himself 
really taken through the tragic situation or tragic experience as if it 
were his own. And then he is taken out of it, and into regenerative 
r e 1 e a sea n d res tor e d 1 i f e. T his, any how, 
d e :p end s 'J nth e artistic geniu.s of the poet in achieving the 
necessary disengagement of the spectator's feelings in the right moment 
and at the right stage in the development of action. r1oreover, pity and 
terror have mnemonic values which the drama cannot dispense with, because 
of its rapid course of action. Who would remember the significance of 
Hamlet or King Lear without its anguish? 
The moment of disengagement is accompanied by a deep sense of relief and 
purification. It is a two-stage process: agitation then assuagement: the 
enjoyment springs from the sense that the spectator gets when he feels that 
he has prevailed over the anarchy of his inner life: ,,(to) succeed in 
banishing from his mind all feelings of contradiction, and irritation, 
and impatience; in order to delight himself with the contemplation of 
1853 II 
some noble action of a heroic time" ("Preface to Poems / p: 14). 
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The ultimate relief comes when the poet brings the tragic situation to 
a state of rest or denouement. This cannot take place as long as the 
reader is left in a state of tension. Only enlightenment, a clear 
comprehension of what is involved in the situation, an understanding of cause 
and effect, a judgement on what he has read or witnessed, and an induced 
state of mind that places it above the riot of passion - can effect this 
necessary reconciliation. Arnold, in the preface to the original 
edition of Merope, declares that the state of feeling which it is 
the highest aim of tragedy to produce resides in a sentiment of sublime 
acquiescence in the course of fate, and in the dispensation of human 
life. This might sound like a torpid fatalism. But it is worthy of 
notice that in the context of Greek tradition, Fate - Necessity or Destiny 
is nothing but the Natural Law. 
There is another function which, one thinks, is central in Arnold's 
line of endeavour and goes back to the origin of the drama itself. 
According to Arnold, Poetry is the celebration of human significance. The 
idea of celebration points to the sources of drama which were a sort of 
ceremonies. These were often such as to generate a great collective 
sentiment and 0,_· attitude by means of excitement, in which 
individuals lost their sense of separateness and felt themselves at one 
with the whole community. This function is of great value to someone 
like Arnold who longed to see "Europe as being, for intellectual and 
spiritual purposes, one great confederation, bound to a joint action and 
working to a common result; and whose members have, for their proper 
outfit, a knowledge of Greek, Roman, and Eastern antiquity, and of one 
another" (CPW, III, p. 284). The special usefulness of poetry to 
perform this function stems from its power to unify human sensibilities 
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without founding this power on the supposed fact. 
Arnold hints at another function for poetry - a psychological one. 
In one of his letters to Clough, he writes that "in Sophocles what 
is valuable is not so much his contributions to psychology and the anatomy 
of sentiment, as the grand moral effects produced by style". (CL, p. 101). 
This raises the question whether harmony and rhythm, which Aristotle 
mentions· in his argument in the Poetics, constitute a second source of 
poetical pleasure; Arnold thought they did and made of them, as form or 
style, the source of delight peculiar to poetry. At any rate, the 
Aristotelian theory does not deny the psychological function of poetry. 
To this effect Professor Trilling writes that this function "is suggested 
by Freud's theory of the traumatic neurosis - which might be called the 
mithridatic function, by which tragedy is used as the homeopathic 
administration of pain to inure ourselves to the greater pain \-Thich life 
will force upon us. There is in the cathartic theory of tragedy, as it 
is usually understood, a conception of tragedy's function which is too 
negative and which inadequately suggests the sense of active mastery 
which tragedy can give". 16 
Poetry, in short, gives strong impressions, habits, methods of 
thinking, and ruling ideas. For, as Arnold puts it in a letter to 
William Steward, "a single line of poetry, working in the mind, may 
produce more thoughts and lead to more light, which is what man wants, 
than the fullest acquaintance with the processes of digestion" (Letters, 
II, p. 84). But these thoughts and habits would not bind man strongly so 
as to act upon them unless he makes them his ovm. Here comes the role of 
emotions. Here, too, one may recall Aristotle's view that moral education 
consists in the attaching of feeling to its proper object.17 The great 
instrument of attaching the feelings to the proper objects is undoubtedly 
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poetry. It acts upon man's powers whether it is ethical or aesthetic" 
r-, ?"z-YV,) 
SO, one finds that the Preface/(1853) is not exclusively written to be 
a moralistic approach to poetry. It is written with the intentiono~ 
balancing moral, aesthetic and intellectual elements - all are equal 
in importance. 
* * * 
Poetry, in Arnold's view, should have a more immediate appreciable 
effect "not only upon the young and enthusiastic to whom the future belongs, 
but upon formed and important personages to whom the present belongs, and 
who are actually moving society" ("Joubert", CP\v, III, p. 193). This shows 
how Arnold firmly believed that literature made things happen, that it 
could change people. A...'1d because it changes them, it is, if one thinks 
about it, not unlike religion. For, as Arnold puts it, "All roads ••• 
lead to Rome; and one finds in like mar~er that all questions raise the 
question of religion ••• Questions of good government, social harmony, 
education, civilisation, come forth and ask to be considered; and very 
soon it appears that we cannot possibly treat them without returning to treat 
of religion" ("Irish Catholicism", CPW, VIII, p. 321). "The question, 
how to live, is itself a moral idea; and it is the question which most 
interests every man, and with which, in some way or other, he is 
perpetually occupied. A large sense is of course to be given to the term 
moral. \Vhatever bears upon the question 'how to live', comes under it", 
( "1tlo.rdsworth", CPW, IX, p. 45). 
Therefore, a poetry of revolt against moral ideas is a poetry of 
revolt against life; a poetry of indifference towards moral ideas is a 
poetry of indifference towards life: "we (says Arnold) find attraction, 
at times, even in a poetry of revolt against (morals); in a poetry which 
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might take for its motto Omar Kheyam' s \-rords: 'Let us make up in the 
tavern for the time which we have wasted in the mosque.' Or we find 
attractions in a poetry indifferent to them; in a poetry where the contents 
may be what they will, but where the form is studied and exquisite" (ibid., 
p. 46). 1<Iodern Poetry "can only subsist by its contents - by becoming 
a complete magister vitae as the poetry of the ancients did: by including 
as their did, religion with poetry" (CL, p. 124). It is important, 
therefore, to hold fast to this: that poet~J is at bottom a criticism of 
life; that the greatness of a poet lies in his powerful and beautiful 
application of ideas to life, - to the question How to live? 
In his Essay, "Maurice de Gu~rin", Arnold gives an illuminating 
account of the poetic method of applying ideas to life: 
Poetry interprets in two ways; it interprets by expressing 
with magical felicity the physiognomy and movement of 
the outward world (i.e., Naturalistic interpretation), and 
it interprets by expressing, with inspired conviction, 
the ideas and laws of the im-rard .rorld of man's moral 
and spiritual nature (i.e. moral interpretation). In other 
words, poetry is interpretative both by having natural magic 
in it, and by having moral profundity. In both ways it 
illuminates man; it gives him a satisfying sense of reality; 
it reconciles him with himself and with the universe 
(CPW, III, p. 33). 
Poetry is the interpretress of the natural world, as yrell as 
of the moral world. Great poets unite in themselves the 
faculty of both kinds of interpretation: the naturalistic and the moral. 
":But it is observable," says Arnold, "that in the poets who unite both 
kinds, the latter (the moral) usually ends by making itself the master" 
(ibid., p. 33). Emnedocles on Etna, in one sense, shows Arnold's argument 
about the impossibility of balanced, harmonious coexistence of these two 
faculties; one faculty could live only in the absence or with the extinction 
of the other. They could be kept in balance but with immense effort. Again, 
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one hears echoes of his trouble as a man, a trouble which he religiously 
suppressed as a poet: 
But how to find the energy and pOt,:er to bring all those 
self-seeking tendencies of the flesh, those multitudinous, 
swarming, eager, and incessant impulses, into obedience to 
the central tendency? Here command~ng and forbidding is of 
no avail, and only irritates opposition in the desires it 
tries to control. It even enlarges their power, because it 
makes us feel our impotence; and the confusion caused by 
their ungoverned working is increased by our being filled 
1Hi th a deepened sense of disharmony, remorse, and dismay, 
( st. Paul and Protestantism, CPW, VI, p. 32). 
In Arnold's poetry, from the beginning, the balance seems to lean 
towards the moral mode of interpretation. It ended up by taking over his 
whole activities as exemplified in his religious writings. Here, as Arnold 
puts it, everything, take it at what point in its existence you will, 
carries within itself the fatal law of its own ulterior development. In 
Shakespeare the two kinds seem yronderfully to balance one another; but 
even in him the balance leans; his expression tends to become too little 
sensuous and simple, too much intellectualised. The same thing may be said 
of Lucretius and Hordsworth. In Shelley, says Arnold, there is not a 
balance of the two gifts, nor even a co-existence of them, but there is 
a passionate straining after them both. In Keats and Guerin the faculty 
of naturalistic interpretation is overpoweringly predominant. While in 
Dante the religious sense overbalances the thinking vision. Neither of 
these on its own is enough. "The present" Arnold says, "has to make its 
own poetry, and not even Sophocles (whose thinking power overbalances 
the religious sense) and his compeers, any more than Dante and Shakespeare, 
are enough for it" (CPW, III, p. 231). 
Now, the naturalistic mode of interpretation draws its substance from 
this material world - Nature, itself, and from its commonest and most 
universally enjoyed elements, sun, air, earth, water, plants. It treats the 
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world according to the demands of the senses; it takes the world by its 
outward sensible side; its expressions correspond with the essential 
reality of things. "This faculty", Arnold says, "always has for its 
basis a peculiar temperament, an extraordinary delicacy of organisation 
and susceptibility to impressions; in exercising it the poet is in a 
great degree passive; he aspires to be a sort of human Aeolian harp, 
catchin~endering every rustle of Nature" (CPvl, III, p. 30). 
The moral mode of interpretation treats the world, according to the 
demands of the heart and imagination, by its inward, symbolical side. 
It admits the whole world, rough and smooth, painful and pleasure-giving, 
all alike, but all is transformed by the power of a spiritual emotion, all 
is brought under a layl of supersensual love that has its seat in the 
soul. 
To sum up: what one has been trying to show in this chapter is that 
-:./,~ ........ , ; 
Arnold's theory of poetry is, as he puts it in the "Preface/(1853)", 
PragmatiC. He uses this term, himself, to describe poetry with a serious 
purpose and immense task to perform. In the next chapter, - "The Poetic 
Process", I shall try to give a clear framework for displaying the full 
meaning of Arnold's pragmatic theory of poetry. 
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CHAPTER II 
The Poetic Process 
But tasks in hours of insight willed 
Can be through hours of gloom fulfilled.' 
Arnold's "lVIorality" (5-6) 
So then always that knowledge is worthiest ••• 
which considereth the simple forms or differences 
of things, which are fevl in number, and the 
degrees and coordinations whereof make all this 
variety. 
Francis Bacon 
A poem, settling to its form, 
Finds there no jailor, but a norm 
Of conduct, and a fitting sphere 
Which stops it wandering ever~Nhere. 
C. Day-Lewis "The Room" 
I 
In the Preface (1853) Arnold uses the telling phrase pragmatic 
poetry, that is, poetry that is more than mere amusement and whose 
existence "is important in the sense that it has implications beyond itself 
and beyond the action of the poem, and that it can affect the world. As 
Arnold put it in a letter to Clough, 'Modern poetry can only subsist by 
its contents: by becoming a complete magister vitae ••• '" ~ On this, as the 
ground-idea, he formed his theory of the proper subjects, language, effects, 
and value of poetry. 
But whatever Arnold may think as a critic, he is operating as a poet 
too, in so far as he is constructing constitutive parts and assembling 
them into a whole; in those operations does the poetic process consist. 
The poetic process is a convenient frame to anSi-ler some of the questions 
that are involved in any poetic theory: Is it rational, conscious, and 
voluntary, or is it not3 It is possible within the frame of poetic process 
to answer these questions and all further questions of why and how, of 
personality, talent and genius. 
In this chapter one '''ill point to various specific \vays in which 
Arnold's poetic theory could be seen as different from the Romantic tradition. 
One will examine some of his opinions of the state of poetry in his own 
time, and something of that conscious reaction against his contemporaries 
and against the earlier Romantic poets who were such a powerful influence 
on Tennyson and his followers. 
If it is a process, it ought to have a definite beginning. vfuere 
does it begin? It would be better to answer this question by contrast. 
Housman, in his little handbook, gives an account of his poetic process 
as follows: 
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Having drunk a pint of beer at luncheon-- beer is a 
sedative to the brain, and my afternoons are the least 
intellectual portion of my life-- I would go out for a 
walk of two or three hours. As I went along, thinking 
of nothing in particular, only looking at things around me 
~~d following the progress of the seasons, there would 
flow into my mind, yrith sudden and unaccountable emotion, 
sometimes a line Qr two of verse, sometimes a whole 
stanza at once. 2 
This view disclaims personal responsibility. Poetry, here, is 
emotion recollected in tranquiTIity - a process of which Wordsworth says: 
Nor is it I who play the part 
But a shy spirit in my heart, 
That comes and goes-- will sometimes leap 
From hiding places ten years deep ) 
The experience of poetic inspiration, here, is said to differ from normal 
ideation, says Abrams "in possessing some or all of these four characteristics: 
(a) The composition is sudden, effortless, and unanticipated. Tpe poem or 
passage springs to completion all at once, without the prior intention of 
the poet, and without that process of considering, rejecting, and selecting 
alternatives which ordin~rily intervenes between the intention and 
achievement. (b) The composition is involuntary and automatic; it comes 
and goes at its own pleasure, independently of the will of the poet. 
(c) In the course of composition, the poet feels intense excitement, usually 
described as a state of elation and rapture, but occasionally said to be 
racking and painful in its initial stages, though followed by a sense of 
blissful relief and quiescence. (d) The completed work is as unfamiliar 
and surprising to the poet as though it had been written by someone else 
(ibid., p. 189). 
Arnold's poetic prJcess begins with an idea. To this effect he writes 
in a letter to Clough that the fault of modern English poets like Keats and 
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Bro,ming is that "they Hill not be patient neither understaIld that they 
must begin I'lith an Idea of the ,',orld in order not to be prevailed over by 
the world's multitudinousness .. 0" (CL, po 97). Professor Culler, L.'1. his 
comment on these lines, says that Arnold "'Has unconsciously reiterating 
the doctrine of the 3gotistical Sublime. For vlhat is an Idea of the world 
but one's olm subjectivitYo "4 This interpretation is at variance vrith 
Arnold's stance as a critic. In many places he reiterates that: 
(The Romantic] poetry had about it ••• something premature ••• 
And this prematureness comes from its ,having proceeded 
without having its proper data, without sufficient materials 
to ,'fOrk i'li tho In other liords, the English poetry of the 
first quarter of this century, vTi th plenty of Energy, 
plenty of creative force, did not know enougho 5 
(The Function of Criticism: CPvl, III, 263). 
In addition to that, Arnold, all the time, contrasts 'the self' with the 
,'fOrld: "the aim of culture," says Arnold, "is to knOH ourselves and the 
,'Torldo" (lIScience and Poetry", CP','l, Z, p. 56). Again "A poet 0', ought to 
1m 0\'[ life ancl tie ';'[orld before dealing "I'rith theD in poetry" ("The Function 
of Criticism", CP~l, III, p. 261). So, contrary to ,'That Culler alleges, it 
is not only the self but the ';[orld too that I·Iatthe'i'T Arnold insists that 
the poet mus t Y-DOiT 0 
In the context of Arnold's thixlking there are tuo categories of ideas: 
moral and intellectual. "Horal ideas leaven and humanise the mult itude: 
ne';l intellectual ideas filter slo'irly dmm to then from the thinking fe'l'," 
("The Bishop and the Philosopher", CFol, III, po 44). "Between the tlW 
conditions there is all the difference ,'Thich there is betvTeen the being in 
love, and the follOloring, Hi th delighted comprehension, a reasoning of PIa to" 
("Spinoza and the Bible", ,Q£li, III, p. 178). The poet must aCQuaint himself 
vri th these ideas for, says ,Arnold, "uhoever seriously occupies himself 'ITi th 
literature Hill soon perceive its vital connection '{'lith other agencies". 
{'Preface to H.b:ed Essays", CP\'l, VIII, p. 370)0 Again, Arnold "Trites in 
"The Function of Criticism at the Present Time" that "This creative pm'rer 
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works with elements, with materials; what if it has not those materials, 
those elements, ready for its use? In that case it must surely wait till 
they are ready ••• the elements which the creative power works are ideas; 
the best ideas, on every matter which literature touches, current at the 
time" (liThe FUnction of Criticism at the Present Time", CPH, III, p. 260). 
The modern poet's problem, as far as creation is concerned, is that 
these ideas are too many as well as contradictory if compared with 
previous ages. Arnold felt that problem for, as early as 1847, he says that 
in the 17th century it was a smaller harvest than now, and sooner to be 
reaped: and therefore to its reaper was left time to stow it more finally 
and curiously. still more was this the case in the ancient world. The 
poet's matter, experience of the world, and his own, increases with every 
century. 6 
One's argument so far may be summed up as follows: Arnold's poetic 
process is conscious, voluntary, purposive, and rational. There is 
effort as 'llell as sacrifice involved in it; it is racking a..'1d painful. Its 
order can be said to be: penetration, incubation, illQrnination and finally 
verification. The remaining pages of this chapter will discuss Arnold's 
concept of the literary idea: the cornerstone of his poetic process. In 
the context of his thinking the Idea resolves itself into hiO categories 
that have an ethical bearings: an idea of the self (or human nature; and an 
idea of the world (a concept of history). Arnold discusses them under what 
he usually calls the Concept of Content. 
II 
The Concept of Content 
i. Arnold's Idea of the Self 
A study of Arnold's idea of the self finds its justification, here in 
this chapter, in the fact that theories of the self and theories of art 
tend to be integrally related and to turn upon similar analogues, explicit 
or submerged. It is an additional advantage that in tracing the 
implications of this topic one comes to understand some of the special 
qualities of Arnold's poetry. 
To put the matter schematically: for the representative nineteenth-
century critic the possible theories of the self may be divided into two 
main groups which, according to C.D. Broad, may be called respectively 
centre and non-centre. By a centre theory Broad means: "a theory which 
ascribes the unity of the mind to the fact that there is a certain 
particular existent - a centre - v,hich stands in a common asymmetrical 
relation to all mental events which would be said to be states of a certain 
mind, and does not stand in this relation to any mental events which ".[ould 
not be said to be states of this mind. By a non-centre theory I (says Broadl 
mean one which denies the existence of any such particular centre, and 
ascribes the unity of the mind to the facts that certain mental events are 
directly inter-related in certain characteristic ways, and that other 
mental events are not related to these in the particular vray in which these 
are related to each other." 7 
David Hume may be taken as a typical example of the non-centre theory. 
According to Hume: 
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All the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves 
into two distinct kinds ••• Impressions and Ideas. The 
difference betwixt these consists in the degrees of force 
and liveliness with which they strike upon the mind, and 
make their way into our thought or consciousness. These 
perceptions, which enter with most force ~~d violence, we 
may name 'impressions'; and under this name I apprehend all 
our sensations, passions and emotions, as they make their 
first appearance in the soul. By 'ideas' I mean the faint 
images of these in thinking and reasoning. 8 
Ideas, according to Hume, are the reflection of impressions, and the rule 
holds without any exception that "every simple idea has a simple 
impression, which resembles it: and every simple impression a correspondent 
'd " ('b'd ~ ea. ~ ~ ., p. 3). 
Hume's theory has dangerous implications. Reason is conceived to 
be the handmaid of the senses, not the arbiter of man's destiny; its function 
is to provide man with justifications for what he instinctively wishes to 
do, while the ,·rill is no less enslaved to elements in man's nature which 
he does not control and for Vlhich he cannot be held responsible. If man 
is not ultimately responsible for what he thinks or what he does, if his 
nature is formed not .2;L him but for him, free will, it is clear, is a 
delusion. The implication of this view on art is greater, for the 
perceiving mind is a reflection of the external world; the inventive 
process consisted in a reassembling of ideas which are literally images, 
or replicas of sensations; and the resulting art work is itself comparable 
to a mirror presenting a selected and ordered image of life. 
The criterion of the truth of an idea would be, according to Hume's 
theory, the possibility of tracing it back to, or comparing it with the 
impression or impressions from which it originated. Applying such a 
criterion to the idea of a unitary self, Hume says that there is not such 
an idea for " ••• from what impression would this idea be derived? ••• If 
any impression gives rise to the idea of self, that impression must continue 
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invariably the same, through the \I[hole course of our lives; since self 
is supposed to exist after that manner. But there is no impressi.on constant 
and invariable. Pain and pleasure, grief and joy, passions a..l1d sensations 
succeed each other, and never all exist at the same time. It ca~l1ot 
therefore, be from any of these impressions, or from any other, that the 
idea of self is derived; and consequently there is no such idea" (ibid., 
pp. 251-25 2 ). 
This chapter will show that though the idea of the self which is 
explored and partially defined in Arnold's poetry reflects the various 
interests of his contemporaries, he ends up by being entirely original: 
he arrives at his idea of the self by accepting the more valuable aspects of 
the Romantic insight, but balancing them with the precepts of classical 
huma:1ism. He has understood the value of Roma..l1tic self-conscJousness 
but rejects their E~oistic exploration of the self. 
As early as 1844, Arnold has rejected the idea of non-central self. 
His sonnet "Hritten in Butler's Sermons" rejects such an idea and asserts 
the existence of the central self: 
Affections, Instincts, Principles, and Powers, 
Impulse and Reason, Freedom and Control -
So men, unravelling God's harmonious whole, 
Rend in a thousand shreds this life of ours. 
Vain labour! Deep a..l1d broad, where none may see, 
Sprina' the foundations of that shadowy throne 
\mere ma..I1' s one nature, queen-like, si ts alone, 
Centred in a majestic unity; 
And rays her powers, like sister-islands seen 
Linking their coral arms under the sea, 
Or clustered peaks vIi th plunging gulfs between 
Spanned by aerial arches all of gold, 
'Nhere'er the chariot wheels of life are rolled 
In cloudy circles to eternity. 
(Poems, pp. 51-52) 
The poem shows Arnold's impatience with the attempt of the eighteenth 
c en tury to analyse human nature. H e 
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is particularly concerned here with Butler's first three sermons, contained 
in the volume of Fifteen Sermons, entitled collectively Upon Human Nature. 
All man's principles and passions, instincts, impulses, affections were, 
according to Butler's almost Newtonian system of moral philosophy, given 
to him by God for his own good and for the good of society, provided 
they were used at the discretion of man's dominating principle, which is his 
conscience, not his self-love as Hobbes would have had it. This view, 
say Tinker and Lowry, "of the presiding conscience may, curiously enough, 
be the germ of Arnold's more poetic 'one nature', which sits queen-like 
on her shadowy throne, 'Centred in a majestic unity.'" 9 
Arnold's method of juxtaposing in a number of poems apprehensions 
which modify and amplify each other, brings to one's mind his sonnet 
11 ',,[ri tten in Emerson's Essays". This sonnet has reference to the first and 
second series of Emerson's Essays published in Britain in 1841 and 1844 
respectively ">lith prefaces by Carlyle. Both Emerson and Butler dealt with 
the problem of the 'self' but from diametrically opposed points of view, 
the former asserting the mystery and unity of the human soul, the latter 
chopping it up into Affections, Instincts, Principles, and Powers. The 
sonnet, in itself, is a problem to the readers. 
Professor Culler, in his corrunent on the poem, says "Today the main 
irony of the poem is that readers are quite divided as to whether Arnold is 
cha~pioning Emerson's Transcendental view of man or whether he finds it 
so palpably at variance with the truth that it constitutes a bitter mockery. 
In view of Arnold's later praise of Emerson as one of the great 'voices' 
of his youth, it is probably the former, but the sonnet is an ambiguous 
production. The reason for this is that the world which refuses to heed 
the 'voice oracular' of Emerson and which passes by with 'a smile of wistful 
incredulity', gains by this smile a strategic advantage over the angry young 
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man who exclaims, '0 monstrous, dead, Uo.'1profi table warld' II (IU12gL1'1ative Reason, p.. 48-49). 
Though the two terms, - "central" and "non-central", carry their own 
value judgement, the choice is not an easy one. The problem is that with 
the central self there comes the desire to place the source of ultimate 
value within the individual. To describe the underlying similarities of 
German Idealist philosophy, expressionistic aesthetics, and visionary 
poetry is to trace various manifestations of the central theory as well as 
of the Romantic self-consciousness. This has its terrifying side: along 
with the release and even apotheosis of the individual came his alienation; 
the will to celebrate the self, to make it an object of intense awareness, 
freed men to new forms of joy and to a widened range of suffering. 
This trend could be traced in Descartes' attempt to originate all 
epistemology and ontology from Hi thin an intellectual intuition of the 
self as thought. Stated ve~J briefly, Descartes' philosophical revolution 
consisted in calling in question the reality of the external world and 
directing man's quest for a basic framework of meaning, certitude, and 
value, imlards to the resources of his oym subjectivity rather than outHards 
to a divinely formed external world immediately given in sensible experience. 
To this effect Patrick Nasterson writes: 
Descartes inaugurated the reignof the principle of immanentism 
which has dominated the evolution of modern philosophy. 
This principle repudiates the traditional epistemological 
position according to which being enjoys primacy vis-i-vis 
thought in such a manner that it is the self-revelation or 
epiphany of being itself which grounds thought as consciousness 
of being. Instead, in virtue of a programme of radical doubt, 
the principle of immanent ism involutes the direction of 
consciousness and prescribes that it takes as its only and 
absolute starting point the luminous presence of the thinking 
subject to himself - a subject defined as identical with his 
own thought. Hence the only access which there is to 
being is through the cogito's excogitation of himself. Thought 
assumes primacy vis~-vis being which henceforth is grounded 
in the self-sufficiency and luminous presence of the thinking 
self to himself. This presence of the thinking self to himself 
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becomes the first yrinciyle and ultimate foun1ation 
from Hhich all validity, certitude and value must in 
some ,·ray be derived. 10 
l,'!hat is of narticul?"r interest, says Nasterson, is the fact that it 
also nrovided a philosophical framevrork in ""hich the modern problematic 
of atheism and alienation could be formulated. In 2,ddition to the 
theological plane, the central theory of the self has dangerous consequences 
on the social plane. It tends to regard all U,e marked distinctions of 
human character as innate and in the main indelible. It ignores the fact 
that by far the greater part of those differences, .rhether behreen 
individuals, races, or sexes, are produced by differences in circumstances. 
John stuart Hill finds in this tendency "the chief hindrances to the rational 
treatment of great social questions, 2.nd one of the greatest stumbling 
blocks to hUn'l2,Yl improYement. ,,11 
Perhans 2.n exposition of the b2.ckgrourld of the sennet may thro',',' some 
light on Arnold's st2..r..ce. The point is th2.t in Arnold.'s day, aSa/undergraduate 
at Oxford, Butler's Sermons 'das used as a required text at Balliol 2.1ong 
\·ri th the Sthics of Aristotle, .rhereas Emerson's Ess2.Ys '..ras neglected. 
Arnold, like many of his fellovr undergraduates, thought ths,t the required 
text ought to be omitted and the omitted text required. His diss2,tisfaction 
on this issue Has such that even thirty years after the event he took the 
subject up again through the lectures he delivered on "Bishop Butler 2nd 
the Zeit-Geist" in Edinourgh. 
The fact remains that the asbiguity of the sonnet has enriched it. 
All alternative meanings have a direct bearing on Arnold's ~~2.1ysis of the 
• sonnet contain 
phenomenon of alienation _ not only does the / an implicit criticism of 
thinking aloud in yoetI"J, . but even the language is that of a 
Carlylean ent'msiast chiding this world. A language that Arnold dissociates 
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himself from by using quotation marks around the speech: 
'0 monstrous, dead, unprofitable world, 
That thou canst hear, and hearing hold thy way! 
A voice oracular hath pealed to-day, 
TO-day a hero's banner is unfurled; 
Hast thou no lip for welcome?' 
(Poems, pp. 52-53) 
This may be an oblique criticism of Carlyle who is associated \'lith Emerson's 
essays since he himself wrote their prefaces. The language, indeed, is 
reminiscent of Carlyle. This reading is plausible for in one of his letters 
Arnold says that time taught him "the precious truth that everything 
turns upon one's exercising the power of persuasion, of charm; that without 
this all fury, energy, reasoning power, acquirement, are thrown away and 
only render their owner more miserable. Even in one's ridicule one must 
preserve a s' . .,reetness and good-humour" (October 29, 1863). Second, the fact 
that the world refuses to heed the "voice oracular" of the seer and passes 
by vii th "a smile of wistful incredulity" has for that reason alone as much 
to do with the alienation of the seer as the necessity of his existing in 
the midst of a hostile society. 
However, in the context of Arnold's search for authority in human 
affairs, his search for a central organising thesis for li£e that takes the 
central self as its nucleus leaves no doubt as to where Arnold stands. 
The idea is constant with Arnold for it appears in "Religious Isolation" 
(1848), "Human Life" (1849), "The Second Best" (1849-52), "The Youth of Man" 
(1852); and as late as 1869, Arnold published an epigram in the midst of 
St Paul and Protestantism to the same effect: 
Belo'li the surface-stream, shallo\-l and light, 
Of what we say we feel - belo\-l the stream, 
As light, of what we think we feel - there flows 
vii th noiseless current strong, obscure and deep, 
The central stream of what we feel indeed. 
(CPW, VI, p. 51). 
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A study of all these poems will show that Arnold's theory of the self 
accords with the centre theory that holds a certain particular existent, 
a kind of monad or supposed simple being, or a pure ego, to be the centre. 
Arnold contrasts this central self or real self with another he 
calls the apparent self or momentary self: 
Ah, what pitfalls are in that word 'Nature!' ••• Do you mean 
that we are to give full swing to our inclinations ••• 
the constitution of things turns out to be somewhat against 
it ••• the free development ••• of our 'apparent' self has to 
undergo a profound modification from the law of our higher 
'real' self, the law of righteousness. 
(Poems, pp. 53-54) 
It is experience which reveals that man does not only have a momentary 
moyen 
self, l'homme/sensuel dominated by the vlishes of the flesh and of current 
thoughts; man has also a total or best self which is realised through 
the unified exercise of his powers of conduct, of knowledge, of beauty, of 
social life and manners, through ~he m~tual interdependence of the Hellenic 
and Hebraic tendencies in man. 
The doctrine of the two selves in man is central to Arnold's ethico-
aesthetic criticism. It unifies his line of endeavour in general. The 
clearest statement of this central doctrine is made in the preface to the 
Last Essays on Church and Religion: 
It will generally be admitted that all experience as to 
conduct brings us at last to the fact of two selves, or 
instincts, or forces, - name them how we will, and however 
we may suppose them to have arisen, - contending for the 
mastery in man: one, a movement of first impulse and more 
involuntary, leading us to gratify any inclination that may 
solicit us, and called generally a movement of man's ordinary 
or passing self, of sense, appetite, desire; the other, a 
movement of reflection and more voluntary, leading us to submit 
inclination to some rule, and called generally a movement of 
man's higher or enduring self, of reason, spirit, will. 
The thing is described in different words by different notions 
and men relating their experience of it, but as to the thing 
itself they all, or all the most serious and important among 
them, agree. 
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This however, creates what might be called duplication of consciousness 
that causes an internal confrontation between socialised, humqnised best 
self and non-socialised apparent self. Here comes Arnold's ideas of the 
dialogue of the mind with itself, and the divorce from the self and 
and all aspects of feelings that accompany the phenomenon of alienation. 
"The Buried Life", the poem that explores these abstract ideas, 
begins as an account of the search of the best self. Love is held, but 
this is rare, to be a possible means of restoring the consciousness to 
its deeper self: 
When a beloved hand is laid in ours. 
. . . . . . . .. ... . . . . . . . . . . .. 
\fuen our "lorld-deafened ear 
Is by the tones of a loved voice caressed -
A bolt is shot back somewhere in our breast, 
And a lost pulse of feeling stirs again. 
-The eye sinks inward, and the heart lies plain, 
And vrha t we mean, we say, and what 'Ne 'dould, 'de kno1N. 
A man becomes aHare of his life's flow, 
And hears its winding murmur; and he sees 
The meadows where it glides, the sun, the breeze. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 
An air of coolness plays upon his face, 
And an unwonted calm pervades his breast. 
And then he thinks he knows 
The hills "There his life rose, 
And the sea where it goes. 
(Poems, p. 275) 
Professor Allott, in his comment on the poem, says that "when self-
knowledge is momentarily achieved the buried stream becomes an ordinary 
river" (Poems, p. 275). In one's view the movement lies in the opposite 
direction, that is, self-knOi'Tledge is achieved in the process of 
sublimation of the ordinary self. But the line "And then he thinks he 
knows" sheds some doubt. The conclusion one comes to is that Arnold suggests, 
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like Kierkegaard, that truth is equal to belief. However, this is rare 
because life with its manifold claims exerts a , __ . _pressure 
as well as distraction on man's nature. This tendency towards fragmentation 
is counteracted, however rarely, by man's soul: 
Yet still, from time to time, vague and forlorn, 
From the soul's subterranean depth upborne 
As from an infinitely distant land, 
Come airs, and floating echoes, and convey 
A melancholy into all our day. 
(Ibid., p. 274) 
Arnold then, explains the law of man's nature by a fable: Fate 
foresaw that man would be subject to frivolous distractions, and in order 
to protect his ·genuine self from his caprice, placed his true life deep 
and indiscernible within him. 
Ah! well for us, if even we, 
~ven for a moment, can get free 
Our heart, and have our lips unchained; 
For that which seals them has been deep-ordained! 
Fate, which foresaw 
How frivolous a baby man ".rould be -
By what distractions he would be possessed, 
How he would pour himself in every strife, 
And well-nigh change his own identity -
That it might keep from his capricious play 
His genuine self, and force him to obey 
Even in his own despite his being's law, 
Bade through the deep recesses of our breast 
The unregarded river of our life 
Pursue \.;ith indiscernible flow its way; 
And that we should not see 
The buried stream, and seem to be 
Eddying at large in blind uncertainty, 
Though driving on with it eternally. 
(Poems, pp. 272-73) 
Professor Allott says that the poem is vITitten between 1849-52. 
But it is likely to be later than that for the imagery echoes Maurice de 
~ 
Guerin's Essay on The Centaur in which an old Centaur on his mOlmtain 
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relates to 11elampus, a human Questioner, the life of his youth. That 
piece Arnold quotes in his essay on IINaurice de Gu:rin" (1863): 
Seekest thou to knOYl the gods ••• and from Ylhat source men, 
animals, and the elements of the universal fire have their 
origin? But the aged Ocean, the father of all things, 
keeps locked. Vlithin his own breast these secrets; and the 
nymphs, Vlho stand around, sing as they weave their eternal 
dance before him, to cover any sound v/hich might escape 
from his lips half-opened by slumber. The mortals, dear to 
the gods for their virtue, have received from their hands 
lyres to give delight to man, or the seeds of new plants 
to make him rich; but from their inexorable lips, nothing! 
(CPW, III, p. 35). 
In the same way Arnold p0'rtrays man as having a 
Longing to inquire 
Into the mystery of this heart which beats 
So wild, so deep in us - to know 
,,/hence our 1 i ves come and v/hence they go. 
And many a man in his own breast then delves, 
But deep enough, alas! none ever mines. 
(Poems, p. 274) 
The poem thus presents an image of the individual psyche, alienated from 
the stream of its buried life, but possibly able to get a glimpse of it 
momentarily under the influence of love. 
The poem suggests two methods of reaching the best self: the first is 
that of the Scholar-Gipsy i.e., one aim in life: 
And we have been on many thousand lines, 
And we have shovffi, on each, spirit and power; 
But hardly have we, for one little hour, 
Been on our own line. 
(Poems, p. 274) 
The other way is the Romantic way: IIBut deep enough, alas none ever mine." 
It is by cutting oneself off from every contaminating influence. Arnold's 
Emnedocles on Etna shows the conseQuences of this way. 
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Arnold's extraordinary sensitivity to the implications of change in 
his own time underlies his lifelon€ search for what is permanent in the 
human nature and the human heart. The point is that 1,-/hat is fundamental 
must be the essence of our true nature, and we can use an understanding 
of that nature to improve ourselves. What one observes in these examples 
is that differential growth of these powers seems to determine the shape 
of culture, society, and subsequently the movement of history. 
Since the self is a system of delicately poised powers the thing 
needed here is to bring them into an equipoise. Poetry, according to 
Arnold's poetics, satisfies this demand. Through the poetic experience 
an individual attains equilibrium. When impulses are harmonised, they 
work together and make us realise the full complexity of our situation. 
In this realisation lies the individual's process of illumination. To this 
effect Arnold writes in Culture and Anarchy that: 
'tlhat we want is a fuller harmonious development of our 
humanity, a free play of thought upon our routine notions, 
spontaneity of consciousness, sweetness and light; and 
these are just what culture generates and fosters. 
CCflJtl., V, p. J 91 ) 
Harmony comes when these powers are related to one another on one hand 
and the individual in society on the other. The first has to do 'o'!i th 
intelligence and the latter in social manner and conduct. To begin 
with the first, these powers are related in diverse ways: 
"vi th one such way of relating them I (Arnold) am 
particularly concerned now. Following our instinct for 
intellect and knowledge we acquire pieces of knowlecge; 
and presently, in the generality of men, there arises the 
desire to relate these pieces of knowledge to our sense 
for conduct, to our sense for beauty, - and there is 
'.'feariness and dissatisfaction if the desire is baulked. 
Now in this desire lies, I think, the strength of that 
hold "'hich letters have upon u" (CPtl, X, p. 62). 
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On the level of conduct, Arnold argues that "Human progress consists 
in a continual increase in the number of those who, ceasini:~ to live by 
the animal life alone and to feel the pleasures of senSes onlYt come to 
participate in the intellectual life also, and to find enjoyment in 
the things of the mind. Rhetoric, brilliant writing, gives them pleasure, 
still more, when it is employed in commendation of a view of life is on 
the whole theirs, and of men and causes with which they are naturally in 
sympathy "(CPW, VIII, p. 169). Poetry accomplishes this task by exercising 
his power on the fundamentals of man's self: "This desire in men that 
good should be for ever present to them" (CPW, X, p. 63). On man's 
"sentiment of the ideal life, which is none other than man's normal life 
as we shall some day know it " (CF1d, VIII, p. 219) .. 
The essence of normal life, in Arnold's thinking, is nothing but 
a sense of order, a law of good taste, a measure for man's words and actions. 
All these are in the power of man to achieve for "man alone has an 
impulse leading him to set up some other lay! to control the bent of his 
nature" (CPld, III, p. 235-36). All these on the whole can be translated 
or expressed in terms of social manners of .... Thich Arnold \-Iri tes: 
Unless \-Ie have cultivated it (soci~l intercourse and 
manners) we are incomplete. The impulse for cultivating it 
is not, indeed, a moral impulse. It is by no means 
identical with the moral impulse to help our neighbour and to 
do him good. Yet in many ways it works to a like end. It 
brings men together, makes them feel the need of one another, 
be considerate of one another, understand one another. But, 
above all things, it is a promoter of equality. It is by 
the humanity of their manners that men are made equaJ 
(CPW, VIII, pp. 288-89). 
In conclusion one can say that the spirit that underlies this vision 
is that of hope. Indeed it offers a glimmer of hope for improvement and 
renovation. The hope lies in the fact that there is in man an inclination 
toward the good. 
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ii. Arnold's Idea of the \'i'orld 
This section 'dill examine Arnold I s concept of the "Idea of the 
world". From the allusion to Goethe's theory of spiral progress in a 
letter of 1848 to the penultimate entry from Karl Marx in the Note Book 
for 1888, Arnold reveals an interest in the nature of historic process. 
The names of Hume, Herder, Hegel, Nichelet, Renan, Reusl, recur in the 
lists of reading in his notebooks. Thucydides, Burke, and Niebuhr are 
referred to as types of the scientific historian. 
The phenomenon of time, periodicity in history, the doctrines of 
development and progress, the relation of the individual to his age, in 
addition to other issues, absorbed Arnold and his contemporaries: Is 
man like Sisyphus pushing the stone that always comes rolling back? Is he 
like Tantalus reaching for the water he can never catch? Is he, again, 
like Ixion following ~~d fleeing from hi~self? All these questions 
busied Arnold. In his poem, "A Summer Night", he writes: 
For most men in a brazen prison live, 
\'/'here, in the sun's hot eye, 
'Nith heads bent 0 'er their toil, they languidly 
Their lives to some unmeaning taskwork give, 
Dreaming of nought beyond their prison-wall. 
And as year after year, 
Fresh products of their barren labour fall 
From their tired hands, and rest 
Never yet comes more near, 
Gloom settles slowly over their breast; 
And while they t~J to stem 
The waves of mournful thought by which they are pressed, 
Death in their prison reaches them, 
Unfreed, having seen nothing, still unblest. 
(Poems, p. 269) 
The alternative view is that man is progressing on long "ray that "lrill lead 
to Truth: 
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And long the way appears, which seemed so short 
To the less practised eye of sanguine youth; 
And high the mountain-tops, in cloudy air, 
The mountain-tops where is the throne of Truth. 
(Poems, p. 504) 
Arnold's intellectual and spiritual journey lies bet'w'een these two 
poles: from utter pessimism to heavily qualified optimism. In this journey 
one can identify three concepts of history as well as three concepts of 
the Zeitgeist: (a) chaotic, or to use Kant's term Abderite, (b) cyclical, 
and (c) progressive. 
(a) To begin with the chaotic concept, Arnold's poetry is, in fact, 
replete with images that show no concrete shape of history. Man is seen 
in perpetual commotion. Many expressions of Arnold approach such 
conce~tions of the whirl, wasteful, and undirected motion: 
••• 'tis the gradual furnace of the '.<[orld, 
I.n '..rhose hot air our spirits are upcurled 
Until they crumble, or else grow like steel 
Hhich kills in us the bloom, the youth, the spring 
Which leaves the fierce necessity to feel, 
But takes away the power _. this can avail, 
By drying up our joy in everything, 
To make our former pleasures all seem stale. 
(Tristram and Iseult, 11. 119-26) 
Again he writes in "Dover Beach ll , about his apprehension of the human 
condition as one of pointless random collision: 
And we are here as on a darkling plain 
Swept with confused alarmsof struggle and flight, 
Where ignorant armies clash by night. 
Arnold usually uses the word eddying to express aimless, pointless 
motion. 
Vlhat is the course of the life 
Of mortal men on the earth? 
Host men eddy about 
Here and there. 
("Rugby Chapel", 11. 58-61) 
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Again, in the sonnet "To the Duke of i'lellington" probably written while 
Arnold, says David DeLaura, "'vas still an undergraduate, he speaks of 
'the fretful foam/ Of vehement actions wi t~"out scope or term,/ Call'd 
history.' This vision of life as confused and without a goal strikingly 
similar to Huxley's youthful despair, anticipates the image of the night 
battle in 'Dover Beach. '" 12 
(b) His father's admiration for the cyclical view of history affected 
Arnold's vision as a poet and a critic too. Arnold's belief in historical 
recurrence made it possible for him to use figures and events from past 
history as analogous .to modern experience: a procedure that suggested 
to Pater thep arallel between Antonine Rome and Victorian England for 
his Marius the Epicurean. 13 
Arnold began to see history as phases of a cultural cycle, the 
alternation of periods of expansion and periods of concentration, periods 
of Hebraism and periods of Hellenism, periods of poetry and periods of 
cri ticism, time when God is vii thin the \·.rorld, and times vlhen he 
inexplicably disappears. But the fact remains that this concept has a 
pessimistic element. "Seen through the eyes of the Germans, history is a 
holocaust. For Schelling, it is a tragic spectacle performed on the 
mournful stage of the world. Hegel's Absolute Spirit has travelled in 
stages from China to Germany, embodying itself temporarily in one world-
historical state after another, nourishing itself on one national genius 
after another. 0nce a nation had passed its zenith, the Spirit moved 
on to the next in order, leaving the now soulless people to drag itself on 
through years of uncreative nullity, busied with politics and perhaps 
war, with a senile repetition of itself, until it finally died in the 
body, having long since bE')en dead in spirit." 14 
Arnold, in Friendship's Garland, seems to reiterate the same concept: 
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"As often as I consider how history is a series of waves, coming 
gradually to a head and then breaking, and that, as the successive waves 
come up, one nation is seen at the top of the wave, and then another of 
the next, I ask myself, counting all the waves which have come up 
with England at the top of them: vfuen the great wave which is now 
mounting has come up, will she be at the top of it?" (CPN', V, pp. 30-31). 
It is Arnold's deep sense of commitment that gave him that feeling 
of apprehension. In a letter to his sister, Fan, Arnold says: 
I have a conviction that there is a real, an almost 
imminent danger of England losing immeasurably in all ways ••• 
for want of what I must still call ideas, for want of 
perceiving how the world is going and must go, and preparing 
her-self accordingly. This conviction haunts me, and at 
times even overwhelms me with depression; I would rather 
not live to see the change come to pass, for we shall all 
deteriorate under it. \Vhile there is time I "lill do all I 
can, and in every way, to prevent its coming to pass ••• 
I know that it is only by facing in eve~J direction that one 
can win the day ••• (Letters, I, pp. 309-10). 
In the cycle theory of history, man's life is governed by necessity: 
••• this vale, this earth, whereon we dream, 
Is on all sides o'ershadow'd by the high 
Uno'erleap'd hountains of i~ecessity, 
Sparing us narrower margin than we deem. 
("To a Republican Friend",p. 103) 
Because of this necessity, 
We shall renew the battle in the plain 
Tomorrow; red with blood will Xanthus be; 
Hector and Ajax will be there again, 
Helen will come upon the wall to see. 
("Palladium"; 13-16) 
Thus man is doomed to suffer in that he is a creature imprisoned in time, 
his bondage to a principle of flux and recurrence allows no possibility 
of salvation. 
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Arnold's poem, Emnedocles on Etna, may be used to illustrate the 
as a cycle endle ssly and ( .:.' ..... "-
view of history,/of conditions/repeating themselvesjof processes endlessly 
to maturitY,and passing away without hope: 
And each succeeding age in which we are born 
Will have more peril for us than the last; 
Will goad our senses with a sharper spur, 
Will fret our minds to an intenser play, 
Will make ourselves harder to be discerned. 
And we shall struggle awhile, gasp and rebel -
And 'tTe shall fly for refuge to past times, 
Their soul of unworn youth, their breath of greatness; 
And the reality will pluck us back, 
Knead us in its hot hand, and change our nature. 
And we shall feel our powers of effort flag, 
And rally them for one last fight, - and fail; 
And we shall sink in the impossible strife, 
And be astray for ever. 
(Poems, pp. 190-91) 
But tLis concept of history could yield an optimistic interpretation 
too: just by putting the emphasis on the idea of renovation. Arnold 
believed in that idea: To this effect he writes that renovation is wh3t 
"makes faith and hope to be among the primal virtues, because they keep 
alive in us confidence in our ideal \-rhen events might otherwise shake 
it. Faith and hope would not be virtues if the exercise of them is easy. 
It is because the exercise of them is hard that they became virtues, and 
that they are a beauty and a merit (then he quotes from Wordsworth's poem 
"To B.R. Hsydon"J:ires 9-141: 
And oh, \-rhen nature sinks, as oft she may, 
Through long-lived pressure of obscure distress, 
Still to be strenuous for the bright reward, 
And in the soul admit of no decay, 
Brook no continuance of weak-mindedness, 
Great is the glory, for the strife is hard. 1I 
("Report of Public Lectures", CPW, X, 
pp. 254-55) -
In the light of this Vie\'l, Arnold gives an animating interpretation of 
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the Greek myth of Adonis as an example to be folloVled: 
Symbolically treated, as the thoughtful man might 
treat it, as the Greek mysteries undoubtedly treated it, 
this sto~J was capable of a noble and touching application, 
and could lead the soul to elevating and consoling 
thoughts. Aconis Vias the sun in his summer and in his 
Vlinte+ course, in his time of triumph and his time of 
defeat; but in his time of triumph still moving tOViards his 
defeat, in his time of defeat still returning tOvlards his 
triumph. Thus he became an emblem of the pOi·rer of life and 
the bloom of beauty, the power of human life and the bloom 
of human beauty, hastening inevitably to diminution and 
decay, yet in that ve~J decay finding 'Hope, and renovation 
Vlithout end'''. 
("Pagan and Mediaeval Sentiment", CP1tl, III, 
p. 222) -
(c) Arnold was also aware of the works of the French philosophers of 
perfectibility who Vlere Vlriting histories of progressive happiness and 
hUlIanity. Saint-Simon, for instance, Vlrites in one of his early 
brochures: "The imagination of the poets placed the Golden Age in the 
cradle of mankind, in the ignorance ar:.d brutality of early times. The 
15 
Golden Age of the human species is not behind us, it is before us." 
Arnold knows the dangers that are involved in this theory. For "In 
Turgot and Condorcet and the early Saint-Sirnon the conclusion is 
inescapable that the history of mankind since primitive times had in fact 
demonstrated the gradual flowering of rational, abstract capacities at 
the expense of imaginative and passionate nature" (Hanuel, p. 104). 
Arnold would not tolerate that: "I cannot conceal from myself the 
objection ••• that the service of reason is freezing to feeling ••• and 
feeling and the religious mood are eternally t~1e deepest being of man, 
the ground of all joy and greatness for him" (Yale MS, in Poems, p. 149). 
Arnold, as early as 1848, cautions against this concept of history. 
Yet, when I muse on Vlhat life is, I seem 
Rather to patience prompted, than that proud 
Prospect of hope which France proclaims so loud. 
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He, does not however, forget to express his genuine concern for the 'armies 
; 
of homeless and unfed; but he still believes that "Socialistic and 
communistic schemes have generally, hmo/ever, a fatal defect; they are 
content with too low and material a standard of well-being. That instinct 
of perfection, which is the master-power in humanity, always rebels at 
this, and frustrates the work" ("Equality," CPH, VIII, pp. 289-90). 
Arnold's suspicions seemed to be confirmed by the later progress 
of the revolution. On 24 May 1848 Arnold, answering Clough's account of 
the deteriorating affair in France, writes: "ifuat you say about France 
is just about the impression I get from the accounts of things there 
it must be disheartening to the believers in progress" (CL, p. 80). 
In the 1860's, Arnold began to believe for valid reasons that the 
life of mankind was destined to undergo transformation or evolution. To 
this effect he i-lri tes to ?<Irs :B'orster in november 1863 that "I think in 
this concluding half of the centu~J the ~nglish spirit is destined to 
undergo a great transformation; or rather, perhaps I should say, to perform 
a great evclution ••• I shall do i-lhat I can for this movement in literature; 
freer perhaps in that sphere than I could be in any other" (p. 207). 
Arnold's emphasis on the word evolution, here, is very significant. For 
though semantic8.11y it is equivalent to the word transformation or 
development, there is a difference between them: the word evolution 
directs the thoughts rather to the source: development to the goal, of the 
process. Perhaps this sentiment, of not breaking the link with the 
sources and tradition, that prompted Arnold to adopt the theory of history 
as a "'progress en li~~_spi_ralell (eL, 80). 
In this concept, history returns at different levels to the same 
place, so that, though the sa~e ideas, cultures and epochs of historJ are 
repeated, yet there is some sort of progress: 
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Haply~ the river of Time ••• 
May acquire, if not the calm 
Of its early mountainous shore, 
Yet a solemn peace of its own. 
("Future", Poems, p. 266) 
"The Future" is one of Arnold's most straightforward expositions of the 
problem of Time and history. The River path can be identified with the 
past, the present, and the future. More frequently, however, it 
denotes the life of the individual, and then the three stages are 
childhood, maturity, and old age. 
Now, the question is: how does Arnold use his idea of history in his 
works, poetry and prose? Most believers in the cyclical theory of history, 
like Arnold, assume that certain clusters of national traits tend to 
reappear at regular intervals throughout the course of history. It would, 
in the light of the fact that ",hen two phenomena had bee:: frequently seen 
together one could be inferred from the other, be possible to dra'II certain 
conclusions about a nation's life and move~ent. This is possible by 
studying past civilisations and the characteristics that accompanied 
their rise and fall. 
This type of logic, certainly, must have been behind Arnold's use of 
history. In his lecture "On the Nodern Element in Literature" Arnold 
begins by distinguishing exterior and inward characteristics that 
distinguish modern epochs: 
To begin 'Ili th what is exterior. One of the most 
characteristic outward features of a modern age, of an 
age of advanced civilisation, is the banishment of the 
ensigns of war and bloodshed from the intercourse of 
civil life. Crime still exists, and wars are still 
carried on; but within the limits of civil life a circle 
has been found within which man can move securely, and 
develop the arts of peace uninterruptedly. 
( CP1il, I, p • 23) 
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Of the inward characteristics Arnold says: 
An important inward characteristic, again, is the 
growth of a tolerant spirit; that spirit which is 
the offspring of an enlarged knoHledge; a spirit 
patient of diversities of habits and opinions. Other 
characteristics are the multiplications of the 
conveniences of life, the formation of taste, the capacity 
for refined pursuits. And this leads us to the supreme 
characteristic of all; the intellectual maturity of man 
himself; the tendency to observe facts with a critical 
spirit; the search for their law, not to wander among 
them at random; to judge by the rule of reason, not by 
the impulse of prejudice or caprice (ibid., pp. 23-24) .•. 
But the predominance of thought, of reflection, in modern 
epochs is not without its penalties; in the unsound, in the 
over-tasked, in the over-sensitive, it has produced the 
most painful, the most lamentable results; it has produced 
a state of feeling unknown to less enlightened but perhaps 
healthier epochs -- the feeling of depression, the feeling 
of ennui. Depression and ennui; these are the characteristics 
stamped on how many of the representative workS of modern 
times (ibid., p. 32). 
Arnold's method is clear. He conducts an inductive study of past 
civilisations and takes cross-sections on the cultural plane. A modern 
poet needs, then, "a significant; a highly-developed, a culminatir:g epoch, 
on the one hand, - a comprehensive,acommenffirrate, an adequate literature, 
on the other, - these will naturally be the objects of deepest interest 
to our modern age" (ibid., p. 22). Arnold's studies gave him two epochs in 
history that might help modern poets to interpret their age: Greek 
civilisation in the age of Pericles and Roman civilisation. Roman 
civilisation, says Arnold, was on the whole the greatest ••• on record, 
but the literature of the Romans was inade1uate, that is, the poets of the 
age did not enter into possession of the general ideas which vlere the law 
of the vast multitude of facts which constitute the copious and complex 
present, that 'immense moving confused spectacle which, while it 
perpetually excites our curiosity, perpetually baffles our comprehension. ' 
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This, then, is what distinguishes certain epochs in the 
history of the human race, and our own amongst the number;-
on the one hand, the presence of a significant spectacle 
to contemplate; on the other hand, the desire to find the 
true point of view from which to contemplate this 
spectacle. He who has found that point of view, he who 
adeQuately comprehends this spectacle, has risen to the 
comprehension of his age: he who ~es that point 
to his age, he who interprets to it that spectacle, is 
one of his age's intellectual deliverers (CPW, I, p. 20). 
Arnold takes Lucretius as his first example. He admits that he 
is modern, but asks 'How can a man adeQuately interpret the activity of 
his age when he is not in sympathy with it?' Arnold's own case must 
come to the mind of every reader when he reaches these words, indeed 
throughout his discussion of Lucretius: 
He bids them (his disciples) to leave the business of the 
world, and to apply themselves 'naturam cognoscere r.erum -
to learn the nature of things;' but there is no cheerfulness 
for him either in the world from which he comes, or in the 
solitude to which he goes. Hith stern effort, with gloomy 
despair, he seems to rivet his eyes on the elementary 
reali ty, the naked frame'N'ork of t~"1e world, because tr:e 
world in its fulness ~~d movement is too exciting a 
spectacle for his discomposed brain. He seems to feel 
the spectacle of it at once terrifying and alluring; 
and to deliver himself from it he has to keep perpetually 
repeating his formula of disencpantment and annihilation. 
\ Qprll, I, po 33) 
In the same vein he dismisses Virgil: 'Over the whole Aeneid there rests 
an ineffab:e melancholy: not a rigid, a moody gloom, like the melancholy 
of Lucretius; no, a sweet, a touching sadness, but still a sadness; a 
melancholy which is at once a source of charm in the poem, and a testimony 
to its incompleteness.' Horace is similarly described as 'exquisite,' 
but not 'interpretative and fortifying,' 'without faith, without 
enthusiasm, without energy.' 
The object of the lecture is thus attained, to demonstrate, by 
showing the deficiencies of the Romans and the Blizabeth~~s, the absolute, 
the enduring interest of Greek literature, and above all, of Greek 
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poetry. This is a position which few people would feel inclined to deny. 
Dissatisfaction does not begin until one asks precisely about the 
reasons behind this conclusion, and realises how much has been left 
to be inferred. 
Lucretius (99-55 B.C.) was a contempora~J of Julius Caesar: a 
period of 'expansion' and order. The frontiers of the ~mpire were the 
Rhine and Danube in Europe, the ~uphrates in Asia, and the desert in 
North Africa. As an epoch of ex~ansion it must have attracted 
Arnold's attention: to study the exterior and inward characteristics that have 
accompanied its rise. He goes to the literature of the age, to the chief 
poet of the period, - Lucretius. But he finds that Lucretius had cut 
himself from his age and busied himself with an alien current of 
thought that belonged to the third century B.C. A period whose feature, 
in the Helle:1istic world, is subjection as well as disorder. In 
philosophy, it includes the found.ation of the Epicurean (Lucretius was 
the only eminent disciple of Epicurus) and Stoic schools, and also of 
Scepticism as a definitely formulated doctrine. It was a period of 
confusion. Menander, who belongs to this age, says: 
So many cases I have known 
Of men who, though not naturally rogues, 
Became so, through misfortune, by constraint. 
(Frag~' 604) 
This sums up the moral character of the third century B.C. C.F. Angus, 
in Cambridge Ancient Histo~J, writes: "Metaphysics sink into the 
background, and ethics, now individual, become of the first importance. 
Philosophy is no longer the pillar of fire going before a few intrepid 
seekers after truth: it is rather an ambulance following in t~e wake of 
the struggle for existence and picking up the weak and wounded" 
(Vol. VII, p. 231). 
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Thus Arnold has arrived at the conclusion that Roman civilisation is 
of little value because the literature of the period does not 
interpret it. Greek literature can help modern poets to interpret their 
age: 
The main element of the modern spirit's life is neither 
the senses and understanding, nor the heart and 
imagination; it is the imaginative reason. And there 
is a century in Greek life, - the century preceding 
the Peloponnesian war, from about the year 530 to the 
year 430 B.C., - in which poetry made, it seems to me, 
the noblest, the IT.ost successful effort she has ever 
made as the priestess of the imaginative reason, of 
the element by which the modern spirit, if it would live 
right, has chiefly to live ("Pagan and Mediaeval Sentiment", 
CPW, III, p. 230). 
It was possible in that age, as in few others, to be both intelligent and 
happy, and happy through intelligence. Thus one finds that the main 
line in Arnold's \ITitings is the inculcation of intelligence. 
"I would tell you," says Arnold to his sister K, " ••• of Ernest 
Renan, between whose line of endeavour and my own I imagine there is 
considerable resemblance, th8-t you might have a look at some of his 
books if you liked. The difference is, perhaps, that he tends to 
inculcate morality, in a high sense of the word, upon the French nation 
as what they most want, while I tend to inculcate intelligence, also in 
a high sense of the word, upon the English nation as what they most 
want; but with respect both to morality and intelligence, I think we 
are singularly at one in our ideas, and also with respect both to the 
progress and the established religion of the present day". (Letters, I, 
p. 111). 
Through intelligence the Greeks were able to reconcile old morality 
with the new freedom: 
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It was not that the old religious beliefs of Greece, to 
\vhich the ideas that inspire conduct had attached 
themselves, did not require to be transformed by the new 
spirit. They did ••• 'The popular faith was everywhere 
shaken, and a life resting on the traditionary notions 
was no longer possible. A d&'1.gerous rupture was at 
hand, unless the ancient faith ',Jere purged and elevated in 
such a manner as to meet the wants of the age. Mediators 
in this sense appeared in the persons of the great poets 
of Athens' "('A Speech at Eton", CPW, IX, pp. 32-33). 
A man like Pericles or Phidias seemed to afford promise that Athens would 
know how to make a real success of her qualities - the quality of 
flexibili ty. Lucidity of thought, clearness and freedom from stiffness, 
openness of mind, amiability of manners, - all these seem to go along with 
a certain flexibility of nature, and to depend upon it. 
Greek civilisation is even more important for the signs that 
heralded its fall or rather disintegration. The balance of forces 
which produced this golden a.ge 'lias precarious. "It soon becaI'le evident, ,,1 
says Arnold, "that the balance between the 010 morality and the new 
freedom 'Has not to be maintained" (ibid., p. 32). The current was setting 
too strongly another way. It was threatened both from within and from vrithout 
from i'l i t h i n b;:r the claim of each city to absolute sovereignty 
(in Arnold's time it waS each person) as well as the bitter and bloody 
strife between rich and poor within most cities, &'1.d from without by 
Sparta (not unlike Germany). Poetry itself, after the death of Soph~cles, 
"was seized by the same current which dissolved the foundations of the 
people's life, and which swept away the soil whe~n the emotions of 
the classical period had been rooted. The old perished; but the modern 
age, with its readiness in thought and speech, was incapable of creating 
a ne',.,r art as a support to its children" (Ibid., pp. 32-33). 
It is, then, to Arnold's credit that he was one of the few thinkers 
who observed the similarities bet'tleen Athenian history in the age of 
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Pericles and the Victorian age. Athens after its victory in the 
Persian wars (like England's victory over the Spanish Armada that opened 
the doors for the Blizabethan renaissance and the victory over Napoleon 
that opened the door for the Victorian one) became rich and powerful, 
not much troubled by wars, and possessed of a democratic constitution 
administered by aristocrats. Under the stimulus of victory and wealth 
and the need of reconstruGtion, architects, sculptors, and dramatists 
produced works which dominated the future down to modern times. This is 
the more surprising, as Arnold puts it in ItNumbers", when one considers 
the smallness of the population involved. Athens at its maximum, about 
430 B.C., is estimated to have numbered about 230,000. 
After having an idea of the world and life, "It remained," says Arnold 
"to select a subject from among those which had been considered to 
possess the true requisites of good tragic subjects; on which great 
works had been composed, but had not survived to chill emulation by 
their grandeur. Of such subjects there is, fortunately, no lack. In 
the writings of Hyginus, a Latin mythographer of uncertain date, we 
possess a large stock of them" (ItPreface to Merope," CPW, I, p. 40). 
The stage is thus set for a discussion of the principles which should 
guire a Victorian poet. Implicit in this debate over subject matter are, of 
course, the persistent demands made of the poet: one was that the poet 
should choose subjects from contemporary life, subjects which have a 
direct relevance to the people and their times; the other demand is that 
the poet should recognise and accept his responsibility to be not 
simply an interpreter and critic of his age, but a moral guide and spiritual 
comforter as well. 
Implicit in this argument is the accusation levelled against Arnold 
that he is a subjective poet since he, in his poetry, does not refer 
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directly to the works of men of his time. The Guardian (VIII 1853), 
enlarging upon such a conclusion, said that: "of a writer who never 
speaks about the men and women with whom he lives, we are apt to 
think that he has not entered into the realities of his own times. 
We suspect him of a lofty contempt for his age, or of a listless indifference 
to its wants and interests -- too indolent to undertake the trouble of 
comprehending its difficulties, too irresolute to enter into its life 
and death, for fear of being involved in the dangers of the strife. He 
are far from imputing such Epicurean sentiments to Nr Arnold; we 
only point out the imputation to which the bent of his poetry is liable" 
(p. 870). 
of 
In the Prefacefi853 Arnold explains why he tas discarded Empedocles 
on Btna. The fact that the subject of the poem is taken from classical 
story allol"ed Arnold to reopen the debate on the topic. He insists at 
the beginning that the subject of the poem was entirely appropriate 
and that he did not fail in the delineation which he intended to effect. 
The age of Empedocles was very much like the modern era; it was an age 
when the old religious vision was fading, the influence of the Sophists 
was sowing the seed of doubt without providing the wholeness of consolation. 
"The calm, the cheerfulness, the disinterested objectivity (of the older 
Greek literature) have disappeared; the dialogue of the mind ,vi th itself 
has commenced; modern problems have presented themselves; 'tle hear 
already the doubts, we iVitr.ess the discouragement, of Hamlet and of Faust" 
of 1853 
("The Preface/,"CPH, I, p. 1): "i-Ihat is that world? It is the 'tlorld of 
man vie'tled as a being ondoyant et divers, balancing and indeterminate, 
the plaything of cross motive3 and shifting impulses, swayed by a 
thousand subtle influences, physiological and pathological" (CP'd, X, 
p. 192). 
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It is plain that Arnold is doing a number of different things in the 
Preface. Ostensibly its main subject is Bmpedocles on Etnaf but this 
is soon lost from sightf and Arnold takes the opportunity to answer 
critics of his own early poems, especially Clough, ~nd then to expose some 
of the excesses of the Romantic movement, especially as shovm by 
Alex~nder Smith. This rapidly develops into a general condemnation of 
the poetry and the poetics of the previous fifty years. Naturally this 
implied ~n unfavourable judgement of Arnold's own contemporaries. The 
sixth paragraph of the Preface for instance is easily constructed as 
an attack, perhaps deliberate, on In Memoriam. 
He attacks the critics of his own time who not only prescribed, with 
their insistance on contemporaneous subject matter, a false poetic 
practice, but also prescribed false poetic aims: 
TI'hey (cri tics]',.,rill permit the poet to select any action he 
pleases, and to suffer that action to go as it will, 
provided he gratifies them vrith occasional bursts of fine 
writing, ~nd with a shower of isolated thoughts and 
images. That is, they permit him to leave their poetical 
sense ungratified, provided that he gratifies their 
rhetorical sense and their curiosity (liThe Preface", 
ibid., pp. 7-8). 
Before that, Arnold does not forget to remind young poets that there are 
certain situations from the representation of which no poetical enjoyment 
can be derived, those in vrhich the suffering finds no vent in action ••• 
in which there is everything to be endured, nothing to be done ••• vrhen 
they occur in actual life they are painful, not tragiC ••• To this class 
of situation, poetically faulty as it appears to me, that of Empedocles, 
as I have endeavoured to represent him, belongs. 16 
The poet, then, has in the first place to select an excellent action. 
For "vrhat are Fe eternal object> of poetry, It asks Arnold, It among all 
nations and at all times? They are actions; human actions possessing an 
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inherent interest in themselves, and which axe to be communicated in an 
interesting manner by the art of the poetll (Preface, ibid., p. 3). The 
context of these lines echoes Aristotle's concept: 
Most important of all is the structure of the incidents. 
For Tragedy is an imitation, not of men, but of an 
action and of life, and life consists in action, and its 
end is a mode of action, not a quality. Now character 
determines men's qualities, but it is by their actions 
that they are happy or the reverse. Dramatic action, 
therefore, is not with a view to the representation of 
character: character comes in as subsidiary to the 
action. Hence the incidents and the plot are the eud of 
a tragedy; and the end is the chief thing of all. 17 
Poets should ask themselves two questions to guide them in their choice: 
'What are we to take? What will nourish us in growth towards perfection?' 
It is better for the poet to select his actions from tradition: liThe 
tradition is a great matter to 2. poet; it is 2.n unspeakable support; it 
gives him the feeling that he is treading on solid ground. Aristotle tells 
the tragic poet that he must not destroy the received stories" ("Freface 
to r1erope", CPv.!, I, p. 53). 
"All depends," says Arnold, "upon the subject; choose a fitting 
action, penetrate yourself with the feeling of its situations; this done, 
everything else will follo ',." ••• The poet then has in the first place to 
select an excellent action; and what actions, asks Arnold, are the most 
excellent? Those, certainly, which powerfully appeal to the great 
primaxy huma.'1 affection;: to those elemE::.ltary feelings which subsist 
permanently in the race, and which are independent of time" (CPv!, I, p. 4). 
In other words, actions should be universal not private or provincial. 
In conformity with this conception Arnold condemns Tennyson's 
Maud and Other Poems: "I think this is a lamentable production, and like 
so much of our literature thoroughly and intensely provincial, not 
European" (eL, p. 148). In the same vein he condemns \flordsworth' s fal1l0US Ode: 
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Even the 'intimations' of the famous Ode, those corner-
stones of the supposed philosophic system of Wordsworth, -
the idea of the high instincts and affections coming out 
in childhood, testifying of a divine home recently left, 
and fading away as our life proceeds, - this idea, of 
undeniable beauty as a play of fancy, has itself not 
the character of poetic truth of the best kind; it has no 
real solidity. The instinct of delight in Nature and her 
beauty had no doubt extraordinary strength in "-iordsworth 
himself as a child. Eut to say that universally this 
instinct is mighty in childhood, and tends to die away 
afterwards, is to say what is extremely doubtful. In 
many people, perhaps with the majority of educated persons, 
the love of nature is nearly imperceptible at ten years 
old, but strong and operative at thirty ("\'iordsworth", 
CPW, IX, pp. 49-50). 
The problem involved here is the distinction between personal, 
topical, and universal. Eut are these different in nature? Some critics 
argue that the universal is but a projection of the topical, and that 
immediate realities contain ~~d project universals 0 In the 
light of this, the most unvarnished eC8nomic and political issues are 
related to the universals of anxiety, fear of deprivation, pain, extinction, 
a~guish, rage, disappointment, dejection and despair; they involve love 
and hate, loyalty and treason, selfishness and self-sacrifice, honour and 
dishonour, falsehood and truth, good and evil. 
Thus, the case of Mr Smith, that Arnold cited in Culture and Anarchy, 
who feared he would come to poverty and be eternally lost and then 
committed suicide, can be interpreted, in the light of this view, in terms 
of fear of deprivation and anxiety. But he, according to Arnold, cannot 
be a subject for poetry becau~e though the motives are universals, such 
a subject would be "too near ••• too mixed up with what was accidental and 
passing, to form a sufficiently grand, detached, and self-subsistent 
object for a tragic poem. Such objects belonged to the domain of the 
comic poet, and of the lighter kinds of poetry" (CPW, I, p. 7). The 
subjects chosen should speak, to use Vlordsworth' s lines, 
Then, says 
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Of truth, of grandeur, beauty, love and hope, 
And melancholy fear subdued by faith, 
Of blessed consolations in distress, 
Of moral strength and intellectual power, 
Of joy in widest cow~onalty spread. 
(Fragment of lfThe Recluse ll prefixed to the E~cursion in 
, 1914, lines 14-18), Arnold, "\ve have a poet lntent on 'the best 8-'1d master thing'" 
("\vordsworth", CPI:l, IX, p. 47). 
Imagination, of course, is required of the poet, but observation must 
precede imagination. His object, in short, is to convince the spectator 
of the realness of his situation as well as of its immediacy by 
accurately observed details, imaginatively selected and combined. Thus, 
the rich and satisfying nature of artistic experience lies in the power of 
the work to bring into awareness, by selected images and emotions, the 
real situation of one's ovffi. The test of excellence, then, is the 
degree of enlighten.ment that the \vork effecis on the reader. But it seems 
that Arnold's interpretations of his situation were too obscure for his 
age to appreciate them. 
Kingsley asks scornfully II1t1hat does the age want with fragments of 
18 
Antigone?" Arnold, however, answers him with a subdued air of irony 
implying that it is good to teach him since he, himself is a writer: 
An action like the action of the Antigone of Sophocles, 
which turns upon the conflict between the heroine's duty to 
her brother's corpse and that to the laws of her country, 
is no longer one in which it is possible that vre should 
feel a deep interest. I am speaking too, it will be 
remembered, not of the best sources of intellectual stimulus 
for the general reader, but of the best models of instruction 
for the individual writer (ibid., p. 12). 
Arnold must have realised that the theme of Antigone is significant 
and central to his writings. Her conflict, as he has observed, is the 
choice between her duty, which is moral, to her brother's corpse and that 
to the laws of her country. It is a choice between two rights. Her 
fault is that she has gone too far in insisting on her rights and thus 
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jeopardised the unity of her country by defying her country's laws. This 
has a direct bearing on Arnold's own time where, to use Arnold's 
vlords, it is a most happy and important thing for a man merely to be 
able to do as he likes. In insisting on her rights she has violated the 
doctrine of Greek society: Sopbrosyne, or moderation. Up till now the 
. action is still rich. Of Antigone's choice, C. Brooks says "In our day 
Antigone's choice has actually been rewritten as a defiance of the claims 
of the tyrannical Fascist state" (A Sha})ing Joy, p. 7). 
In his comment on the poem, Arnold says: "my Antigone supports me 
and in some degree subjugates destiny" (CL, p. 101). Again the aspect 
that the poem emphasises is central to Arnold's thinking: the primacy of 
the law that consecrates the ties of blood (humanism) over self-selected 
good. 
In little companies, 
And, our own place once left, 
Ignorant where to stand, or \'J'hom to avoid, 
By city and household grouped, we live; and many shocks 
Our order heaven-ordained 
Must every day endure: 
Voyages, exiles, hates, dissensions, wars. 
Besides what waste he makes, 
The all-hated, order-breaking, 
1tli thout friend, city, or home, 
Death, who dissevers all. 
Him then I praise, who dares 
To self-selected good 
Prefer obedience to the primal law, 
vmich consecrates the ties of blood; for these, indeed, 
Are to the Gods a care; 
That touches but himself. 
For every day man may be linked and loosed 
With strangers; but the bond 
Original, deep-inwound, 
Of blood, can he not bind, 
Nor, if Fate binds, not bear. 
(Poems, p. 61) 
But such an objective diagnosis of its ills, however, the modern age seems 
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not to want. It wants, says Arnold, one of two things: it wants introspection, 
I'a true allegory of the state of one's own mind, II or it wants glorification 
of its own achievements -- it wants its poets to inflate "themselves with 
a belief in the pre-eminent importance and greatness of their O\'1n times, 't 
and to this latter function it gives the modest name of "interpreting 
their age: '1 in the context it is perfectly clear that interpreting means 
praising- and nothing else ("Preface to Poems 1853,"CPW, I, p. 17). 
In conclusion, the Greeks, Arnold declares, "in a passage that 
points forward to much of his literary, social, and biblical criticism, 
(could help) to cure the great vice of the modern intellect -- a want of 
sanity which is manifested in literature, art, religion, morality. 
Sanity is the great virtue of ancient literature; the want of it is the 
great defect of modern literature. 'It is impossible,' Arnold concludes, 
'to read carefully the great ancients, without losing something of our 
caprice and eccentricity; and to emulate them we must at least read them"'. 19 
The poet who studies them will catch, like Gray, "their poetic point 
of view for regarding life, ••• and their poetic manner" (CPVl, IX, p. 181). 
"Only, the poet vlho \-lould reproduce this must cultivate in himself a Greek 
virtue by no means common among the moderns in general, and the English 
in particular, - moderation" (liOn Translating Homer", CPW, I, p. 168). 
"In the Athenians the sense of energy abhorred every kind of waste of time, 
their sense of measure abhoIred bombast and redundancy, and their clear 
intelligence everything partaking of obscurity or vagueness; it \-las their 
habit in all things to advance directly and resolutely to the goal" 
~Speech at Eton", CPW, IX, p. 24). These are the qualities that Arnold 
was trying to cultivate in his age. 
In the meantime Arnold contented himself with a brief Preface to 
the Edition of 1854 in which he cleared up some minor misunderstandings: 
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It has been said that I wish to limit the poet, in his 
choice of subjects, to the period of Greek and Roman 
antiquity; but it is not so. I only counsel him to 
choose for his subjects great actions, without regarding 
to what time they belong. Nor do I deny that the poetic 
faculty can and does manifest itself in treating the most 
trifling action, the most hopeless subject. But it is 
a pity that power should be wasted; and that the poet should 
be compelled to impart interest and force to his subject, 
instead of receiving them from it, and thereby doubling 
his impressiveness (CPW, I, p. 17). 
Though it is a partial retreat, it is not made without passing value 
judgement on such procedure, - trifling action ,hopeless subject'. 
Arnold, however, in selecting the actions of Sohrab and Rustum from 
Persian legend and Balder Dead from Nordic Saga, while at the same time 
treating them both in a Greek fashion, certainly conformed to this 
advice. 
III 
Concept of Form 
But the fact remains that whatever Arnold may think as a critic, he 
is operating as a poet too: insofar as he is constructing constitutive 
parts and assembling them into a whole. In these operations lies what 
Arnold calls, the "concept of form": 
Which do both give it (poem] being and maintain 
A balance, an ennobling interchange 
Of action from without and from within; 
The excellence, pure function, and best power 20 
Both of the object seen, and eye that sees. 
Warren, speaking of the Preface, says that "Arnold is virtually 
the only critic in the Early Victorian period who was seriously concerned 
with the problem of form in poetry, and who gave anything like an adequate 
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weight to it in his theory. This may account for the fact that, of the 
various critical essays of the period, the 'Preface' is likely to be the only 
one familiar to the general reader, which is merely another way of saying 
21 
that Arnold is the most modern of the Early Victorian critics". 
Arnold speaks in a letter to Clough of "Form of conception" as well as 
"Form of expression", suggesting that there is more to it than simply 
diction, rhyme, meter, and figures: 
It is to be observed that power of style, in the sense in 
which I am here speaking of style, is something quite 
different from the power of idiomatic, simple, nervous, 
racy expression, such as the expression of healthy, robust 
natures so often is, such as Luther's was in a striking 
degree. Style, in my sense of the word, is a peculiar 
recasting and heightening, under a certain condition of 
spiritual excitement, of what a man has to say, in such 
a manner as to add dignity and distinction to it. 
("On the Study of Celtic Literature", 
CPW, III, pp. 263-64) 
Form in a poem also includes, more importantly, as this study i.,rill sho't!, 
the structure of the embodied experience and its significance. For, as 
Arnold puts it, "the dramatic form exhibits, above all, the actions of man 
as strictly determined by his thoughts and feelings; it exhibits, therefore, 
what may be always accessible, always intelligible, always interesting 
("On the Nodern Element in Literature", CPW, I, p. 34). 
The question that comes to one's mind is: How can we capture, hold 
and handle feelings so that their content may be made accessible and 
intelligible? Arnold would say "Fit details strictly combined, in view of 
a large general result nobly conceived; that is just the beautiful 
symmetria prisca of the Greeks, and it is just where we English fail, 
where all our art fails (IILiterature and Science", CPW, X, p. 71). So, 
one finds that among the guiding principles in the Preface is the subordination 
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of parts to the whole, the preference for a mighty total-impression 
rather than for brilliant single lines and passages. Careful 
construction assuring the -true relation of the parts to the whole was in 
Arnold's view the hallmark of a true artist: "They (Shakespeare, Noliere-, 
and Swift) are great literary masters, they are supreme writers, because 
they knew how to work into a literary composition their materials, and 
to subdue them to the pu.Y;Joses of literary effect" (CPW, X, p. 174). 
There is no doubt that the idea of beauty, for many people, is linked 
with the idea of symmetry. They apply it to harmoniously proportioned 
statues and pictures, harmonious and rhythmical music and poetry, and 
refuse to apply it to discordant and harsh-sounding music and poetry, and 
disproportioned sculpture and painting. Arnold knows that. He makes it 
a condition that if the poem is to be beautiful, it should have a certain 
magnitude as determined by the specific whole and its parts. It must 
have symmetry: 
The regular correspondence of part with part, the antithesis, 
in answering stanzas, of thought to thought, feeling to 
feeling, with the balance of the whole struck in one 
independent final stanza or epode ••• (that is) something 
of the peculiar distinctness and symmetry, which constitute 
the vital force of the Greek tragic forms ~ 
(IIPreface to Nerope", CPH, I, pp. 61-62). 
Again, Arnold, in expounding Hilton's three adjectives, simple, sensuous, 
and passionate, which Coleridge regards as an adequate summa~J definition 
of poetry, he makes the point that the second condition, sensuousness, 
insures that framework of objectivity, that definiteness and articulation 
of imagery, without which poetry evaporates into day-dreaming, while the 
third condition, passion, provides that neither thought nor imagery 
shall be simply objective, but that the passio vera of humanity shall warm 
and animate both • 
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']'he Preface heing basic2,11y 8.!"'. expre:.:osion of a critical theory that 
takes its startinfS point frem the idea of a rejection of romar:tic 
subjectivism, '.rges the nineteenth-century poet to choose an excellent 
action and to subordina.te his talents to the presentation of it. Again in 
a letter to Clou.r.:h, he says: 
I feel that the difference beh!een a mature and a youthful 
age of the 'dorld compels the poetry of the former to use 
great plainness of speech as compared \ofi th that of the 
latter: ar-,d that Keats and Shelley were on a false track 
when they set themselves to reproduce the exuberance of 
expression, the charm, the richness of images, and the 
felicity, of the Elizabethan poets. Yet critics cannot 
get to learn this, because the Elizabethan poets are our 
greatest, and our canons of poetry are founded on their 
works. They still think that the object of poetry is to 
produce exquisite bits and images ••• whereas modern 
poetry can only subsist by its contents: by becoming a 
complete magister vitae as the poetry of the ancients did: 
by including, as theirs did, religion with p06tr~r, instead 
of existing 8.S postry only, and leaving reUgious wants 
to be supplied by the Christian religi.on, as 3. po'..rer 
existing independent of the poetical power. But the 
lar,guage, style arld general p.L'oceedin£;"s of a poetry which 
has sl~ch aY'; immense task to perfo::"" mus t be verJ plain 
direct and severe: a:;1d it mus t not lose itself in parts and 
episodes and ornamental work, but must press forwards to the 
whole. 
(eL, p. 124) 
The idea be'nind this is that "The end ar:d aim of all religion, 
access to God, - the sense of harmony with the universal order, the 
parta..1.cing of the divine nature, that our faith and hope might be in God, 
that we might have life and have it more abund8Ltly, - meant, for the 
Hebrew, access to the source of the moral order in especial, and harmony 
with it" (CPW, VI, p. 24). This is the main r08.d toward man's proper 
totality and perfection. "In this conformity to the will of God, as we 
religiously name the moral order, is our peace and ha:ppiness (ibid., p. 32). 
The echo of Da.'1te' s famous lir.e: 'In la sua volur,tade e nostr3. pace' - one 
of Arnold's critical touchstones - is very 3.udible. 
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This way of thinking depends on the assumption that human nature, in 
its passion and sensibilities no less than its reason, is everywhere 
fundamentally the same. For it seems to be a universal human desire to 
wish to occupy a place in the world of at least one ~ :0ther person. 
Perhaps the greatest solace in religion is the sense that one lives in the 
presence of an Other. Once a person imagines vividly his union with 
a force greater than his solitary self, he begins to act as if the authority 
of the moral lavl were acting through him. 1rIith the death of the ordinary 
self, he merges in the life of the universe. 
But the Cartesian cogito, in its reinforcement by the impact of modern 
science, has inspired the philosophical itinerary in the course of which 
the traditional conviction that the alienated man is the man who does 
not believe in God has given way to the view that belief in God is 
a profound source of human alienation. This theme is illustrated in the 
philosophies of Kant, Hegel, Feuerbach and Harx and in its contemporary 
expression in positivistic Naturalism and Existentialism. lilt is 
maintained that the affirmation of God as infinite being necessarily implies 
the devaluation of finite being and, in particular, the dehumanisation 
of man. The merely negative form of atheism has been replaced by a more 
sophisticated version according to which contemporary man if he is to be 
truly human must, perhaps reluctantly, dispense ",ith belief in God. Thus 
the 'problem of God' is posed today as a feature of a more basic problem 
of human alienation and authenticity" (Masterson, Atheism and Alienation, 
p. 13). 
Given the conclusion of modern thought, Arnold was convinced that 
the decline of belief, especially of old Christianity, was inevitable. 
But he also believed that IIfeeling and the religious mood are eternally 
the deepest being of man, the ground of all joy and greatness for him" 
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(Yale ME, Poems, p. 149). How does, then, poetry bring man to a due 
sense of religion? The problem is that modern poem cannot any more 
preach, like Dante or Hilton, a sublime sermon on a given text like the 
Bible, because the Bible itself was fighting for its existence against 
the claims of science. "The best and indeed the only method," says 
David Hume, "of bringing everyone to a due sense of religion, is by just 
representations of the misery ••• of man. And for that purpose a talent of 
eloquence and strong imagery is more requisite than that of reasoning 
and argument. For is it necessary to prove, what every one feels within 
himself? 'Tis only necessary to make us feel it, if possible, more 
22 
intimately and sensibly." 
Arnold seems to think in that direction. For he quotes from T. Gray 
that "He 'dho best knows our nature (for he made us what we are) by such 
afflictions recalls us from our wandering thoughts and idle merriment, 
from the insolence of youth and prosperity, to serious reflection, to our 
duty, and to himself" (CP1;[, IX, p. 195). Again he writes, in the Preface 
1853, "the more tragic the situation, the deeper becomes the enjoyment; and 
the situation is more tragic in proportion as it becomes more terrible" 
(CPW, I, p 2). Perhaps nothing is more terrible than one's feeling 
of loneliness, confusion, separateness, and incompleteness. Arnold did 
not invent these states, they were the bent of the time: "In an epoch of 
dissolution and transformation, such as that on which we are now entered, 
habits, ties, and associations are inevitably broken up, the action of 
individuals becomes more distinct, the shortcomings, errors, heats, 
disputes, which necessarily attend individual action, are brought into 
greater prominence" ("Preface to Essays in Criticism", CP'tT., III, 2~8). 
Arnold's critical practice conforms \-lith this method. John S. Eells has 
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written a valuable study of Arnold's well-known touchstones in "The 
study of Poetry" (1880), sho\ving that the bulk of them express emotions 
of loss, pain, grief, death, "the transience of both glory and happiness, 
the abiding pathos of young death; the manifold sorrow of man; the 
pathetic vicissitudes of man; the inward petrifaction caused by grief too 
deep for tears; the pain of living; the grandeur and majesty of a noble 
personality brought to ruin by a tragic flaw; the sense of loss of 
23 
something beloved".' 
This shows that Arnold's concept of form is not separated from that of 
content: they modify each other. To this effect Arnold says to Clough that 
the "idea of style [is] half the work ••• And had Shakespeare and Hilton 
lived in the atmosphere of modern feeling, had they had the multitude of 
new thoughts and feelings to deal with a modern has, I think it likely 
the style of each would have been far less curious ~~d exquisite. For in 
a man style is the saying in the best way what you have to say. The 
what you have to say depends on your age" (CL, pp. 64-65). Again he stresses 
the idea that poetic style has a noble and an important function: to 
produce a noble effect. Grand moral effects are produced by style. "For 
the style is the expression of the nobility of the poet's character, 
as the matter is the expression of the richness of his mind" (CL, p. lOl~. 
To this aim .~old lists the finest of the Greek literary techniques 
such as: clearness of arrangement, vigour of development, simplicity of 
style and the manifestation of a severe and scrupulous self-restraint. 
Their expression "is excellent because it is so admirably kept in its right 
degree of prominence, because it is so simple and so well subordinated; 
because it draws its force directly from the pregnancy of the matter which 
it conveys" (~, I, p. 5). "'What distinguishes the artist from the 
mere amateur,' says Goethe, 'is Architectonic~, in the highest sense; that 
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pOvler of execution, Hhich creates, forms, and constitutes: not the profound-
ness of single thoughts, not the richness of imagery, not the abundance of 
illustration'" (Ibid., p. 9). 
Arnold's most distinctively original achievements Here in free verse, 
or what R.H. Hutton called "pieces of unrhymed recitative", for which his 
models seem to have been both Greek lyrics and poems of Goethe e.nd Heine. He 
tried fifteen quite different verse-forms in the sixteen poems that Here not 
sonnets; only "The Hayswater Boat" and "A Hemory Picture" use some'dhat 
similar stanzas. The sonnets, too, are clearly practice pieces; he scarcely 
used the form again until his last collection in 1867. His sonnets, Hhich 
comprise about a fourth of his published poems, are microcosms of his later 
poetic themes. In subject matter, they deal with literature, politics, nature, 
religion, and personal philosophy. However, love, the traditional subject of 
sonneteers, is absent. In addition, his sonnets illustrate his metrical 
diversity, his use of nature imagery, and his balanced, classic line. 
jYlost critics, hOHever, complain that Arnold is inconsistent in his 
critical theory, not to mention their complaints about the lack of correspond-
ence between his theory and practice: there is, first, the Arnold of the 1853 
Preface where he puts his emphasis on style; there is also the Arnold of the 
1864 "The Function of Criticism at the Present Time", 'dhose historical concern 
with the source of ideas - the enabling factor of poetry - leads him to belittle 
the Romantics. There is, finally, the Arnold of the 1880 "The Study of Poetry", 
whose devotion to poetry's moving pOHer - its power to unify man's sensibilit-
ies - leads him to declare that the greatness of poetrJ lies "in the matter 
and substance, ••• and in its manner and style" (CPvl, IX, p.171). Arnold does 
not, in fact, put his emphasis only on style. As early as October 28, 1852 he 
writes to Clough that "modern poetrJ can only subsist by its contents: by 
- 75 -
becoming a complete magister vitae" (CL, p. 124). The idea is developed 
later in "The study of Poetry" (1880). 
There is, hOvlever, a development - in the sense of one belief 
emerging recognisably from the previous one and leading inevitably to the 
next: it vlOuld be all much tidier were this not so. ' It is the preroga ti ve 
of the artist as well as the thinker to use some other thinkers and poets 
to mediate between his material and his imagination. Arnold has anti9ipated 
this accusation. In his preface to The Poems of ~lordsworth (1879), he 
says: 
As if a man, journeying home, and finding a nice inn 
on the road, and liking it, were to stay for ever at the 
inn! Nan, thou hast forgotten thine object; they journey was 
not ~ this, but through this. 'But this inn is taking.' 
And how many other inns, too, are taking, and how many fields 
and meadows! but as places of passages merely. You have an 
object, "/hich is this: to get home, to do your duty to 
your family, friends, and fellm'l-countrymen, to attain 
inward freedom, serenity, happiness, contentment. Style takes 
your fancy, arguing takes your fancy, and you forget your 
home and want to make your abode with them and to stay with 
them, on the plea that they are taking. villo denies that they 
are taking? But as places of passages, as inns. And vlhen I 
say this, you suppose me to be attacking the care for style, 
the care for argument. I am not; I attack the resting in 
them, the not looking to the end which is beyond them. 
( CPW, IX, p. 47) 
Another accusation levelled against Arnold is that his poetry fails 
musically. Lowry, to this effect, says "It is a little hard to understand 
how he who had made the golden cars of Nycerinus 'sweep in the sounding 
stillness of the night,' and uttered the perfect felicities of 'Dover 
Beach,' could have imagined that there was a line of poetry even dormant 
in 'Germany, France, Christ, Noses, Athens, Rome'" (Introduction to CL, p. 40). 
Douglas Bush, in his comment on Arnold's poetry, writes: "Arnold's 
characteristic and often prosaic plainness came in part from his theory 
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of poetry, in part from the nature of his poetic gifts. In setting forth 
his spiritual troubles he seeks first of all to achieve a true and adequate 
statement, bare of non-essential decoration ••• The reader, while moved 
by what is said, may feel that the writing is not inspired and 
inevitable, that perhaps he himself could make improvement in diction and 
rhythm. Though Arnold achieves beautiful and individual rhythms, ••• 
24 
he has a notoriously unreliable ear". 
Arnold used to think that rhythm, metre, diction are provided by 
the age: the poet does not make them. If this is so and he se68 that his 
age is unpoetic, good construction, in this situation, would be taken as a 
mark of insincerity; instead of expressing naturally and uninhibitedly 
what he is feeling, one would suspect that he has worked on his poetry 
and dressed it up for public presentation. In conformity with this line of 
thought some critics rightly argue that cacophony in Arnold's poetry 
is a deliberate plan that Arnold follows to show that form and content 
determine each other. To this effect Park Honan writes "we should hardly 
wish to be without those sonnets and reflective lyrics in which Arnold 
deliberately sought degrees of harshness to fulfill two needs: to provide 
a sound metaphor for the spiritual temper of the age, and to provide 
a style-metaphor for the noble character of the poet \-rho was to instruct 
ttat age. His thought in these poems has influenced our o'tm thought 
considerably. And his technique in them has influenced modern poetic 
25 
technique." This line of argument will be dealt with in more detail in 
Part Two of this Thesis. 
Arnold must have been aware of these imperfections. He considers 
them as acceptable, for as he says "Perfection of a certain kind may 
there be attained, or at least approached, without knocking yourself to 
pieces, but to attain or approach perfection in the region of thought and 
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feeling, and to unite this with perfection of form, demands not merely an 
effort and a labour, but an actual tearing of oneself to pieces, which 
one does not readily consent to (although one is sometimes forced to it) 
illlless one can devote one's ",hole life to poetry" (Letters, I, pp. 62-63). 
Again in a strain of self justification he says: 
Shakespeare frequently has lines and passages in a strain quite 
false, and "'hich are entirely unworthy of him. But one can 
imagine his smiling if one could meet him in the Elysiam 
Fields and tell him so; smiling and replying that he knew 
it perfectly well himself, and what did it matter? But 'IIi th 
Wordsworth the case is different. Work altogether inferior, 
work quite uninspired, flat and dull, is produced by him with 
evident unconsciousness of its defects, and he presents 
it to us with the same faith and seriousness as his best 
work (CPW, IX, p. 42). 
26 
It is worthy of notice that whenever Arnold speaks of poet~J he speaks 
"of poetic genius as employing itself upon narrative or dramatic poetry, -
poetry in which the poet has to go out of himself and to create. In lyrical 
poet~J, in the direct expression of personal feeling, the most subtle 
genius may, under the momentary pressure of passion, express itself 
~implyll ("On Translating Homer lt , CPU, I, p. 206). And of dramatic poetry 
he means tragedy, for "comedy," according to Arnold, "escapes ••• the test 
of entire seriousness; it remains, by the law of its being, in a region of 
comparative lightness and irony. vfuat is artificial passes in comedy more 
easily" (~, IX, p. 73). "The case of the great Holi'8re himse1f will 
illustrate the truth of what I say. Moliere is by far the chief name in 
French poetry; he is one of the very greatest names in all literature. 
He has admirable and delightful power, penetrativeness, insight; a 
masterly criticism of life. But he is a comic poet. Why? ••• 
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For only by breasting in full the storm 
and cloud of life, breasting it and passing 
through it and above it, can the dramatist Vlho 
feels the weight of mortal things liberate 
himself from the pressure, and rise, as we all 
seek to rise, to content and joy. Tragedy breasts 
the pressure of life. Comedy eludes it, half 
liberates itself from it by irony. But the 
tragedian, if he has the sterner labour, 
has also the higher prize. Shakespeare has more joy 
than r'loligre, more assurance and peace (CPd, IX, p. 72). 
John Farrell, in his comment on Arnold's idea of tra~edy, has rightly 
observed that "'since the French Revolution, the idea of tragedy can be 
seen as in different ways of response to a culture in a conscious change and 
movement.' Arnold's idea of tragedy is just such a response. The response 
is determined by the tragic sense of history that involves thea? 
attitudes: the attitude that human destiny is profoundly shaped by one's 
milieu, that this r:lilieu derives its organisation from a historical 
process 1"hich is both magnifice:!1t a::J.d radically fl8.\"ed, aXed that the 
participation of a heroic individual in this process, hi~ confrontation 
.... tith its revolutionary direction, may possess the dignity of tragic 
27 
conflict". 
But Arnold's originality and his finest achievement, as a poet-critic, 
lies in his making the issues discussed in this chapter, "The Poetic 
Process", which belong to abstract thi~~ing, dramatic. The questicn that 
underlies his poetic process might be phrased as foll01/ls: How does the 
poet relate himself to the external world; how does he perceive the world 
objectively and yet retain his own integrity and individuality? 
In the next two chapters, - "Varieties of Poetic Vision" and "On Poets", I 
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shall try to show how Arnold h~~dles this abstract question 
poetically. 
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CHAPTER III 
Varieties of Poetic Vision 
Ah! two desires toss about 
The poet's feverish blood, 
One drives him to the world without, 
And one to solitude. 
M. Arnold "In Memory of the Author of 'Obermann'" 
The aim of this chapter is to show that Arnold rejects, in part, 
the Romantic personality as well as the Romantic theory of poetry as 
inadequate to cope with social, religious, and philosophical problems of 
a progressive, sceptical, and scientific age; it will show his Oyffi 
conception of the appropriate poetic vision and the kind of poetry that 
ought to be written in that age. The key poems on that matter are "The 
strayed Reveller", "Resignation", and "Epilogue to Lessing's Laocoon". 
My argument will be to show that these three poems represent successive 
stages in the development of an argument by poetic means about the 
appropriate poetic vision. 
I 
"The 'Strayed Reveller" is (after the early and not very coherent 
"The New Sirens"l) Arn;ld's fullest exploration of the romantic poet's 
plunge into experience and the consequence for his creativity. The 
poem is Arnold's examination of the strayed poet giving himself up to a 
kaleidoscopic and almost psychedelic swirl of vision -- and curiously 
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exempt from the pain which the reveller himself says a poet must 
undergo. 
The fact that "The Strayed R,eveller" was chosen to be the title 
poem of the 1849 volume shows, among many other things, Arnold's 
satisfaction in what he has created. This is confirmed by the fact that 
"it was reprinted in every collected edition with practically no alteration 
of the text" (Commentary, pp. 159-160). The poem is the title of a 
volume of verse whose preoccupation is the relation of the poet, the 
sensitive and deeply thinking harmoniser of experience, to the raw material 
he handles: can the poet see the world as it really is without becoming 
involved in it? Is not the god-like detached vision illusory and superficial? 
And is not the painful and time-bound vision of the poet too emotional and 
too subjective? These questions are, in fact, the frame of the argument in 
the poem. The argument shows that poetry should correspond with human 
experience and deal with the universal experience of all men. In a word, 
Arnold expects the poet to answer the question: how to live. This is a 
long and laborious way that needs patience, knowledge, self-discipline, 
virtue, decisiveness and self-control. The poet should have an ardent 
impulse to seek the genuine truth on all matters he thinks of, and a gift for 
finding and recognising it when it is found. Undoubtedly, the reveller 
has nothing of these qualities g Some modern readers see it as Arnold's 
most authentic anatomy of true classicism, before the more frozen 
and Apollonian pseudo-classicism of 1853 and later. Warren D. Anderson, 
in his comment on the poem, says "'The Strayed Reveller' suggests no 
clear similarity between the ecstatic intoxication of Dionysiac revels 
and the act of poetic creation. In fact, it makes a certain effort to 
keep them separate".2 This remark seems to be a criticism of Tinker and 
Lowry's study in which they say, "This symbolic poem seems to suggest 
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a similarity between the intoxication of the Bacchic revellers in their 
ecstasy and the experience of poets in the act of creation" (Commentary, 
p. 16). Anderson comes to the conclusion that the poem shows Arnold 
unable, or unwilling to resolve that dilemma by choosing between 
alternatives (p. 70). Alan Roper, concerning the difficulty. of the poem, 
says "what makes the 'Strayed Reveller' difficult is that, unusually 
for Arnold, it lacks the features which permit a value judgement upon 
the action and professions it contains. It is Arnold's fullest poetic 
statement about the nature of the poet and his creation ••• But the statement 
is made without the sort of comment, however indirect, which could tell 
us whether or not it constitutes a full and adequate aesthetic".3 Robert 
Stange, to this effect, writes that "the poem's statement is, unfortunately, 
somewhat blurred - chiefly, I think, because the suggestions of the plot 
are not carried to a conclusion".4 N. Friedman says that "the fault of 
the poem is that it sets up a problem which it fails to resolve, or 
even illuminate or embody successfully".5 To the same effect, L. Gottfried 
says "many readers, including members of Arnold's own family, found some 
or all of these performances obscure, puzzling, or remote from the serious 
concerns of contemporary reality".6 
This might intimidate an inexperienced critic, but once one realises 
that the critic's temptations do not proceed from what is ordinary but 
from what is not, one finds it rewarding to attempt an interpretation of 
this poem. The criiics' remarks can be roughly rewritten as follows: 
Arnold's argument is not clear because it lacks a value judgement upon 
the action it contains; and if there is an argument, it is not carried to 
a conclusion. 
It is a characteristic of Arnold that he often builds his poems 
around a dramatic contrast between two or three characters who represent 
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varying ways of life; and that he uses a frame of reference to recommend one 
thing and to condemn another. To this effect he writes in Culture and 
Anarchy "we are often supposed, when we criticise by the help of culture 
some imperfect doing or other, to have in our eye some well-known rival 
plan of doing, which we want to serve and recommend".7 Naturally, the 
first thing the artist does, is to try to find that frame of reference 
in his own society. But the ideal order in human society, the world of 
man, which "had provided Shakespeare and Pope with a frame of reference," 
as Foakes puts it, "had collapsed and could no longer supply images of 
harmony".8 Indeed, human society has become, in the poetry of Arnold, 
an image of waste, futility, ultimate disorder and anarchy; the city as well 
has become an image of spiritual exhaustion, or even an image of hell. 
Arnold in general solves this problem in three ways: firstly, by 
taking myths as man's formulation of his own experience and of the 
values that operate upon him in time and in nature; secondly, by using 
images from the natural world such as light, rivers, mountains etc. 
and; thirdly, by using a vocabulary of assertion, value words, words that 
have religious associations. In "The Strayed Reveller", he uses all these 
methods. 
Many critics are dissatisfied with Arnold's usage of the myths 
in this poem. Friedman says "I can find no particular dramatic reason 
why this setting (Book X of the Odyssey) is chosen, for Ulysses' functional 
role is slight indeed". (p. 407). Of myths one would like to say that.the 
value of any myth cannot depend on its demonstrability as a fact, but only 
on the value of the attitudes it embodies, the further attitudes it 
engenders and the actions it motivates. In addition to that, myth allows 
selection and rhetorical exaggeration and frees the writer from the burden 
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of irrelevant detail that attends descriptions of modern life. It can 
be used as an interpretive device - the poet reinterprets the present 
in terms of the past. What distinguishes one poet from another is the 
art of catching the essence of the situation, of putting one's finger on 
the heart of the matter. 
In many of Arnold's poems the dream of a primitive mythological world 
of simple joy and harmony is emphasised. This is the impression Arnold 
likes to give but beneath the surface one finds the opposite. Such a world 
is rhetorically used to oppose or contrast with the sick hurry of modern 
life. Arnold uses it, as Professor Bush put it, "not as a preferable or 
possible alternative or as a complete ideal, for Arnold would not 
disown his intellectual heritage, however painful its responsibilities, 
but as a partial corrective of ill-balanced modernity and as a cool 
refuge for his perplexed and lonely soul. And his sense of the high 
seriousness of life and poetry, his constant effort to see himself and 
nature under the reign of law, prevented his mythological visions from 
being mere poetry of escape".9 It is true, for Arnold knows that there 
is no escape from the city except in temporary excursions into a nostalgically 
regarded past. 
In this poem Arnold contrasts two ways: the way of involvement and 
that of detachment and solitude. He disinterestedly remains aloof, paring 
his fingernails in the expectation that the reader will be encouraged to 
appreciate how complex the problem is. The poem is pregnant with many 
suggestive ideas and questions due to its mythological background. 
If the poem is to be taken as allegory, the title ought to be 
carefully considered. It would appear that the word "strayed" must 
convey more meaning than its literal significance. It belongs to a class of 
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words poets use to establish a transcendental order, usually called a 
vocabulary'of assertion or value words. They represent concepts or 
feelings universally regarded as valuable due to the fact that they are 
endowed by religious associations. This may explain why Arnold calls his 
youth a . strayed reveller' because the word astray ';hasiBiblical connotation 
of sheep who have strayed from the path of righteousness. Similarly 
the word reveller has a religious connotation too, it is often used by 
St Paul tl Pet. 4:3 "Let the time that is past suffice for doing what the 
Gentiles like to do, living in licentiousness, passions, drunkenness, 
revels, carousing, and lawless idolatory.,,)lO From this point of view 
one can say that Arnold is condemning the way of the reveller. This view 
will be sufficiently supported and proved in the remainder of this essay. 
The topography of the action is given clearly: a valley slopes up 
to high ground on which the Reveller lives alone in a hut; part way down 
the valley and apparently on opposite sides of it there are two buildings: 
the temple of lacchus: 
In the town, round the temple, 
lacchus' white fane 
On yonder hill. 
(11.37-39) 
And the palace of Circe: 
Down the dark valley; I saw 
On my left, through the beeches, 
Thy palace, Goddess, 
Smokeless, empty. 
(11.42-45) 
As the poem opens the youth, who has strayed from the Bacchic rout, is 
discovered in the evening at the portico of Circe's palace. In his first 
speech he explains that he has drunk the enchantress's wine and succumbed to 
the charms of her magical world. The reveller may be taken to represent the 
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inexperienced romantic poet who has neglected the moral mode of the 
vision (Bacchic way] and given himself into enchantment and intoxication: 
the naturalistic mode of vision (Circe way). His way is not enough: 
for poetry, says Arnold, "interprets ••• by expressing with magical felicity 
the physiognomy and movement of the outward world, and it interprets by 
expressing with inspired conviction, the ideas and laws of the inward 
world of men's moral and spiritual nature" (If Maurice de Guerin", CPl,oI, III, 
, ---
p. 33). The poet in the poem does not master the technique of versification 
either. Anyhow~ there is pictorial vividness which Professor Allott 
says "is unusual for Arnold; it may have been worked up partly to 
compensate for the lack of rhyme and conventional metre" (Poems, p. 66). 
The reveller, being unfurnished with an idea about the world, succumbs 
to the spells of Circe who changes him and robs him of his manhood: The 
youth is immensely changed after he drinks from the cup. Most noticeably he 
now prefers imaginative to real life. Drinking from Circe's cup has 
changed the Reveller's appearance. Ulysses gives this picture of him 
just after he has taken the potion: 
• •• he sits, 'bending downward 
His white, delicate neck 
To the ivy-wreathed marge 
Of thy cup; bright, glancing vine-leaves 
That crown his hair, 
Falling forward, mingling 
With the dark ivy-plants-
His fawn-skin, half untied, 
Smeared with red wine-stains. 
(11.82-90) 
In this description the youth, as Sundell puts it, "appears just the 
opposite of what he was in the morning. Before he was rough, active and 
masculine; now he is delicate, passive, and even feminine".ll This 
brings to the reader's mind Arnold's description of the poetic temperament 
of Guerin and Keats. In this type of poetic temperament 
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the poet, as Arnold puts it, aspires to be a sort of Aeolian harp. 
This might, too, remind the reader of a period where the poet was a 
/ 
Shaman of whom Roheim writes "in his relation to the supernatural 
world he is the female, the Receiver, completely overcome in his ecstatic 
state by a Will that imposes itself from without and penetrates into 
his body".12 
Most critics describe the youth as a young follower of Dionysus. 
This description is not in fact in harmony with his deepest nature, for his 
dwelling place, in the hut at the head of the high valley, is a place of 
fresh natural beauty. The temple of Iacchus is in the town and is 
surrounded by a rout of people. It clearly represents the world in 
opposition to the solitude in which the youth lives, and his descent into 
the town is the usual Arnoldian symbol for the descent onto the burning 
plain. Arnold is fond of contrasting these two worlds to give value 
judgement. Of this opposition, Professor Drew writes that "It is the 
life of the countryside, innocent, restorative, and making for easy 
natural poetry, while the 'city-noise' and 'the great town's harsh heart-
wearying roar' represent all the forces that overtask and ultimately 
silence a poet's voice" ("The Passage of Time", p. 207). This is true, 
Arnold is never tired of describing the age as unpoetical. What makes 
one believe that the contrast is a rhetorical device is Arnold's 
awareness that the past is already dead and that he "knew enough of the 
world to realise that Britain was certain to grow steadily more urban" 
(ibid., p. 205). 
Arnold, in fact, associates the world of Circe with Hellenism and that 
of Dionysus with Hebraism. The fault of the youth, in this case, is that 
he mistakes one for the other and that he takes one of them as an end in 
itself. Arnold does not present Hellenism and Hebraism as two ways of life. 
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He has proved, in many places, the fallacy of followinz one and neglecting 
the other. To this effect, he says in Culture and Anarchy that "the 
evolution of these forces, separately and in themselves, is not the whole 
evolution of humanity, -- their history is not the whole history of man; 
whereas their admirers are always apt to make it stand for the whole 
history. Hebraism and Hellenism are, neither of them, the law of human 
development, as their admirers are prone to make them; they are ••• ~ 
contribution to human development".13 
Similarly, Circe is chosen because she represents, among many other 
things, a stage in the journey of Ulysses. She does not have the secret 
of knowledge so as to guide him to his home. She tells him "but before 
I can send you home you have to make a journey of a very different kind, 
and your way to the Halls of Hades and Persephone the Dread, to consult 
the soul of Tiresias, the blind Theban prophet, whose understanding even 
death has not impaired".14 This shows that the way to the vision is the 
way of pain and suffering and not that of intoxication. He who wants the 
vision must suffer like Ulysses and his crew who say "And a melancholy 
crew we were ••• in the City of Perpetual Hist" (p. 171). He should take 
the long way of suffering and experience to come to the vision. 
In order to emphasise the contrast between the Reveller and Ulysses, 
the sailor and hunter who, as Homer says, can resist enchantment, knows 
where he wants to go and gets there, Arnold stablises one factor 
which is Circe and takes the Reveller and Ulysses as variable elements. 
The latter is well defined, he retains his identity. The youth recognises 
him at once. While the youth's character is not well-defined, Ulysses is 
not certain of him: 
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I am Ulysses. 
And thou, too, sleeper? 
Thy voice is sweet. 
It may be thou hast followed 
Through the islands some divine bard, 
By age taught many things, 
Age and the Muses; 
And heard him delighting 
The chiefs and people 
••• and learned his songs, 
Of Gods and Heroes, 
Of war and arts 
And peopled cities, 
Inland, or built 
By the grey sea. - If so, then hail! 
I honour and welcome thee. 
(rr.114-129) 
It is Arnold's intention that Circe is to be an ambiguous character. 
On one level she is used to recommend Hellenism and in this way he 
condemns the Hebriastic tendencies in the Victorian city. This is implied 
by the fact that she can make people lose all memory of their native 
land. On the other level she is not recommended as the only way of life, 
she is but one-fourth of life. The youth has made the secondary the 
principal at the wrong moment, and the principal he has at the wrong 
moment treated as secondary. Of a situation like this Arnold says in 
Culture and Anarchy that: 
This contravention of the natural order has produced, as such 
contravention always must produce, a certain confusion and 
false movement, of which we are now beginning to feel, in 
almost every direction, the inconvenience. In all directions 
our habitual courses of action seem to be losing 
efficaciousness, credit, and control, both with others 
and even with ourselves; everywhere we see the beginning of 
confusion, and we want a clue to some sound order and 
authority. This we can only get by going back upon the 
actual instincts and forces which rule our life, seeing 
them as they are, connecting them with other instincts and 
forces, and enlarging our whole view and rule of life 
( CF,{ ., V, 17 5 ) 
This, in fact, can be said of the youth. 
Ulysses is seen, in the poem hunting with Circe: 
- 92 -
Hist! Thou-within there! 
Come forth, Ulysses! 
Art tired with hunting? 
While we range the woodland, 
See what the day brings. 
(11.70-74) 
Ulysses is obviously introduced to be contrasted with the more dreamy 
youth and not to give him a pretext to say his long speech as some 
critics think. Most critics contrast them on the basis of action. 
Action, however, is not the salient feature of Ulysses. The basic 
differences are experience and knowledge: 'Idea of the world'. 
Ulysses is a wanderer who has acquired experience and knowledge of the 
world. He is the 'proved, much enduring,/Wave toss'd wanderer!'" 
(pp. 102-3). The bards see and bear Ulysses IS experience: 
They see the Heroes 
Near harbour; but they share 
Their lives, and former violent toil in Thebes, 
Seven-gated Thebes, or Troy; 
Or where the echoing oars 
Of Argo first 
Startled the unknown sea. 
(254-60) 
The youth describes three modes of vision; that of the Gods, that 
of the wise bards, and finally his own. 
The first vision (11.130-206) portrays a transcendent and divinely 
serene view of the world and its inhabitants, the import being that the 
Gods see all things from a blissfully detached point of view, since all 
they see appears easy and natural and without pain or suffering. Eut 
the vision of Gods is superficial and impassive. One senses, here, an 
oblique criticism of gods as being indifferent to man's fate, consequently 
man should arrange his own affairs. He should not expect anything from 
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gods. Dorothy Mermin, in her comment on the poem, says that "Gods whose 
vision is so superficial, narrow, and detached can hardly care much 
about men, or deserve that men care about them. They are Epicurean 
gods, and their indifference must be a prime cause of the grim futility 
of human life ll • 15 This view, one thinks, reads more into the situation 
than really is. Such a view is alien to Arnold's line of thought; the 
poem, itself, does not support it. 
The gods are said to see six specific things: Tiresias, the Centaurs, 
the Indian in the vale of Cashmeer, the Scythians, the ferry crossing the 
Oxus, and the heroes nearing the Happy Island. They see Tiresias 
comfortably musing and sitting 
On the warm, grassy 
Asopus Bank, 
His robe drawn over 
His old, sightless head. 
(137-140) 
This is a static, comfortable, and external vision. The wise bards can 
also see Tiresias, but the vision of the poets pierces through that 
robe. They project themselves into or identify themselves with what 
they see and experience. Through this process -- Empathy, poets get their 
knowledge of life and Nature. A poet's alienation may arise in this 
area. Such feelings of unease and constriction arise when the writer aims 
at conveying the meaning and feelings of a certain experience in his 
attempt to unify himself, the reader, and the experience in its concrete 
forms, and finds it difficult because of the concretion of the imagery. 
The bards remember the doom that accompanied Tiresias's gift of prophecy. 
They see and bear: 
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His groping blindness, 
His dark foreboding, 
His scorned white hairs. 
(217-19) 
The gods see the Centaurs. The notable quality of the gods' view 
is its charm. To them the Centaurs present onlya scene of living nature. 
However, the relation of the Centaurs to the youth is more oblique, as 
impassioned half-men, half-beasts they are reminiscent of all who come 
under Circe's power. 
The gods see the Scythian's "wheeled house" halted on a plain like 
an ocean, the track stretching ahead into the "sunny waste": 
On the wide steppe, unharnessing 
His wheeled house at noon. 
He tethers his beast down, and makes his meals -
• • • •• •• 
The track, a straight black line, 
Furrows the rich soil; here and there 
Clusters of lonely mounds 
Topped with rough-hewn, 
Grey, rain-bleared statues, overpeer 
The sunny waste. 
(163-65 and 175-80) 
The poets seethe same scene, but at the end of a long, harsh winter. 
They see this sunny waste become a "bare steppe" in winter, and the 
Scythian submerged in the plain, fading like the grass that the goilisee 
round him. 
-- They see 
The Scythian; but long frosts 
Parch them in winter-time on the bare steppe, 
Till they too fade like grass; they crawl 
Like shadows forth in spring. 
(239-43) 
In conformity with the premise that Arnold knows what he is about, it 
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appears from this point of view that he composes images to cover a wider 
sector of people and places. Professor Allott, who has identified these 
sources, says "why did he (Arnold) call his nomadic steppe-dweller of 
lines 162-176 ••• a Scythian? •• The question can be answered out of 
Chapter XXVI of The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, by Gibbon's 
footnote: 'In speaking of all, or any of the northern shepherds of Europe, 
or Asia, I indifferently use the appelation of Scythians or Tartars. ,,,16 
That Arnold is selective in his choice of his images, is undeniable. He 
uses another source to provide himself with another aspect of the 
same image. "A later section (of Pallas' Travels) 'Journey from Taganrog 
to Tourida,' gives us Arnold's 'Wheel'd house' in the 'two wheeled carts, 
or Araba of the wandering Nagays'" (ibid., 165). 
Finally, gods see the Heroes approaching the Happy Isles; poets 
remember the struggles that led to their death. 
In a word the poets see all that gods see, but whereas the gods see 
them directly, from their height on Mount Olympus, a symbol of solitude 
and detachment, the poets see them only by projecting themselves into 
the scenes they describe. They see it through pain and agony. That is 
the first difference, and by this Arnold seems to associate vision, the 
true vision, with pain. 
such a price 
The Gods exact for song: 
To become what we sing. 
D. Culler, in his comment on these lines, says "The basis of this idea was an 
eighteenth -century concept of the imagination as grounded in Sympathy: 
t~rough Sympathy one enters into the characters he would depict. But in 
the l820s Hazlitt, followed by Keats, distinguished between two types of 
imagination, one founded on Sympathy and the other on Self-love" (Imaginative 
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Reason, p. 65). This view is not so far divorced from Arnold's practice 
in this poem, for the vision of the gods springs from Self-love. A vision 
of whatever is, is right. A vision that does not allow pain, worry, agony 
or ennui to spoil the sense of fulfillment that emanates from their 
satisfaction from what they created. Hence their vision is a kind of flat 
visual and external one. It stops at the surface of things and so 
gives an impression that all is well. 
The youth, in the final stanza, ends the poem where it begins. As 
the vision fades, he calls for the cup again, and thus the poem ends 
with the invocation: 
Faster, faster, 
o Circe, Goddess, 
Let the wild, thronging train, 
The bright procession 
Of eddying forms, 
Sweep through my soul. 
(II. 292-97) 
The circularity of structure, which accounts for the critics' complaints 
that the suggestions of the plot are not carried to a conclusion, 
indicates that Arnold is condemning this way. 
If one were asked to give an account of the Reveller's character one 
would say, to use Arnold's words about Byron, that the Reveller "as a man 
could not manage himself, could not guide his way aright, but was all 
astray he has no light, cannot lead us from the past to the futUre" 
(CPW., IX, p. 234). He had not the patience, knowledge, self-discipline, 
virtue, requisite for seeing the way out of the false state of things. 
One has an inclination to believe that Keats is the poet that is 
invoked in the poem. One's reason for that is the Victorian reactions 
to him. The major Victorian reactions to Keats appear in the views of 
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Tennyson and Rossetti. To Tennyson, the poetry of Keats is on the 
whole completely adequate. Gradually, however, as he accepts the Victorian 
belief that a poet should deal with the problem of his age, he found 
Keats lacking in intellect. Rossetti, on the other hand, remains 
completely satisfied with Keats. In addition to that, Arnold used to 
compare Browning to Keats, as a man with a moderate gift passionately 
desiring movement and fullness. "They [Browning and Keats) will not be 
patient neither understood that they must begin with an Idea of the 
world in order not to be prevailed over by the world's multitudinousness" 
(CL, p. 97). 
What one has been trying to show is that pure and absolute detachment 
and isolation, in Arnold's poetic theory, would not produce genuine art at 
all. 
II 
"Resignation", more than any other poem in this volume - 1849, reveals 
Arnold's real stance. It shows that he knows what he is about and leads 
directly to his critical doctrine in the Preface (1853). It has been a 
favourite with all the admirers of Arnold's poetry, and critics have 
sought an explanation of its philosophical reflections in sources as 
remote and diverse as Lucretius, Senancour, and the Bhagavad Gita. 
The poem is better understood if read while considering the spirit 
in which it was composed: the death of Arnold's father, the broken 
engagement of Jane,17 the religious unrest, the Oxford Novement, and Carlyle's 
notion of the importance of reducing one's denominator. Add to that the 
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Romantic influence "on the modern English habit [in poetic matter~ 
(too much encouraged by Wordsworth) of using poetry as a channel for 
thinking aloud, instead of making anything" (Whitridge, Letters, p. 17). 
The purpose of this part is to show that the poem is Arnold's own 
rejection of the Romantic theory of poetry. But the term "Romantic" is 
vague itself. It is "a word for which, in connection with literature, 
there is no generally accepted definition" (Oxford Compa:nj.--;n. to English 
Literature, S.V. "Romantic'). A definition like this "will not take us 
much farther," says Professor Drew, "unless we can attach a definite 
meaning to the word 'Romantic' (The Poetry of Browning, pp. 3-4). 
Professor Drew gives a series of textbook attributes of Romanticism, 
which one finds invaluable for one's reading of "Resignation". He sets 
them out as follows: 
(i) an interest in the magical, exotic, and supernatural; 
(ii) an interest in, often amounting to a worship of, 
natural scenery; (iii) the use of a diction, often remote 
from ordinary speech, which is particularly rich in euphonious 
and evocative words and phrases; (iv) a tradition of detailed 
observation especially of natural objects (see (ii) ); and 
(v) a belief in the supreme importance of the individual, and 
hence in the primacy of the personal will and intuition over 
the dictates of external authority. This often leads to an 
introspective melancholy, or to a mood of rebellion against 
established institutions~ It is expressed in various 
other ways -- as a regard for primitive rather than for 
civilised man, for Nature as opposed to Art, and for the 
countryside as opposed to the City (ibid., p. 4). 
It is not difficult to decide that most of these qualities are not to 
be found, but rather their contraries: 
(i) The si tua tion, in "Resignation", has nothing mysterious, exotic, or 
supernatural about it. On the contrary, it is based on two actual walks 
the poet took over the Wythburn fells: the first in childhood wi th a 
family group in 1833, the second ten years later with his sister Jane 
[called Fausta in the poem]. What happens in the poem - the walk, the 
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recollection of the previous walk, the poet's consideration of various 
ethical attitudes, and his earnest debate with Fausta - is, in its 
total configurations, a kind of metaphor for the activity of the poetic 
intelligence. 
(ii) The poem though shows an interest in natural scenery, it does not 
amount to a worship of it. The rep~tition of the walk does not bring the 
spiritual rebirth of Tintern Abbey, to which, indeed, "Resignation" has 
been called :-a conscious reply -, an expression of Arnold's inability to 
accept the Wordsworthian religion of nature. The concept of Nature, in 
the poem, is qualified by the wider intellectual views afforded by 
scientific scepticism and historicism. To the Victorians Nature could 
not mean what it had meant to Wordsworth. Scientists had uncovered a nature 
r_Eill in t9gJ;h. @9- cl_Cl,w_-, and economists had claimed Nature as the spirit of 
Laissez-faire -- neither concept especially inviting to spiritual 
contemplation. 
(iii) The diction, though intellectualised, is simple and not remote 
from ordinary speech. 
(iv) The poem has a detailed observation of natural objects. But this 
does not emanate from a worship of ~ature, it is part of Arnold's poetic 
method -- the naturalistic mode of interpretation. 
(v) Finally, the fact that the poem takes, for its title and philosophy, 
the idea of resignation, shows that Arnold does not accept the Romantic 
'belief in the supreme importance of the individual, and hence in the 
primacy of the personal will and intuition over the dictates of external 
authority'. This attitude is implied in his concept of Nature. In his 
poem, for example, "The Youth of Nature", one finds that "the core of 
the poem and its final sentiment ••• are not so much Wordsworth's as they are 
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the ancient classical problem of the Greek elegists marvelling at 
permanence of the objective world and the transitory life of man"(Commentary, 
p. 188). 
This concept, partly, accounts for "this quality, the 'pity and 
mournful awe' which Arnold speaks of in 'Grande Chartreuse', that seems," 
as Professor Drew puts it, " ••• to be the most powerful informing force 
in Arnold's best poems. In 'Resignation' ••• the terms of the poem so 
qualify any tentative expressions of hope that it is hard to be certain 
of more than the quality of Arnold's initial despair"(npassage of Time", 
p. 204). This is due to the fact that Arnold embodies in the fabric of 
the poems the one ultimately irresistible force of destruction, Time. i 
For Arnold, in the poem, is not only concerned with the question of what a 
poet must be and do, he is also concerned with the subject that worries 
him personally, the subject of Time, and the question of man's place in 
the temporal order. 
'l'he poem, the~, is one of Arnold's most c.omplete poems. Its position 
as the last poem in The Strayed Reveller and Other Poems indicates the 
emphasis Arnold wished to put on it. It does not, like "The New Sirens", 
pose a question that is left unanswered. It can be seen as an answer to 
-
some of the questions raised in other poems of the volume about views of 
life and art that a young poet is subject to. Mr Stange, in his comment on 
the poem, has rightly observed that !tIt offers no less than a description 
of that state of mind which is requisite both to the creation and the fullest 
enjoyment of poetry!t (p. 54). 
The poem, as its title implies, explores the function of resignation 
as an ethical attitude for life. It purports to be a dialogue between 
Arnold and his sister, who is here given the name of Fausta because of 
her impatience at time and human limitation. The poem, as a palinode to 
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the title poem - "The Strayed Reveller", explores the type of poetry that 
could be written in modern times. It marks too Arnold's rejection of 
poetry that is written according to the Romantic theory with special 
reference to Wordsworth. To Arnold, Wordsworth is out of step with 
history. Living in an·age marked by momentous changes in all aspects of 
life, Wordsworth retired ••• into a monastery ••• he plunged himself in 
the inward life, he voluntarily cut himself off from the modern spirit. 
And instead of accepting the need for social reform to answer the 
problems raised by the new industrialism and the demands of a growing 
spirit of democracy, Wordsworth counsels a return to nature and adherence 
to forms and institutions of the past. 
To this effect Knoepflmacher has rightly observed that "Arnold's 
• I 
'Resignation is his version, or, more properly, his inversion, of 
Wordsworth's 'Tintern Abbey'. The parallelism between the two poems is 
deliberate. It enables Arnold to employ his predecessor's work as a 
frame of reference, an ironic 'touchstone' essential to his own meaning".18 
Wordsworth's vision "is transcendent and symbolical .•• (but) Arnold's 
vision is analytical and allegorical ••• Therefore, while Wordsworth's 
poet is a medium for the divine plan of Nature, Arnold's poet is the 
interpreter of (it) ••• Whereas Wordsworth becomes infused and intoxicated by 
Nature, Arnold must stand aside and examine his own relative position in 
time and space in order to preserve his 'lucidity of soul'" (ibid., p. 21). 
Arnold often builds his poems, as one has observed before, around a 
dramatic contrast between two or three characters who represent varying 
ways of life. In this poem one has four distinct attitudes towards 
experience: there are (i) the activist pilgrims; (ii) the wise men who 
have achieved resignation; (iii) the Faustian Romantics; and (iv) the 
speaker himself who, one infers, is an aspirant towards resignation. 
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The poem begins with a vision of men travelling through time toward 
their "self-ordained" goals: 
To die be given us, or attain! 
Fierce work it were, to do again. 
So pilgrims, bound for Mecca, prayed 
At burning noon; so warriors said, 
Scarfed with the cross, who watched the miles 
Of dust which wreathed their struggling files 
Down Lydian mountains; so, when snows 
Round Alpine summits, eddying, rose, 
The Goth, bound Rome-wards; so the Hun, 
Crouched on his saddle, while the sun 
Went lurid down o'er flooded plains 
Through which the groaning Danube strains 
To the drear Euxine. 
(1-13) 
These are the men of forceful and unquestioning action. 
Next section of the poem (22-29) describes the condition of the 
resigned natures, the extreme opposite of the previous vision: 
But milder natures, and more free--
Whom an unblamed serenity 
Has freed from passions, and the state 
Of struggle these necessitate; 
Whom schooling of the stubborn mind 
Has made, or birth hath found, resigned--
These mourn not, that their goings pay 
Obedience to the passing day. 
(22-29) 
In response to Fausta's restlessness, Arnold suggests the adoption of 
a stoic resignation as the best means of meeting life and conquering 
fate. He gives her two examples for clarification: The first is a band of 
gipsies, whom they have met on both trips. They are wanderers rather 
than striders, they would seem to have achieved a kind of resignation. 
But Arnold points out that their attitude is an unconscious one: Though 
life becomes a little harder for them every year, they have learned to put 
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up with it until death releases them: 
But no! - they rubbed through yesterday 
In their hereditary way, 
And they will rub though, if they can, 
Tomorrow on the self-same plan, 
Till death arrive to supersede, 
For them, vicissitude and need. 
The second example is the poet, who feels the changes more deeply and 
understands them more clearly. Perhaps the chief influence on Arnold's 
concept of the poet is Goethe~ Wilhelm Meister. Tinker and Lowry have 
identified the source; it is worthy to be quoted in full. Chapter two 
of the second book contains a discourse between Werner and Wilhelm, the 
disappointed romantic, on the theme of 'Resignation' -- man's unrest 
and ambition, and the role of the poet: 
Look at men, how they struggle after happiness and 
satisfaction! Their wishes, their toil, their gold 
are ever hunting restlessly; and after that? After that 
which the poet has received from nature; the right enjoyment 
of the world; the feeling of himself in others; the 
harmonious conjunction of many things that seldom exist 
together. 
What is it that keeps men in continual discontent and 
agitation? It is, that they cannot make realities correspond 
with their conceptions, that enjoyment steals away from 
among their hands, that the wished-for comes too late, and 
nothing reached and acquired produces on the heart the effect, 
which their longing for it at a distance led them to anticipate. 
Now, fate has exalted the poet above all this, as if he were 
a god. He views the conflicting tumult of the passions; 
sees families and kingdoms raging in aimless commotion; sees 
those inexplicable enigmas of misunderstanding, which 
frequently a single monosyllable would suffice to explain, 
occasioning convulsions unutterably baleful. He has a 
fellow-feeling of the mournful and the joyful in the fate of 
all human beings ••• the lightly-moved and all-conceiving 
spirit of the poet, steps forth, like the sun from night to 
day, and with soft transitions tunes his harp to joy or 
woe. From his heart, its native soil, springs up the 
lovely flower of wisdom ••• And thus the poet is at once a 
teacher, a prophet, a friend of gods and men. How! thou 
wouldst have him to descend from his height to some paltry 
occupation? He who is fashioned like the bird to hover 
round the world ••• ought also to work at the plough. 
(Commentary, pp. 65-66: 
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Arnold, then, writes in lines that show his classicism that: 
The poet, to whose mighty heart 
Heaven doth a quicker pulse impart, 
Subdues that energy to scan 
Not his own course, but that of man. 
Though he move mountains, though his day 
Be passed on the proud heights of sway, 
Though he hath loosed a thousand chains, 
Though he hath borne immortal pains, 
Action and suffering though he know--
He hath not lived, if he lives so. 
(144-53) 
M. Bonnerot, in his comment on these lines, has rightly observed that 
"11 (classicisme) se distingue du vulgaire et de l'homme d'action par une 
sensibilit: plus vive ••• Le mot subdues, d' une si vigoureuse pre6ision, 
marque bien la pr{dominance de la conscience sur les instincts, de la 
volont{ sur 1 'inspiration. Ces quatre vers constituent, ~ mon sens, l'une 
I 
des meilleures definitions du classicisme. Tout en reconnaissant l'influence 
/ 
secrete du ciel, l'importance primordiale de la sensibilite, Arnold pose en 
prinCiPe que Ie r~e du po~te est non de s'abandonner au courant de cette 
/ 
energie, mais de la canaliser pour l'utiliser i des fins conscientes et 
d~int~ess~es. 11 est ici d'accord avec Pope quand il declare: 
Know then thyself, presume not God to scan; 
The proper study of mankind is man. 
Chez Pope comme chez Arnold nous trouvons la meme condemnation implicite de 
la po~sie personnelle, du lyrisme, au profit d'une po~sie plus generale, 
plus objective.,,19 
William A. Madden, in his comment on the poem, says that the poem 
"marks Arnold's rejection of the way of the wise bard who suffers what 
he sings. Not only does the speaker identify himself with those, who, 
like Fausta, have been deprived of the poet's 'rapt security', but his 
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description of the poet's vision eliminates entirely the element of pain 
that is so prominent in 'The Strayed Reveller.'" 20 The poem, in my view, 
does not support such view, on the contrary it shows that pain is part 
and parcel of the vision: 
Though he (the poet) hath borne immortal pains, 
Action and suffering though he know--
He hath not lived, if he lives so. 
(151-53) 
• • • • • • • 
Leaned on his gate, he gazes - tears 
Are in his eyes, and in his ears 
The murmur of a thousand years. 
(186-88) 
These lines assert the element of pain in the poetic vision as well as 
the idea of sympathy and pity. They point to Arnold's ideas in his 
essay "On the Nodern Element in Literatuxe" where he asserts the idea of 
sympathy. The poet, through sympathy, identifies himself with the 
life of the others. "He does so not to increase his se1fhood but rather 
to lose it" (Trilling, Matthew Arnold, p. 99) and thus, to use Arnold's "Iords, 
"He hath not lived, if he lives so". 
Arnold's own attitudes and judgements concerning the poet's relation 
to action need some explanations. First, it is the actions of 
unintelligent ordinary men that make the poet lose himself in unnecessary 
details; second, it is politics, in particular, from which the poet should 
dissociate himself. The true poet who is evoked in the poem must know all 
the strong and beautiful forces of life and not be tempted to make them 
his own. These notions are illustrated in an orderly way as Arnold 
gives examples of the poet freeinc himself from individual attachment in 
the several important areas of human experience. Concerning the temptation 
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of power, the poet sees: 
A ruler of the people stand, 
Sees his strong thought in fiery flood 
Roll through the heaving multitude; 
Exults - yet for no moment's space 
Envies the all-regarded place. 
(155-59) 
P. F. Baum, in his comment on these lines, has rightly observed that 
"it is likely that Arnold had LalJl.artine in mind, who was minister of 
Foreign Affairs in 1848. The idea is plausible, for Arnold, in one of his 
letters to Clough, says "My man (Lord Lansdowne) remarks that Poets should 
hold up their heads now a Poet (Lamartine) is at the head of France" (CL, p. 
69). The idea is constant with Arnold for he remarked towards the 
end of his career that Plato would have been less perfect had he mingled 
with politics. 
Arnold's position is intermediate between Quietism and Action. 
He puts it clearly in his essay "The Function of Criticism at the Present 
Time" (1864): 
In action's dizzying eddy whirl'd: The rush and roar of 
practical life will always have a dizzying and attracting 
effect upon the most collected spectator, and tend to draw 
him into its vortex; most of all will this the case where 
that life is so powerful as it is in England. But it is 
only by remaining collected, and refusing to lend himself 
to the point of view of the practical man, that the critic 
can do the practical man any service. 
(~., III, 274-75) 
The poem, in one's view, meets Arnold's demands from poets and 
poetry. The following lines show the poet accompanying the movement of 
life in time and space: 
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From some high station he (the poet) looks down, 
At sunset, on a populous town; 
Surveys each happy group which fleets, 
Toil ended, through the shining streets, 
Each with some errand of its own--
And does not say : I am alone. 
He sees the gentle stir of birth 
When morning purifies the earth; 
He leans upon a gate and sees 
The pastures, and the quiet trees. 
Low, woody hill, with gracious bound, 
Folds the still vally almost round; 
The cuckoo, loud on some high lawn, 
Is answered from the depth of dawn; 
In the hedge straggling to the stream, 
Pale, dew-drenched, half-shut roses gleam; 
But, where the farther side slopes down, 
He sees the drowsy new-waked clown 
In his white quaint-embroidered frock 
Make, whistling, tow'rd his mist-wreathed flock--
Slowly, behind his heavy tread, 
The wet, flowered grass heaves up its head. 
Leaned on his gate, he gazes - tears 
Are in his eyes, and in his ears 
The murmur of a thousand years. 
(164-88) 
Here, his seeing of the City is from a distance and at sunset, people are 
seen as group where they have lost their identity. But his seeing of 
nature is something profound and close, and results in an intense emotion 
which involves the fusion of seeing and feeling as the last three lines 
indicate. It, really, is a poetry that interprets life. 
It applies ideas to life by the fact that the speaker's mind is 
focussed-- and the objects in the landscape as well as his memories are 
brought into that focus-- upon the brevity and pain of human life. The 
question implied here is the question of how to use one's time,in other 
words~how to live. There is a suggestion that the gypsies enjoy freedom 
from anxiety and struggle because they are so close to cyclical nature and 
so little absorbed with past and future. If the poet can, with more 
difficulty, extricate himself from bondage to the transient ends it is 
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because he sees not so little but so much, because he hears "the murmur 
of a thousand years" and feels it. It is an intellectual act even though 
it were only a matter of feeling. For if feeling be regarded as conscious, 
it is unquestionable that it involves an intellectual process. 
In the next section (189-230). Arnold establishes a hierarchy: the 
poet, man, and the gypsies. At the top is the contemplative poet, who is 
said to scan "Not his own course, but that of man": 
Before him he sees life unroll, 
A placid and continuous whole -
That general life, which does not cease, 
wnose secret is not joy, but peace; 
That life, whose dumb wish is not missed 
If birth proceeds, if things subsist; 
The life of plants, and stones, and rain, 
The life he craves - if not in vain 
Fate gave, what chance shall not control, 
His sad lucidity of soul. 
(189-98 ) 
Professor Bush, in his comment on these lines has rightly observed that 
Arnold "here seems to crave participation, not in the cosmic order, but in 
mere nonsentient being well below even the gipsy leve:i.".21 
The poet knows the general life by attending upon it. It is the life of 
the whole universe, both human and natural; to approach it means to ab~~don 
the romantic striving self. There is pain in that life. To Arnold, the l~~d-
scape is but an emblem of the general life an impersonal power which demands 
the submission of all men. But rather than becoming a mere object subjected to 
the capriciousness of chance, man c~~ achieve the dignity if he understands 
his own relative position within the general scheme of life. This understanding 
is achieved instinctively by gypsies plodding in their hereditary way; it is 
achieved consciously by those who can imaginatively raise themselves out 
of the flux of things, and attend upon the idea of life itself in its true 
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essence. To this effect, Arnold argues in Literature and Dogma that the 
very words mind, 'memo~ and remain" come, probably, all from the 
same root, from the notion of staying, attending. Possibly even the 
word 'man' comes from the same; so entirely does the idea of humanity, of 
intelligence, of looking before and after, of raising oneself out of the 
flux of things, rest upon the idea of steadying oneself, concentrating 
oneself, making order in the chaos of one's impressions, by atten~ing 
to one impression rather than the other. 
But knowing life does not mean the excess of thought in a poem or 
trying to go into and to the bottom of an object. Critics may say that 
"Resignation" abounds in erudite allusion and that it echoes from 
sources as varied as Lucretius and Goethe. This is true, but the fact 
remains that Arnold takes only one idea: the idea of stoicism. He attends 
on it in an attempt not in rendering abstract that which is sensible, but 
in rendering sensible that which is abstract; apparent that which is 
hidden; imaginable, if so it may be, that which is only intelligible; and 
intelligible, finally, that which an ordinary attention fails to seize. 
Arnold believes, as he says to Clough, that "a slight gift of poetical 
expression ••• is overlaid and crushed in a profound thinker ••• The 
trying to go into and to the bottom of an object instead of grouping 
o b,jects is as fa tal to the sensuousness of poetry as the mere painting" 
( CL , p. 99). 
The broad scope of the poem brings the reader into the main stream 
of Arnold's poems of ideas. It is, as one has observed before, conditioned 
by the large premise: that Christianity no longer serves to establish man in 
an ordered providential universe with assured religious and moral guidance. 
How does it apply ideas to life? The poem by virtue of the fact that it 
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embodies the element of Time, gives an expression to Heraclitus' idea 
of perpetual flux and change. But Arnold knows that the search for 
something permanent is one of the deepest instincts in man. It is desired, 
no doubt, from love of home and desire for a refuge from danger. 
Religion seeks permanence in two forms: God and immortality. In 
God is no variableness neither shadow of turning; the life after death 
is eternal and unchanging. But nineteenth century thinkers being 
obsessed with the idea of progress and evolution turned men against these 
static conceptions; some of them even contended'~hat there is progress in 
heaven and evolution in the Godhead".22 
Philosophers, though unable to deny that whatever is in time is 
transitory, have invented, says Russell, a conception of eternity as 
not persistence through endless time, but existence outside the whole 
temporal process. Eternal life, according to, for example, Dean Inge, 
does not mean existence through every moment of future time, but a 
mode of being wholly independent of time, in which there is no before and 
after, and therefore no lQgical possibility of change. This view has been 
poetically expressed by Vaughan: 
I saw Eternity the other night, 
Like a great ring of pure and endless light, 
All calm, as it was bright; 
And round beneath it, Time in hours, days, years, 
Driven by the spheres 
Like a vast shadow moved; in which the world 
And all her train vere hurled. -
Arnold, like the Greek philosopher Parmenides, seems to solve the 
problem by suggesting permanence through memory. He offers two examples: 
the gipsies who seem to have no memory: 
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they rubbed through yesterday 
In their hereditary way, 
And they will rub through, if they can, 
To-morrow on the self-same plan, 
Till death arrive to supersede, 
For them, vicissitude and need. 
The other example is the poet: 
•••••••• and in his ears 
The murmur of a thousand years. 
The main idea of the line is that: since the poet can know the past, it 
can not really be past, but must, in some sense, exist now. When one 
recollects, the recollection occurs now. Now, if memory is to be 
be 
accepted as a source of knowledge, the past must /before the mind now, 
and must therefore in some sense still exist. 
It is worthy of notice that by September 1849 Arnold had decided 
that his "one natural craving was not for profound. thoughts, mighty spiritual 
workings etc., but a distinct seeing of my way as far as my own nature is 
concerned" (Lowry, p. 110). Fausta, he thinks would rate the gypsies as 
less, the poet as more: 
Those gipsies, so your thoughts I scan, 
Are less, the poet more, than man. 
They feel not, though they move and see; 
Deeper the poet feels; but he 
Breathes, when he will, immortal air, 
Where Orpheus and where Horner are. 
In the day's life, whose iron round 
Hems us all ID. he is no t bound; 
He leaves his kind, o'erleaps their pen, 
And flees the cornmon life of men. 
He escapes thence, but we abide--
Not deep the poet sees, but wide. 
(204-14) 
The central idea in these lines is the double affirmation: deeply the poet 
feels - Not deep the poet sees, but wide. This is one of the problems that 
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confronts any poet. M. Bonnerot finds in this idea an expression of 
/ 
dualism: "To feel, to see ,sont ~es deux ~ermes d 'un dilemm?- Qll la £~ 
d'Arnold est prisonniBre~ (p. 292). 
The next section (231-60) is a summary of the philosophy of the 
poem: renunciation of personal desires in favour of the poet's freedom 
and security. 
And though fate grudge to thee and me 
The poet's rapt security, 
Yet they, believe me who await 
No gifts from chance, have conquered fate. 
They, winning room to see and hear, 
And to men's business not too near, 
Through clouds of individual strife 
Draw homeward to the general life. 
(245-52) 
What one has been trying to show is that the poem represents a fundamental 
change in the theory of the poet's function. In the Romantic theory 
that function was animated by belief in Nature, but bere it proceeds 
from an awareness of the limitations suggested by landscape: 
Yet, Fausta, the mute turf we tread, 
The solemn hills around us spread, 
This stream which falls incessantly, 
The strange-scrawled rocks, the lonely sky, 
If I might lend their life a voice, 
Seem to bear rather than rejoice. 
(265-70) 
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III 
Ever since Aristotle's Poetics (Peri Poietikes) there has been an 
established tradition in any poetic theory to define poetry and its 
various branches and subdivisions, forms and technical resources, as well 
as the principles that govern it and that distinguish it from other 
creative activities. "Epilogue to Lessing's Laocoon" is Arnold's most 
detailed discussion of the principles that distinguish poetry from other 
Arts. It is, to use Professor Drew's words, "an invaluable compendium 
of Victorian attitudes to the relation of painting, music and 1i terature" 
(Poetry of Browning, p. 441). So the best remark about the poem is that 
it is precisely what it is called: an Epilogue. 
The poem assumes a knowledge of Lessing's theories; it takes its 
departure from his thesis: that poetry deals with temporal, painting 
with spatial relations, poetry with the successive and painting with 
the co-existent. Lessing's treatise, published in 1766, tries to 
remove the confusion in theory and practice between poetry and painting 
and plastic arts that resulted from, as M. H. Abrams puts it, "an 
uninquisitive acceptance of Simonides' maxim that 'painting is dumb poetry 
and poetry a speaking painting'" (The Mirror and the Lamp, p. 13). 
Lessing's intention is to establish aesthetic principles by an inductive 
logic which is deliberately opposed to the procedure of Batteaux. 23 
Nevertheless, like Batteaux, Lessing concludes that poetry, no less 
than painting is imitation. The diversity between these arts follows 
from their difference in medium, which imposes necessary differences 
in the objects each is competent to imitate. 
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Professor ~nge, who studied the poem in some detail, has 
rightly said that "The Epilogue is a variation on the scheme of 
'Resignation' it too describes a walk in which the peripatetic 
poet speaker, accompanied by a responsive, but not fully perceptive, 
friend, achieves an awareness that is both illustrated and, in a 
sense provoked by the course of the walk and the objects of the 
concrete environment" (p.87). The setting is made to symbolise 
the Victorian world; Hyde Park is an appropriate microcosm of 
that world. It has been a place, and is still, for public meetings 
and riots. It is at the same time an emblem of nature itself. 
The question which the poem raises is why_the arts of music and 
painting have so much more often achieved success in their spheres 
than poetry has in the sphere proper to it. 
The argument begins with the painter's sphere and his limitation: 
'Behold~ I said, 'the painter's sphere! 
The limits of his art appear. 
The passing group, the summer-morn, 
The grass, the elms, that blossomed thorn --
Those cattle couched, or, as they rise, 
Their shining flanks, their liquid eyes --
These, or much greater things, but caught 
Like these, and in one aspect brought! 
In Outward semblance he must give 
A moment's life of things that live; 
Then let him choose his moment well, 
With power divine its story tell.' 
(49-60) 
The next section deals with music and composers: 
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The inspired mUS1Clan what a range, 
What power of passion, wealth of changel 
Some source of feeling he must choose 
And its locked fount of beauty use, 
And though the stream of music tell 
Its else unutterable spell; 
To choose it rightly in his part, 
And press into its inmost heart. 
(81-88) 
Stange, in his comment on these lines, says that "The composer's freedom 
is suggested by the repetition of the word 'choose', and the expansiveness 
and clarity of his materials contrast sharply with the strict limitations 
of the poet's condition (the verb for him is must)" (p. 91). 
Then, comes the poet's sphere: 
'Behold, at last the poet's spherel 
But who,' I said, 'suffices here? 
'For, ah! so much he has to do; 
Be painter and musician too! 
The aspect of the moment show, 
The feeling of the moment know! 
The aspect not, I grant, express 
Clear as the painter's art can dress; 
The feeling not, I grant, explore 
So deep as the musician's lore--
But clear as words can make revealing, 
And deep as words can follow feeling.' 
(127-38) 
"Lessing holds that poetry differs from the plastic arts in 'being a 
progressive imitation of an action" (Allott, Poems, p. 513). Arnold agrees 
with this idea, but he brings to the notion his own reflections on art 
and experience and thereby extends it and gives it a moral and 
spiritual dimension "it becomes the poet's duty to convey the movement 
1\ ) 
of life itself (ibid., p. 513 • 
Arnold shows that more is required of the poet than of the painter 
or the composer: 
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But, ah! then comes his sorest spell 
Of toil - he must life's movement tell! 
The thread which binds it all in one, 
And not its separate parts alone. 
The movement he must tell of life, 
Its pain and pleasure, rest and strife; 
His eye must travel down, at full, 
The long, unpausing spectacle; 
With faithful unrelaxing force 
Attend it from its primal source, 
From change to change and year to year 
Attend it of its mid career, 
Attend it to the last repose 
And solemn silence of its close. 
(139-52) 
These lines show clearly Arnold's own account of the poet's function. The 
poet's task, compared to the painter's or the musician's, is the most 
difficult. He must tell of life's movement with its complex, shifting 
process and penetrate it. 
Arnold, reiterating his idea in "Resignation" and "The Strayed Reveller" 
of the poet who must experience many kinds of lives, says: 
'The cattle rising from the grass 
His thought must follow where they pass; 
The penitent with anguish bowed 
His thought must follow through the crowd. 
Yes! all this eddying, motley throng 
That sparkles in the sun along, 
Girl, statesman, merchant, soldier bold, 
Master and servant, young and old, 
Grave, gay, child, parent, husband, wife, 
He follows home, and lives their life.' 
(153-62) 
The palm is given to the poet. For, though painters and musicians 
deal with perfection, the poets' glory is that they must bring beauty 
out of life's failure and distress: 
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And many, many are the souls 
Life's movement fascinates, controls; 
It draws them on, they cannot save 
Their feet from its alluring wave; 
They cannot leave it, they must go 
With its unconquerable flow. 
But ah! how few, of all that try 
This mighty march, do ought but die! 
For ill-endowed for such a way, 
Ill-stored in strength, in wits are they. 
They faint, they stagger to and fro, 
And wandering from the stream they go; 
In pain, in terror, in distress, 
They see, all round, a wilderness. 
Sometimes a momentary gleam 
They catch of the mysterious stream; 
Sometimes, a second's space, their ear 
The murmur of its waves doth hear. 
That transient glimpse in song they say, 
But not as painter can portray--
That transient sound in song they tell, 
But not, as the musician, well. 
And when at last their snatches cease, 
And they are silent and at peace, 
The stream of life's majestic whole 
Hath ne'er been mirrored on their soul. 
(164-88) 
These lines show that Arnold is consistent in his poetic theory. Line 187 
may be thought of as an extension of his conception of the "general life" 
in "Resignation", that placid and continuous whole ••• / which does not 
cease (cf. lines 189ff.) 
The last two sections of the poem contrast the unsuccessful poet, 
~ 
swamped by life, with the rare, supreme poet who both contains and removes 
himself from life's profuse activity. In other words he contrasts the 
youth in "The Strayed Reveller" with the poet in "Resignation". The true 
poet is characterised by his untiring attendance on life's movement. He 
does more than recording some outer semblance , as the painter must, 
more even than the musician's work. of communicating emotions; the poet 
does more, for he reveals the scope of life and its movement. He combines 
and transcends the power of painter and musician. His process is one of 
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fusion or, as Arnold puts it, synthesis: 
their eye 
Drinks up delighted ecstasy, 
And its deep-toned, melodious voice 
For ever makes their ear rejoice, 
They speak! the happiness divine 
They feel, runs o'er in every line; 
Its spell is round them like a shower--
It gives them pathos, gives them power. 
(193-200) 
The three poems are thus Arnold's instrument for expressing his 
views about poetry and of the poet's relation to his age. They are a 
remarkably coherent body of poetry about poetry. This is precisely what 
Arnold meant by his reference to his poems as a body of doctrine • 
The main movement of these poems is primarily a process of dispelling the 
dream. The movement begins with the "Strayed Reveller" where the creative 
prQcess is unconscious and involuntary; then the transitional stage of 
"Resignation" where Arnold voices the travail of imagination as it grows 
in understanding of its situation: the process is that of a deepened and more 
realistic understanding. Finally, "Epilogue to Lessing's Laocoon" comes, 
the full realisation is achieved through its definition of the poet's 
function and his position among other artists. 
In conclusion one can say that Arnold's poetic theory is a theory 
that recognises the conditions of modern life and is chiefly directed 
towards them. There is no escapism even in his poetry of isolation. With 
these three poems in mind one is prepared to meet the question that 
Professor Drew puts, in his work on Arnold, "You say that 
Arnold writes superbly in some poems, and that in others he offers us an 
argument of great subtlety and importance, but does he ever do both at 
once?" ("Passage of Time", p. 201). 
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In answering this question, one is tempted to use Arnold's own 
critical criterion in his essay "On the Modern Element in Literature": 
What is, in fact, the character of the poem, the frame of 
mind of the poet? Has the poem the depth, the completeness 
of the poems of Aeschylus or Sophocles, of those adequate 
and consumate representation of hunan life? Has the poet 
the serious cheerfulness of Sophocles, of a man who has 
mastered the problem of human life, who knows its gravity, 
and is therefore serious, but who knows that he comprehends 
it, and is therefore Cheerful? Over the whole of the great 
poem of Virgil, over the whole Aeneid, there rests an 
ineffable melancholy: not a rigid, a moody gloom, like the 
melancholy of Lucretius; no, a sweet, a touching sadness, 
but still a sadness; a melancholy which is at once a source 
of charm in the poem, and a testimony to its incompleteness 
(CPW, I, p. 35). 
One is apt to say that these poems show depth, completeness and a 
perfect representation of human life. The poet, Arnold, is serious and knows 
the gravity of his situation. But the fact remains that there rests an 
ineffable melancholy. This is not a symptom of the failure of poetic 
control or of the lack of moral fibre! It is the poems' source of sincerity, 
for it is impossible to "represent ••• the main movement of the last quarter 
of (the nineteenth century)", as Arnold puts it in one of his letters, 
and ignore this element. It has always been Arnold's aim to analyse his 
situation: 
But woe was upon me if I analysed not my situation: and 
Werther (,) Rene (,) and such like (,) none of them analyse the 
modern situation in its true blankness and barreness, 
and unpoetrylessness (CL, p. 126). 
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CB:.AP1 ER Dr 
On Poets 
Such, poets, is your bride, the Euse! young, ge.y, 
Radiant, adorn'd outside; a hidden ground 
Of thought and of austerity r,<ri thin. 
Arnold's "The Austerity of Poetry" 
• • • the mis er ie s 0 f the ;mr Id 
Are misery and will not let him rest. 
Keats 
. . . ... such a price 
The Gods exact for song: 
To become ~!hat 'iTe sing. 
"1:he S tre.ye d Reve ller" 
In Chapter one, I have defined the nature of Poetry pragmatically, 
the.t is, in terms of its function. Similarly, the nature of the poet 
follo~'TS from his function: he is "That he does. From cropter one of 
this pe.rt, one could infer the demands that are made on the poet in 
Arnold's poetic theory. To this effect he vTOuld say: "vrhat Plato has 
thought, he (the poet) may think; I'Tha t a saint has felt, he Bay feel; 
\'That at e.ny time has befallen any man, he can understand" ("Emerson", 
CPU 
--, X, p. 167) • Or as he puts it in "Bacchanalia; or the Ner,'T Age": 
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The world but feels the present's spell, 
The poet feels the past as well; 
Whatever men have done, might do, 
Whatever thought, might think it too. 
(Poems, p. 538) 
I 
The Poet's Dilemma 
But everything the poet gains he pays for in more than equal coin: 
But oh, what labour! 
o prince, what pain! 
••• • •• such a price 
The Gods exact for song: 
To become what we sing. 
In the background to this question lies a more general and epistemological 
issue that was first developed after the psychological contributions of 
Hobbes and Locke in the seventeenth century. The issue involves the 
increasing attention that was given, in Arnold's time, to the mental 
constitution of the poet, the quality and degree of his 'genius', and the 
play of his faculties in the act of creation. Is the poet born or made? 
Is he different from other men and alienated from society by the 
superiority of his perception? Is this superiority inextricably bound up 
with a certain malady of the poet? 
These questions were part and parcel of the nineteenth-century 
thinking. In France, de Vigny, in Stello (1832), developed the idea that 
the poet is a marked man: a po~~ maudi t. In England, Carlyle, in "Hero 
as Poet", espoused a notion that vision and pain, like strength and 
mutilation, are inextricably bound up together. In America, there was the 
Emersonian idea of compensation: that the poet's way is not the world's 
way, and he who succeeds in the one cannot succeed in the other. This 
\, 
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chapter attempts to show, beside answering these questions, that the poet, 
in Arnold's poetics, is at bottom an esprit maladif : ondoyant et 
divers: balancing and indeterminate, the plaything of cross motives and 
shifting impulses, swayed by a thousand subtle influences, physiological 
and pathological. 
This conclusion could be inferred from Arnold's method in his 
critical essays. The underlying idea in these essays is that art and 
personality are correlated variables. A critic may properly deal with 
a poet's character as Arnold did in his essays on Gray and Keats. Arnold's 
method, like that of Saint-Beuve, - tel arbre, tel fruit,-attempts to 
isolate and explain the special quality of a work by reference to the 
special quality of the character, life, lineage, and milieu: the man and 
the moment. 
Arnold's treatment of an important author usually falls into three 
parts: (1) an, initial record of biographical facts, with a review of the 
occasion and the public reception of his works with special emphasis on 
the auth9r's milieu: the hindrance or encouragment which his poetic 
inspiration meets from without; (2) an appraisal of the author's intellectual~ 
spiritual powers with an analysis of the relative power of his sources of 
inspiration, - Hellenism and Hebraism. The poet's poetic development is 
explained in terms of the conflict of these two forces; and finally 
(3) a review of some of the author's representative works: taking the 
reader on a conducted tour pointing out the beauties and defects of the 
work through a comparison with touchstones of the best examples in the 
world's classics. 
Now, the question is: is there any correlation between pain and 
vision? Arnold tried hard to refute this concept. In a letter (September, 
1859J to Clough he says: "Froude says ••• about your being so happy and so 
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virtuous that it is not desirable to get literary work out of you - in 
that regular Carlyle an strain which we all know by heart and which the 
clear-headed among us have so utter a contempt for - since we know 
very well that so long as segnities is, as Spinoza says, with superbia 
the great bane of man, it will need the stimulant of literary work or 
something equally rousing, to overcome this, and to educe out of man 
what virtue there is in him" (CL, p. 151). 
But the fact remains that Arnold's life, poetry, and critical 
essays indirectly supports this concept. In his criticism of James 
Spedding, Arnold writes: "About Spedding there is much to be said - his 
great fault is that he is not ondoyant and divers enough) to use Montaigne's 
language, to deal rightly with matters of poetical criticism" (CL, July, 
1861, p. 156). He quotes the following story: 
In the year 1340, says the Chronicle of Linburg, all 
over Germany everybody was strumming and humming certain 
songs more lovely and delightful than any which had ever 
yet been known in German countries; and all people, old 
and young, the women particularly, were perfectly mad 
about them, so that from morning till night you heard 
nothing else. Only, the Chronicle adds, the author of 
these songs happened to be a young clerk, afflicted with 
leprosy, and living apart from all the world in a 
desolate place. The exc8.11ent reader does not require 
to be told how horrible a complaint was leprosy in the 
Middle Ages, and how the poor wretches who had this 
incurable plague were banished from society, and had to 
keep at distance from every human being ••• This poor 
clerk, then, whose poetical gift the Limburg Chronicle 
extols, was a leper, and he sate moping in the dismal 
deserts of his misery, whilst all Germany, gay and 
tuneful, was praising his songs ••• 
("Pagan and Mediaeval Sentiment", 
CPW, III, pp. 228-29) 
The story is significant for it illustrates Arnold's idea of the 
dual nature of the poet and his duty to maintain hope in his misery and 
not to parade his wound to his readers. It can be taken as a footnote to 
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Arnold's sonnet: "The Austerity of Poetry", in which he sa;ys: 
Such, poets, is your bride, the Muse! young, gay, 
Radiant, adorn'd outside; a hidden ground 
Of thought and of austerity within. 
The poet, in the context of Arnold's writings, is an esprit maladif, 
and this can be said about Arnold himself. In 1853, he wrote to his 
sister K: "There is only one esoteric poem in this collection - only 
one, that is calculated to interest none but the writer and a few 
esprits maladifs; you, who are not an esprit maladif will nevertheless 
discover it and read it for my sake" (Unpublished letters, p. 21). It is 
no secret that when Arnold's first volume of poems appeared in 1849 his 
own family was startled at the profundity and serious depth they 
r~vealed. His sister, Mary, wrote at the time: 
It is the moral strength, or, at any rate, the moral 
consciousness which struck and surprised me so much in 
the poems. I could have been prepared for any degree 
of poetical power, for there being a great deal more 
than I could at all appreciate; but there is something 
altogether different from this, something which such a 
man as Clough has, for instance, which I did not expect 
to find in Matt; but it is there. 1 
Several interpretations were given of this apparent contradiction 
between Arnold's outward behaviour and what he was writing during the 
forties. Critics argue that Arnold, like Edgar or Hamlet, was preserving 
himself intact beneath a mask. The idea is plausible for he writes to 
this effect that "In the long-run one makes enemies by having one's 
brilliancy and ability praised; one can only get oneself really accepted 
by men by making oneself forgotten in the people and doctrines one 
recommends ••• " (Letters, January, 1864, I, p. 219). 
The fact remains that the poet's instinct for good, his genius, an 
ardent impulse for seeking the genuine truth on all matters, and his refined 
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sentiment, the powen that gives genius its materials of quick and 
strong perception, will exercise pressure on his soul and incur pain: 
The motive of Shakespeare, the master-thought at the 
bottom of Shakespeare's production, is the same as the 
master-thought at the bottom of the production of 
Homer and Sophocles, Dante and Moliere, Rousseau and 
George Sand. With all the difference of manner, power, 
and performance between these makers, the governing 
thought and motive is the same. It is the motive 
enunciated in the burden to the famous chorus in the 
Agamemnon - 'Let the good prevail'. 
("G. Sand", CPW, X, p. 188) 
The master-pressure upon their spirit is the pressure exercised by this 
same thought: "Let the good prevail". This instinct exists in human 
nature. The difference is not in kind, but in degree of passion to see 
good prevail. It is the passion in human nature that prompts man to 
see good. The existence of this instinct is the ground of all hope for 
communication. Along with the astounding power and passion for good 
that poets have, they have too a strong and deep sense for what is perfect 
and beautiful in nature, and for what is beautiful in human action and 
suffering which they make their own: 
••• the miseries of the world 
Are misery and will not let him rest. 
Poets, according to Arnold, are lovers of light, who, when they have 
an idea to put forth, brood long over it first, and wait patiently till 
it shines ••• 
Spirits who know by experience that the driest matter and 
the dullest words hide within them the germ and spark of 
some brightness ••• spirits who. maintain that, to see and 
exhibit things in beauty, is to see and show things as in 
their essence they really are, and not as they exist for 
the eye of the careless, who do not look beyond the outside; 
spirits hard to satisfy, because of a keen-sightedness in 
them, which makes them discern but too clearly both the 
- 128 -
models to be followed and those to be shunned; spirits 
active though meditative, who cannot rest except in 
solid truths, and whom only beauty can make happy; 
spirits far less concerned for glory than for perfection, 
who, because their art is long and life is short, often 
die without leaving a monument, having had their own 
inward sense of life and fruitfulness for their best 
reward. 
("Joubert", CHI, III, p. 196) 
There must be due to that some degree of sacrifice. This is not 
just a matter of time and energy, but of the poet's priestly dedication 
to ideas. It concerns the kind of attention, of contemplation, analysis 
and verification through creation. The sacrifice involves a momentary 
exile to the world of thought and a return again to the world of men. 
To this effect Arnold writes in Empedocles on Etna: 
Where shall thy votary fly then? back to men? 
But they will gladly welcome him once more, 
And help him to unbend his too tense thought, 
And rid him of the presence of himself, 
And keep their friendly chatter at his ear, 
And haunt him, till the absence from himself, 
That other torment, grow unbearable; 
And he will fly to solitude again, 
And he will find its air too keen for him, 
And so change back; and many thousand times 
Be miserably bandied to and fro 
Like a sea-wave, betwixt the world and thee, 
Thou young implacable God! and only death 
Can cut his oscillation short, and so 
Bring him to poise. There is no other way. 
(Act II, Sc. ii, 220-34) 
This is the fate of the poet, there is no escape. To this effect 
S. Freud says: "whoever wishes to be intellectually creative must submit 
himself to a peculiar rhythm: he is bound to withdraw from other men and 
must return to them again. Only in solitude can the mind work creatively. 
A man who seeks only among other men will never find himself".2 The 
life of every free, fruitful spirit moves like a pendulum between these two 
- 129 -
poles. He dares not live only for the others; something always drives him 
back into solitude. And he dares not live only for himself; something 
always drives him back to other men" (ibid., p. 198). Freud's words 
seem to reiterate Arnold's lines in "In Memory of the Author of 'Obermann''': 
Ahl two desires toss about 
The poet's feverish blood. 
One drives him to the world without, 
And one to solitude. 
(Poems, p. 134, lines: 92-95) 
The poet, in penetrating himself with actions and ideas, will find 
himself parting from a way of life: the way of simple acceptance of life 
without thought of its anguish and pain. In other words the Panglosian 
one dimension way of whatever is, is right. He becomes espoused to the 
way of pain. This gives the poet a more comprehensive vision of life as a 
'mixture of agony and ecstasy. For, as Emerson puts it, 'he has seen but 
half the universe who never has been shown the house of pain'. It is, in 
short, a lonely way. To this effect Arnold says: " Wh oever sets 
himself to see things as they are will find himself one of a very small 
circle; but it is only by this small circle resolutely doing its own work 
that adequate ideas will ever get current at all tl (tiThe Function of 
CritiCism", ,CP~·l., III, 274). 
The poet, with this intellectual powers as well as that strong passion 
for perfection, will find that the necessity to produce, to produce 
constantly, to produce whether in vein or out of the vein, to produce 
something, - is the most intolerable of torture. "I do not like to put 
off writing," says Arnold, "any longer, but to say the truth I do not feel 
in the vein to write even now, nor do I feel certain that I can write as I 
should. I am past thirty, and three parts iced over - and my pen, it seems 
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to me is even stiffer and more cramped than my feeling" (CL, Febr uary, 1853, 
p. 128). Again he writes (August 6, 1858): "It is only in the best poetical 
epochs (such as the Elizabethan) that you can descend into yourself and 
produce the best of your thoughts and feeling naturally, and without an 
overwhelming and in some degree morbid effort; for then all the people 
around you are more or less doing the same thing" (Letters, I, 63). 
The situation was like that of Gray, with whom Arnold must have 
felt much in common. "I am glad," says Arnold to his wife, It you like 
Gray; that century is very interesting, though I should not like to have 
lived in it; but the people were just like ourselves, whilst the 
Elizabethan are not" (Letters, December, 1880, II, p. 187). Gray was 
isolated in his age. Maintaining and fortifying his mind and soul by 
lofty studies, he yet could not fully educe and enjoy them; the want of a 
genial atmosphere, the failure of sympathy in his contemporaries, were too 
great. Arnold must have felt Gray's dilemma, for in his letters to Clough 
one recurring theme is the utterly arid, unpoetical character of the age, 
of modern civilisation: 
I have been at Oxford the last two days and hearing Seller and 
the rest of that clique who know neither life nor themselves 
rave about your poem gave me a strong almost bitter feeling 
with respect to them, the age, the poem, even you. Yes I 
said to myself something tells me I can, if need be, at last 
dispense with them all, even with him: better that, 
than be sucked for an hour even into the Time Stream in which 
they and he plunge and beDDw. I became calm in spirit, but 
uncompromising, almost stern. More English than European, 
I said finally, more American than English: and took up 
Obermann, and refuged myself with him in his forest against 
your Zeit Geist. 
(CL, November, 1848, p. 95) 
At this stage one comes to the question of the relation of the artist to 
his age. 
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The relation of the poet to his age was the central issue in Arnold's 
writings: poetry as well as prose. 
There is but a very small remnant (says Plato] 'of 
honest followers of wisdom, and they who are of these few, 
and who have tasted how sweet and blessed a possession is 
wisdom, and who can fully see, moreover, the madness of the 
multitude, and that there is no one, we may say, whose 
action in public matters is sound, and no ally for 
whosoever would help the just, what,' asks Plato, 'are 
they to do? They may be compared, says Plato, 'to a man 
who has fallen among wild beasts; he will not be one of 
them, but he is too unaided to make head against them; 
and before he can do any good to society or his friends, he 
will be overwhelmed and perish uselessly. When he considers 
this, he will resolve to keep still, and to mind his own 
business; as it were standing aside under a wall in a storm 
of dust and hurricane of driving wind; and he will endure 
to behold the rest filled with iniquity, if only he himself 
may live his life clear of injustice and of impiety, and 
depart, when his time comes, in mild and gracious mood, 
with fair hope.' 
("Numbers", CPW, X, pp. 145-46). 
This can be taken as a fair description of the alienated poets. Arnold 
dismisses it as gloomy. But he allows a degree of dissatisfaction: "So 
with the spectacle of our civilisation most people are well satisfied. But 
there are two sorts of people who have always been, or generally been, 
dissatisfied and malcontents - the poets and the saints" ("Reports of 
Public Lectures", CPW, X, p. 250). "Sages and saints are apt to be severe, 
it is true; apt to take a gloomy view of the society in which they live, and 
to prognosticate evil to it. But then it must be added that their 
prognostications are very apt to turn out right" ("Numbers", CPW, X, 
pp. 145-46). 
Now, the question is: how did Arnold react to his situation? Did he 
withdraw from his age, like Plato's remnants? Did he resolve to keep 
still, and to mind his own business? Did he even vacillate? No, let us 
listen to him himself: "I have so lately had a stronger wish than usual 
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not to vacillate and be helpless, but to do my duty, whatever that may 
be; and out of that wish one may always hope to make something" (Letters, 
December, 1854, I, p. 41). "Perhaps there is nothing in which one may more 
safely employ oneself, or which brings one, and properly brings so much 
happiness as beneficence. But do not you feel sometimes anxious to attack 
the condition of the things which seems to bring about the evils on which 
your beneficence has to be exercised? When once you have got it into your 
head that this condition in great measure brings the evils about, and that 
it is in great measure remediable, I think one can hardly rest satisfied 
with merely alleviating the evils that arise under it" (Letters, ll;January 
1879, pp. 151-52). 
Even with his own personal sufferings Arnold did not forget his 
public role: "And so this loss (the death of his son) comes to me just 
after my fortyfifth birthday, with so much other 'suffering in the flesh', 
the departure of youth, cares of many kinds, an almost painful anxiety 
about public matters" (Letters, January, 1868, I, p. 382). In these lines 
lies the key to Arnold's career. In all this one is passing from the 
external environment of the poet to the interior s ta.te of the poet. 
Poets generally unite in themselves two sources of inspiration, -
Hellenism and Hebraism. Heinrich Heine is one of those poets who "had in 
him both the spirit of Greece and the spirit of Judea; both these spirits 
reach the infinite, which is the true goal of all poetry and all art, -
the Greek spirit by beauty, the Hebrew spirit by sublimity. By his 
perfection of literary form, by his love of clearness, by his love of 
beauty, Heine is Greek; by his intensity, by his ••• 'longing which cannot be 
uttered,' he is Hebrew" (CPW, III, p. 128). 
But Hellenism and Hebraism, as faculties, are not at equipoise all the 
time. They are, above all, instincts and feelings. Their coexistence creates 
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tension or conflict. For example "the religious feeling, which (is) as 
much a part of (the poet's] essence as the passion for nature and the 
literary instinct, shows itself at moments jealous of these its rivals, 
and alarmed at their predominance. Like all powerful feelings, it wants 
to exclude every other feeling and to be absolute" ("Maurice de Gu~rin", 
CPW, III, pp. 21-22). "From the first, two conflicting forces, two 
sources of inspiration, had contended with one another ••• for the possession 
of Milton, - Renascence and Puritanism. Milton felt the power of both ••• 
(his) early poems, such as the Allegro, the Penseroso, are poems produced 
while a sort of equilibrium still prevailed in the poet's nature, hence 
their charm" (IIA French Critic on Milton", ~, VIII, p. 178) • 
. The Hellenic source of inspiration gratifies the senses and understanding. 
The predominance of this instinct gives the poet, like Keats as well as 
Guerin, a certain t;;rpe of temperament: Ita temperament common enough among 
artists, but with which few artists, who have it to the same degree as 
Guerin, unite a seriousness and a sad intensity like his" ("Dr Stanley's 
Lectures", CPW, III, p. 67). This instinct appeals to human nature. "But 
by the very intensity and unremittingness of its appeal to the senses and 
the understanding, by its stimulating a single side of us too absolutely, 
ends by fatiguing and revolting us; ends by leaving us with a sense of 
confinement, of oppression, - with the desire for an utter change, for 
clouds, storms, effusion, and relief" ("Pagan and Mediaeval Religious 
Sentiment", CPW, III, p. 223). For at the same time there is something 
else in human nature prompting man to live by his soul and imagination 
rather than by his senses. The existence of this something is the 
ground of all hope. 
Human nature is neither all senses and understanding, nor all heart 
and imagination. It is a combination of both: the imaginative reason. 
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Hellenism and Hebraism 
/: are a familiar content to poetic mind. When they are equally felt 
they create tension. Freud calls that state the "principle of ambivalence". 
Most of Arnold's great poetry is a series of variations on this many-sided 
conflict: spontaneity and discipline, emotion and reason, faith and 
scepticism, the rich youth and the dry age. But the fact remains that his 
poems are not self-expression, they are representative, not individual 
in the emotion they express. It was the dilemma of an age in state of 
transition. 
Arnold must have felt this many-sided conflict otherwise he would not 
have been able to express it so strongly. Above all he is a man endued 
with the sensibility of a poet. He had also the intellect to understand it. 
His realisation of his own responsibility as a guide in his age made his 
Dionysian strain stop short of the sensual and violent. It was none-the-
less genuine. In 1865 he wrote to his mother: "No one has a stronger 
and more abiding sense than I have of the 'daemonic' element - as Goethe 
called it - which underlies and encompasses our life; but I think, as 
Goethe thought, that the right thing is, while conscious of this element, 
and of all that there is inexplicable round one, to keep pushing on one's 
posts into the darkness, and to establish no post that is not perfectly 
in light and firm. One gains nothing on the darkness by being, like 
Shelley, as incoherent as the darkness itself" (Letters, I, p. 249). 
The poet's realisation of his own responsibilities towards his age 
as well as his own awareness that the time when you could 'descend into 
yourself and produce the best of your thought and feeling naturally' is 
past and even to do so now requires 'an overwhelming and in some degree 
morbid effort', has created a rare phenomenon that could be described as 
"constricted situation", - the quality that describes the poet's sense of 
unease. On the plane of action it is represented by the passive role 
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played by the poet in the major part of Arnold's poetry, where passivity 
and suffering are but two faces to one coin, - the image of a constricted 
man. 
This is Arnold's interpretation of the poet's dilemma that what 
he had to say about his life and the world he lived in was to be 
expressed only in an image of constricted man. He seems to be quite 
conscious of his own dilemma. About 1852 in "The Grande Chartreuse" he 
had written: 
My melancholy, sciolists say, 
Is a past mode, an outworn theme ••• 
Ah, if it be passed, take away, 
At least, the restlessness, the pain; 
Be man henceforth no more a prey 
To these out-dated stings again! 
(II. 99-106). 
He meets his critics by challenging them to show that his dejection is not 
amply warranted by the miseries of existence: 
The kings of modern thought are dumb; 
Silent they are, though not content, 
And wait to see the future come. 
They have the grief men had of yore, 
But they contend and cry no more. 
(II .116-120 ). 
Byron, Shelley and Senancour cried aloud, but what good did they do? Have 
restless hearts one throb the less? On the whole the sons of the world 
ignored the poets and went on their self-confident way. To them Arnold 
remarks in the same tone of unemphatic irony: 
We admire with awe 
The exulting thunder of your race; 
You give the universe your law, 
You triumph over time and space! 
Your pride of life, your tireless powers, 
We laud them, but they are not ours. 
(n.163-l68) 
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"The Scholar-Gipsy" and "Thyrsis" are Arnold's most complete 
argument by poetic means, in addition to Empedocles on Etna, about men 
cut off from their sources of power. The question that "The Scholar-Gipsy" 
"poses in its simple form is whether it is possible for a young man to avoid 
the challenge of the modern world. In'Thyrsis' the question is put in 
another way: if a middle-aged man is immersed in 'the world and wave of 
men' does this mean that the ideal world dreamed of when he was young and 
indeed for a time enjoyed, is in fact thereby destroyed? The two questions 
are shown to be related when the Scholar-Gipsy is formally identified with 
a particular tree in the familiar landscape" ~Thyrsisll, 11.26-30).3 
In "The Scholar-Gipsy" the correlative is a mythical figure of a 
young man, about to be a poet, who has somehow managed to avoid the 
contagion of the world and moves freely through a countryside which he 
has become a part. Its structure is threefold: the first section proceeds 
by means of the natural mode of interpretation (stanzas 1-13); the second 
section proceeds by means of the moral mode of interpretation (stanzas 
14-22); and finally two concluding stanzas with their end-symbol of the 
Tyrian Trader - a notorious point of difference among critics, that 
sums up in itself all that Arnold has said in the poem. 
The first section concentrates upon the Cumnor landscape, recreating 
Glanvil's historical figure as a genius loci who has kept himself unspotted 
while awaiting the spark from heaven to fall. Andrew Farmer, in his 
comment on the poem, complains that "the description of the countryside 
through which the Scholar Gipsy wanders, is developed far beyond what is 
required by the argument".4 Arnold, by dwelling so long on his description, 
was trying to fix the remembrance of those delightful days and thus adding 
a mnemonic function to poetry. For Arnold knows that Britain is growing more 
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urban every day. To this effect he writes to his brother Tom: "Do you 
remember a poem of mine called 'The Scholar-Gipsy?' It was meant to fix 
the remembrance of those delightful wanderings of ours in the Cumner hills, 
before they were quite effaced - and as such Clough and Walrond accepted 
it, and it has had much success at Oxford, I am told, as was perhaps 
likely from its couleur locale" (A Writer's Recollections, pp. 72-73). 
By doing that Arnold gives the poem a wider implication: through his 
description of the landscape and the introduction of the shepherd, the 
poem is introduced to the pastoral tradition that can carry a number of 
meanings, personal, poetic, academic, and religious: 
Go, for they call you, shepherd, from the hill; 
Go, shepherd, and untie the wattled cotes! 
No longer leave thy wistful flock unfed, 
Nor let thy bawling fellows rack their throats, 
Nor the cropped herbage shoot another head. 
But when the fields are still, 
And the tired men and dogs all gone to rest, 
And only the white sheep are sometimes seen 
Cross and recross the strips of moon-blanched green, 
Come, shepherd, and again begin the quest! 
(Poems, pp. 333-334, lines 1-10) 
Tinker and Lowry, in their comment on these lines, say "the function 
of the shepherd, mentioned at the beginning of the poem, is not clear. 
What is the quest which is to be renewed by moonlight? Is it the same 
quest as that of the scholar-gipsy, or merely emblematic of the spiritual 
quest of the thoughtful soul? And who is the companion that is to share 
it? 'Thyrsis', very probably, for Clough and Arnold are naturally 
associated in the reader's mind with the spiritual and philosophical 'quest' 
of their time. Moreover such companionship is implied by the conventions 
of pastoral poetry; c.f.the line in 'Thyrsis' 'Alas, for Corydon no 
rival now! '" (Commentary, pp. 208-9). 
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The shepherd's quest may recall to the reader's mind Moses' quest. 
He, too, had a companion - his brother, and he was a shepherd. The 
idea of a quest implies a fixed object in life, which in turn implies that 
all activity is not random, since some principle of order is to be 
discovered. Arnold, in his prose as well as in his poetry, is trying to 
prove that a truth does exist. His argument is that the search for 
truth must be unrelenting and that its very attainment promotes a 
further search for a more ultimate truth. If there is any touch of 
scepticism about Arnold's writing or sense of uncertainty it is not about 
the reality of truth but about the possi bili ty of a-ttaining it in one's 
life. And whether we are on the right path to it or not. 
The old tale of the frustrated scholar who left Oxford to learn the 
gipsies' magical lore is in Arnold's hands a parable of the modern 
spirit's quest for unity and totality. For the Scholar-Gipsy, essentially, 
has hellenistic qualities that Arnold wants to foster in his own over-
Hebraic age. He himself aspired to lucidity and balance, the harmony 
between the mind and the heart. But the story contains some other 
suggestive ideas: the time and the place. The time in which the original 
story took place is the seventeenth century: an age of transition. As 
for the place, perhaps Arnold's description of Oxford might explain that 
significance: 
A city steeped in sentiment as she lies, spreading her 
gardens to the moonlight, and whispering from her 
towers the l~st enchantments of the Middle Ages... 5 
unravaged b~/~ierce intellectual life of our century. 
And of the Middle Ages he says: 
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I have a strong sense of the irrationality of that 
period, and of the utter folly of those who take it 
seriously and play at restoring it, still, it has 
poetically the greatest charm and refreshment for me. 
(Letters, Vol., I, p. 127, December, 1860) 
These lines might be taken as a disguised criticism of the Oxford 
Movement of which Sir Llewellyn Woodward writes: 
The Oxford Movement appears out of scale with the early 
railway· age ••• It was scarcely possible for sensitive 
and clever men like Keble, Pusey, Newman, or ••• Froude 
to understand the world of George Stephenson or Feargus 
O'Connor or Edwin Chadwick. The fascination of Oxford 
was too much for them. There was interest enough in her 
intellectual discipline; her internal disputes had the 
vividness of the politics of a city state. The domination 
of ecclesiastical subjects and religious beliefs was a 
real domination ••• - For all their intellectual ability, 
the Oxford reformers knew little or nothing of the 
physical and biological sCiences.o 
In addition to that, though Oxford was a national university, it 
limited its endowments to members of the Church of England. So a lad 
being of very pregnant parts, yet wanting the encouragement of preferment, 
would be forced, by his poverty, to leave his studies there. All these 
questions must have weighed on Arnold's thinking while writing the poem. 
Above all the master-thought with him was the idea of integrity. The 
integration of the self was the prime object of Arnold's intellectual 
quest. 
On June 21, 1870, the honorary degree of D.C.L. was conferred upon 
Arnold by Lord Salisbury, Chancellor of the UniverSity of Oxford. Arnold 
was naturally gratified by the attention, but some of Salisbury's remarks 
during the ceremonials of the week led him to conceive that Salisbury was, 
as he wrote to his mother, "a dangerous man ••• chiefly from his want of 
any true sense and experience of literature and its beneficent function. 
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Religion he knows, and physical science he knows, but the immense work 
between the two, which is for literature to accomplish, he knows nothing 
of" (Letters, II, p. 35). All this pressed a good deal upon his mind at 
Oxford. But, by this dramatic collision with Oxonian religious dogma, he 
came to an idea for the book which he believed his most important one: 
Literature and Dogma. 
The situation needed a mediator, a healing and reconciling influence, 
between the claims of science and those of religion. But people should 
be balanced first. Arnold found that they lack the qualities of Hellenism. 
Hellenism, and human life in the hands of Hellenism, are invested with a 
kind of aerial ease, clearness and radiancy, they are kept full of sweetness 
and light. Such qualities he finds in the scholar-gipsy himself, and on 
the strength of them is soon identifying the gipsy with Dionysian powers. 
Arnold, however, was not blind to its imperfection: asort of moral 
weakness, and of relaxation or insensibility of the moral fibre. 
This sort of awareness is reflected in Arnold's concept of the gypsies 
in the poem. A highly romantic view of the gipsy is found in the "Stanzas 
on a Gipsy Child by the Sea-Shore", and a realistic one in "Resignation", 
both poems in the volume of 1849. But the conception of gipsy's life 
set forth in "The Scholar-Gipsy" differs from both these earlier views. The 
wandering scholar betrays an ungipsy-like disinclination to associate 
with his own kind. His search is philosophical - that of the sage living 
in retirement from the distracting world. He means, when he has mastered 
the secret of this magic, to offer it to mankind: 
But once, years after, in the country-lanes, 
Two scholars, whom at college erst he knew, 
Met him, and of his way of life enquired; 
Whereat he answered, that the gipsy-crew, 
His mates, had arts to rule as they desired 
The workings of men's brains, 
And they can bind them to what thoughts they will. 
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'And I,' he said, 'the secret of their art, 
When fully learned, will to the world impart; 
But it needs heaven-sent moments for this skill.' 
(Poems, p. 335, lines: 41-50) 
The Scholar-Gipsy, then, himself is a figure of perfeot poise and 
balance. He achieves this unity of purpose in life through calm that he 
gets from nature. His intimacy with nature becomes explicit when: 
••• the blackbird, picking food 
Sees thee, nor stops his meal, nor fears at all; 
So often has he known thee past him stray. 
To make him eternal Arnold associates him with the cycle of seasons. He is 
seen in spring: 
In Summer: 
And 
Shepherds had met him on the Hurst in spring. (I.57) 
Maidens, who from the distant hamlets come 
To dance around the Fyfield elm in May, 
Oft through the darkening fields have seen thee roam, 
Or cross a stile into the public way. 
Oft thou hast given them store 
Of flowers - the frail-leafed, white anemone, 
Dark bluebells drenched with dews of summer eves. (I.82-88) 
In autumn, on the skirts of Bagley Wood. (1.110 ) 
Finally in stanza XIII, winter comes: 
And once, in winter, on the causeway chill 
Where home through flooded fields foot-travellers go, 
Have I not passed thee on the wooden bridge, 
Wrapped in thy cloak and battling with the snow, 
Thy face tow'rd Hinksey and its wintry ridge? (121-125) 
The question here is very significant for it prepares the reader for the 
scepticism of the nineteenth-century. 
In lines that mark the return to the realism of the age Arnold 
says: 
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~ut what - I dresm! Two hundred years are flown 
Since first the story ran through Oxford halls, 
And the grave Glanvil did the tale inscribe 
That thou wert wandered from the studious walls 
To learn strange arts, and join a gipsy-tribe; 
And thou from earth art gone 
Long since, and in some quiet churchyard laid-
Some country-nook, where o'er thy unknown grave 
Tall grasses and white flowering nettles wave, 
Under a dark, red-fruited yew-tree's shade. 
At this stage the poem takes on its religious function. 7 The two 
themes are interwound. For poetry, like religion, was attacked in the 
nineteenth century as'~rimitive and kthat it] must inevitably decay with 
the progress of science and civilisation" (Bush, English Poetry, p. 159). 
Arnold had distinguished three trends in his age whose attitudes would be 
fatal to any imaginative experience either in the ~ible or in poetry. 
The Pharisees, with their genuine concern for religion, but 
total want of perception of what religion really is, and 
by their temper, attitude, and aims doing their best to 
make religion impossible, are the Protestant Dissenters. 
The Sadducees are our friends the philosophical Liberals, 
who believe neither in angel nor spirit but in Mr Herbert 
Spencer. Even the Roman governor has his close parallel 
in our celebrated aristocracy, with its superficial 
good sense and good nature, its complete inaptitude for 
ideas, its profound helplessness in presence of all great 
spiritual movements. 
(Literature and Dogma, CPW, p. 399) 
Arnold must have asked himself the question that Dr Newman asked himself 
before: How, then, in our age are those wants and feelings of our common 
nature satisfied, which were formerly supplied by symbols, now that 
symbolical language and symbolical rites have almost perished or dismissed 
~s dreams? Arnold's answer is what he had urged in the poem "Progress": 
"Leave then the cross as ye have left carved gods,/ But guard the fire within." 
And if Christ is to be understood and followed, the prime necessity is to 
get free from the anthropomorphic supernaturalism. Though the myth of 
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Christianity, as embodied in the Bible, may not be true, still it 
contained moral truths which were very necessary in the conduct of life. 
Therefore, these truths should be kept alive. The truth of the Scholar-
Gipsy should also be kept alive by disengaging it from the flimsiness of 
seventeenth-century superstition. 
At this point, the poem proceeds by means of the moral mode of 
interpretation (stanzas 14-23). In that part the Scholar-Gipsy is changed 
into a symbol of immortal youth and hope whose single-minded pursuit and 
quiet self-possession stand as a devastating indictment of the hurry, 
disease, and endless fluctuation of life in the modern world. The poem 
moves correspondingly from the vivid description of an actual landscape 
into the language of abstraction - H change to change 11, II repeated shocks ••• 
numb the elas tic powers 'I, ., bliss and teen 'I, ;, a thousand schemes ". In 
contrast to the firm physical imagery which characterises the Scholar and 
his world, modern man is marked by vague, widely-applicable classes of 
experience. 
The Scholar-Gipsy has become a model Arnold employs to make his 
critique as effective as possible. But one has to learn what gave the 
Scholar his immunity: the explanations follow. First he fled while he was 
young 'with powers/Fresh, undiverted to the world without.' Those who 
have to go on living find that age itself brings dissatisfaction. The 
unsatisfactoriness is rendered in Arnold's intangible, slippery vocabulary -
"sick fatigue", "languid doubt'., ilmuch to have tried, in much been 
baffled II, I' nor knows for what he strives ", "casual creeds ", ilvague resolves ", 
I, new beginnings, disappointments new'l. The faults and griefs of modern 
man are touched in the widest possible terms in phrases such as '~fuo 
hesitate and falter life away,' And lose tomorrow the ground won today,' 
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These idle fluctuations "without term or scope'l contrast painfully, by 
their generality and randomness, with the Gipsy's "one aim, one business, 
one desire." 
It is because men are tossed to and fro in the mUltitudinousness of 
life that they die, that they perish with their own generation: 
For what wears out the life of mortal men? 
,~ that from change to change their peing rolls; 
'Tfu that repeated shocks, again, again, 
Exhaust the energy of strongest souls 
And numb the elastic powers. 
(Poems, p. 339, lines 142-46). 
By line 201, the model is so far restored and purified to be a proper 
model. In the vision he was a shy, romantic figure. But in the 
non-mythical statement of the second part he is made of sterner stuff: 
"Thou hadst one aim, one business, one desire. If He seems now to belong to 
the world of classical antiquity. At this point Arnold has come close to 
the second reason for the Scholar's immunity, his good luck in being: 
o born in days when wits were fresh and clear, 
And life ran gaily as the sparkling Thames; 
Before this strange disease of modern life, 
With its sick hurry, its divided aims, 
Its heads o'ertaxed, its palsied hearts, was rife-
This was doubly fortunate, since earlier ages were not simply easier to live 
in, because they were calmer, but easier to write poetry in. The idea which 
occupies the rest of the poem is the importance for the Scholar of 
avoiding 'feverish contact' with the modern world: 
Fly hence, our contact fear! 
Still fly, plunge deeper in the bowering wood! 
Averse, as Dido did with gesture stern 
From her false friend's approach in Hades turn, 
Wave us away, and keep thy solitude! 
(Poems, p. 342) 
His salvation can lie only in flight. This suggests an explanation of the 
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concluding simile of the Tyrian trader. 
The Dido image, says Culler, is appropriate because in her the ideal 
of love and personal faith was wronged by one whose errand was the 
practical founding of the most practical empire in the world. But it is 
also appropriate because the scene is Hades, the Hades in which the poet him-
self is located, and Dido is preserving her integrity after she has 
suffered, not before. And finally, her conflict with Aeneas represents 
the historic conflict between East and West, of which the Scholar Gipsy's 
conflict with the modern world is a modern variant. And through her 
connection with Carthage, the colony of Tyre, she leads into the final 
symbol of the Tyrian trader, which is the culmination of the poem 
(Imaginative Reason, p. 189). 
Finally, there are the last two stanzas with ,their end symbol of the 
Tyrian trader that has caused difficulty for some readers. Recent 
interpretations of the poem, however much they differ on other points, 
invariably agree in seeing the final stanzas as an image of culture 
confrontation. G. Wilson Knight8 finds that Arnold's poem confronts our 
western tradition with suggestions of a wisdom, lore, or magic of oriental 
affinities or origin. A.E. Dyson in a refutation of Professor Knight's 
interpretation, says something very similar. E.K. Brown points out that 
"The Tyrian trader's flight before the clamorous spirited Greeks is 
exactly analogous to the scholar gipsy's flight before the drink and 
clatter of the smock-frock'd boors or before the bathers in the abandoned 
lasher or before the Oxford riders blithe. Both flights express a 
desire for calm, a desire for aloofness. And little ingenuity is required 
to discover a similarity between the gipsies and those 'shy traffickers, 
the dark Iberians' to whom the Tyrian trader flies. There is, at the least 
a general relevance to the character of the gipsy in the elaborate simile".9 
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Professor Drew adds that the image has an obvious punctuating role in 
the poem and that it provides a bridge to the Greek myths which lie behind 
"Thyrsis". 
All these views were a response to G. Saintsbury's claims that 
"No ingenui"tiYcan work out the parallel between the 'uncloude:ily joyous' 
scholar who is bid avoid the palsied, diseased enfants du siecle, and the 
grave Tyrian who was indignant at the competition of the merry Greek, and 
shook out more sail to seek fresh markets" (Poems, p. 343). The imagery 
might be taken as Arnold's method to apply his idea of the symmetrical 
structure of a poem: of the regular correspondence of part with part, of 
thought to thought, feeling to feeling. The Tyrian trader with his gravity 
of demeanour and settled habits betrays Apollonian leanings in contrast to 
Dionysian excessiveness of the youthful Greeks. This aspect is made explicit 
through imagery that is associated with the Dionysian cult: 
And saw the merry Grecian coaster come, 
Freighted with amber grapes, and Chi an wine, 
Green, bursting figs, and tunnies steeped in brine-
And knew the intruders on his ancient home. 
(Poems, p. 344) 
The image also shows the contrast between two different modes of 
communication: communication through involvement and assimilation, and 
communication controlled and limited by detachment. What is being suggested 
here is a form of action without unnecessary involvement. The conclusion 
that the poem suggests is that Hebraism and Hellenism: doing and knowing, 
must in the end be reconciled, and thus man's two great natural forces will 
no longer be dissociate and rival, but will be a joint force of right 
thinking and strong doing to carry him on to perfection. 
The character of the Scholar-Gipsy surely stands for this kind of 
awareness, a new poise, a unified functioning of faculties. The poem, 
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despite what Arnold says about it, is animating. It animates by the fact 
that we are waiting. The act of waiting itself involves hope. This hope 
is made nearer every stanza through the verbal sequence that describe the 
rumours hanging about the countryside: begins in the past tense in stanza 
six, moves through the subjunctive in stanza seven, to the present perfect 
in stanza eight: "was seen", "had met", "had found", "would fly", "Cif) 
hast passed", '(if) haunt'st", "lov'st", "have met". This hope is carried 
on to the companion piece, "Thyrsis" , where it is finally identified 
with a fixed object: the tree. 
Roam on! The light we sought is shining still. 
Dost thou ask proof? Our tree yet crowns the hill, 
Our Scholar travels yet the loved hill-side. 
(Poems, p. 508) 
The image of the tree reinforces the idea of integrity: root, shoot, blossom. 
In "Thyrsis" the correlative is an uphill journey on foot at the end 
of a winter's day by a middle-aged man finding his way by memory through 
an altered countryside in search of a tree whose position he has forgotten 
and which may no longer be where it was. He is not to write very much more 
poetry. The countryside which he once knew so well but which is now so 
altered is of course the first half of "The Sc!l.olar-Gipsy". It purports to 
be A Monody to commemorate Arnold's friend, Arthur Hugh Clough, who died 
on 13 November 1861. Arnold placed it after "The Scholar Gj::7sy", to which 
it is, first and foremost, a sequel in style and tone. But in theme it is 
intended as an antidote. 
It is an antidote in a sense that in the "Scholar-Gipsy" the poet's 
dilemma is that he has fallen on an uncongenial, arid and unpoetical age. 
It is the dilemma of Gray, Leopardi and Arnold. It is also Keats' 
dilemma where the two forces of inspiration could only be kept in balance 
at a high price. The poet's dilemma in "Thyrsis" is different: the poet dies 
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because .he allowed himself to become involved in human strife and be 
sucked in the Time stream: Thyrsis of his own will went away, 
It irked him to be here, he could not rest. 
He loved each simple joy the country yields, 
He loved his mates; but yet he could not keep, 
For that a shadow loured on the fields, 
Here with the shepherds and the silly sheep. 
Some life of men unblest 
He knew, which made him droop, and filled his head. 
He went; his piping took a troubled sound 
Of storms that rage outside our happy ground; 
He could not wait their passing, he is dead. 
(Poems, p. 500) 
Clough's resignation of his Oriel fellowship was for Arnold the time of 
Clough's real death. 
In these two poems one finds involvement I'nd detachment are juxtaposed, 
and Arnold remains aloof, paring his fingernails in the expectation that 
the reader will be encouraged to appreciate how complex the problem is. 
Seen from this standpoint, Arnold has found an objective correlative for 
his emotion rather than merely trying to explain it directly, and in doing 
so he avoided becoming didactic. He even succeeded in avoiding being 
subjective by setting 'his own grief for Clough, for his lost youth and 
for his ill-luck in falling on an uncongenial age in the context of a 
universal lament for the fate of modern man'. 
The poem on the whole animates and gives joy. It remains unique in 
Arnold's poetry, as a fusion of his typical tender nostalgia, associated 
with the natural scenes he most dearly loved, with a mood, not of melancholy 
defeatism, but of hope and tentative optimism. His sight of the tree as 
":Bare on its lonely ride, the Tree! the Tree! (160), and his immediate 
recognition that he cannot reach it tonight are a way of saying that the 
search for truth, however difficult, is not hopeless, and that the tree 
still stands if it cannot be reached at once: 
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I cannot reach the signal-tree to-night, 
Yet, happy omen hail! 
(165-166) 
II 
The Poet's Ideal 
The study ~~s~ so far, shown that the poet in Arnold's theory is at 
bottom ondoyo.nt et divers: balancing and indeterminate, the plaything of 
cross motives and shifting impulses, swayed by a thousand subtle influences, 
physiological and pathological. But the fact remains that the greatness of 
the poet lies in his being able to subdue this side of his troubled self and 
to retain a hopeful and serene temper. This has been the main idea behind 
Arnold's evaluation of poets. 
In his study of Emerson Arnold follows this principle: 
As late as 1870, he (Emerson) writes to Carlyle ' ••• the 
strong hours conquer us; and I am the victim of miscellany, -
miscellany of designs, vast debility, and procrastination'. 
The forlorn note belonging to the phrase 'vast debility', 
recalls that saddest and most discouraged of writers, the 
author of Obermann, Senancour, with whom Emerson has in 
truth a certain kinship. He has in common with Senancour his 
pureness, his passion for nature, his single eye; and here 
we find him confessing, like Senancour, a sense in himself of 
sterility and impatience. 
(IIEmerson", flY, X, pp. 176-77) 
Yet the secret of his effect is not even in these; it is in his temper. 
It is in the hopeful, serene, beautiful temper wherewith these, in 
Emerson, are indissolubly joined; in which they work, and have their being. 
He says himself: IIWe judge of a man's wisdom by his hope, knowing that the 
10 
perception of the inexhaustibleness of nature is an immortal youth" 
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(ibid., pp. 181-82). ":By his conviction that in the life of the spirit is 
happiness, and by his hope that this life of the spirit will come more 
and more to be sanely understood, and to prevail, and to work for happiness, 
by this conviction and hope Emerson was great, and he will surely prove 
in the end to have been right in them" (ibid., pp. 184-85). 
So in spite of his inner conflict Emerson retains his aspirations for 
happiness, and he is great because he gives the reader this hopeful 
vision of life, while Carlyle's perverse attitude towards happiness cut 
him as well as his readers off from hope. Thus Arnold uses him for 
contrast: 
:But consider Carlyle's temper, as we have been considering 
Emerson's; take his own account of it: ' ••• I lead a most 
dyspeptic, solitary, self-shrouded life; consuming; 
if possible in silence, my considerable daily allotment of 
pain, glad when any strength is left in me for working, which 
is the only use I can see in myself, - too rare a case of 
late. The ground of my existence is black as death; too black, 
when all ~ too; but at times there paint themselves on it 
pictures of gold, and rainbow, and lightning, all the brighter 
for the black ground, I suppose. Withal, 1 am very much of a 
fool' - No, not a fool, but turbid and morbid, wilful and 
perverse. 'We judge of a man's wisdom by his hope'. 
(ibid., pp. 182-83) 
Wise men everywhere, says Arnold, know that we must keep up our courage 
and hope; they knew that hope is, as \'lordsworth well says, -
The paramount duty which Heaven lays 
For its own honour, on man's suffering heart. 
:But the very word duty points to an effort and a struggle to maintain our 
hope unbroken. The poet can maintain this line, as Arnold did, by becoming 
less personal in his endeavour: 
I more and more'Lwrites Arnold to his mother]become conscious 
of having something to do, and of a resolution to do it ••• to be 
less and less personal in one's desires and workings is the 
great matter, and too I feel, I am glad to say, more deeply 
than I did, but for progress in the direction of the 'seeketh 
not her own' there is always room. 
(Letters, I, p. 344) 
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In short, character and self-control, the virtus verusque labor so 
necessary for any kind of greatness, and for the great artist too. Poets, 
in the context of Arnold's thinking, are part of a: 
certain number of aliens, if we may so call them, -
persons ~ho are mainly led, not by their class spirit, 
but by a general humane spirit, by the love of human 
perfection; and that this number is capable of being 
diminished or augmented. I mean (says Arnold), the number 
of those who will succeed in developing this happy 
instinct will be greater or smaller, in proportion both 
to the force of the original instinct within them, and 
to the hindrance or encouragement which it meets with 
from without. 
(Culture and Anarchy ,CPW <>, V,~ 146) 0_ 
The aliens are detached from classes and parties. They yet are lovers 
of their country, and lovers of human life and of civilisation, and 
therefore grievously distressed at the condition in which they see their 
own civilisation at the present time, and appalled at the prophecies 
they hear of the turn which things in their society must certainly take. 
Arnold's objective was to increase their number. "But what we have to do 
is to raise and multiply in this country a third host, with the conviction 
that the ideals both of Simpletons, and Savages are profoundly inadequate 
and profoundly unedifying, and with the resolve to win victory for a 
better ideal than of either of them" ("Falkland", CPW, VIII, p. 205). 
These are Arnold's criteria in classifying poets into men of genius 
on one hand and men of ability on the other: 
There are the famous men of genius in literature, - the 
Homers, Dantes, Shakespeares: of them we need not speak; 
their praise is for ever and ever. Then there are the 
famous men of ability in literature: their praise is 
in their own generation. And what makes this difference? 
The work of the two orders of men is at the bottom the same, -
a criticism of life ••• But the criticism which the men 
of genius pass upon human life is permanently acceptable 
to mankind; the criticism which the men of ability pass 
upon human life is transitorily acceptable. 
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••• The first kind are the great abounding fountains of 
truth, whose criticism of life is a source of illumination 
and joy to the whole human race for ever, - the Homers, 
the Shakespeares. These are the sacred personages, whom 
all civilised warfare respects. The second are those 
whom the outskirmishers of the new generation, its 
forerunners, - quick-witted soldiers ••• the select of the 
army, - recognise, though the bulk of their comrades 
behind might not, as the same family and character with the 
sacred personages, exercising like them an immortal 
function, and like them inspiring a permanent interest. 
("Joubert", CPW, III, pp. 209-10) 
The second order of poets marry the spirit of their own generation 
and become the widow to the next one. ":But for a spirit of any delicacy 
and dignity, what a fate, if he could foresee it! to be an oracle for one 
generation, and then of little or no account for ever. How far better to 
pass with scant notice through one's own generation, but to be singled 
out and preserved by the very iconoclasts of the next, then in their turn 
by those of the next, and so, like the lamp of life itself, to be handed on 
(
' \I from one generation to another in safety" Joubert,~, III, pp. 210-11). 
But Arnold knows that this is not an easy task and it depends in part 
on the poet's age. In his sonnet "Shakespeare", he speaks of the perenial 
problem of the objective poet confronted by an audience that expects or 
demands subjective poetry. It is, in one's view, Arnold's own criticism 
of Romantic poets for writing so much about themselves as well as an 
early condemnation of those who advocated a true allegory of the state 
of one's own mind as the highest thing that one can attempt in the way 
of poetry. 
Shakespeare had so schooled himself and made himself so secure against 
this confusion of his personality and his poetry that he could tread on 
earth unguess'd at: 
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others abide our question. Thou art free. 
We ask and ask - Thou smilest and art still, 
out-topping knowledge. For the loftiest hill, 
Who to the stars uncrowns his majesty, 
Planting his steadfast footsteps in the sea, 
Making the heaven of heavens his dwelling-place, 
Spares but the cloudy border of his base 
To the foiled searching of mortality; 
And thou, who didst the staxs and sunbeams know, 
Self-schooled, self-scanned, self-honoured, self-secure, 
Didst tread on earth unguessed at. - Better so! 
All pains the immortal spirit must endure, 
All weakness which impairs, all griefs which bow, 
Find their sole speech in that victorious brow. 
Line 10 may remind the reader of the poet in "Resignation". In the sonnet, 
Arnold argues that Shakespeare had endured the pains, weaknesses, and 
griefs of man's mortality but left them out of his poetry; and his victory 
over them might be seen only in his serene temper. 
The sonnet, as most critics have observed, is admittedly obscure and 
the dubious logic of its images has been diversely interpreted. Three 
possibilities present themselves: (1) the question of Shakeaspeare's rank 
or supremacy as a poet; (2) the question whether his plays contain a 
revelation of his own character and his private understanding of life 
(or more generally, perhaps, the whole question of how a creative artist 
works): and (3) the question whether his plays may be regarded as 
providing the readers with a guide to conduct: a practical criticism of 
life. All these issues could be raised. But if one takes into consideration 
the historical background of the sonnet and relates it to Arnold's 
poetic theory, then there can hardly be any doubt at least as to the 
general tenor of its meaning. 
In the years immediately preceeding 1844, when the sonnet was written, 
there was a great deal of research done on the life of Shakespeare. In 
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the very year in which Arnold's sonnet was written there appeared two 
studies of Shakespeare's life: one by John Payne Collier and the other 
by Charles Knight. The studies were unproductive in their results -
so unproductive that the stage was all set for attributing the works of 
Shakespeare to Bacon and sometimes to Marlowe. 
It is true that many have asked before about Shakespeare's private 
life and opinions; they have scrutinised his plays for some supplement to 
the meagre biographical knowledge of the poet. They were looking for some 
autobiographical hints revealing the man. For instance Schiller writes: 
Misled by my acquaintance with recent poetry so as in 
every work to look first for the poet, to meet him heart 
to heart, and to reflect with him upon his object, in 
short to look at the object only as it is reflected in the 
subject, I found it intolerable that here the poet nrver 
showed himself and would never let me question him. 1 
Another critic was Schlegel who came to the conclusion that "just 
as God, despite His transcendence, is immanent in the world, showing 'the 
invisible things of him ••• by the things that are made,' so also the 
typical modern writer, Shakespeare in his instance, despite his transcendence 
of his works by virtue of his objectivity, is plainly immanent in them and reveals 
his :lrN.isl"ble preser:ce by things that he has made" (Abra.ms, The J'liirror and the Lamp.':! 
p. 240). It is possible, Schlegel thought, that the literary qualities of 
Itobjectivity" and "interestedness" are not incompatible, so that a modern 
writer may at the same time be in, and aloof from, his own dramas. This is 
seeming contradiction, but one which had sanction in an ancient and persistent 
concept about the relation of God to the universe. The recourse to theology 
for resolving the paradox of Shakespeare had been suggested by Schiller 
himself, in the passage comparing the poet to Deity behind this universe: 
"Like Deity behind the universe, he (Le. the 'objective' poet of 
Shakespeare's kind) hides himself behind his work'" (Allott, Poems, p. 49). 
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The disagreement between Schiller and Schlegel whether Shakespeare 
was objective or subjective continued to divide literary critics, though 
the majority concurred with Schiller that Shakespeare was the very type 
of the objective poet who does not reveal his personality in his writings 
but loses himself in the characters he creates. Coleridge, thus, employs 
the term "sympathy" to explain how a poet is able to annul space and 
the isolation of his individual nervous system and become, for the 
nonce, the personality he contemplates. The very idea which Arnol~ used in 
his poem "The Strayed Reveller", that the poet "becomes what he sings". 
Through sympathy the poet cultivates an appropriate state of feeling 
in himself, as one of various artistic means to which he resorts for 
affecting his readers. It also helps him to enter into the characters 
he would depict. But in the 1820's Hazlitt, followed by Keats, distinguished 
between two types of imagination: one founded on Sympathy and the other on 
Self-love. The former Keats called "Negative Capability" and the latter the 
"Egotistical Sublime". 
Negative Capability involved, among other things, the ability to 
transform oneself almost at will into all sorts and conditions of men. 
Lacking a proper nature of one's own, one could take on the nature of an 
I ago , a Desdamona, a Hamlet. The Egotistical Sublime, on the other hand, 
lacked this ability. It had so powerful a nature, and was so deeply 
self-absorbed, that it could not enter into others, rather transformed 
them into some aspect of itself. The one projected itself into a multifarious 
world and took on the colours of its subject, the other assimilated the world 
into itself and imbued it with the colour of its own mind. In Hazlitt's 
view, Wordsworth, Milton, and Byron were examples of the latter, whereas 
Shakespeare was the supreme example of the former. 
Critics have associated Arnold with the doctrine of the Egotistical 
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Sublime because of the fact that the poet in his poetry is racked by 
inner conflicts. But who would deny that this was the case of all 
influential poets in the early nineteenth century such as Senancour, 
Leopardi, Carlyle, Keats and many others who were considered as models 
to imitate. The poet, in Arnold's poetry, is defined negatively. In this 
way Arnold was able to hold the mirror to his contemporary poets without 
being didactic. However, more will be said about this topic in the course 
of the second part. 
Arnold wished the European poets would become aware of their own 
ineffectiveness andpassivity. His aim waS not only England but Europe. The 
continent has always so much interest for him. He writes to his mother: 
"I value his praise (Saint-Seuve's) both in itself, and because it carries 
one's name through the literary circles of Europe in a way that no 
English praise can carry it" ( Letters, I, p. 134). His name was carried 
far enough to attract the attention of the Italian government. "Il'he 
Italian Government", he writes to his mother, "has proposed to me to take 
charge of Prince Thomas of Savoy ••• " (Letters, II, pp. 1-2). Besides 
these responsibilities, he is a man in the daily exercise of a profession 
full of practical detail, full of routine. But he has had a culture which 
keeps his thinking quick and large and fresh and lucid, and which makes 
thinking of this sort a necessity to him. 
NOTES 
1 H. Ward, A Writer's Recollection (London, 1918), p. 45. 
2 Theoder Reik, From Thirty Years with Freud, tr. R. t:Jinston (r~ew York <;lnd 
Toronto: -Fairar &:~inehart, ~940), p.198. 
3 "The Passage of Time", 206. 
- 157 -
4 Andrew Farmer, "Arnold's Gipsy Reconsidered" Essays in Criticism,Vol. 22 
(1972), 64. 
5 In A.E. Dyson, "The Last Enchantments" Between Two Worlds (Great Britain: 
Macmillan, 1972), p. 47. 
6 E.L. Woodward, The Age of Reform 1815-1870 (Oxford, 1938), p. 512, p.520. 
7 In spite of Mr Michael Thorpe's view that Arnold "did not use poetry as 
a vehicle for his religious ideas. His religious thinking 
plays little part in his most memorable poetry". In 
Matthew Arnold (London: Evans Brothers, 1969), p. 81. 
8 G. W. Knight, tiThe Scholar Gipsy: An Interpretation", Review of English 
Studies, Vol. ·0' (1955). 
9 E.K. Brown, "The Scholar-Gipsy", Revue Anglo-Ameri caine ,. 12 (1934-5), 
224-5. 
10 Emerson, "Spiritual Laws tl Centenary ed., 11, 137-38. 
11 The translation is that in Bernard Bosanquet, A History of Aesthetic 
(London, 1939), p. 299. Quoted by P.F. Baum, Ten Studies 
in the Poetry of Matthew Arnold (Druham, 1958), p. 7n. 
PART II 
MATTHEW ARNOLD'S POETIC PRACTICE 
o God, on Nature, and on human life.-
Matthew Arnold 
CHAPI'ER V 
Prologue 
A single line of poetry, working in the mind, 
may produce more thoughts and lead to more light, 
which is what man wants, than the fullest 
acquaintance with the processes of digestion. -
Matthew Arnold 
Man'sIdea of God and Its Relation to the Phenomenon of Alienation 
The goal towards which I shall move will be the one already 
foreshadowed in the introduction of this thesis: Man's entire life, if not 
history, depends on his concept of God. From this concept there develops 
an immense system of institutions, established facts, accredited dogmas, 
customs, rules etc. In all religion, the possibility of man's estrangement 
from the Divine Order is fundamental; indeed, perhaps the central function 
of religion is to prevent this estrangement of man from God. yfuat brings 
about or prevents this estrangement is man's idea of God. Some concepts in 
conformity with human nature, are more in view and more in honour at one 
time, some at another. To this effect Arnold says: 
Human life and human society arise out of the constant 
endeavour of these instincts to satisfy and develop 
themselves. We may briefly sum them up, these needs or 
instincts, as being, first and foremost, a general instinct 
of expansion; then, as being instincts following diverse 
great lines, which may be conveniently designated as the 
lines of conduct, of intellect and knowledge, of beauty, 
of social life and manners. Some lines are more in view 
and more in honour at one time, some at another. Some 
men and some nations are more eminent on one line, some 
on another. But the final aim, of making our own and of 
harmoniously combining the powers to be reached on each 
and all of these great lines, is the ideal of human life. 
And our race is for ever recalled to this aim, and held fast 
to it, by the instinct of self-preservation in humanity. 
("A Speech at Eton", CPW, IX, pp. 26-7) 
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But human nature is not static:there will corne times when men 
will feel the sense of want of correspondence between these social 
institutions and their own nature. To this effect Arnold writes: 
Modern times find themselves with an immense system 
of institutions, established facts, accredited dogmas, 
customs, rules, which have come to them from times not 
modern. In this system their life has to be carried 
forward; yet they have a sense that this system is not 
of their own creation, that it by no means corresponds 
exactly with the wants of their actual life, that, for 
them, it is customary, not rational. The awakening of 
this sense is the awakening of the modern spirit. 
("Heinrich Heine", CPW, III,p. 109) 
Regarding the problem in this light, as essentially a problem of a 
contradiction between an ever dynamic and changing human nature and 
rigid religious and social institutions, I set aside from the outset, as 
foreign to my purpose, any kind of enquiry into the objective validity of 
anyone among the religious beliefs thus set before us as subject-matter. 
I am not even, at the moment, concerned with the question whether God 
exists or not, for a philosophical as well as scientific proof of God's 
existence is in principle impossible. It does but endeavour to show how 
inevitable these ideas were, and how man's life and history were affected 
by them. 
There are certain traditional questions which men and women have 
asked in all ages, and which they are still asking today:l Is the 
universe a fortuitous collection of atoms, or is it the embodiment of 
design and plan? Is the world we know a chance world, or a planned? Is 
life an incidental by-product of material processes, a mere eddy in the 
primaeval slime, or is it flmdamental in the scheme of things? Is the 
process of evolution haphazard or purposive? Is humanity, in particular, its 
most promising achievement, destined to carry life to higher levels than have 
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yet appeared, or is it doomed to failure and extinction so soon as the 
material conditions which favoured its development have ceased to obtaiA? 
Are we free to make our lives as we please, or are our wills determined 
by bodily reflexes and unconscious wishes? Is mind a unique and 
independent activity, or a mere function of bodily processes which have 
produced consciousness as a kind of glow surrounding the brain like the 
bright colours on an oil-film? 
All cultures provide for a patterned system in which certain answers 
to these questions are predominant: hence certain striving and satisfactions. 
Religion, theistic or non-theistic, and philosophy are attempts to give 
an answer to man's existential problem as embodied in these questions. 
Both, religion and philosophy, have the same general objective: to combine 
all experience into a single, all comprehensive system, a system, moreover, 
which will provide the ultimate ground and unity of all being and all 
knowledge; in other words a description of reality as a whole, of truth, 
"not in one region but in all; Truth apprehended, if it may be, in its 
highest unity".2 
The finest, and the most barbaric cultures have the same function -
the difference is only whether the answer given is better or worse. The 
devi~from the cultural pattern is just as much in search of an answer 
as his more well-adjusted brother. His answer may be better or worse 
than the one given by his culture - it is always another answer to the 
same fundamental questions raised by human existence. In this sense all 
cultures are religious and every deviation is a private form of relgion, 
provided one means by religion an attempt to answer the problem of human 
existence. All these questions and their answers are embodied in man's 
concept of God and His relation to the world. It might be daring for an 
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amateur of philosophy to say that the history of philosophy can be 
read as a story of this concept in history. In point of theory there 
are two concepts: Pantheistic concept of God and a Deistic or Dualistic 
one. In philosophy, they are called pluralism and monism respectively. 
Pantheism is one of those terms to which, though of familiar use,' 
vague and often contradictory meanings are attached. Perhaps, what it 
generally stands for in the popular thought is the notion or doctrine 
which identifies God with the world. According to this view, all things 
and beings are parts of the divine nature, all events and actions are 
expressions of the divine activity. The forces of nature, the movements 
of the human spirit, the incidents of each individual life, the history 
of nations and of the human race, all thinking things, all objects of all 
thought, are immediate manifestations of the being and life of God. Man 
does not need to rise above the finite world to find God, or discern 
in nature and man proofs of the divine existence; for nature and man 
are themselves divine. Pantheism, so understood, is simply the deification 
of the finite world. 
This trend, Pantheism, finds its practical expression in pantheistic 
religions such as the cult of Osiris (ancient Egypt), the cult of Adonis, 
~rahmanism and, in one point of view, Buddhism, the cult of Dionysus or 
~acchus, and Catholicism in the Christian religion. It might be said 
that pantheism has found its most developed and systematic speculative 
expression in Spinoza's philosophy. If one asks what is the ethical 
bearing of pantheism, the answer must be that pantheism knows nothing of 
moral distinctions: with the ideas of freedom and individuality, the 
ideas of responsibilities and of moral good and evil disappear. 
The natural reaction, from a unity which rules out the element of 
difference, is a view of things which, by exaggerating it, becomes virtually 
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dualistic. In the recoil from a theory ,'Thich sVTamps the finite 
in the infinite, the tendency arises to an excessive emphasising 
of the independence of the finite 1iTorldo In the endeavour to 
main tain the infinitude of the divine nature consistently "rith 
the ascription of any measure of reality - nature and man, Deism 
betakes itself to anthropomorphic analogies derived from the 
relations of man to the outvrard world - such as that of a human 
contriver or artist to the 'iJOrk of [lis hands, or that of a 
potentate to his subjects. This Deistic conception of the re~ation 
of God to the I'lorld, vrhether as Creator or as Ruler and Governor, 
is one ,'Thich rests essentially on the notion of arbitrary 'ITill and 
p01iJer. It traces the exis tence of the "rorld, not to anything in 
the nature of God, but only to an arbitrary L~explicable act, by 
,'[hich of His mere vTill and pleasure He calls a \'lOrld i.Yl to be ingo 
In the system of the universe there is an unbridged gap, a dualistic 
breach of unity, so long as there is nothing to connect the essential 
na ture of God I'Ti th the Horld He creates o 
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ITOH, the difference behTeen these hTO concepts is not a mere 
matter of abstract speculation; it is full of practical conse~uences 
and lies at the foundation of all the greatest differences of practical 
opinion. For instance, Hax '-'Teber attri bu tes the differences bet"Teen 
Protestant students and Catholic stu~ents to the mental and spiritual 
peculiarities ac~uired from the environment, here the type of education 
favoured by the religious atmosphere of the home community and the 
parental home. All these "have determined the choice of occupation, 
a~d tDxough it the professional career ••• The principal e}~lanation 
of this difference must be sought in the permaclent intrinsic character 
of their religious beliefs, and not only in their temporary external 
historico-political :L'1stitutions ". 3 
These hlo concepts, in considering the teachings of the various 
religions, express themselves Ln the form of representational thought. 
Thus, for example, the theme of the Father begetting the Son, the 
Creation story, and many other stories, all belong to the realms of 
representational thought 'tThose truth in a pure form is accessible only 
to abstract thinking. This is necessary for the being of God is not 
merely intellectual: it involves feeling anci. 'tTill as well as thought. 
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"From time to time each of these elements has been emphasised at 
the expense of the others, e.g. Thought in Scholasticism, Enlightenment, 
Hegel, etc. Emotional elements in devotional theolog'J, Romanticism, 
Pietism, Schleiermacher, etc. - Elements of ,'rill in moralistic theology, 
the rigour and activism of bourgeois Protestantism, Kant, Ritschl, etc. ,,4 
The course of human history may be compared "with a gigantic 
pendulum which swings back and forth betvleen these hro concepts: 
Pantheism and Deism. One likens the idea of religion to a tree that 
gro"l'ls till it becomes very diff icult for it to carry eny fruit. 
Then comes a reformer, in the order tr~t Carlyle expo~~ded in his 
Heroes and Hero-i'lOrshiu, to trim the tree so as to uroduce fruit 
again a..~d so on along the march of ma:!J.kind. The mechanism of the 
metamorphosis is not difficult to explain: as the tree must be a 
seed at the beginning \'Then it grOHS it absorbs some elements from 
the soil, in this case social circumstances of tr.e people. l'li th 
the passage of time a branch might be mistaken for the stem and 
hence the deviation from the original concept of religion. 
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People are not conscious of this process: it is a gane of 
many generations. They add concepts to the original concept of 
God like those weavers I'rho never see the tapestry they are "leaving. 
No,'l, it is important to recall here that the relationship bebleen 
human activity and the 11'orld produced by it is and remains 
dialectical. 5 Thus men add to their gods 'Ilhat Arnold calls 
extra-belief or Acerglaube even vlhile they apprehend thenselves 
as totally dependent upon them. But by the same token, the 
"other \Vorld" of the gods takes on a certain autonomy vis-a-vis 
the human activity that produces it: it is capable of acting 
back upon the empirical existence of men in society. This points 
to another important fact, that is, the rootedness of religion 
in the practical concerns of everyday life. To this effect Arnold says: 
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All roads lead to Rome; and one finds 
in like manner that all questions raise 
the question of religion .OQ. Questions 
of good government, social harmony, 
education, civilisation, come forth and 
ask to be considered; and very soon it 
appears that 'iTe cannot possibly treat 
them Idthout returning to treat of 
religion. 
("Irish Catholicism and British 
Liberation", Q.5i, VIII, ppo 321). 
The concept of the historical development as a necessary force, 
irresistably cr~nging and reshapL~g the forms of religion and 
thought, is central to Arnold's thinking especially in his 
Literature and Dogmao He as I'Tell "I'laS avTare of the mechanism of 
the process of the metamorphosis from one concept to anothero 
To this effect he says that vlith either concept there groHs 
the Aberglaube: 
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All this [says Arnold] is in Paul. And there 
is besides, the Aberglaube, or extra-belief, 
of the bodily resurrection, of Christ's second 
advent during the lifetime of men then living; 
there is the Calvinistical God '"Tilling to sho,·, 
his ',rrath and to make his pOlver kno~m by vessels 
of ,ITath fitted to destruction' (Romo iv. 22); 
there is the Rabbinical Logic, and the unsound 
use of prophecy and the Old Testament "'0 6 
This Aberglaub~ has s~rung out of a false 
cri tic ism of the literary records :in I'Thich the 
doctrine is conveyed; ,vhat is called 'orthodox 
divinity' is, in fact, an immense literary 
misappre~ensiono 
(ibid, p. 276) 
The practical reformer has to be sure that changes to be made 
in things are supported by pm'Terful and ,,fidely-spread feelings; and 
it is often an indispensable part of his argument to sho
'
;.[, how' those 
pm'Terful feelings had their origin, and how those facts came to seem 
necessary and indefeasibleo It is his first task then, to ascertain 
':Tha t is the nature of man, 7 and I'Tha t are the needs ,'Thich stem from 
his nature. The task is furthermore to recognise the laws inherent 
in human nature and the inherent goals for its development and 
unfolding. This is precisely ,That Arnold did. He began with the 
premise of a human nature common to the human race, throughout all 
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cultures and ages, and of certain ascertainable needs and strivings 
inherent in that nature: 
Human nature is built up of .. (fou:r pO"Hers: the pOTtIer 
of conduct, the povler of intellect and knmlledge, the 
pm-Ter of beauty, and the power of so cial life and 
manner s), we have the nee d for them all. I'lhen He 
have rightly met and adjusted the claims of them all, 
vTe shall then be in a fair T,my for getting soberness 
and righteousness, vTith "Tisdom. 
~Literature and Science;) CPW, X, p. 62) 
The task nOl'/' is to test one I s hypothesis of the continually 
al terna ting movement behleen hro concepts of God: Pantheism and 
Deisr;}, by a brief excursion into the history of thought. This is 
also necessary as an introduction to the nineteenth-century's dilenma 
and the role of the reformer Ln that situation. 
In the Presocratic philosophers, in the archaic E~Jptian 
histo:ry, and in the earliest books of the Old Testament, scholars 
see evidence that our culture at its begi.."'1nings experienced the 
divine power as im..rrediately present in nature, in society, and in 
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each man's hearto One particularly telling representation of the 
fundamental relation behTeen man and nature is offered in the 
biblical myth of man I s expulsion from paradise: 11an and ,'Toman live 
in the Garden of Eden in complete harmony ,'Ii th each other and ,·Ti th 
nature. There is peace and no necessity to Hork. The social 
history of man started ,vi th his emerging from that state of unity 
'\'lith the natural ivorld to an awareness of himself as an entity 
separate from surrounding nature and men. Yet this ai'lareness 
renained very dim over long periods of history, for primit ive 
religions bear testimony to man's feeling of oneness vrith nature o 
The L~dividual continued to be closely tied to the natural and 
social 'iTorld from vrhich he l!llI1e-.cgedj while being partly mrare of 
himself as a separate entity, he felt also part of the vlorld around 
himo 
Erich Fromm, in his cOmntGnt on this situation, 'writes: 
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The problem of manls existence, then, is 
unique in the vThole of nature; he has fallen 
out of nature, as it "Here, and is still in it; 
he is partly divine, partly animal; partly 
infinite, partly finite. The necessity to 
fin<l ever-ne'IT solutions for the contra-
dictions in his existence, to find ever-
brighter forms of unity 1dith nature, his 
fellOl'lI!len and himself, is the source of all 
psychic forces "Thich motivate man, of all his 
passions, affects and anxieties. 8 
The records of the Ancient Egyptian history show that after 
that state of oneness "Ti th nature, there emerged a deistic concept 
of god - lie 0 The gOtL lie continued to rule till "b..e vTas challenged 
vii th the religion of Osiris (Pc:ntheistic concept]. IJ:he history 
of ancient Egypt can be read as a history of the conflict between 
these hIo cults. 9 
A similar process had been enacted on the stage of Greek 
civilisation. To be brief, the 'iTorshipper of Dionysus (Pantheism) 
reacts against any form of restraints. "In intoxication, physical 
or spiritual, he recovers an intensity of feeling "Thich prudence 
had destroyed; he finds the world full of delight and beauty, and 
his imagination is suddenly liberated from the prison of every-day 
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preoccupa tion. The Eacchic ritual produced "lh2. t Ims called 
I enthusiasm', \'Thich means, . etymologically, having the god enter 
into the l'lOrshipper, \'Tho believed that he ocame one "Tith the 
god. Huch of I'That is greatest in human achievement involves 
some elements of intoxication, some sl'Teeping mray of prudence by 
passion. i'li thout the Bacchic element, life \'TOuld be uninteresting; 
with it, it is d2.ngerous. Prudence versus passion is a conflict 
that runs through history. It is not a conflict in 1irhich \'Te olJght 
to side ',Tholly '.iith either party" (3. Russell, op.cH. ,po 34). 
In other "I'Tords, it is the type of religion that gives full gratif-
ication to the senses. It st~~ulates a single side of the human 
n2.ture too a'osolutely, th2.t m2.kes man desire for utter chE.nge o 
For at the S2.ille tine there is something else in human n2.ture, S2.ys 
Arnold, prompting man to live by his soul and imagination rather 
than by his senses only. It vms Orpheus C2.n ascetic cult) that 
brought that change by substituting nen tal for physical 
intoxication. 
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To go to the other root of ~'Testern Civilisation, it is certain 
that the Israelite tribes left Egypt 'wi th the Osiris religious cult in 
its Im'Test state: their behaviour in Sinai shm-IS that. Hoses emerged 
and trimmed the tree and gave it back to the Israelites in the form 
of a Deistic concept of God and His comnandments. "The God of the 
J e'ilS is an authoritarian master and they thenselves an isolated and 
alienated people l1 (Nasterson, op.cit., po 98). 111 am nothing - He 
is everything and therein lies my ultimate bliss' - in this formula, 11 
says Peter Berger, I1lie~ the essence of the masochistic attitudeo ••• 
It transforms the self into nothingness, the other ll1to 
absolute reality. Its eC2tasy consists pre cisely in 
this double metamorphosis, "Thich is profoundly libe:::>ating 
in that it seens to cut all at once trxough the ambiguities 
and angaish of separate, individual subjectivity confronting 
the subjectivities of others. The fact that the masochistic 
attitude is inherently predestined to failure, because the 
self cannot be a~~ihilated this side of death and because 
the other can only be absolutised in illusion, need not 
concern us here. The important point for our considerations 
is that masochism, by its radical self-denial, provides t~0 
means by I'Thich the individual's suffering and even death 
can be radically transcended, to the point ,[here the 
individual not only finds these experiences bearable but 
even Helcomes them. Han cannot accept aloneness and he 
cannot accept mear-inglessness. The masochistic surrender 
is an attempt to escape aloneness by absorption in an 
other, "lIho at the same time is pos ited as the only and 
absolute meaning, at least in the instant in '!Thich the 
surrender occursl1. 
(Op.cit., ppo 63-64) 
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What is interesting in these lines is the point that Professor Berger 
has omitted:-The fact that the masochistic attitude is inherently 
predestined to failure~. This point, in one's view, is the essence of 
alienation that is inherent in the Deistic concept of God as this study 
will show. However, for Hegel, the Jew is a slave who has alienated, 
handed over to God, his freedom, his autonomy, his authentic creativity 
and subjectivity. More precisely, he has not yet achieved a conscious 
realisation of his kinship and unity as spirit with the absolute, and of 
the exigencies of this spirituality which must be satisfied in any 
allegedly authentic religious relationship.10 Because of his impoverished 
conception of human life he submits to an absolute dichotomy between 
man and God and locates the source of any meaning and value which might 
adorn human existence in the inscrutable providence of an utterly 
transcendent Lord. 
The problem began 'flith Israel's definition of God. "As he had 
developed his idea of God from personal experience," says Arnold, 
"Israel knew what we, who have developed our idea from his words about it, 
so often are ignorant of: that his words were but thrown out at a vast 
object of consciousness, which he could not fully grasp, and which he 
apprehended clearly by one point alone - that it made for the great concern 
of life, conduct" (Literature and Dogma, pp. 187-88). 
"But we," says Arnold, "have seen how in the hopes of the nation 
and in the promises of prophecy this true and vital belief of Israel was 
mixed with a quantity of what we have called Aberglaube or extra-belief, 
adding all manner of shape and circumstance to the original thought ••• 
most of this has a poetical value, some of it has a moral value" (ibid., 
p. 229). With the passage of time, the stress was put on that Aberglaube. 
This prepared the way to Christianity which is, in principle, the authentic 
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religious expression of the unity of finite and infinite: 
"Thus, (says Arnold) did Jesus seek to transform this 
immense" materialising 'Aberglaube,' into which the religion 
of Israel had fallen, and to spiritualise it at all points; 
while in his method and secret he supplied a sure basis for 
practice. But to follow him entirely there was needed an 
'epieikeia,' an unfailing sweetness and unerring 
perception, like his own~. 
(ibid., pp. 321-22) 
What Jesus wished to draw the attention to, as Hegel as well as 
Arnold had observed, was that morality must be raised from the thou shalt" 
of law to the is of love. The superiority of amorality of love over one 
of law is illustrated by the fact that it includes the content of the 
latter but obviates its alienating legal form. "This moral insight," 
says Patrick Masterson, who rendered adequately Hegel's ideas on this topic, 
"has a metaphysical counterpart, namely, that the unifying power of love 
rather than the objectifying and analytic quality of thought is the key 
to the truth about reality" (OP. cit., pp. 48-9). Through love man can 
come to a concrete awareness of the unity of his life with infinite life 
and through it with all life. "Love itself," says Hegel, "pronounces no 
imperative. It is no universal opposed to a particular, no unity of the 
concept, but a unity of spirit, divinity. To love God is to feel onels self 
in the lall' of life, with no restrictions, in the infinite" (ibid., pp. 48-9). 
In the Jewish tradition, reverence for the "thou shalt" of the moral 
imperative is proposed as the essence of morality. Jesus repudiated as 
inadequate this view of the human condition. His gospel of love exhibits 
that which fulfils the law but annuls it as law. By opening manls eyes 
to the unifying value of love Jesus overcame the alienation implicit in a 
morality of law and commands. He showed that love, understood as an 
inner harmony of inclination and reason, is a fundamental disposition of 
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human life, transcending the order of duties and commands. To express it in 
the form of an imperative is quite inadequate to its reality as a 
modification of life itself. 
With such a view of the relationship between Man and God, created 
things would not be "merely signs," says J. Hillis Miller, "pointing to 
something which remained off at a distance, separated from them. The 
Eucharist was the archetype of the divine analogy where by created things 
participated in the supernatural reality they signified. Poetry in turn was, 
in one way or another, modeled on sacramental or scriptural language. 
The words of the poem incarnated the things they named, just as the 
words of the Mass shared in the transformation they evoked. The symbols and 
metaphors of poetry were no mere invention of the poets. They were borrowed 
from the divine analogies of nature. Poetry was meaningful in the same 
way as nature itself - by a communion of the verbal symbols with the 
11 
reality they name~t. 
Arnold, in Empedocles On Etna, speaks of God in pantheistic terms: 
He speaks of a Power which is life itself: a universal and immanent Force 
manifesting itself by necessity: 
All things the world which fill 
Of but one stuff are spun, 
That we who rail are still, 
With what we rail at, one; 
One with the o'erlaboured Power that through the breadth 
Of earth, and air, and sea, and length 
In men, and plants, and stones, 
Hath toil perpetually, 
And travails, pants, and moans; 
Fain would do all things well, but sometimes fails in 
strength. 
(Lines, 287-296, Poems, p. 168) 
At the level of community no less than at the level of individual 
existence acknowledgement of God was, in the JvIiddle Ages, the basic source 
of unity, harmony and peace. Virtue would consist in conformity to the 
divine will. As Masterson puts it: "In such a cultural context, permeated 
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by a lively sense of the sacred, it was readily accepted that the alienated 
man, the estranged man, was the man who did not believe in God or who did 
not live out the consequences of belief in God. Only through lived 
fidelity to divine providence could man achieve inner harmony, 
reconciliation, and fulfilment. 'Thou hast made us for thyself 0 Lord and our 
hearts are restless until they rest in thee' (st Augustine). The man who 
denied God was not the mature, sophisticated, well-integrated man. On the 
contrary he was the irrational, morally disoriented and foolish manu 
(Op. cit., pp. 14-15). 
In other words God was then immersed in nature and in man's heart: 
God, nature and man himself were one common wave of thought and joy. The 
illiterate peasant, in that cultural context, who comments upon the death 
of a child by referring to the will of God is, in fact, engaging in 
theodicy as much as the learned theologian who writes a treatise to 
demonstrate that the suffering of the innocent does not negate the conception 
of a God both all-good and all-powerful. This sort of unity in mediaeval 
society has found classical expression in Jacob Burckhardt's description 
of mediaeval culture: 
In the Middle Ages both sides of human consciousness -
that which was turned within as that which was turned 
without - lay dreaming or half awake beneath a common 
veil. The veil was woven of faith, illusion, and childish 
prepossession, through which the world and history were 
seen clad in strange hues. Man was conscious of himself only 
as member of a race, people, party, family, or corporation -
only through some general category. 12 
Undoubtedly many of the mediaeval theologians and philosophers made 
important distinctions between reason and faith, grace and nature, sacred 
and the secular. Likewise, they developed profound reflections concerning 
the intrinsic intelligibility and relative autonomy of the created order. 
But the cultural context within which such reflections were developed was an 
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unquestioned theistic context pre-reflectively animated and pervasively 
informed by Christian faith. As the personal influence of Jesus, says 
Arnold in Literature and Dogma, faded, the 'extra-belief' grew stronger. 
First we got the Apostles' Creed, the popular science of Christianity. As 
Christianity spread, the Aryan genius for metaphysics worked over this 
material, and the result was the Nicene Creed, or learned science of 
Christianity. But metaphysicians could and did quarrel, and the victorious 
party, ruffled by fighting, set forth the dogmatic formulation of Christianity 
in ever more insistent and uncompromising terms. The outcome was the 
~Lr 
Athansian Creed, learned science with a strong dash of vindictive temper. 
~ 
Now, Arnold continues, it is quite possible (to a man of culture) and 
highly desirable to cut back through these later dogmatic formulations 
and discover the true Bible-dogma. And what is this but the simple and 
verifiable truths of historical human experience. 
These differences of the metaphysicians did not affect the life 
of the individual at that time. But in the High Renaissance, God became 
both transcendent and immanent: the God within nature and the God beyond 
nature gradually became separate from one another. Scepticism grew, thus 
man started to look for an authority outside himself. Martin Luther 
(d. 1546) gave this authority by trimming the tree with one eye on the God 
of the Old Testament (Deistic), and the other on the God of st. Augustine. 
The highest religious experience which the Lutheran faith strives to 
attain is the Unio mystic~ with the deity. As the name itself, which is 
unknown to the Reformed faith in this form, suggests, it is a feeling of 
actual absorption in the deity, that of a real entrance of the divine into 
the soul of the believer. But it seems that this was not enough to give 
man the sense of security he demanded from his beliefs: more was needed. 
It was Calvin who seemed to offer this: 
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The rule of Calvinism as it was enforced in the sixteenth 
century in Geneva and in Scotland, at the turn of the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in large parts of the 
Netherlands, in the seventeenth in New England, and for a 
time in England itself, would be for us the most absolutely 
unbearable form of ecclesiastical control of the individual 
which could possibly exist. That Was exactly what large 
numbers of the old commercial aristocracy of those times, in 
Geneva as well as in Holland and England, felt about it ••• 
Now how does it happen that at that time those countries 
which were most advanced economically, and within them the 
rising bourgeois middle classes, not only failed to resist 
this unexampled tyranny of Puritanism, but even developed 
~ 
a heroism in its defence? For bourgeois classes as such 
have seldom before and never since displayed heroism. 
It was 'the last of our heroism,' as Carlyle, not without 
reason, has said. 
(Max Weber, p. 37) 
As one has made it the rule in this study to take the impact of man's 
concept of God on his view of life, the same procedure is followed in 
one's treatment of Puritanism. That is, one takes the results which the 
adoption of Puritanism might have had on the conduct of the individual, and 
not an evaluation of the doctrine itself. Puritanism, like every rational 
type of asceticism, tried to enable man to maintain and act upon his 
constant motives, espeCially those which it taught him itself, against 
the emotions. In this formal psychological sense of the term it tried to 
make him into a personality. Contrary to many popular ideas, the end of 
this asceticism was to be able to lead an alert, intelligent life: the 
most urgent task was the destruction of spontaneous, impulsive enjoyment, 
the most important means was to bring order into the conduct of its 
adherents. "On this methodical control over the whole man rests the 
enormous expansive power of both, especially the ability of Calvinism as 
against Lutheranism to defend the cause of Protestantism as the Church 
militant" (Max Weber, pp. 119-20). 
One of the essential qualities of the sacred in Puritanism, as 
encountered in religious experience, is otherness, its manifestation as 
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something totaliter aliter as compared to ordinary, profane human life. 
It is precisely this otherness that lies at the heart of religious awe, 
numinous dread, of the adoration of what totally transcends all dimensions 
of the merely human. The lines of connection between Man and God have 
been, due to this concept, broken down: God no longer inheres in the world 
as the force binding together all men and all things. Man, as Arnold puts 
it, "entered the prison of Puritanism and had the key turned upon his 
spiri t there for two hundred years" ("Equali ty", CPW, VIII, p. 294). The 
history of modern literature is in part the history of the splitting apart 
of this communion. To this effect Miller writes: 
This splitting apart has been matched by a similar 
dispersal of the cultural unity of man, God, nature, and 
language. It is not possible to explain why this 
fragmentation has come about. A great historical transfor-
mation remains mysterious, just as does the homogeneity 
of the culture of a single age. We can neither explain why 
people stop feeling and believing in an old way, nor why 
a new way of feeling and believing appears simultaneously 
in widely separated individuals. The attempt to establish the 
genesis of historical change usually reveals more about the 
presuppositions of the historian than about cause and 
effect relations in the events themselves. To a Marxist 
economic and social changes produce ideological change$. 
To a man like Yeats the rise of a materialistic civilisation 
has itself been governed by occult forces turning the 
gyres of history. It may be that the disappearance of God 
has been caused not so much by man's turning his back on 
God, as by a strange withdrawal of God himself. 
(Op. cit., pp. 3-4) 
This quotation is interesting and useful in two ways: first, it shows 
how one could speak, as the last line shows, in anthropomorphic terms 
without being aware of it. Second, though this book from which the 
quotation is taken has a long chapter on Arnold, a view such as "It is 
not possible to explain why this fragmentation has corne about," means that 
the author missed the main thesis of Arnold's poetic practice. Arnold 
starts with the assumption that the process of transformation is quite 
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predictable: binary logic or alternation between periods of Hellenism 
and others of Hebraism. 
To be able to feel the difference between literature that is 
written under a Pantheistic concept of God and one that is written under 
the shadow of a Deistic one, one need only to take for instance the end 
of the Divine Comedy, where the poet in Paradise stands speechless in 
his passive contemplation of the secrets of God, and compare it with the 
poem which has come to be called the Uivine Comedy of Puritanism -
Paradise Lost. Milton closes the last song of Paradise Lost after 
describing the expulsion from paradise as follows: 
They, looking back, all the eastern side beheld 
Of Paradise, so late their happy seat, 
Waved over by that flaming brand, the gate 
With dreadful faces thronged and fiery arms: 
Some natural tears they dropped, but wiped them soon; 
The world was all before them, \'!here to choose 
Their place of rest, and Providence their guide: 
They hand in hand with Ylandering steps and slow, 
Through Eden took their solitary way. 
(Bk. XII, 641-649). 
And only a little before Michael had said to Adam: 
••• ••• Only add 
Deeds to thy knowledge answerable; add faith, 
Add virtue, patience, temperance; add love, 
By name to come called Charity, the soul 
Of all the rest: then wilt thou not be loth 
To leave this Paradise, but shall possess 
A Paradise within thee, happier far. 
This powerful expression of the Puritan's serious attention to this world, 
his acceptance of his life in the world as a task, could not possibly, says 
Max Weber, have come from the pen of a mediaeval writer. 
The life of the individual was directed solely towards a transcendental 
end: salvation. But precisely for that reason it was thoroughly rationalised 
in this world and dominated entirely by the aim to add to the glory of 
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c· 
God on earth. Never has the precept omnia in majorm dei gloriam been 
" 
taken with more bitter seriousness. Only a life guided by constant 
thought could achieve conquest over the state of nature. Descartes's 
cogito ergo sum was taken over by the contemporary Puritans with this 
ethical reinterpretation. It was this rationalisation which gave the 
Reformed faith its peculiar ascetic tendency, and is the basis both of 
its relationship to and its conflict with Catholicism. 
The influence of the God-fearing but perfectly unemotional wisdom of the 
Hebrews,which is expressed in the books most read by the Puritans, the 
Proverbs and the Psalms, can be felt in their whole attitude towards life. 
In particular, its rational suppression of the mystical, in fact the 
whole emotional side of religion, has rightly been attributed by 
Sanford to the influence of Old Testament. 13 Examples of this 8.scet icism 
from theology as well as literature could be multiplied almost at random: 
from the awesome throne vision of Isaiah to William Blake's of the tiger, 
burning bright in the forests of the night pointing beyond its own 
"fearful symmetry" to the divine other behind the phenomena of nature. Arnold 
summarises the situation as follows: 
What were the wise man's plan? 
Through this sharp,toil-set life, 
To work as best he can, 
And win what's won by strife. 
But we an easier way to cheat our pains have 
found. 
Scratched by a fall, with moans 
As children of weak age 
Lend life to the dumb stones 
Whereon.to veni their ra~e And bena tnelr 11ttle I1sts, ana rate 
So, loth to suffer mute, 
We, peopling the void air, 
Make Gods to whom to impute 
The ills we ought to bear; 
the senseless 
ground; 
With God and Fate to rail at, suffering easily. 
(Lines: 267-281, Poems, p. 167-168) 
In other words Monotheistic religion itself has, to a large extent, 
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regressed into idolatry: 
Man projects his power of love and of reason unto God; 
he does not feel them any more as his own powers, and 
then he prays to God to give him back some of 
what he, man, has projected unto God. In early Protestantism 
and Calvinism, the required religious attitude is that man 
should feel himself empty and impoverished, and put his 
trust in the grace of God, that is, into the hope that God 
may return to him part of his own qualities, which he has put 
into God. 14 
It might be interesting to mention that grace, in Puritanism, is the 
sole product of an objective power, and not in the least to be attributed 
to personal worth. The interest of it is solely in God, not in man; God 
does not exist for men, but men for the sake of God. All creation, including 
of course the fact that only a small proportion of men are chosen for 
eternal grace, can have any meaning only as means to the glory and 
majesty of God. 
The most important practical consequence of this concept upon the 
humanly constructed world is that empirical history and biography are falsely 
apprehended as grounded in supra-empirical necessities. To this effect 
Peter Berger writes: 
The innumerable contingencies of human existence are 
transformed into inevitable manifestations of universal law. 
Activity becomes process. Choices become destiny. Men then 
live in the world they themselves have made as if they 
were fated to do so by powers that are quite independent of 
their own world-constructing enterprises. When alienation 
is religiously legitimated, the independence of these 
powers is vastly augmented, both in the collective nomos and 
in individual consciousness. 
(The Social Reality of Religion, p.102) 
Yet, in spite of all this evidence, the history of man shows that he 
cannot live under this fearful image of God for ever: It is against one 
of man's basic instincts - the instinct of expansion and love of liberty. 
People react to this condition. In most cases, poets are the first to react 
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against it, and then they produce a corresponding state of belief 
and feeling in the minds of their readers. 
Thus on the stage of nineteenth-century thought, the problem 
of God was posed as a feature of a more basic problem of human 
alienation and authenticityo The debate revolved around the 
follor.dng question: 
Vlhat is it that alienates man from himself -
the confessions of God's presence in history and 
in man's consciousness or the suppression of 
him from history and the repression of him from 
consciousness? 15 
This question found expression in the major poets of the age o 
For example, God w'ld irmnortality are, to Temwson, satters not of 
k.'lOi<Tl8~.ge or proof, but of fai tho This position is maintained 
throughout Tennyson's poetry, and is set forth 
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most fully and maturely, says Professor Bradley,16 in the following 
lines from The Ancient Sage: 
Thou canst not prove the Nameless, 0 my son, 
Nor canst thou prove the world thou movest in, 
Thou canst not prove that thou art body alone, 
Nor canst thou prove that thou art spirit alone, 
Nor canst thou prove that thou art both in one; 
Thou canst not prove thou art immortal, no 
Nor yet that thou art mortal - nay my son, 
Thou canst not prove that I, who speak with thee, 
Am not thyself in converse with thyself, 
For nothing worthyproving can be proven, 
Nor yet disproven: wherefore thou be wise, 
Cleave ever to the sunnier side of doubt, 
And cling to Faith beyond the forms of Faith! 
Arnold, in his summing up of the spiritual Situation, writes: 
This is what everyone sees to constitute the special moral 
feature of our times: 'the masses' are losing the Bible 
and its religion. At the Renascence, many cultivated wits 
lost it; but the great solid mass of the common people 
kept it, and brought the world back to it after a start 
had seemed to be made in quite another direction. But 
it is 'the people' which is getting detached from the ~ible. 
(Literature and Dogma, CPW, p. 362) 
It is impossible to finish this review of the major poets without 
mentioning Browning. His poem "Gold Hair", published in 1864, was 
popular and was often quoted: 
The candid incline to surmise of late 
That the Christian faith proves false, I find: 
For our Essays and Reviews debate 
Begins to tell on the public mind, 
And Colenso's words have weight. 17 
The Philosophers, too, quite very early sensed the problem and 
began a series of rationalisations of it. Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), in 
his Religion within the limits of Reason alone, had argued that the only 
true worship of God consisted in fidelity to the moral imperatives of 
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man's practical reason. Such a vie,'r comme.nded itself to the young 
G.',ioFo Hegel (1770-1831) \'Tho Has repelled by the imposed" 1:hstitutional 
2.nd §.omuati9 character of Christianity as it Ims presented to himo 
Such Christianity in virtue of its positivity, as he puts it, could 
only be a source of alienation - a religion for servile mano Thus, 
for Hegel, the JevT is a slave who has alienated, handed over to God, 
his freedom, his autonomy, his authentic creativity and subjectivityo 
Nore precisely, he has not yet achieved a conscious realisation of 
his kinship and unity as spirit vrith the absolute, and of the exigencies of 
this spirituality which must be satisfied in any authentic religious 
relationship. This, in Hegel's opinion, was the only aim pursued in 
the religious teaching of Jesus "Tho "undertook to raise religion and 
virtue to morality and to restore to morality the freedoI:l '\'Thich is 
its essence ••• Jesus, on this viei'r, lms the teacher of a pure ly 
moral religion, not a positive one"o 18 
Arnold, in his interpretation of the phenomenon, looked in that 
direction. In Literature and Dogma he ';Trites to this effect: 
It has often been reI:larked that the Puritans are like 
the Je~·js of the Old Testament; and Hr. Fraude thinks he 
defines the Puritans by saying that they, like the Jelrs 
of the Old Testament, had their hearts set on a theocracy, 
on a fashioning of politics and society to suit the 
government of God. Ho\'! strange that he does not perceive 
that he thus passes, 2nd'idth justice, the gravest 
condemnation on the Puritans as follm'lers of Jesus Christ! 
At the Christian era the tiI:J.e had passed, in religion, for 
ouhrard adaptations of this kind, and for all care 
about establishing or abolishing them. The time had come 
for imrardness B....'1d self-reconstruction - a time to last till 
the self-reconstruction is fully achieved (p. 225). 
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f 1 " 19 o re ~g.lon 
Hegel's philosophy kttempts to reconc~le the anthropocentric and 
theocentric viei~oints, albeit at the expense of the traditional 
conceptions of both man and God. But contra~J to its author's 
intention it paved the way for Feuerbach's20 explicit denial of 
God and his more radical affirmation of the vie1'T that belief in 
God is a source of human alienation. Thus he \·rri tes: 
All divine attributes, all the attributes "Thich 
make God God, are attributes of the species -
attributes which in the individual are limited, 
but the limits of which are abolished in the essence 
of the species, ~~d even in its existence, insofar 
s.s it hE.s its complete existence only i:1 all men 
taken together. Ey knoc;rledge, my will, is limited; 
but ny linit is not the lini t of a ... nother nan, to say 
nothing of mankL.~d, "That i.s dif:icul t to me is easy 
to another; ,·rhE.t is impossible, inconceivable, to 
one age, is to the comLng age conceivable and 
possible. Hy life is bound to a limited time; not 
so in the life of hULlani ty. 21 
For Feuerbach, the religious man is by definition the alienated man. 
The crovming perfections of his essential nature he mistakenly ascribes 
to God, and, by contrast ':lith this extrapolation, defines himself in 
terms of the merely individual, the incidental, the llJperfect. Since the 
religious projection is essentially a transference of htillan properties to 
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an illusory God, the richer the notion of God elaborated, the more man 
is impoverished and reduced to a miserable and servile condition: 
Religion is the disuniting of man from himself; he sets 
God before him as the antithesis of himself. God is not 
what man is - man is not what God is. God is the infinite, 
man the finite being; God is perfect, man imperfect; 
God eternal, man temporal; God almighty, man weak; God 
holy, man sinful. God and man are extremes: God is the 
absolutely positive, the sum of all realities; man the 
absolutely negative, comprehending all negations. 
(ibid., p. 33) 
Each person, according to Feuerbach, as an individual human being 
recognises himself to be limited and recognises his dependence upon Nature. 
Eut in also recognising the infinity of the human species, as characterised 
by perfections which transcend man simply as an individual - namely, 
reason, will, and love - he attains an object of absolute worth. "The 
'absolute' to man is his own nature" (ibid., p. 5). But man is inclined 
to ascribe his own individual limitations to the species as such and to 
project the infinite perfection of his essence into an external object. In 
this way he comes to the idea that religion, in its pejorative sense, 
is man's earliest and indirect form of self-knowledge in which he 
contemplates his own nature as though extrinsic to himself and pertaining 
rather to a transcendent deity. Religion represents the naive childlike 
condition of humanity which must be transmuted by philosophy into an 
integral humanism. This false antithesis must be resolved, not in the 
illusory way of Hegel's philosophy of spirit, but in a manner which will 
genuinly liberate man and reconcile him with true reality. Thus, in 
conscious opposition to the idealist tradition, Feuerbach proposes what he 
·calls a "materiaiist" or "realist" resolution of the problem of human 
alienation. 
- 189 -
Karl Harx (1818-33), 1'1hose doctoral dissertation \'Tas on Feuerbach, 
developed this secular or materialist line. i'That, he asked himself, 
consti tutes this self-contradictoriness of the secular 'fTorld "Thich 
must be understood in its contradiction and then revolutionised in 
practice? Its simplest and most basic contradiction is that man, vTho as 
a worker and a social being should find fulfilment in his "I"ork and in his 
social relationships, is in fact dehumanised through his \'fork and 
deformed by his social relationships. This is "I'Thy the critique of 
religion is so necessary. "The criticism of religion dis:Lllusions man 
so that he vTill think, act, and fashion his reality as a man vrho has 
lost his illusions and regained his reason; so that he will revolve 
about himself as his mm true sun. ,,22 
It is the thesis tl:.at any attenpt to explain man in terms of 
a principle allegedly superior to man himself constitutes an 
alienation of human autonomy: 
A being does not regard himself as L~dependent tUlless 
he is his OIill master, and he is only his Olm master 
"Then he 0I1es his existence to himself. A man ,,,ho lives 
by the favour of another considers himself a dependent 
beingo But I live completely by another person's favou:r 
vThen I mie to him not only the continuance of my life 
but also its creation; 'iihen he is its source. 23 
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Marx, in other words, accepts without reservation that the critique of 
religion must be total and radical - to the point of affirming man as the 
only absolute: Effective human emancipation is possible only if 
"one adopts the point of view of that theory according to which man is 
the highest being for man" (ibid., p. 59). The universal quality of 
man will be truly achieved when everyone experiences the world as that 
which, through the combined work of man, has become the <l'IIelling place of 
a community which embodies the adequate fulfilment of everyone's needs 
and allows the proper expression of everyone's capacities. In virtue of his 
concrete accomplishment of this society man will have eradicated the 
conditions of the possibility of relgion. For he will have overcome the 
economic alienation which is its hidden source and, in the process, will 
have provided himself with palpable evidence that his whole human reality 
and values have derived from within his own productive resources. Even 
the indirect reference to God, which characterises the conventional 
understanding of atheism, will no longer be necessary. As Marx, himself, 
puts it in the following extended quotation which might be said to 
summarise his philosophy of religion: 
Since, however, for socialist man, the whole of what is 
called world history is nothing but the creation of man by 
human labour, and the emergence of nature for man, he 
therefore, has the evident and irrefutable proof of his 
self-creation, of his own origin. Once the essence of man 
and of nature, man as a natural being and nature as a 
human reality, has become evident in practical life, in 
sense experience, the quest for an alien being, a being 
above man and nature (a quest which is the avowal of the 
unreality of man and nature) becomes impossible in 
practice. Atheism, as a denial of this unreality, is no 
longer meaningful, for atheism is a negation of God and 
seeks to assert by this negation the existence of man. 
Socialism no longer requires such a roundabout method; 
it begins from the theoretical and practical sense perception 
of man and nature as essential beings. It is positive 
human self-consciousness, no longer a self-consciousness 
attained through the negation of religion. 
(Economic and Philosonhic~lJ1~~uscri~§, pp. 166-67). 
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One, i'Tith 9.11 the privileges of retrospection, could come to the 
conclusion that all this complex of ideas is but a movement from a 
monism of authority and values tmTards pluralistic liberalismo 
vihat all philosophers, including Ellrx,24 '\'Tere trying to do is but 
an attempt at a deification of the finite VTorld. The historical 
analogy of this movement is the transition from Judaic culture to 
the Christian one: God (the infinite) came to the \'forld (finite)o 
But philosophy as such does not affect the life of the masses o 
It can, truly, clear up obscurities, it can measure and enumerate 
'YTi th greater and ever greater precision • But in no sense can it be 
said to affect the masses or expand their consciousness o But there 
is another ... my by 1iThich philosophy, as in our age, could be said to 
affect the life of the individual: 1ihen the ID.i'TS that govern his 
life are made according to particular philosophy. This could be said 
of Utilitarianism. "Throughout the middle portion of the nineteenth 
century, the influence of the Benthamites on British legislation and 
po licy 'YTas astonishingly great, cons idering their comple te absence of 
emotional appeal" (B. Russell, po 305). 
J"tilitari81lism, in one's viej'!, by the virtue of its first 
principle, 
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the supreme good is the greatest happiness of the greatest number , is 
the practical expression of this movement from the monism of authority 
and values towards the pluralistic liberalism (with the pluralistic concept 
of authority go the ideas of tolerance and equality not only between man 
and woman but of races too). This 'greatest happiness principle' gained 
its name and first fame through the work of Jeremy Benthan (1748-1832). 
The present point is made in an essay on "Bentham" by Bentham's disciple 
John stuart Mill (1806-1873): 
Whether happiness be or be not the end to which morality 
should be referred - that it should be referred to an end 
of some sort, and not left in the dominion of vague feeling 
or inexplicable internal conviction, that it be made a 
matter of reason and calculation, and not merely of 
sentiment, is essential to the very idea of moral philosophy; 
is, in fact, what renders argument or discussion on moral 
question possible. That the morality of actions depends on 
the consequences which they tend to produce, is the doctrine 
of rational persons of all schools; that the good or evil of 
those consequences is measured solely by pleasure or pain 
is all of the doctrine of the school of utility which is 
peculiar to it. 25 
This Utilitarian doctrine - it is worth underlining - was, says A. Flew, 
first introduced as, and still remains, "a doctrine for benevolent reformers. 
For Bentham and for his immediate followers it provided the criterion by 
which to test established laws and institutions, and to find them very 
often and very badly wanting" (ibid., p. 117). But because 
it ignored the emotional side of man, Utilitarianism left Man's spiritual 
needs unsatisfied. J.S. Mill, as the chief follower and exponent of this 
doctrine, came in later life to realise its limitations, and its lack of 
any satisfactory philosophy of either society or history. The publication 
of his Theism, written between 1868-1870, but nclpublished until 1874 the 
year after his death, aroused considerable dismay among his followers and 
made 'a sort of intellectual scandal'. This philosophy, however, was 
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"a transitional school. (Its) system gave birth to two others, of more 
importance than itself, namely Darwinism and Socialism" (B. Russell, p. 807). 
This situation left a great impact on every sector of life and 
thinking. In philosophy, Sidgwicl1, in 1866, "had concluded that it was 
'a monstrous mistake (talking about Idealism in its later development],' 
adding 'we must go back to Kant and begin again from him,,,.26 In the 
social life, scepticism was coupled with all those changes associated with 
the rise of science and technology: industrialisation, the increasing 
predominance of the middle class, the gradual breakdown of the old 
hierarchical class structure. In the life of individual, man became alienated 
from God, from nature, from his fellow men, and finally from himself. The 
result was a radical sense of inner nothingness with nowhere to go: 
Wandering between two worlds, one dead, 
The other powerless to be born, 
With nowhere yet to rest (his; head, 
Like these, on earth (he) waits forlorn. 
(Lines: 85-88. Poems, pp. 288-89). 
The protagonist's position in nineteenth century literature is usually 
expressed in terms of these lines. For instance the central character in 
Kierkegaard's Repetition says: 
My life has been brought to an impasse. I loathe existence ••• 
One sticks one's finger into the soil to tell by the smell 
in what land one is: I stick my finger into existence - it 
smells of nothing. Where am I? Who am I? How came I here? 
What is this thing called world? What does this word mean? 
Who is it that has lured me into the world? Why was I not 
consulted, why not made acquainted with its manners and 
customs ••• ? How did I obtain interest in this big enterprise 
they call reality? Why should I have an interest in it? Is it 
not a voluntary concern? And if I am to be compelled to take 
part in it, where is the director? I should like to make a 
remark to him. Is there no director? 1N.hither shall I turn with 
my complaint? 27 
The sceptical atmosphere of the age produced two dogmatic trends of 
thought: SCientists28 and theologians. Scientists wanted to cut the tree of 
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of religion from its roots. This trend is represented by Professor 
Hu..;;:ley '!Thom Arnold quotes saying: 
Professor Huxley told the London School Board lately, 
that 'if these islands had no religion at all, it "rould 
not enter into his mind to introduce the religious idea 
by the agency of the Bible o ' 
(LiteratlITe &~d Dogma, CPH, po 172). 
The other trend, the theologian's one, insisted that every branch as 
,1ell as leaf is equipollento 
Nediators29 VTere needed to harmonise these conflicting attitudes o 
It needed a critic to disengage the kernel from the .~., the spiritual 
princi:91e froD. the temporal ex-pressiol1 of it: to cut bad: through these 
later ,dogmatic forr.'.t' .. lations 8..l'ld ~iscover .... ' vDe true Bible-dogma • A...l'ld 
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To have before (his) mind - instead 
Of the sick room, the mortal strife, 
The turmoil for a little breath -
The pure eternal course of life. 
Not human combatings with death. 
This pure eternal course of life, for Arnold, is nothing but the simple 
and verifiable truths of historical human experience. It is, however, not 
an easy task: 
It is one of the hardest tasks in the world to make new 
intellectual ideas harmonise truly with the religious' 
life, to place them in their right light for that life. 
The moments in which such a change is accomplished are 
epochs in religious history; the men through whose 
instrumentality it is accomplished are great religious 
ref~rmers. The greatness of these men does not consist in 
their having these new ideas, in their originating them. 
The ideas are in the world; they come originally from 
the sphere of pure thought; they are put into circulation 
by the spirit of the time. The greatness of a religious 
reformer consists in his reconciling them with the 
religious life, in his starting this life upon a fresh 
period in company with them. No such religious reformer for 
the present age has yet shown himself. 
("Dr Stanley's Lectures on the Jewish Church", 
CPW, III, pp. 69-70) 
Arnold thought of himself in these terms. The Spinozistic view of the 
universe, which is indeed also that of modern science, serves for a 
starting point: one does not look outside the system for any causes whatso-
ever of events within the system. Therefore, God, according to Arnold, 
may be defined, for purposes of modern science, as 'the stream of tendency 
by which all things seek to fulfill the law of their being'. This definition 
has a curiously familiar ring about it these days: it has similarities 
with both the ideas of the new theologians of the Hone$to God variety who 
define God as the ground of our being and with the form of pantheism 
which Wordsworth expressed openly in his lines composed a Few Miles Above 
Tintern Abbey and which he carefully eliminated from The Prelude: 30 
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And I have felt 
A presence that disturbs me with the joy 
Of elevated thoughts; a sense sublime 
Of something far more deeply interfused, 
Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns, 
And the round ocean and the living air, 
And the blue sky, and in the mind of man: 
A motion and a spirit, that impels 
All thinking things, all objects of all thought 
And rolls through all things. 
Indeed, as Reich puts it, "If and when God represents nothing but the 
personification of the natural laws which govern man and make him part 
of the universal natural process, then - and only then - can science and 
religion come to terms".31 
The two people who had actively anticipated Arnold in this line, and made 
it their mission, Jesus Christ and Giordano Bruno (1548-1600), were both 
martyred. Bruno was burnt at the stake in Rome for his adherence to 
pantheism: "His enthusiasm for nature, however, led him to hold an extreme 
form of pantheistic immanentism ll (Oxford Dictionary of Christian Church, 
London, 1957). Arnold thought that a rational and intelligent outlook 
would lead men to a new view of their relationship to nature which resembles 
the religious conception of pantheism: "God and the world are not distinct, 
and that everything in the world is part of God. This view is develdped 
most fully in Spinoza, but is one to which almost all mystics are attracted" 
is 
(B. Russell, p. 373). This, in fact,/the source of some contradictions in 
Arnold's thought: he thought to preach a pantheistic view of God and life, 
lof 
which is necessity mystic and unconscious, by a rationalistic method. 
The metaphysical system of Spinoza is the type inaugurated by 
Parmenides. There is only one substance, - God or Nature. Nothing finite is 
self-subsistent. There can be no such personal immortality as Christians 
believe in, but only that impersonal sort that consists in becoming more 
and more one with God. Finite things are defined by their boundaries, 
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physical or logical, that is to say, by what they are not: "all 
determination is negation ll • There can be only one Being who is wholly 
positive, and He must be absolutely infinite. Hence, Spinoza is led to a 
complete and undiluted pantheism. 
Arnold, in his attempt to discover an ethical principle to underlie 
the naturalism of his new world, adopted Spinoza's ideas. This principle 
is expressed in his own adaptation of a sentence by Spinoza: "Our desire 
is not that nature may obey us, but, on the contrary, that we may obey 
nature ll • Meanwhile, Arnold is quite clear on the governing ideas of 
Spinoza. They are the denial of final causes, the belief in an active 
stoicism, and the distinction, - which became 'a current notion for educated 
Europe', between adequate and inadequate ideas; and a non-teleological view 
of the universe: 
It is not the mathematical rationalism of the Ethics 
which attracts Arnold, however. It is rather the practical 
teaching of the Tractatus-Theologico-Politicus, where 
religion, the Bible, and Christianity are interpreted in 
the light of human nature and human experience, purified 
of irrational excrescences, and justified as a permanent 
contribution to the adequate realisation of man's 
distinctively human nature, a nature whose goal is the 
achieving, as fully as possible, that moral perfection which 
is one aspect of God. 32 
Arnold, in his comment on the work, says, "The scope of that work 
is this. Spinoza sees that the life and practice of Christian nations 
professing the .religion of the Bible, are not the due fruits of the 
religion of the Bible; he sees only hatred, bitterness, and strife, when 
he might have expected to see love, and joy, peace in believing; and he 
asks himself the reason of this. The reason is, he says, that people 
misunderstand their Bible. Well, then, is his conclusion, I will write 
a Tractatus-Theologico-Politicus ll • 33 But what attracted Arnold more is 
Spinoza's width and grandeur of his view of nature: 
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He (SpinozaJ fortifies and stills his mobile, straining, 
passionate poetic temperament by the moral lesson he 
draws from his view of nature. And a moral lesson not of 
mere resigned acquiescence, not of melancholy quietism, 
but of joyful activity within the limits of man's true 
sphere: Man's very essence is the effort wherewith each 
man strives to maintain his own being ••• Man's virtue is 
this very essence, so far as it is defined by this single 
effort to maintain his own being ••• Happiness consists in a 
man's being able to maintain his own being ••• Joy is man's 
passage to a greater perfection ••• Sorrow is man's passage to 
a lesser perfection. 
("Spinoza ~d _the Bi'qle," ill., III, 177) 
Spinoza rejects anthropomorphic deity, literal inspiration, and 
the whole metaphysical basis of traditional theology. Miracles do not 
happen, since they would transgress the eternal and immutable laws of 
nature, which are laws of God, are in fact of His essence. The prophets 
were men of vivid imagination, speaking Hebrew poetry, of extraordinary 
piety but of ordinary minds: 
The divine law, properly so named, is the method of 
life for attaining this height of human blessedness: 
this law is universal, written in the heart, and one 
for all mankind. Human law is the method of life for 
attaining and preserving temporal security and prosperity: 
this law is dictated by a lawgiver, and every nation has 
its own (ibid., p. 188) ••• He (Spinoza) makes the love of 
God to consist in the knowledge of God, and, as we know 
God only through his manifestations of Himself in the laws 
of all nature, it is by knowing these laws that we love 
God, and the more we know them the more we love him. This 
may be true, but this is not what the Christian means 
by the love of God. 
(ibid., p. 178). 
To sum up. The main critical ideas common to Arnold and Spinoza 
might be summarised as follows: the dismissal of anthropomorphic deity, 
miracles, plenary inspiration, and general Bibliolatry; the treatment of 
the resurrection in a spiritual sense; the stress on the Bible as addressing 
the experience and imagination of men, not the reasoning powers of 
metaphysicians and theologians, the pragmatic test for faith and good 
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conduct as resulting in blessedness. Not only these critical ideas but 
the foundations of Arnold's psychology are similar to that of Spinoza. 
To Spinoza, there is neither morality nor reason in the natural state, but 
just power and desire. But in man, by the necessity of his nature, the 
potentialities are there, enabling him to escape from the miseries of this 
state of nature, of unlicensed freedom, to a civil and religious state. 
To work towards that life is to fulfil the deepest law of his being, to 
obey a divinely implanted impulse, to realise his moral, social, and 
religious happiness in terms of the law peculiar to his own nature. 
But "moral ideas,1t as Arnold puts it, "apprehended as ideas first, 
and then rigorously followed as laws, are and must be, for the sage only. 
The mass of mankind have neither force of intellect enough to apprehend 
them clearly as ideas, nor force of character enough to follow them 
strictly as laws. The mass of mankind can be carried along a course full 
of hardship for the natural man, can be borne over the thousand 
impediments of the narrow way, only by the tide of a joyful and bounding 
emotion" (CPW, III, p. 134). This is the function of the poet and his 
poetry, for, as Shelley puts it, poetry redeems from decay the visitations 
of the divinity. And apart from that, 
What a remarkable philosopher really does for human thought, 
is to throw into circulation a number of new and striking 
ideas and expression, and to stimulate with them the 
thought and imagination of his century or of after-times. 
So Spinoza had made his distinction between adequate and 
inadequate ideas a current notion for educated Europe. 
So Hegel seized a single pregnant sentence of Heraclitus, 
and cast it, with a thousand striking applications, into 
the world of modern thought. 
(CPW, III, p. 181) 
In addition to that, philosophers, as Arnold puts it, belong to the 
world of the few - the world of speculative life. The world of the few, 
however, is not the world of the many, the world of religious life; the 
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thoughts of the former cannot properly be transformed to the other, 
cannot be called true in the latter, except on certain conditions. As a 
condition of an idea to be popular, - to be a comfort for the mass of 
mankind, under the pressure of calamity, to live by - it must be touched 
with emotion: 
Poetry gives the idea, but it gives it touched with 
beauty, heightened by emotion. This is what we feel to 
be interpretative for us, to satisfy us - thought, but thought 
invested with beauty, with emotion. Science (as well as 
philosophy) thinks, but not emotionally. It adds thought to 
thought, accumulates the elements of a synthesis which 
will never be complete until it is touched with beauty and 
emotion; and when itis touched with these, it has passed 
out of the sphere of science, it has felt the fashioning 
hand of the poet. 
(CPW, IX, p. _62) 
Arnold thought of himself in these terms: It was the task which he put 
upon himself for, as he puts it, "I for my part find here that I could 
willingly fish all day and read the newspapers all the evening, and so 
live - but I am not pleased with the results in myself of even a day or 
two of such life" (CL, p. 151). 
Ny task in the following chapters is to show how Arnold entered 
this complex of ideas into poetry: How he transformed reality into poetry 
rather than poetry into reality: 
NOTES 
Ny poems represent on the whole, the main movement of 
mind of the last quarter of a century, and thus they will 
probably have their day as people become conscious to 
themselves of what the movement of mind is, and interested 
in the literary productions which reflect it. 
(Letters, II, p.9) 
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The basic association between religion and alienation was first made by 
Feuerbach. Not only Marx but also Nietzche and Freud were influenced 
by Feuerbach in their conception of religion. 
L. Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianit ed. and trans. by George Eliot 
Marian Evans , introd. K. Barth, foreward H.R. Niebuhr 
(New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1957), p. 157. 
K. Marx, "Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right," 
in Karl Marx Early Writings, trans. T.B. Bottomore (London, 
1963), p. 44. 
Economic and Philosophical Nanuscripts (ibid.,), p. 165. 
One would not go as far as Daya Krisha who writes that: "Marx, though he 
loved to call himself a materialist, was essentially an idealist and a 
dreamer. He loved to dream of a time in the future when there would be no 
alienation and when real History would begin; he had convinced himself by 
abstracts, ratiocinative logic that what he so devoutly desired was bound 
to corne to pass as the very necessity of history itself. That 'the real 
is rational' and that 'the real is valuational' are the twin pillars of 
all idealism - the latter more basic than the former - and Marx subscribed 
to bothll (Op cit., pp. 41-42). However, Marx fits in one's scheme: the 
seeming contradiction lies in the fact that he viewed the movement from 
monism to pluralism with a deistic concept of authority, the result was 
totalitarianism. -"':"'" 
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Quoted by Anthony Flew, An Introduction to Western Philoso h (Great 
Britain: Thames and Hudson, 1971 , pp. 116-17. 
L.E. Elliott-Binns, (Op. cit.,) p. 71. 
S. Kierkegaard, Repetition, trans. Walter Lowrie (Princetown, N.Y., 1946), 
p. 114. 
It is true that the growth of positive science was first made under the 
inspiration of men such as Copernicus (1473-1543), Galileo (1564-1642), 
and Newton (1642-1727), but the fact remains that their findings were 
confined to a small circle of readers. In the nineteenth century, knowledge 
was accessible to a wider circle. A partial list of the well-known books 
and names might be useful in this respect: There were, to go no further 
back, the rationalistic legacy of the eighteenth century (Hume, Paine, 
Godwin, et.al.), Gibbon's Roman Empire; that bulwark of orthodoxy, 
Paley's view of the Evidences of Christianity (1794). It came to alienate 
more readers most notably of all Coleridge who appealed to inward 
experience. Coleridge's Natural Theolo~ (1802) had a strong formative 
influence on Darwin. Sir Charles Lyell's Principles of Geolo~ (1830-33), 
though he was discreet, undermined the biblical story of creation and set 
the earth and its creatures in a time-less continuum of natural process. 
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Christianity (1838), which was highly praised by David Strauss, 
accomplished the conversion of young Mary Ann Evans. She herself 
translated Strauss's Life of Jesus (1846) and Feuerbach's Essence of 
Christianity (1854). Robert Chambers Vestiges of the Natural History 
of Creation (1844): a popular account of evolution that was widely 
read and attacked. It even inspired an amusing dialogue in Disraeli's 
Tancred (1847). Along with Darwin's Ori in of S ecies, Mill's On Liberty 
(1859), and Buckle's Histo of Civilisation 1858, there was the 
general influence of Herbert Spencer 1820-1903), as well as Huxley 
(1825-95), and August Comte (1795-1857). The publication of Comte's 
princip,al work: the six-volume Course of Positive Philosophy (completed 
in 1842) helped, in addition to Marx's historical materialism and the 
evolutionism of Darwin, to mould the positivistic naturalism that 
characterised the latter half of nineteenth century European culture. 
The majority of the theologians in Britain were unacquainted with the 
works of the German "mediating" critics. And those who had become 
convinced of the truth of many things in the new outlook were reticent 
about making them widely known; they even tried to conceal from the 
public the results arrived at by German scholars, a procedure that was 
exposed and condemned by Bishop Thirlwall and Benjamin Jowett. 
The German "mediating" critics' chief idea was: that the Old and ~ew 
Testament, taken in a literal fashion, would not stand up to tests of 
exactitude concerning history, language, natural science, and so forth, 
but that the spirit which had been expressed in the frequently loose, 
inaccurate, and legendary accounts was of eternal value. These theologians 
felt that both the rationalists and the Pietists had missed the greatest 
verities of religion by attacking or defending its historical 
expressions. What was needed, Schleiermacher wrote, "was a thorough~ 
going historical, linguistic, literary, and scientific criticism to 
disengage ••• the spiritual principle from temporal expression of it" 
(Quoted by Merton A. Christenson, iiT. Arnold's debt to the German 
Theologians: A Prelude to Matthew Arnold's Literature and Dogma", p. 19). 
Arnold's ideas in Literature and Dogma are not dissimilar, not because 
he was influenced by them but because the source of them both is one: 
that expressed in Spinoza's Tractatus-Theologico-Politicus. To this 
effect Arnold says in a letter to Huxley: 
"Your letter gave me very great pleasure. First, because 
it put the saddle on the right horse, and made me 
indebted to Spinoza and not to the Germans. It makes me 
rather angry to be affiliated to German Biblical critics; 
I have had to read masses of them, and they would have 
drowned me if it had not been for the corks I had brought 
from the study of Spinoza. To him lowe more than I can 
say" (W.H.G. Armytage, "Matthew Arnold and T.H. Huxley: 
Some New Letters 1870-1880", p. 350). 
See section 10 of Ernest de Selincourt's Introduction to the uncensored 
1805 version (London: 1933). 
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Heinemann, 1959), p. 167. 
33 Matthew Arnold, "8pinoza and the Bible", in CPlil., III, 160., 
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CHAPTER VI 
On God 
o Earth's upholder, who on earth dost dwell, 
Whoe'er thou art, past finding out, whate'er 
Thy name be,Zeus, or .Necessary Law 
Of Nature, or the fund of Mortal Man, 
I worship thee, for still with noiseless tread, 
Thou guid'st all human things the righteous way. 
Euripides's Troades 
I 
It has been observed in the last chapter that the main movement of 
the spirit of the time is from a monistic concept of authority and values 
towards a pluralistic one. It is 'tlorthy of notice too that in the history 
of mankind, this process is usually accomplished by means of the dissolution 
of the institutions and systems that are based on a Transcendent or deistic 
concept of God. Jesus C~ist for instance preached love as a method for 
this dissolution. Arnold understood this mechanism and made his contribution 
to this movement by preaching intelligence or to use his words: sweetness 
and light. The light of intelligence and the sweetness of the method: 
Modern times find themselves with an immense system of 
institutions, established facts, accredited dogmas, customs, 
rules, which have come to them from times not modern. In 
this system their life has to be carried forward; yet they 
have a sense ••• that it by no means corresponds exactly with 
the wants of their actual life, that, for them, it is customary, 
not rational. The awakening of this sense is the awakening of 
the modern spirit ••• To remove this want of correspondence 
is beginning to be the settled endeavour of most persons of 
good sense. Dissolvents of the old European system of 
dominant ideas and facts we must be. 
(QEl., III, 109-10). 
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Applied to religion, what does this mean? That means to destroy the 
"illusions of popular Christianity" and to preserve the kernel of belief, 
for belief, as M. Schorer puts it, "organises experience not because it is 
rational but because all belief depends on a controlling imagery, and 
rational belief is the intellectual formalisation of that imagery".l But 
to preserve the old exactly as it had been handed down from the past was out 
of the question; the only wise course is to accept the new truths and 
incorporate them in the structure of the faith without cutting the 
connection with the past: 
Not to break one's connexion with the past in one's 
religion (says Arnold, in June 1876) is one of the strongest 
instincts in human nature. Protestantism is breaking up 
every where it has, severed this connexion; only in England 
has it any hold upon the educated class, and that is because 
the Church of England is the one Protestant Church which 
maintained its connexion with the past. 
(Letters, II, p. 131) 
Arnold's Literature and Dogma aims at an understanding of the Bible 
that is acceptable to the modern mind. The execution of this task may, for 
convenience, be considered in two parts: the first is the theoretical part 
which turns principally upon Arnold's view that the Bible is literature, not 
science, and must be studied as literature if it is to yield the saving 
truths that it contains. The other part is the application of the theory, 
which takes the form of a re-examination and reinterpretation of some of the 
most fundamental points of the Christian faith, such as the meaning of God, 
the divinity of Christ, the miracles of the Incarnation, and the Resurrection, 
and the meaning of 'revealed' and 'revelation' as applied particularly to 
the Scriptures. 
Arnold's religious position is based, as A.O.J. Cockshut puts it, on 
the following assumptions: 2 
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1. There is a general tendency in the universe that makes for righteousness. 
2. Jesus was always over the heads of his reporters. 
3. Miracles do not happen. 
4. Conduct is three-fourths of life, and charity and sexual purity are the 
key principles of conduct. 
To these points, Eugene L. Williams adds: 3 
1. Rejection of the idea of plenary Biblical inspiration. 
2. Emphasis on the ethical rather than the metaphysical significance of 
the Bible. 
3. Validation of religious doctrines by the teachings of Christ. 
4. Reference to experience, - the experimental test , as a demonstration 
of the efficacy of Christian teachings. 
5. Distrust of anthropomorphic conceptions of God's nature. 
6. The employment of humanistic learning in Bible interpretation. 
But Arnold's contribution does not lie only in what he says but in 
the way he says it too, - his argument. Arnold begins his argument by 
saying: "If the present time is a time to speak, there must be a reason why 
it is so 
And there is a reason; and it is this - Clergymen and 
ministers of religion are full of lamentations over what 
they call the spread of scepticism, and because of the 
little hold which religion now has on the masses of the 
people - the lapsed masses, as some call them. Practical 
hold on them it never, perhaps, had very much, but they 
did not question its truth, and they held it in considerable 
awe. As the best of them raised themselves up out of a merely 
animal life, religion attracted and engaged them. But now 
they seem to have hardly any awe of it at all, and they freely 
question its truth". 
(Literature and Dogma, CPW, p. 148) 
We hope, says Arnold, to put ourselves right with our adversaries as 
to the real question between us and them, we will proceed with our 
endeavour to free the Bible - by showing that it is not science but 
literature; by following it continuously and by interpreting it naturally 
(ibid., p. 280). So true and prophetic, says Arnold, are Vinet's words: 
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"'We must,' he said, 'make it our business to bring forward the rational 
side of Christianity, and to show that for thinkers, too, it has a right 
to be an authority. ,"4 Let us anticipate, says Arnold, the objection that 
the religion here spoken of is but natural religion, by pointing out the 
falseness of the common antithesis, also, between 'natural' and 
'revealed'. For that in us which is really natural is, in truth, 'revealed'. 
We awake to the consciousness of it, we are aware of it coming forth in 
our mind; but we feel that we did not make it, that it is discovered to us, 
that it is what it is whether we will or no. If we are little concerned 
about it, we say it is 'natural'; if much, we say it is 'revealed' (ibid., 
pp. 144-45). 
Arnold, in his definition of religion and its function, says that the 
end and aim of all religion is access to God - the sense of harmony with the 
universal order - the partaking of the divine nature ••• (IX, p. 32). 
"Religion, if we follow the intention of thought and human language in 
the use of the word, is ethics heightened, enkindled, lit up by feeling: 
the passage from morality to religion is made when to morality is applied 
~motion. And the true meaning of religion is thus, not simply 'morality', 
but 'morality touched by emotion'. And this new elevation and inspiration 
of morality is well marked by the word 'righteousness'. Conduct is the 
word of common life, morality is the word of philosophical disquisition, 
righteousness is the word of religion" (ibid., p. 176). 
The books of the Bible were written by men; they record and create, 
~n a nation of unique religious genius, a movement from 'external 
observations to inwardness, a process culminating in Jesus and his 
interpreter, st. Paul. The authors' words of reflection and presentation 
are inevitably literary, metaphorical, poetic: The Bible must not be taken 
as a set of scientific propositions, or as a sort of talisman given down to 
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us out of Heaven, with all its parts equipollent - which became the Jewish 
view and is now the unhistorical, uncritical fundamentalist view: 
I have said elsewhere (Culture and Anarchy) how much it 
has contributed to the misunderstanding of st. Paul, that 
terms like 'grace', 'new birth', 'justification' - which 
he used in a fluid and passing way, as men use terms in 
common discourse or in eloquence and poetry, to describe 
approximately, but only approximately, what they have 
present before their mind, but do not profess that their 
mind does or can grasp exactly or adequately - that such 
terms people have blunderingly taken in a fixed and rigid 
manner, as if they were symbols with as definite and fully 
grasped a meaning as the names 'line' or 'angle', and 
proceeded to use them on this supposition. Terms, in short, 
which with St. Paul are 'literary' terms, theologians 
have employed as if they were scientific terms. 
(Ibid., p. 170) 
Arnold, by his emphasis upon the totally contextual nature of the 
language and how the same words may be used in a wide variety of utterances, 
has touched upon one of the main issues in present-day linguistic 
philosophy_ Contemporary linguistic philosophers no longer accept the 
empiricists' assumptions concerning knowledge and meaning as completely 
as did logical positivists. In its current form, linguistic philosophy 
favours a more flexible and less iconoclastic conception of meaning. 
One of the chief sources of inspiration of this more recent approach to 
meaning is the Austrian philosopher, Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951). 
Logic is, therefore, of quite limited usefulness even in philosophy. 
It cannot formalise contextual discourse, and yet most philosophical, not 
to mention theological, problems arise from such contexts. Certainly 
logic may be of use in situations where context does not matter, such as, for 
example, in mathematics and science, but it cannot cope with the complexity 
of informal discourse. To this effect Arnold writes: "But matters are not at 
all mended by taking their language of approximate figure and turning it 
into the language of scientific definition; or by crediting them with our 
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own dubious science, deduced from metaphorical ideas which they never had. 
A better way than this, surely, is to take their fact of experience II (ibid., 
p. 200). 
Arnold's attitude on the rejection of the doctrine of the plenary 
inspiration of the Bible may be illustrated briefly from the following 
quotation: 
Recognition of the liability of the New Testament writers to 
make mistakes, both of fact and argument, will certainly, 
as we have said, more and more gain strength and spread 
wider and wider. The futility of their mode of demonstration 
from prophecy ••• will be more and more felt. The fallibility 
of that demonstration from miracles to which they and all 
about them attached such preponderating weight, which made the 
disciples of Jesus believe in him, will be more and more 
recognised. 
(Ibid., p.253) 
Now, one comes to the most controversial point in Arnold's thought: 
his definition of God. Arnold's analysis of the phenomenon of alienation 
and his explicit conviction that its most grievous source is a false 
conception of God made him to give this point an important place in his 
argument: 
There stand the Bible words! how you construe them depends 
entirely on what definition of God you start with... to start 
with an assertion which can be verified: the assertion, 
namely, not of 'a Great. Personal First Cause,' but of 'an 
enduring Power, not ourselves, that makes for righteousness.' 
Then by the light of this discovery we read and understand 
all the expressions that follow. Jesus comes forth from 
this enduring Power that makes for righteousness, is sent by 
this Power, is this Power's Son; the Holy Spirit proceeds 
from this same Power, and so on". 
(ibid., pp. 374-5) 
It was a common idea in the age (Hegel, Feuerbach, and Marx) that a 
servile religious conception of men will inevitably be accompanied by an 
alienated social and political condition. But while Arnold was proposing a de-
mythologisation of the concept of God in terms of a pantheistic concept of 
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of the ultimate unity of man and God, most philosophers, except Hegel, 
were in favour of tackling the problem rather in terms of a thoroughgoing 
explicit atheism. "For the total man, therefore, the truer conception 
of God is as 'the Eternal Power, not ourselves, by which all things fulfil 
the law of their being;' by which, therefore, we fulfil the law of our 
being so far as our being is aesthetic and intellective, as well as so far 
it is moral" (ibid., p. 409). Again Arnold adds, God is "the stream of 
tendency by which all things fulfil the law of their being" (ibid., p. 42). 
In his comment on the second definition Eugene Williams says that Arnold 
"opposed religious anthropomorphism with an approximation to the 
'pantheistic doctrines' repudiated by Dr. Arnold" (op. cit., p. 542). 
Arnold's aims and strategies are complex: against Orthodox Christians 
he argues that the notion of a Personal God is unintelligible and unverifiable 
- according to a special notion of verification. Against the rationalising 
philosophical liberals: positivists, he argues that the masses need emotional 
and imaginative support for the practice of morality, and that this can 
only come from the Bible. God, he argues, cannot be regarded as a person, 
and all reasoning based on such a notion is on a false track, including 
the notion that Jesus is the Son of God in any sense in which a father may 
be thought of as having sons, or the Personal First Cause of the universe, 
as the Bishops of Gloucester and Winchester say, nor is he the Absolute 
Self-Existent, as the more philosophical theologians say; nor is he even 
the Supreme Father: he is the Eternal-not-ourselves-which makes-for-
righteousness. "We see how far the pseudo-scientific language of our creeds, 
about 'persons', and 'substance', and 'godhead', and 'co-equal', and 
'co-eternal', and 'created', and 'begotten', and 'proceeding', has 
anything at all to do with what Jesus said or meant" (ibid., p. 311). 
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To the masses, Arnold continues, the dogmas have always been 
unintelligible, but while in the ages of faith, and particularly before 
the Reformation, they were unintelligible but accepted for truth as the 
chief part of man's obedience to the Church, they are now, especially in 
the later nineteenth century, both unintelligible and rejected as false, 
or at best as irrelevant to the love and practice of righteousness. 
Yet the Church insists that the dogmas are points of faith, that sincere 
belief in them is necessary to salvation, that Christianity stands or 
falls by them. "Thus religion has been made to stand on its apex instead of 
its base. Righteousness is supported on ecclesiastical dogma, instead 
of ecclesiastical dogma being supported on righteousness" (ibid., p. 350). 
"But, after all," says Arnold, "the question sooner or later arises 
in respect to a matter taken for granted, like the Catholic doctrine of 
the Mass or the Protestant doctrine of Justification: Is it 'sure'? can what 
is here assumed be verified? And this is the real objection both to the 
Catholic and to the Protestant doctrine as a basis for conduct - not that 
it is a degrading superstition, but that it is 'not sure;' that it assumes 
what cannot be 'verified'" (ibid., pp. 360-61). 
The other elements in popular religion which were exposing it to 
scientific attack, and which Arnold wished to remove were, in addition to 
the petrified formulas of Calvinism, the whole miraculous element in 
Christianity itself. The proof of Christianity had long been made to 
rest upon miracle and upon prophecy, instead of its own internal and 
verifiable truth. And now that both prophecy and miracle5 are being 
impugned by the Zeitgei~t, many feel that "the whole certainty of religion 
seems discredited, and the basis of conduct gone" (ibid., p. 108). It is 
not religion that is discredited, says Arnold, it is Aberglaube. 
"The great prophecies," says Arnold, "of Isaiah and Jeremiah are, critics 
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can easily see, not strictly predictions at all; and predictions which 
are strictly meant as such, like those in the Book of Daniel, are an 
embarrassment to the Bible rather than a main element of it. The 'Zeit-Geist', 
and the mere spread of what is called 'enlightenment', superficial and barren 
as this often is, will inevitably, before long, make this conviction of 
/Md 
criticism a popular opinion, held far wide. And then, what will be their case, 
who have been so long and sedulously taught to rely on supernatural 
predictions as a mainstay?" (Ibid., p. 236). 
Arnold in his diagnosis of the Time-Spirit in Culture and Anarchy has 
pointedly underlined the rOle of historical perspective in the task of ordinary 
man's past ~~d present experiences. In the light of the historical development 
of man's spiritual life and the changes wrought on man's consciousness by the 
advance of science, religion must be recast to meet the changing needs of man. 
This adjustment could be accomplished by extracting the permanently useful 
message of Christ which now is buried in the mass of Aberglaube, or extra-
beliefs, peculiar to the mental climate of the past epoch. In this Arnold was 
convinced of two things: First, that the general tendency was inevitable: The 
spirit of the age was killing belief in miracles as surely as it had killed 
belief in witchcraft: 
For it is what we call the Time-Spirit which is sapping the proof 
from miracles - it is the 'Zeit-Geist' itself. Whether we attack 
them, or whether we defend them, does not much matter. The human 
mind, as its experience widens, is turning away from t~em. And 
for this reason: it sees, as its experience widens, how they arise. 
It sees that, under certain circumstances, they always do arise; 
and that they have not more solidity in one case than another. 
(Ibid., p. 246) 
The very position is expressed in "Obermann Once More": 
~nile we believed, on earth he went, 
And open stood his grave, 
Men called from chamber, church, and tent; 
And Christ was by to save. 
Now he is dead! Far hence he lies 
In the lorn Syrian town; 
And on his grave, with shining eyes, 
The Syrian stars look down. 
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Secondly, that the moral influence and spiritual consolation of religion 
must be retained, since religion is the solidest of realities, and 
Christianity the greatest and happiest stroke ever yet made for human 
perfection. To achieve that is a great change: "Of course, to pass from 
a Christianity relying on its miracles to a Christianity relying on its 
natural truth is a great change" (ibid., p. 143). 
The emphasis of Arnold's argument about the miracles fall upon 
no necessary connection. Even if it were scientifically and historically 
true, says Arnold, that Jesus walked upon the waters, this by itself would 
be powerless to prove that he was the Son of God and that his Gospel 
therefore proceeded from God, the Eternal that loveth righteousness. There 
is no necessary connexion- between the miracles of Jesus and the redemptive 
power of his Gospel. The miracles, then, being merely external, are no 
evidence of the divinity of Jesus or his Gospel. There is only one kind 
of evidence that can prove that Jesus' Gospel proceeds from God and that is 
internal: "Its grandeur and truth is brought out experimentally, and the 
thing is to make people see this" (ibid., p. 366). 
Thus Arnold shows that he has a pragmatic theory of ethics as well 
as a pragmatic theory of aesthetic. To this effect he writes: 
That is, we preach a doctrine, nottr.aurmaturgical and 
not speculative, but practical and experimental; a 
doctrine which has no meaning except in positive 
application to conduct, but in this application is 
inexhaustible (ibid., p. 357-58). And so, when we are 
asked, what is the object of religion? - let us reply: 
Conduct. And when we are asked further, what is conduct? -
let us answer: Three-fourths of life (ibid., p. 175). 
Eating, drinking, ease, pleasure, money, the intercourse 
of the sexes, the giving free swing to one's temper and 
instincts - these are the matters with which conduct 
is concerned, and with which all mankind know and feel 
it to be concerned. 
(ibid., p. 173) 
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II 
Although Arnold, in speaking about God, says that "we would not 
allow ourselves to start with any metaphysical conception at all, not with 
the monotheistic idea, as it is styled, any more than with the pantheistic 
idea" (ibid, pp. 241-42), it is clear from his practice that he started 
with concepts of this sort. 6 For from the link he established in his 
mind between the fragments of Empedocles and the Bhagavad Gita one can 
deduce the fact that the common denominator is the pantheistic notion of itA 
God identical with the world and with the sum of force therein contained: 
not exterior to it" (Yale Ms.) which is expressed in Empedocles on Etna: 
All things the world which fill 
Of but one stuff are spun, 
That we who rail are still, 
\vith what we rail at, one ••• 
(I.H. 287-90). 
But ideas, as one has observed, do not affect the masses as such: 
thought needs emotion beside it. For as Arnold puts it: 
Powerful thought and emotion, flowing in strongly markedch~ 
make a stronger impression: this is the main reason why a 
metrical form is a more effective vehicle for them than prose: 
in prose there is more freedom, but, in the metrical form, the 
very limit gives a sense (of) precision and emphasis. This 
sense of emphatic distinctness in our impressions rises, as 
the thought and emotion swell higher and higher without over-
flowing their boundaries, to a lofty sense of the mastery of 
the human spirit over its stormiest agitations. 
("Preface to Merope", CPW, I, pp. 58-9) 
There are well known traditional stories that embody that concept of 
pantheism and all of them were favourite with poets: The ancient Egyptian 
myth of Osiris, the Syrian myth of Adonis and the Greek myths of Orpheus 
- 216 -
and that of Persephone. The last three names are particularly influential 
in Western tradition. Arnold's interpretation of the story of Adonis as 
leading to thoughts of "Hope, and a renovation without end", borrows a line 
from Wordsworth but parallels Muller's treatment of the story of Persephone: 
"the return of Persephone to the world of light also denoted a renovation of 
life and a new birth to men," and hence the mysteries "inspired the most 
elevating and animating hopes with regard to the condition of the soul 
after death."? 
Orpheus was a reformer of the religion of Dionysus. His followers 
were associated with the Eleusinian Mysteries and the Chthonian gods of 
nature and the underworld. The myth, as was understood in Arnold's time, 
embodied the pantheistic concept of gods and nature and was opposed to 
Olympian gods who stood for a Transcendental or deistic concept of life. 
This case is reflected in "Arnold's interpretation of the Orphic beliefs 
of Empedocles. To understand the significance of Orpheus in Empedocles on Etna 
we must first consider the Olympians who dominate the poem, chiefly Apollo" 
(Schneider, 32-33). For it is worthy of notice that Muller's account of 
the Orphics differs 'from that of modern scholars. What is important is the 
way in which each of these myths acts on the reader. It would be tempting to 
try to discover the rule by which certain myths may seem to exercise a greater 
spell than others. However, in one's view, it is the idea of hope and 
renovation that Arnold spoke about. 
Arnold's object, almost from the start, was to grasp the spiritual 
essence of his age and to use his knowledge as the subject for poetry. Thus, 
his poems are more or less related to one another in theme, a fact that 
indicates a remarkably coherent body of poetry. The fallacious concept of 
inimical gods is given in many poems of his such as "Human Life", "Meeting", 
"To Narguerite-Continued ll , in "Self-Deception", "Stanzas in Memory of the 
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Author of 'Obermann"' , "Mycerinus", and in Empedocles on Etna. Most of 
these poems will be dealt with in other chapters, the ones I have chosen 
to illustrate my point in this chapter are: "Human Life", "Self-Deception", 
"Mycerinus", and "Empedocles on Etna". 
In "Human Life" (1849-50?), Arnold describes the impossibility of 
steering a course "As, charted by some unknown Powers,/We stem across the 
sea of life by night." The tone is sternly moral, but finally it is 
unknown nature which sweeps man away from the "unsuiting consort" and the 
attractive coast "on life's incognizable sea". 
No! as the foaming swath 
Of torn-up water, on the main, 
Falls heavily away with long-drawn roar 
On either side the black deep-furrowed path 
Cut by an onward-labouring vessel's prore, 
And never touches the ship-side again; 
Even so we leave behind, 
As, charted by some unknown Powers, 
We stem across the sea of life by night, 
The joys which were not for our use designed; 
The friends to whom we had no natural right, 
The homes that were not destined to be ours. 
(Lines, 19-30, Poems, p. 140) 
The voyager does not bring his ship safely to harbour by faithfully 
steering by this inner chart, on the contrary his safe arrival is because 
of the mysterious operations of 'some unknown Powers' who determine men's 
course on life's sea. One wonders, how much is put here of the puritan's 
interpretation of the doctrine of grace as well as of Calvin's doctrine of 
election: 
The phenomenon of the religious sense of grace is combined ••• 
with the feeling of certainty that that grace is the sole 
product of an objective power, and not in the least to 
be attributed to personal worth ••• The interest of it is 
solely in God, not in man; God does not exist for men, 
but men for the sake of God. All creation, including of 
course the fact, as it undoubtedly was for Calvin, that only 
a small proportion of men are chosen for eternal grace, can 
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have any meaning only as means to the glory and majesty 
of God. To apply earthy standards of justice to His sovereign 
decrees is meaningless and an insult to His Majesty, since 
He and He alone is free, i.e., is subject to no law. His 
decrees can only be understood by or even known to us in so 
far as it has been His pleasure to reveal them. We can only 
hold to these fragments of eternal truth. Everything else, 
including the meaning of our individual destiny, is hidden 
in dark mystery which it would be both impossible to 
pierce and presumptuous to question. 
(Max Weber, Ope cit., pp. 101-103)· 
To make one's position clear concerning these ideas, one would like to say that 
one'sconcern is not with the evaluation of these dogmas, but the historical 
significance of them. 
"Self-Deception" (1849-52) derives partly from the Platonic myth 
Er, but it presents "a Power beyond our seeing" who has left man with: 
Shreds of gifts which he refused in full. 
Still waste us with their hopeless straining, 
Still the attempt to use them proves them null. 
And on earth we wander, groping, reeling; 
Powers stir in us, stir and disappear. 
Ah! and he, who placed our master-feeling, 
Failed to place that master-feeling clear. 
(Poems, p. 277) 
In Plato's account of souls preparing to enter mortal existence, each 
chooses his lot and does so with complete impartiality. "God is not 
responsible," Plato points out, "the responsibility is his who has made 
the choice." The determinilBm of "Self-Deception", says Anderson, has no 
classical origin (Cl?ssical Tra~iti~n, Ope cit., p. 34). However, this 
determination is to some extent watered down by the sense of longing when 
Arnold asks: 
Ah! ~ power exists there, which is ours? 
Some end is there, we indeed may gain? 
(Lines, 27-28, Poems, 277: 
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"Mycerinus" (1843-44?) is another case of inimical and incomprehensible 
gods. In the poem, Arnold transforms a tale of Eastern ingenui ty (Herodo~i;us, 8 
ii, 133) into a small variation on the problem of Job. The poem is "an 
indictment of heavenly injustice, answering Wordsworth's Laodamia to 
which it draws attention by its metrical imitation" (ibid., p. 82). In 
Herodotus, Mycerinus, a young Egyptian king, has endeavoured to live all 
his life in perfect virtue; now, however, he learns from the oracle that he 
is doomed to an early death while his father i~loved injustice and lived 
long. Disillusioned, Mycerinus determines to imitate and even compete 
with the careless gods by giving up his last remaining years to an intense 
Epicureanism in order to compensate for a life time of misguided asceticism. 
Arnold, in his treatment of the subject, had suppressed the motive 
behind the gods' decision in cutting short the life of Hycerinus. Then it 
can only follow that there is a fundamental divorce between the divine 
power and human values. 
Having received the oracle, Mycerinus gave an address to his people 
conSidering the nature of the gods: 
'Mere phantoms of man's self-tormenting heart, 
Which on the sweets that woo it dares not feed! 
Vain dreams, which quench our pleasures, then depart, 
When the duped soul, self-mastered, claims its meed; 
When, on the strenuous just man, Heaven bestows, 
Crown of his struggling life, an unjust close! 
Seems it so light a thing, then, austere Powers, 
To spurn man's common lure, life's pleasant things? 
Seems there no joy in dances crowned with flowers, 
Love, free to range, and regal banquetings? 
Bend ye on these, indeed, an unmoved eye, 
Not Gods but ghosts, in frozen apathy? 
Or is it that some Force, too wise, too strong, 
Even for yourselves to conquer or beguile, 
Sweeps earth, and heaven, and men, and gods along, 
Like the broad volume of the insurgent Nile? 
And the great powers we serve, themselves may be 
Slaves of a tyrannous necessity? 
Or in mid-heaven, perhaps, your golden cars, 
Where earthly voice climbs never, wing their flight, 
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And in wild hunt, through mazy tracts of stars, 
Sweep in the sounding stillness of the night? 
Or in deaf ease, on thrones of dazzling sheen, 
Drinking deep draughts of joy, ye dwell serene?' 
(II. 25-54, Poems, 28-9) 
Bonnerot, in his comment on this passage, summarises Mycerinus' pondering 
by saying that three different hypotheses are presented: "ou bien les Dieux 
n'existent pas: ce ne sont que de fantOmes issus de notre immagination, 
oubien ils sont domin~s eux-m~mes par une puissance superieure; ou 
encore ils sont sereinement indifferents" (p. 163). He goes on to say 
that the second of these hypotheses is the one held by Arnold. This is 
not true. There is, here, a suppressed conditional clause: If things were 
such and such then the response develops. 
The response of Mycerinus to this cosmic conception is immediate 
as well as natural: he turns at once to an Epicurean style of life 
'The rest I give to joy. Even while I speak, 
Mr sand runs short; and - as yon star-shot ray, 
Hemmed by two banks of cloud, peers pale and weak, 
Now, as the barrier closes, dies away -
Even so do past and future interwine, 
Blotting this six years' space, which yet is mine. 
(II. 55-60. Poems, p. 2~) 
Leaving his throne, the young king retires to finish his few remaining 
years among the cool groves of the Nile, bitterly giving his days to 
revel and sensual delight. It is worthy of notice that when the 'frozen' 
universe was thrust upon Mycerinus, he responded to it by asserting the 
self: If the gods are indifferent to man's fate or they are dead, the self 
then must fill the world. In previous time the reaction was different: man 
responded by liquidating the self in the Absolute-Transcendental-Other. 
But the fact remains that the king's theological speculation in the 
first part of the poem is not forgotten in the final revelry: 
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There by the river-banks he wandered on, 
From palm-grove on to palm-grove, happy trees, 
Their smooth tops shining sunward, and beneath 
Burying their unsunned stems in grass and flowers; 
Where in one dream the feverish time of youth 
Might fade in slumber, and the feet of joy 
Might wander all day long and never tire. 
(II. 85-91, Poems, pp. 30-31) 
The Epicureanism which the king displays is only an apparent one: for 
he revels with but half his mind, and his real inward thoughts are on 
the transformation which this whole experience has occasioned within his 
soul. This is reflected in the speculative hypothesis of lines 100-111: 
It may be that sometimes his wondering soul 
From the loud joyful laughter of his lips 
Might shrink half startled, like a guilty man 
Who wrestles with his dream; as some pale shape 
Gliding half hidden through the dusky stems, 
Would thrust a hand before the lifted bowl, 
Whispering: A little space, and thou art mine! 
It may be on that joyless feast his eye 
Dwelt with mere outward seeming; he, within, 
Took measure of his soul, and knew its strength, 
And by that silent knowledge, day by day, 
Was calmed, ennobled, comforted, sustained. 
(II. 100-111, Poems, p. 31) 
What Mycerinus has learned is that he was not originally a truly 
virtuous person, since he practised virtue in the expectation of some 
reward. This lesson echoes Kant's insistence that morality arises only 
from a rational will's obedience to self-imposed universal laws, and his 
determination not to compromise this crowning glory of man, his moral 
autonomy, colours his whole attitude to religion. Kant admits that morality 
certainly leads us to religion and to the affirmation of God as supreme 
Lawgiver. Religion is the recognition of all duties as divine commands. 
But it would be a perversion of both man and religion to argue that I 
must know in advance that something is a divine command in order to 
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recognise it as my duty, needless to mention the expectation of reward. 
The poem ends, like so many of Arnold's poems, on the sad resolution of clear 
water, the murmur of the moving Nile. 
Before leaving "Mycerinus" one should comment on the poem's 
Concept of Content and Concept of Form. To begin with the first, Tinker 
and Lowry record the complaint "that the meaning of 'Mycerinus' is not 
olear, since the poet expresses no disapproval of the young king's 
abandonment of his duty, and seems to sympathise with the devotion of his 
six remaining years to revelry" (Commentary, p. 36). To the same effect 
Anderson writes: "No amount of ingenuity can reconcile Stoic serenity with 
revelling that turns night into day for the pretence of cheating death" 
(Classical Tradition, p. 19). In the opinion of the critic for the 
English Review, Arnold was doubting, too full of melancholy. And the 
poem "is a kind of apotheosis of despair; it looks as if suggested by a 
father's fate. At the same time, it seems almost a profession of atheism".9 
Professor Super, in his attempt to solve the seeming "contradiction between 
the first part of the poem and the second,,,lO ends up with a lucid 
paraphrasing of the poem. 
It is true that Arnold does not condemn Mycerinus for the decision 
he took. He also endows him with a modern sort of scepticism and 
rebelliousness against the course of fate and adds the Puritan's sense 
of guilt that blights pleasure and thwarts spontaneity. There is even some 
evidence, as most critics have observed, that the poem has an autobiographical 
significance. This autobiographical element, however, does not detract 
or reduce the importance of the poem as an objective interpretation of 
the situation it depicts: false conception of gods. For Arnold, by 
juxtaposing opposites: austere ascetism and epicuranism, shows, not that 
they are irreconcilable in their extremist forms and so a choice must be 
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made but, that the comparison is fruitful in yielding illumination for 
both sides. 
As for the concept of form, the external form of the poem, to 
many critics, is also sUrprising if not confusing. Baum, in his comment 
on the shift from stanzas to blank verse, says "Evidently a contrast was 
intended, but one might have expected the dramatic speech to be in blank 
verse and a lyrical descriptive portion to be in stanzas. Yet one finds 
the rimed stanzas just right for the ironic sequel, especially since the 
blank verse is handled with its own peculiar originality" (Ten Studies, 
pp. 19-20). 
The poem, in onets view, is a fine example where form and content 
merge together to produce a certain effect: in the first section of the 
poem the king was a theist with all that this term means, he practised 
virtue in expectation of a reward. In the second part he speaks of the 
spontaneous liberation of man's energy and of his inner harmony with 
nature, thus it is written in blank verse and is qUieter and subtler. 
There is hardly a weak line in the poem, it ends on a high note: a 
technique that Arnold used again and most successfully at the end of 
Sohrab and Rustum and in Empedocles on Etna, the work to which the rest 
of this chapter is devoted. 
III 
Human life and human society arise [says Arnold] out of the 
constant endeavour of these instincts to satisfy and develop 
themselves. We may briefly sum them up, these needs or 
instincts, as being, first and foremost, a general instinct 
of expansion; then, as being instincts following diverse great 
lines, which may be conveniently designated as the lines of 
conduct, of intellect and knowledge, of beauty, of social 
life and manners. Some lines are more in view and more in 
honour at one time, some at another. Some men and some nations 
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are more eminent on one line, some on another. But the 
final aim, of making our own and of harmoniously combining 
the powers to be reached on each and all of these great 
lines, is the ideal of human life. And our race is for 
ever recalled to this aim, and held fast to it, by the 
instinct of self-preservation in humanity. 
(itA Speech at Eton", CPW, IX, pp. 26-27) 
But men, as Arnold has shown, find themselves with an immense system 
of institutions, established facts, accredited dogmas, customs, rules 
that by no means correspond exactly with the wants of their actual life. 
The awakening of this sense is the awakening of the modern spirit. This 
awakening is ignited by the predominance of thought and reflection. However, 
The predominance of thought, of reflection, in modern 
epochs is not without its penalties; in the unsound, in 
the over-tasked, in the over-sensitive, it has produced 
the most painful, the most lamentable results; it has 
produced a state of feeling unknown to less enlightened 
but perhaps healthier epochs - the feeling of depression, 
the feeling of ennui. Depression and ennui; these are the 
characteristics stamped on how many of the representative 
works of modern times! 
("On the Modern Element in Literature", 
CPW, I, p. 32) 
Empedocles on Etna is Arnold's most complete analysis of this 
situation. Yet it suffered at Arnold's own hands more than any other 
poem of his. In his explanation of the omission, he says in "The Preface 
1853" that there are certain situations from the representation of which 
no poetical enjoyment can be derived "those in which the suffering finds 
no vent in action; in which a continuous state of mental distress is 
prolonged, unrelieved by incident, hope, or resistance; in which there 
is everything to be endured, nothing to be done ••• When they occur in 
actual life, they are painful, not tragic; representation of them in poetry 
is painful also. 
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To this class of situations, poetically faulty as it appears 
to me, that of Empedocles, as I have endeavoured to 
represent him, belongs; and I have therefore excluded the 
poem from the present collection". 
(CPW, I, pp. 2-3). 
Curiously enough, he had included in that volume "Mycerinus" , even though 
it is a poem which pre-eminently fixes upon a situation in which 'there 
is everything to be endured, nothing to be done.' 
The purpose of this reading of the poem is to show that Matthew 
Arnold is interpreting the phenomenon of alienation while it is yet in 
germ. He examines it through a number of its manifestations: the break 
down of the faith due to the misunderstanding of the real essence of 
Christianity: 
The central fact of the situation always remains for 
me this: that whereas the basis of things amidst all chance 
and change has even in Europe generally been for ever so 
long supernatural Christianity, and far more so in England 
than in Europe generally, this basis is certainly going -
amidst the full consciousness of the continentals that it is 
going, and amidst the provincial unconsciousness of the 
English that is going. 
(Letters, Vol. II, to Grant Duff, p. 201) 
In this chapter, the study will show that Arnold finds Christianity, as it 
is understood by his age, no longer serves to establish man in an ordered 
providential universe with assured religious and moral guidance. 
i 
Hell is the Other 
The theme of Ernpedocles on Etna centres around the contrast between 
three ways of life, or rather three modes of seeing life, as represented 
by Pausanias, Callicles, and Empedocles. Firstly, the mode of one who looks 
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at the world with his two eyes: the mode of ordinary man, like Pausanias. 
His is the attitude of the practical man who would learn the secrets 
of nature in order to use them for immediate practical ends. Secondly, 
the mode of the one who looks at the world with one eye and looks inside 
himself with the other one. This is the poet in Arnold's poetry: 
Callicles. Such a mode helps to create a dialogue between the central 
self and the outer reality in its simplest forms. This in itself increases 
the ability to sense the transcendent reality behind all individual 
perceptions, and to synthesise the fragmentary objects of everyday 
consciousness. Thirdly, the mode of the one who looks inside himself with 
his two eyes creating a "dialogue of the mind with itself". This is 
Empedocles's mode of seeing. 
The contrast is developed partly by means of the natural scene. 
The topography of the action is given clearly. Arnold depends on Lyell's 
book Principle of Geology (1830-33): 
The cone (of Etna) is divided by nature into three 
distinct zones called the 'fertile", the 'woody', and the 
'desert' region. The first of these, comprising the 
delightful country around the skirts of the mountain is 
well cultivated, thickly inhabited, and covered with olives, 
vines, corn, fruit-trees, and aromatic herbs. Higher up, 
the woody region encircles the mountain - an extensive 
forest, six or seven miles in width, affording pasturage 
for numerous flocks. The trees are of various speCies, 
the chestnut, oak, and pine being most luxuriant; while in 
some tracts are groves of cork and beech. Above the forest 
is the desert region, a waste of black lava and scoriae, 
where, on a kind of plain, rises the cone to the height of 
almost eleven hundred feet, from which sulphurous vapours 
are continually evolved. 
(Quoted in Imaginative Reason, p. 157) 
Professor Culler has observed that Arnold collapses the fertile and woody 
regions into one and adds a thiJ.:d, the hot cities on the dusty plain below. 
Each of these Arnold associates with one of his characters, Pausanias with 
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the cities, Callicles with the fertile and woody region of the lower 
slopes, and Empedocles with the barren cone. 
It is worthy of notice that while mountains ordinarily suggest 
precincts of wisdom in Arnold's poetry, in Empedocles on Etna Etna is 
something else, though it is not inconsistent wi,th the usual pattern: 
Etna is intellect like other mountains, but instead of wisdom it represents 
the devouring flame of t~ht. Men's intellectual passions are as 
I 
dangerous as their fleshy desires. Empedocles' mountain is one of flame, 
A 
not calm, because his intellect is not calm and poised but ablaze, 
beclouded, and enslaved. The poem's central concern, then, is with 
the reasons for Empedocles' alienation: what is this fatal illness of the 
spirit from which he suffers? The poem provides a number of answers 
viewed from three different angles: 
Pausanias is the first interpreter of Empedocles' illness. His 
analyses embody the formula "Hell is the other" (!.Ienfer, clest Ju 
autres), he sees it mainly in terms of social context - the change between 
the conditions of Empedocles' field of action in the past and the present. 
The times, here, are at fault. The charismatic powers of Empedocles, 
connected to his mastery of music, have been paralysed, the direct result 
not of interior forces but of exterior, social degeneration. His misery, 
it seems, is partly due to the hostility of his environment, for the 
great period of Greek religious philosophy is past and the influence of 
the Sophists has begun to prevail. To this effect Arnold says "I intended 
to delineate the feelings of one of the last of the Greek religious 
philosophers, one of the family of Orpheus and Mus aeu s , having survived 
his fellows, living on into a time when the habits of Greek thought 
and feeling had begun fast to change, character to dwindle, the influence 
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of the Sophists to prevail. Into the feelings of a man so situated there 
entered much that we are accustomed to consider as exclusively modern" 
( CFvl , I, p. 1). So Pausanias says: 
but now, since all 
Clouds and growas daily worse in Sicily, 
Since braDs tear us in twain, since this new swarm 
Of sophists has got empire in our schools 
Where he was paramount, since he is banished 
And lives a lonely man in triple gloom -
He grasps the very reins of life and death. 
(Act I, Sc. i, 119-125, Poems, p. 154) 
The quality of the verse, here, is not as high ~s that of Callicles for 
example. But Arnold, who believes that form and content should merge together 
to produce the required effect, reserved for Pausanias, the most unimaginative 
philistine, this prosaic verse. 
The sophists are an~logous to the triumphant Utilitarians and 
positivistic philosophers in general. The sophists, one might say, include 
German philosophers like Schopenhauer (1788-1860). This view can be 
justified if one sees his impact on Guy De Maupassant (1850-1893) who 
declares that the German philosopher has "stamped mankind with the seal of 
his disdain and disenchantment", and continues: "He has upset belief, hope, 
poetry, fantasy, destroyed aspirations, ravaged confidence, killed love, 
overthrown the idealistic cult of womanhood, murdered the illusions of the 
heart, and altogether performed the most gigantic sceptical operation ever 
carried out. He has riddled everything with his mockery, and drained 
everything dry.;~ llThe impact has been very great on many writers who have 
begun to see only avarice and lechery, cruelty and greed, selfishness and 
hatred at work wherever they turned. Arnold has been aware of this problem 
and its consequences. 
Pausanias is the type of beyrildered nineteenth-century clergyman "'ho sees 
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in miracles the focal point in the conflict between science and religion. 
He asks Empedocles to give him the secret of his healing spell, for 
It is enough that all men speak of it. 
But I will also say, that when the Gods 
~~it us as they do with sign and plague, 
~To know those spells of thine which stay their hand 
Were to live free from terror. 
(Act I, Sc. ii, 22-25, Poems, p. 157) 
Arnold admits in one of his letters that Empedocles on Etna betrays an 
impatience with the language and assumptions of the popular theology of 
the dayl1 (Commentarr, p. 288). This impatience is centred on the figure of 
Pausanias who himself represents precisely the kind of thinking that the 
sophists have risen to attack. He is a simpleton of the first order, and 
is rebuked by Empedocles for his dependence on Aberglaube : '~pells? Mistrust 
them?" (I, ii, 27). Professor Culler, in his comment on the poem, says 
"one has the feeling that under the figure of Pausanias Arnold may be 
making a sly allusion to his fellow poets. For it is striking that the 
miracle in Christian story which is parallel to the classical miracle 
of Pantheh is the raising of Lazarus. Tennyson used it in 'In Memoriam', 
and since 'In Memoriam', published two years before 'Empedocles on Etna', 
is the poem in which Tennyson struggles with the same intellectual and 
spiritual problems as did Arnold, one suspects a covert allusion" (pP. 161-162). 
I So, the first source of Empedocles' illness is 'de sa difference avec 
son temps'. It is an age which is unimaginative and unpoetical: I1how deeply 
unpoetical the age and all one's surroundings are. Not unprofound, not 
ungrand, not unmoving: - but unpoeticall1 (CL, p. 99). In other words it is 
the temper of the age, as being 'unpoetical' and 'arid', that accounts for 
the public misunderstanding and subsequently the alienation of the artist. 
Psychologically speaking, one might say that Empedocles is put into an 
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alien position. 
ii 
Hell is ourselves (l'enfer, c'est nous-m~me) 
Callicles is the second interpreter of Empedocles' sufferings. He is 
Arnold's principal addition to the story. His voice here is that of the 
moralist and critic, it has the moral implication "Hell is ourselves 
A V (llenfer! ~'est n~us-meme). 
In Act I scene I, he explicitly recommends a more positive attitude 
to the natural world: 
Apollo! 
What mortal could be sick or sorry here? 
(Lines 19-20, Poems, p~150) 
These lines bear the implication that Empedocles suffers because he cannot 
respond to the beauty of nature and its joy. This line of thought is made 
absolutely clear in the final speech where, after proclaiming that the 
outward world is dead to him, he projects his melancholy to the stars and 
fancies that they too have survived themselves, that they once lived moved 
joyfully in an older world, "a mightier order": 
But now, ye kindle 
Your lonely, cold-shining lights, 
Unwilling lingerers 
In the heavenly wilderness, 
For a younger, ignoble world. 
(II, ii, 288-292, Poems, 187) 
Callicles has the insight to deride Empedocles l power as a miracle 
worker and his pride and vanity in allowing the people to believe that he has 
supernatural gifts: 
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Bah! Thou a doctor! Thou art superstitious. 
Simple Pausanias, 'twas no miracle! 
Pantheia, for I know her kinsmen well, 
Was subject to these trances from a girl. 
Empedocles would say so, did he deign; 
But he still lets the people, whom he scorns, 
Gape and cry wizard at him, if they list. 
(I, i, 133-139, Poems, p. 154) 
He refutes Pausanias' idea that the sophists are the cause of Empedocles 
malady: 
The sophists are no enemies of his; 
I hear, Gorgias, their chief, speaks nobly of him, 
As of his gifted master, and once friend. 
He is too scornful, too high-wrought, too bitter. 
'Tis not the times, 'tis not the sophists vex him; 
There is some root of suffering in himself, 
Some secret and unfollowed vein of woe, 
Which makes the time look black and sad to him. 
(I, i, 146-153, Poems, p. 155) 
Matthew Arnold, in his delineation of Empedocles' character, follows, 
to use his words, "Aristotle's profound remark ••• that the tragic personage 
whose ruin is represented, should be a personage neither eminently good, 
nor yet one brought to ruin by sheer iniquity; nay, that his character 
should incline rather to good than to bad, but that he should have some 
fault which impels him to his fall. For, as he explains, the two grand 
tragic feelings, pity and terror, which it is the business of tragedy 
to excite, will not be excited by the spectacle of the ruin of a mere villian; 
since pity is for those who suffer undeservedly, and such a man suffers 
deservedly: terror is excited by the fall of one of like nature with 
ourselves" (CPW, I, pp. 54-55). 
What then, are Empedocles' faults that Arnold condemns? Arnold's 
method is clear - contrast. To this effect he writes "we are often 
supposed, when we criticise by the help of culture some imperfect doing 
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(actionJ or other, to have in our eye some well-know rival plan of doing 
(standard), which we want to serve and recommend" (CPU., V, 234). 
So, in his condemnation of Lucretius, with whom Empedocles is rightly 
associated, Arnold contrasts him with Thucydides: " ••• Thucydides is no mere 
literary man; no isolated thinker, speakingBr over the heads of his hearers 
to a future age - no: he was a man of action, a man of the world, a man 
of his time ("On the Modern Element in Literature", CPW, p. 76). As for 
Lucretius, whose representation in Arnold's writings is hardly distinguishable 
from Empedocle's, Arnold writes: "with stern effort, with gloomy despair, 
he (Lucretius) seems to rivet his eyes on the elementary reality, the 
naked framework of the world, because the world in its fullness and 
movement is too exciting a spectacle for his discomposed brain. He seems 
to feel the spectacle of it at once terrifying and alluring; and to deliver 
himself from it he has to keep perpetually repeating his formula of 
disenchantment and annihilation ••• Lucretius is, therefore, overstrained, gloom-
1,oleighted', morbid (.QJt, I, pp.33=34) and Arnold continues: "yes, Lucretius 
is modern; but is he adequate? And how can a man adequately interpret the 
activity of his age when he is not in sympathy with it? Think of the varied, 
the abundant, the wide spectacle of the Roman life of his day; think of 
its fullness of occupation, its energy of effort. From those Lucretius 
withdraws himself; and bids his disciples to withdraw themselves; 
he bids them to leave the business of the world, and to apply themselves 
'.n a turam congnoscere rerum - to learn the nature of things;' but there 
is no peace, no cheerfulness for him either in the world from which he 
comes, or in the solitude to which he goes" (CPyl, I, p. 33). 
So, Arnold's attack on Empedocles is in fact an oblique criticism of 
authors who fix their attention on the negative aspect of modern life -
the feeling of depression, the feeling of ennui. Certainly the nature 
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of Empedocle~1 illness is no mystery to the reader of Romantic poetry. It 
is the Romantic melancholy of Byron's 'Manfred', of George Sand's 'Lelia', 
of Foscolo's ItUltimeLettere di Jacopo Ortis", and above all, of Senancour's 
"Obermann". That Empedocles is identified with Senancour through Lucretius 
is plain if one compares Callicles' ana~ with Arnold's own views in his 
essay on "Obermann": "But a root of failure, powerlessness, and ennui, there 
certainly was in the constitution of Senancour's own nature; so that 
unfavourable as may have been his time, we should err in attributing to 
any outward circumstances the whole of the discouragement by which he is 
pervaded" (Poems, p. 155). Arnold's remark on Byron's heroes is significant 
too: 
" ••• 
not so much in collision with outward things, as breaking on some 
rock of revolt and misery in the depths of their own nature; Manfred, 
self-consumed, fighting blindly and passionately with I know not what ••• " 
(Poems, Fn., p. 155). Professor David De1aura rightly suggests that 
Coleridge's Hamlet criticism may have influenced Arnold's portrait of 
Empedocles' problem. "The disintegration of the 'balance' of faculties, 
of inward and outward, of thought and feeling.,,12 
On the thoughts and feelings that Arnold has put in the character of 
Empedocles Professor Allott writes: "we have learned from the careful 
disentangling of the philosophical and literary sources of Empedocles on 
Etna that whatever Arnold may have taken for his portrait of Empedocles from 
his reading of Karsten's Philosophorum Graecorum Veterum ••• (1838), the 
influences most deeply affecting the central thought and feeling in the 
poem ••• derive from his response to Lucretius, Marcus Aurelius and Epictetus 
among the ancients, Spinoza among later writers, and Carlyle among his 
contemporaries, together with strong injections of Romantic melancholy from 
nineteenth-century writers ranging from Byron to George Sand and from 
Foscolo to Senancour of 'Obermann'tI.13 One may add Leopardi, Dr Arnold, 
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and Goethe especially when he describes the deeply understood despondency 
and suicide of Werther in such a way as to 'save myself from a 
tempestuous element", in My Life: Poetry and Truth, Bk. XIII. 
The Romantic poet, generally speaking, suffers from a consciousness 
of the superiority of his perception that leads him, as it has led 
Empedocles, to be "too scornful, too high-wrought, too bitter", so he 
lacks the saving faculty of compromise and surrenders himself to despair. 
Of the Romantic element in Empedocles, Culler says: "the Romantic hero fre"": 
quently unites in himself an element of the infinite with an element of 
the finite. This is the form which that incongruous union takes in 
Empedocles" (p. 165). 
Of the different tradition in Romantic poetry Fred Kaplan has 
distinguished two: "In the minor one, melancholy, depression, and eventual 
paralysis result from the poet's awareness of the 'worry, the fever, and 
the frat' that inevitably occur when he realises that he lives in a 
corrupt world of mutability. In the major one, perhaps conditioned by his 
awareness of exterior corruption and mutability, often against a background 
of deep epistemological incertitude about the nature of reality, the poet 
confronts a crises of confidence not only in the general value of socially 
organised life but in the cosmic purpose that he believed had been 
superrationally and somewhat ineffably struggling to be revealed in his own 
imagination and in his own poetic language. Sometimes the doubt in 
this general cosmic purpose precedes loss of faith in his own ministry, 
sometimes the process is reversed; often the complex subtleties of such 
thoughts and expressions do not permit the poet or his readers to make 
the distinction at all".14 This view, in fact, reveals much of what 
one is going to say about Empedocles. 
~ 
Empedocles' long diatribe to Pausaias is introduced by Callicles' 
~ 
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first song that recounts the myth of Chiron. Due to the fact that the 
mythological references are ambiguous, most critics have made little 
note of the significance implied in Callicles' songs. Professor Culler, 
for instance writes that "Callicles is blissfully ignorant of all this (artists' 
dilemma). He sings these songs. simply because they are beautiful and 
because they are about music. He is the kind of artist who does not 
realise that poems have a content as well as a form" (p. 176). 
To answer this view, a digression in one's argument about myth and its 
function and the truth implied in its content is necessary, "Poetic 
myth," says C. Day Lewis, "was created by a collective consciousness; the 
poetic image returns to that ,consciousness for its sanction. It is not 
merely that, time and again, we find in the images of modern poetry forms 
and impulses derived from the myths; but the very nature of the image of 
poetry in its metaphorical aspect invokes that consciousness as though man, 
even at his most individual, still see~emotional reassurance from the 
sense of community, not community with his fellow-being alone, but with 
whatever is living in the universe and with the dead".15 
The myth, as extended verbal image in which relations between man and 
the supernatural order are dynamically depicted, offers authentic-··knowre_dge. 
The ideas contained in its structure are present in modern man's subconscious, 
or to use Arnold's words "the unchangeable substructure" (Literature and 
Dogma, p. 211) of man's being. In other words myth subsists as the 
substructure of all human activity. This is due to the fact that all 
ideas in the language are supported by submerged metaphor: all generalisations 
proceed from things, no system of abstractions can affect man's behaviour, 
as Arnold has observed, unless it has generated an imaginative symbolism 
in his mind. In all this, myth is the element that activates ideas. 
/ According to Levi-Strauss, the knowledge embodied in the myth "is just as 
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sophisticated as (ours is) it is simply that they use a different 
system of notation ••• the whole structure of primitive thought is binary" 
(Leach, Ope cit., pp. 87-88). 
Underlying nineteenth-century views of myth, both the empirical and 
the transcendental, there is the generally accepted notion that myth 
contains and retains and celebrates some significant experience of man in 
relation to the alien universe, to nature and to time, that through the 
various stages of his development he has been unwilling to let ~r go, and 
has therefore incorporated into his religion and his poetry and kept it • 
There comes the view that poetry embodies archetypal symbols which are 
the repository of racial memories, vestiges of primordial ritual and 
ceremony. The poetic imagination is archetypal in nature when it takes 
particular objects as embodiments of a universal experience. In the light 
of this, there comes the view that to understand a phenomenon is to 
understand it in its historical development. To this effect Frege writes 
" ••• for all the multiplicity of languages, mankind has a common stock of 
thought ••• The task of logic can hardly be performed without trying to 
recognise the thought in its manifold guises".16 The view of myth, in 
general, that Arnold has been acquainted with from his reading, the generally 
accepted nineteenth-century view, is that mythical story, a trans-cultural 
primitive phenomenon, is a form of knowledge, anthropomorphic in nature, 
and recording man's original significant experience in nature and in time, 
in all the variety of these experiences. 
Now, to resume the argument, Callicles' first song, "The Last Glen", 
moves from a description of the last dell on the mountain to the myth of 
Chiron, Achilles, and Peleus. The glen is a traditional feature of Arnolds 
'symbolic landscape'. Central to this metaphoric landscape, are the Forest 
Glade and the Burning Plain. In the Forest Glade man is "in Unison with 
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God, Nature, and his fellow man", but on the Burning Plain, "he is 
abandoned by Gods, divorced from nature, and alienated from his fellow 
man. What is more, he is alienated even from himself" (Culler, p. 12). The 
Last Glen has been interpreted as the half-way point which the poet must 
maintain in relation to society, but by analogy it may also be read as 
a metaphor for man's relation to the truth. The song alludes to the myth of 
Chiron, the aged centaur who taught Achilles, Hercules, and other heroes 
the lore of nature: 
In such a glen, on such a day, 
On Pelion, on the grassy ground, 
Chiron, the aged Centaur lay, 
The young Achilles standing by. 
The Centaur taught him to explore 
The mountains; where the glens are dry 
And the tired Centaurs come to rest. 
( I , ii, 57 -63) • 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 
He showed him Phthia far away, 
And said: 0 boy, I taught this lore 
To Peleus, in long distant years! 
He told him of the Gods, the stars, 
The tides; and then of mortal wars, 
And of the life which heroes lead 
Before they reach the Elysian place 
And rest in the immortal mead; 
And all the wisdom of his race. 
(I, ii, 68-76, Poems 158-159) 
Being aware of the relation between form and content, Arnold aptly shifts from 
the five beat lines of the first section of the song, which is entirely 
descriptive of landscape, to a tripping storytelling four beat line in 
the second section to describe the student-teacher relationship between 
Achilles and the Centaur. Professors K. and M. Allotthave rightly observed 
that "in Empedocles on Etna, ••• the metrical variations signal and help 
to define the complex feelings which shape the poem. Act I, i is in blank 
verse for the explanatory speeches given to Callicles and Pausanfus and 
so is Act I, ii for the not yet highly charged exchanges between Empedocles 
and Pausanias, but the metre begins to change at I, ii 36-76 for Callicles' 
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first song, which opens with a twenty-line descriptive introduction ••• 
in irregularly stressed unrhymed verse (though five-beat lines still 
predominate) and continues with a chant-celebrating the importance of 
traditional wisdom - which is four-beat lines and has an irregularly patterned 
rhyme scheme tI, ii. 57-75)" (Writers and their Background, p. 78). 
It has been rightly observed that there is a parallel between the 
counselling of Achilles by Chiron and the counselling of Pausanias by 
Empedocles. To this effect Professor Allott wri tes "the traditional lore 
taught to Achilles contrasts with the philosophical instruction about to 
be given to Pausanias" (Poems, 158). Professor Culler, explaining the 
significance of the contrast, says that Callicles is a poet of Keatsian 
natural magic deficient in the moral profundity Empedocles so obviously 
possesses. The reading one proposes is to show that the relation is of 
similarity rather than of contrast. It is two modes of communicating the 
same thing. If there is contrast it is in the type of the language they 
use: Empedocles, certainly, uses ethical language, while Callicles uses 
aesthetical 17 
• 
Empedocles and Chiron are known teachers and healers,and moreover both 
have supposedly raised someone from the dead, they have sought truths 
which belong only to the gods. The result, in Empedocles' case, is his 
exile and estrangement from society, the loss of feeling, despair, and 
suicide. This theme operates through an intensifying series of mythological 
analogies and contrasts. The analogy of this aspect is the inadvisability 
of rebelling against the limitations imposed by gods. There is throughout 
the poem the implication that to defy the gods is both hopeless and chaotic. 
The contrast is not in the message itself but rather is between a logic 
which is constructed out of observed contrasts in the sensory qualities of 
concrete objects and a logic which depends upon formal contrast of entirely 
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abstract entities. 
Following this, Empedocles himself holds the centre of the stage for 
the rest of the poem. He expounds his philosophy on "God, on nature, and on 
human life". E.D.H. Johnson, in his comment, writes that Empedocles 
"appears to be somewhat insecure in his moralising. When he preaches reliance 
on the mind to Pausanias, his friend quotes the wise man's own words 
which he is now understood to contradict: mind, he once said, is a 
mocking light that leads men false who trust. it. Apparently the self-
conscious mind vacillates between two diametrically opposed notions 
about itself. We might almost suspect Arnold here of oblique self-criticism; 
18 
Empedocles may seem, like his creator, to be a bundle of contradictions". 
It seems probable that Arnold knowingly and deliberately wants it to 
look like that, that terms like ~, are taken by theologians, like 
Pausanias, in a fixed and rigid manner as if they were symbols with as 
definite and fully grasped a meaning. If this reading is right, one would 
take it as an oblique criticism of theologians who take terms that Jesus 
/them 
Christ and st Paul have uttered in a 'literary' manner, and employ as if they 
were scientific terms. For mind in this poem is not reason but the 
understanding. This seems to be consistent with Arnold's view in Literature 
and Dogma. Thus he writes: 
These hundred doctors try 
To preach thee to their school. 
We have the truth! they cry; 
And yet their oracle, 
Trumpet it as they will, is but the same as thine. 
(I, ii, 137-141, p. 162) 
But, next, we would reverse 
The scheme ourselves have spun, 
And what we made to curse 
We now would lean upon, 
And feign Kind Gods who perfect what man vainly tries. 
(I, ii, 312-316, Poems, p. 169) 
- 240 -
We shut our eyes, and muse 
How our own minds are made. 
What springs of thought they use, 
How rightened, how betrayed -
And spend our wit to name what most employ unnamed. 
(I, ii, 327-331, Poems, p. 169) 
Empedocles, like Arnold who attempts to deal with modern religious 
problems from a naturalistic point of view, ridicules faith in an 
anthropomorphic God either hostile or benign: his ideas cover the topics like 
God and His relation to the world, miracles, salvation and future life and 
finally on how to live: 
And, lastly, though of ours 
No weakness spoil our lot, 
Though the non-human powers 
Of Nature harm us not, 
The ill deeds of other men make often our life dark. 
(I, ii, 262-366) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 
Harsh Gods and hostile Fates 
Are dreams! 
(I, ii, 304-306) 
Eut a little reflection must soon bring the man who takes this line of 
reasoning to the point where he finds that the attribution of cruelty to 
Nature is as futile an anthropomorphism as is the attribution of paternal 
benevolence to a deity. Arnold is aware of this and so his Nature is 
Spinozistically neutral; any animus it seems to have is but the product of 
human fancy: 
Scratched by a fall, with moans 
As children of weak age 
Lend life to the dumb stones 
Whereon to vent their rage, 
And bend their little fis~ and rate the senseless ground; 
So, loth to suffer mute 
We, peopling the void air, 
Make Gods to whom to impute 
The ills we ought to hear; 
With God and Fate to rail at, suffering easily. 
(I, ii, 272-281, Poems, pp. 167-168) 
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Empedocles is angry with his people who fill the universe with Gods. 
Kindly or hostile, to account for good and bad fortune, they explain 
the limitations on human knowledge by assuming an omniscient God, they 
console themselves for their incapacity to reach ultimate and satisfying 
joy by imagining gods who do. All this is childish and foolish to 
Empedocles, who recognises only a Power which is life itself: a 
universal and immanent Force manifesting itself by necessity: 
All things the world which fill 
Of but one stuff are spun, 
That we who rail are still, 
'tli th what we rail at, one; 
One with the o'erlaboured Power that through the breadth and length 
Of earth, and air, and sea, 
In men, and plants, and stones, 
Hath toil perpetually, 
And travails, pants, and moans; 
Fain would do all things 'tlell, but sometimes fails in strength. 
And patiently exact 
This universal God 
Alike to any act 
Proceeds at any nod, 
And quietly declaims the cursings of himself. 
(I, ii, 287-301, Poems, p. 168) 
Empedocles is speaking here in a pantheistic term. This pantheist 
notion seems to arise from the link Arnold establishes in his mind 
between the fragments of Empedocles and the Hindu Scriptures - the 
Bhagavad Gita. 19 He writes "A God identical with the world and with the 
sum of force therein contained: not exterior to it" (Yale Ms.) (Poems, p. 168). 
The Gods, says Empedocles, laugh at man, "who knows not what to 
believe/ Since he sees nothing clear" (p. 160). In short, "Harsh Gods and 
hostile Fates/ Are dreams" (I, ii, 304-305). But he goes on to ask 'Is 
this Pausanias, so?' - and he answers 'I will not judge'. For he is concerned 
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at the moment less with the metaphysical than with the pragmatic~. 
J 
line that Arnold explains in details in Literature and Dogma. 
One comes, now, to the very heart of Arnold's message: his treatment 
of one of the most important supports of popular Christianity~the Miracle. 
Miracles, according to Arnold, do not happen. There comes his emphasis 
on the permanent conflict between nature and mankind; even if man were 
just and pure, utterly without sin, there would be other existences in the 
universe to clash with his: 
Like us, the lightning-fires 
Love to have scope and play; 
The stream, like us, desires 
An unimpeded way; 
Like us, the Libyan wind delights to roam at large. 
Streams will not curb their pride 
The just man not to entomb, 
Nor lightnings go aside 
To give his virtues room; 
Nor is that wind less rough which blows a good man's barge. 
(I, ii, 247-256, Poems, p. 167) 
Nature is neutral, man is part of nature and there is no morality, in 
the human sense, to be found in her: 
Nature, with equal mind, 
Sees all her sons at play; 
Sees man control the wind, 
The wind sweep man away; 
Allows the proudly-riding and the foundering bark. 
(I, ii, 257-261, Poems, p. 167) 
The only cosmic morality, according to Arnold, is that all things 
fulfil the law of their own being. No special promise has been made to man. 
The denial of a special providence is an old doctrine. It has been found 
to be central to the Stoics and the Epicureans. Empedocles, or rather 
Arnold, is echoing Lucretius: "'Picture a storm at sea ••• Terrified, [the 
mariner] begs in his prayers that the winds may subside ••• But in vain no 
less for all his prayers is he borne by the violence of the hurricane to the 
shock of death'. If there really are personal gods to intervene in human 
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affairs, Lucretius asks, why does not their lightning strike the 
outrageously immoral wretch, instead of, as so often happens, the man whose 
conscience is clear of sin?" (Super, Time-Spirit, p. 70). Professor K. 
Allott has distinguished another source of this idea - Spinoza's Ethics: 
"'Experience day by day protested and showed by infinite examples, that 
good and evil fortunes fall to the lot of pious and impious alike '" (Poems, 
p. 167). 
What matters here is Arnold's consistency as far as Empedocles on Etna 
is concerned. As one has shown, Empedocles shows a Pantheistic line of 
thought: a God identical with the world and with the sum of force therein 
contained: not exterior to it: "All things the world which fill/ Of 
but one stuff are spun". Consequently, a miracle - or understanding by 
a miracle which is but a breach of the laws of nature - is impossible, : 
and to think it possible is, according to Spinoza, to dishonour God; 
for the laws of nature are the laws of God, and to say that God violates 
the laws of nature is to say that he violates his own nature. 
In his despair over the people of Agrigentum Empedocles says "Except 
ye see signs and wonders, ye will not believe: 
Ask not the latest news of the last miracle, 
Ask not what days and nights 
In trance Pantheia lay, 
But ask how thou such sights 
May'st see without dismay; 
Ask what most helps when known, thou son of Anchitus. 
(I, ii, 106-111, Poems, p. 160) 
Arnold here puts his finger on the heart of the matter - even the 
resurrected Lazarus died sometime, and man's problem is not how to postpone 
death, but how to accommodate his mind to the sure knowledge that it 
will come, for himself, for his friend.s, and for a-n mankind. 
Empedocles mocks Pausanias and all those who believe in the idea of 
a personal God: 
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Heaven is with earth at strife, 
Sign3 make thy soul afraid, 
The dead return to life, 
Rivers are dried, winds stayed; 
Scarce can one think in calm, so threatening are the Gods; 
(I, ii, 122-126, Poems, p. 161) 
Empedocles on Etna , being one of Arnold's earliest attempt to deal 
with modern religious problems from a naturalistic point of view, 
ridicules faith in miracles, in an anthropomorphic God either hostile 
or benign. It states too Arnold's views on the future state of bliss: 
Fools! That so often here 
Happiness mocked our prayer, 
I think, might make us fear 
A like event elsewhere; 
Make us, not fly to dreams, but moderate desire. 
(I, ii, 382-386, Poems, p. 171), 
The Carlylean tone of that last line is easily recognisable: "Blockhead! 
(thY misery) all comes of thy vanity; of what thou fanciest those same 
deserts of thine to be ••• The fraction of life can be increased in value 
not so much by increasing your numerator as by Ie ssenmg your denominator ••• 
Make thy claim of wages a zero, then;thou hast the world under thy 
20 
feet". 
There must be a concession on the part of man: the necessity of 
submission to the universal order. From Stoicism as well as from Goethe 
and Spinoza, Arnold draws this lesson: the inadequacy of Romantic 
self-assertion. Epi~tus confirms the lesson and also teaches him that 
some questions, to use Professor Allott's words "are perhaps incomprehensible 
to human mind ••• and that it is enough to know the nature of good and 
evil ••• and not to trouble ourselves about the things above us". 
('~ackground to Empedocles on Etna~ pp. 85-86). Epictetus' lesson is very 
important in a time where "it is a most happy and important thing for a 
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man merely to be able to do as he likes" (CPtl, p. 74). Right judgement 
is necessary here because man's desires conflict. 
This is what Arnold is doing. The first purpose, he achieves by 
cultivating intelligence and inwardness. There comes Empedocles' advice to 
Pausanias on the importance of 'inwardness': 
Once. read thy own breast right, 
And thou hast done with fears; 
Man gets no other light, 
Search he a thousand years. 
Sink in thyself! there ask what ails thee, at that shrine! 
Empedocles then tells Pausanias that he need not despair. He must 
look within for the truth, moderate his desires, and manufacture no gods to 
explain what cannot be explained: 
I say: Fear not! Life still 
Leaves human effort scope. 
~ut since life teems with ill, 
NUrse no extravagant hope; 
Because thou must not dream, thou need'st not then despair. 
(I, ii, 422-426, p. 172) 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • •• 
And yet, for those who know 
Themselves, who wisely take 
Their way through life, and bow 
To what they cannot break, 
Why should I say that life need yield but moderate bliss. 
(I, ii, 387-396, p. 171) 
Critics have noticed the similarity between these lines and Carlyle's 
equal dismissal of fear and hope as 'false shadows' in the "Everlasting 
Yea ". So, if Pausanias is unhappy, it is because he is unable to accept 
this fact but continually deludes himself with hopes or fears which are 
unfounded. And above all Empedocles warns him to be "neither saint 
nor sophist-led" (I, ii, 136) but be a man. The saints parallel, as critics 
have observed, the Evangelicals and Protestant Dissen~ion, the sophists 
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parallel the eudaemonist r~tionalists, the Utilitarians. 
It is worthy of notice that Arnold, from the very beginning, 
distinguishes between two types of Stoicism: active and passive. So, he 
writes that the aspect of Spinoza's thought which has satisfied Goethe is 
the active, rather than paSSive, stoicism. Activity involves, by necessity, 
conduct. Here, the stoics provides the best example - that is Socrates. 
Socrates has been the chief saint of the Stoics throughout their history; 
his attitude at the time of his trial, his refusal to escape, his 
calmness in the face of death. 
If activity involves conduct, conduct in turn involves society. 
Empedocles urges Pausanias to live with men but not as most men live. He 
gives him a sermon on proper active living: 
The world's course proves the terms 
On which man wins content; 
Reason the proof confirms. 
We spurn it, and invent 
A false course for the world, and for ourselves, false powers. 
Riches we wish to get, 
Yet remain spendthrift still; 
We would have health, and yet 
Still use our bodies ill; 
Bafflers of our own prayers, from youth to life's last scenes. 
We would have inward peace, 
Yet will not look within; 
We would have misery cease, 
Yet will not cease from sin; 
We want all pleasant ends, but will use no hard means; 
We do not what we ought, 
What we ought not, we do, 
And lean upon the thought 
That chance will bring us through; 
But our own acts, for good or ill, are mightier Powers. 
(I, ii, 222-241, Poems, 241) 
There is still some delight in life: 
Is it so small a thing 
To have enjoyed the sun, 
To have lived light in the spring, 
To have loved, to have thought, to have done; 
To have advanced true friends, and beat down baffling foes. 
(I, ii, 397-401) 
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James Simpson has observed that "Arnold found in stoicism a certain 
joylessness which made it valueless as a creed to live by, and as he 
grew older it became steadily less appropriate to his situation" (Writers 
and their Background, p. 298). This is quite reasonable for there is, 
in fact, an element of sour grapes in stoicism. Man can't be happy by 
trying to be, but he can be good by trying to be, let him therefore pretend 
that, so long as he is good, it doesn't matter being unhappy. This 
doctrine is heroic, and is in a bad world, useful. For if man cannot 
see clear, as Arnold maintains, and that 'innumerable philosophies of 
man', to use Carlyle's words, and which Arnold represents, 'contending in 
boundless hubbub, must annihilate each other, before an inspired Poesy and 
Faith for Man can fashion itself together', the only way left is to be 
found in Indian Soteriologics - the 'Bha.g:wad Gi ta and Stoicism. In the 
Indian soteriologics "two typical implications have been the options 
" 
of withdrawing from this illusion-world in the ascetic quest for liberation 
(moksha) and of continuing to act within it ••• but doing so in an 
attitude of inner detachment from one's mundane activity - the classic 
distinction between the so-called 'way of knowledge' jnana-monga and the 
'way of action' karma monga, the latter finding its most famous expression 
in the Bhagavad Gita lt (The Social Reality of Religion, Ope cit., pp. 103-4). 
iii 
The Poet's Burden 
The third perspective in Arnold's analysis of alienation is concerned 
with the poet, his poetry, and his mission. It is not, like the Romantic 
poets, about the loss of the poet's feeling of creativity and the 
intensifying loss of faith in the power of poetry and creativity, it is 
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about the poet's burden and the price of his vision. Shakespeare's 
words are a good expression of the situation: 
The time is out of joint; 0 cursed spite, 
That ever I was born to set it right. 
(Hamlet, Act I, Sc. V, 188-189) 
Again the outline of the poem leaves no doubt of it: "His mind is 
land 
overtasked by the effort to hold fast so great severe a truth in 
solitude: the atmosphere he breathes not being modified by the presence 
of human life, is too rare for him ••• His spring and elasticity of mind 
are gone: he is clouded, oppressed, dispirited, without hope and 
energy" (Commentary, 291-2). In the character of Empedocles, Arnold 
sees the possibility of portraying both modern thought and modern 
feeling. But what are the characteristics of modern age? It is the 
predominance of thought and of reflection. This is not without 
penalties: in the unsound, in the over-tasked, in the over-sensitive, it 
has produced a state of feeling unknown to less enlightened but perhaps 
healthier epochs - the feeling of depression, the feeling of ennui. 
Depression and ennui, or in other >"ords alienation, are the characteristics 
stamped on how many of the representative works of modern times. 
Empedocles stands between man, nature, and the gods, trying to balance 
between them. This is his mission, for these three realms have always 
been one, and could still be brought back into harmony. To preserve the 
harmony, the poet has to deal with the new ideas and to reconcile the 
old with the new in the realm of ideas. But too much thought is likely 
to destroy the proper balance between man's mental powers and his feelings. 
In Eropedocles, thought has been the destroyer of joy. To this effect 
Arnold writes: "I cannot conceal from myself the objection ••• that the 
service of reason is freezing to feeling ••• and feeling and the religious 
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mood are eternally the deepest being of man, the ground of all joy and 
greatness for him" (Poems, 149). 
Empedocles on Etna deals among many other topics, with its 
protagonist's immense struggle to preserve his power of perception_of 
-the truth- and ~to see things as they are-. But this has a price, for as 
Arnold puts it, "Whoever sets himself to see things as they are will find 
himself one of a very small circle; but it is only by this small circle 
resolutely doing its own work that adequate ideas will even get current 
at all" (9PI'[. ,111., 274)~ This does not mean complete isolation, for 
perfection, as culture conceives it, is not possible, says Arnold, while 
the individual remains isolated. "The individual is required, under 
pain of being stunted and enfeebled in his own development if he disobeys, 
to carry others along with him in his march towards perfection, t:) be 
continually doing all he can to enlarge and increase the volume of the 
human stream sweeping thitherward" (Culture and Anarchy,(cp)'", if, 94). 
Men of culture constitute "a certain number of 'aliens', if we may 
so call them, persons who are mainly led, not by their class spirit, but 
by a general humane spirit, by the love of human perfection; and that 
this number is capable of being diminished or augmented ••• in proportion 
both to the force of the original instinct within them, and to the 
hindrance or encouragement which it meets with from without" (£ELL.,. if ~ 146). 
This is due to the fact that culture is a social idea; and the men of 
culture are the true apostles of equality. They are those who have a 
passion for diffusing, for making prevail,for carrying from one end of 
society to the other, the best knowledge, the best ideas of their time; 
who have laboured to divest knowledge of all that is harsh, uncouth, 
difficult, abstract, professional, exclusive; to humanise it, to make it 
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efficient outside the clique of the cultivated and learned, yet still 
remaining the best knowledge and thought of the time, and a true source 
therefore, of sweetness and light. The poet may find himself in unpoetical, 
hostile environment in the Philistine's day, in a place and time when 
almost every idea current in literature has the mark of Dagon upon it, 
and not the mark of the children of light, he should keep aloof from the 
reigning superstitions, and refuse to bow the knee to the gods of Canaan. 
In the light of these statements, Empedocles can be seen as 
Arnold's most impressive portrayal of the guiltless hero brought to 
calamity by some inadequacy inherent in his temperament - his passivity. 
He is literally passive of course in the sense of being a sufferer. ~ut, 
while the poem's major interest is focused on the nature of Empedocles' 
failing as a source of his alienation, Arnold sees the crisis on Etna, 
as one has shown, as precipitated by the revolutionary climate of 
Empedocles' age. Arnold sees, also, what may happen to a man ' .... hen he 
leaves behind as illusion the religious beliefs which have hitherto given 
his life significance and moves into what Yeats calls the desolation 
of reality. Empedocles 'sees things as they are', but the vision is too 
much for him. 
Act one concludes with Empedocles' abrupt dismissal of Pausanias. He 
makes clear his resolution to return, "in the sure revolutions of the 
world", in his ambiguous answer that he will revisit Catana: an oblique 
reference to reincarnation: 
Either to-morrow or some other day, 
In the sure revolutions of the world, 
Good friend, I shall revisit Catana. 
I have seen many cities in my time, 
Till mine eyes ache with the long spectacle, 
And I shall doubtless see them all again. 
(I, ii, 471-476, p. 175) 
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Just at the conclusion of Act I, Callicles resumes his irregular 
rhymed joyful chant, the story of the metamorphosis of Cadmus and Harmonia: 
Far, far from here, 
The Adriatic breaks in a warm bay 
Among the green Illyrian hills; and there 
The sunshine in the happy glens is fair, 
And by the sea, and in the brakes. 
The grass is cool, the sea-side air 
~uoyant and fresh, the mountain flowers 
More Virginal and sweet than ours. 
And there, they say, two bright and aged snakes, 
Who once were Cadmus and Harmonia, 
~ask in the glens or on the warm sea-shore, 
In breathless quiet, after all their ills; 
Nor do they see their country, nor the place 
Where the Sphinx lived among the frowning hills, 
Nor the unhappy palace of their race, 
Nor Thebes,nOI:'ite Ismenus, any more. 
(I, ii, 427-442). 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 
There those two live, far in the Illyrian brakes! 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 
Placed safely in changed forms, the pair 
Wholly forget their first sad life, and home, 
And all that Theban ,.,00, and stray 
For ever through the glens, placid and dumb. 
(I, ii, 457-460, pp. 173-4) 
These lines stress the idea that pain is part and parcel of life: a 
suggestion that dehumanisation is a defence against the pain of life. 
H.W. Fulweiler, in his comment on the poem, says that "the lesson 
.21 
Empedocles learns from the song is that action in life is futile". If 
this is so, one might venture and say that Empedocles does not grasp the 
significance of the story. The lesson he should have learnt is that if he 
accepts life, he should accept pain as a constituent in life's responsibilities. 
Life without pain is but death. 
So, the first song of Callicles - Chiron, reminds Empedocles of his 
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duty and his debt to society: 
- alone! 
Pausanias is far hence, and that is well, 
For I must henceforth speak no more with man. 
He hath his lesson too, and that debt's paid. 
The second song - \I Cadmus and Harmonia", tells him of the price, the 
same price of the vision in the "Strayed Reveller" - i.e. Pain. 
In Act II the metrical variations continue to draw attention to the 
personal conflict which brings together in the poem the contrasted figures 
of the young serene poet and the poet-philosopher who has left behind 
youth, joy and his poetic self. Empedocles climbs upward, like Obermann, 
into lofty solitude through the smoke-filled atmosphere of the upper 
, . 
slopes of Etna, a charr'd, blacken'd, melancholy waste' of the desolate 
spirit. In that atmosphere he subjects himself to ruthless self analysis: 
No, thou art come too late, Empedocles! 
And the world hath the day, and must break thee, 
Not thou the world. With men thou canst not live, 
Their thoughts, their ways, their wishes, are not thine; 
And being lonely thou art miserable, 
For something has impaired thy spirit's strength, 
And dried its self sufficing fount of joy. 
(II, 16-23, Poems, p. 176) 
Empedocles is clear here about two areas of his alienation: he sees 
differently so he is lonely. This is a price to be paid for, as Arnold 
puts it, whosoever sets himself to see things as they are will find 
himself one of a very small circle. The next two lines are pivotal: 
Thou canst not live with men nor with thyself-
Osage! 0 sage! Take then the one way left. 
(II, 24-25, Poems, p. 177) 
Then he refers to the two immediate motivations for his suicide: 
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And turn thee to the elements, thy friends, 
Thy well-tried friends, thy willing ministers, 
And say: Ye helpers, hear Empedocles, 
Who asks this final service at your hands! 
Before the sophist-brood hath overlaid 
The last spark of man's consciousness with words -
Ere quite the being of man, ere quite the world 
Be disarrayed of their divinity -
Before the soul lose all her solemn joys, 
And awe be dead, and hope impossible, 
And the soul's deep eternal night come on. 
Receive me, hide me, quench me, take me home! 
(II, 25-36, Poems, p. 177)· 
Walter Houghton, who has analysed the poem in some detail, rightly considers 
these lines as "a prologue because all of Act II is here implicit. Why 
Empedocles cannot live either with men in society or with himself in 
solitude is the subject of lines 331 -337: why he now, at this moment, 
decides to take his life points forward to lines 331-416. At the end of 
the play, the chorus-like song of Callicles 417-469 may be viewed as an 
22 
epilogue'~ 
With this speech the conflict changes its form, for whereas previously 
it has been between Empedocles and the social world of man, now it is 
between Empedocles and nature. So, Callicles\ third song about Typho 
introduces this. Empedocles remembers the myth which ascribed to the 
roars of Typho, the Titan whom Jove has deposed and chained beneath Etna, 
and Jove's unjust triumph typifies for him the ethical failure of 
society. The song also illustrates the destructive results of man's 
refusal to accept the limitations imposed by his gods, and it warns of 
the terrible fate which awaits those who defy those limitations. 
Empedocles draws from the myth one lesson and misses the other. The lesson 
that the world has no place for the brave heart, that "littleness united/ 
Is become invincible". There are, however, analogies wi th Empedocles' 
character, temper and circumstance: he too is pushed aside by a younger 
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generation and now planning to leap into the same crater. He himself 
seizes on the parallel with his own banishment: 
He fables, yet speaks truth! 
The brave, impetuous heart yields everywhere 
To the subtle, contriving head; 
Great qualities are trodden down, 
And littleness united 
Is become invincible. 
(II, 89-94, p. 180) 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • •• 
But over all the world 
What suffering is there not seen 
Of plainness oppressed by cunning 
As the well-counselled Zeno oppressed 
That self-helping son of earth! 
What anguish of greatness, 
Railed and hunted from the world, 
Because its simplicity rebukes 
This envious, miserable age! 
(II, 99-107, p. 181) 
The interaction between these two areas of alienation emanates from 
the fact that there is in Arnold's writings a recurrent theme that a 
genuine society could be depended on to mediate between man and God. 
He attaches considerable importance to this close relationship between 
the spiritual liberation attained through religion and the attainment 
of genuine socio-political emancipation. A social order which is un~ust, 
estranged, irrational and inegalitarian will certainly tend to prevent 
man's quest for lmion with self, society, and God. It will create a 
superstitious form of religious beliefs. More fundamentally, however, 
until man has attained a truly liberating form of religious consciousness 
thare is no possibility of an integrated social order. 
Empedocles' reaction is to withdraw from art and society: 
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I am weary of it. 
- Lie there, ye ensigns 
Of my unloved preeminence 
In an age like this! 
Among a people of children, 
Who thronged me in their cities, 
Who worshipped me in their houses, 
And asked, not wisdom, 
But drugs to charm with, 
But spells to mutter -
All the fool's armoury of magic! Lie there, 
My goJden circlet, 
My pv.rple robe! 
(II, 109-20, p. 181) 
In these lines it is clear that Arnold is condemning both Empedocles 
for abandoning art on the basis of false argument, and his age for its 
misunderstanding of the true mission of art and poet. Suppose one has 
some fault with his desk lamp and brings an electrician to fix it, but 
instead of fixing it he blows it up, \'Tould it be convincing to 
give up all the uses of electricity because of that electrician's tault? 
if 
If people are like children, /they want miracles and worship the wrong 
God, that is not the fault of religion. Religion as well as art is good, 
it is good not relatively but as an absolute that is, its 
qualities and merits are independent of the criteria of time and 
place. 
Callicles sings the Myth of Marsyas and Apollo (II, 121-190). The 
song "is about the price of being a poet - Empedocles, like Marsyas, is 
Apollo's victim and finds the price too high" (~, 181): 
I am weary of thee. 
I am weary of the solitude 
Where he who bears thee must abide -
Of the rocks of Parnassus, 
Of the gorge of Delphi, 
Of the moonlit peaks, and the caves. 
Thou guardest them, Apollo! 
Over the grave of the slain Pytho, 
Though young, intolerably severe! 
Thou keepest aloof the profane, 
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:But the soli tude oppresses thy votaI"'J! 
The jars of men reach him not in thy valley -
~ut can life reach him? 
Thou fencest him from the multitude -
Who will fence him from himself? 
He hears nothing but the cry of the torrents, 
And the beating of his own heart. 
The air is thin, the veins s\-,ell, 
The temples tighten and throb there -
Air! Air! 
(II, 198-217, p. 184) 
Arnold, then, goes into the problem of the artist in society: 
Where shall thy votary fly then? back to men? 
13ut they will gladly welcome him once more, 
And help him to unbend his too tense thought, 
And rid him of the presence of himself, 
And keep their friendly chatter at his ear, 
And haunt him, till the absence from himself, 
That other torment, grow unbearable; 
And he will fly to solitude again, 
And he will find its air too keen for him, 
And so change back; and may thousand times 
Be miserably bandied to and fro 
Like a sea-wave, betwixt the world and thee, 
Thou young, implacable God! and only death 
Can cut his oscillations short, and so 
13ring him to poise. There is no other way. 
(II, 220-234) 
These are dangerous alternatives. For many, like Chiron, society 
becomes bondage; and for many, like Empedocles, solitude is fatal. Some 
cannot find tranquility, and many who have found it cannot find their 
way back to the world of man. Some are so deafened by the tumult about 
them that they can no longer hear, says Freud, 'their own inner voice'; 
and many hear only this and have no more communion with the world. 
"The life of every free, fruitful spirit", sa;vs Freud, "moves like 
a pendulum between these two poles. He dares not live only for the 
others; something always drives him back into solitude. And he dares not 
live only for himself; something always drives him back to other men ll 
(Reik, p. 198). Freud's words seems to reiterate Arnold's lines in his 
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poems "In Memory of The Author of 'Obermann''': 
Ah! two desires toss about 
The poet's feverish blood. 
One drives him to the world without, 
And one to solitude. 
(92-96, Poems, p. 134) 
The contrast of two ages is then given a further dimension as 
Empedocles looks up at the stars. The younger world is not only ignoble, 
it is also atheist. And since it is without character or faith, it makes 
man to be isolated: without a friend or home in society or in the Universe: 
You (stars), too, once lived; 
You, too, moved joyfully 
Among august companions, 
In an older world, peopled by Gods. 
In a mightier order, 
The radiant, rejoicing, intelligent Sons of Heaven, 
But now, ye kindle 
Your lonely, cold-shining lights, 
Unwilling lingerers 
In the heavinly wilderness, 
For a younger, ignoble world, 
And renew, by necessity, 
Night after night your courses, 
In echoing, unnea~ed silence, 
Above a race you know not -
Uncaring and undelighted, 
Without friend and without home. 
(II, 282-298, Poems, p. 187) 
Once more there is an interaction between the loss of faith and the 
disintegration of social order. 
Is it nature that is so bleak and forbidding? The cosmos that is dead? 
Empedocles puts these questions as he addresses the stars. "No", the 
answer comes, neither stars, nor earth, nor cloud, nor sea are dead -
I alone 
Am dead to life and joy, therefore I read 
In all things my deadness. 
(II, 320-322) 
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Arnold, here, adopts "the answer which Coleridge had given in 'Dejection: 
an Ode', and which Arnold himself had given in 'The Youth of Nature', that 
the loss of joy is the loss of a power in the individual, not of a quality 
in the world, Empedocles returns to himself as the source of his 
difficulties" (Culler, p. 170). The poem's movement moves to the lowest 
point of Empedocles' development by his admission that he is: 
A living man no more, Empedocles! 
Nothing but a devouring flame of thought -
But a naked, eternally restless mind! 
(11,328-330). 
Eropedocles, in his final speech, talks about man's relationship with 
nature - a question which occupies Arnold's imagination always: 
But mind, but thought -
If these have been the master part of us -
vfuere will they find their parent element? 
1Nbat will receive them, who will call them horne? 
But we shall still be in them, and they in us, 
And we shall be the strangers of the world, 
And they will be our lords, as they are now; 
And keep us prisoners of our consciousness, 
And never let us clasp and feel the All 
But through their forms, and modes, and stifling veils. 
And we shall be unsatisfied as now; 
And we shall feel the agony of thirst, 
The ineffable longing for life of life 
Baffled for ever. 
(II, 345-358, Poems, p. 189) 
Just before his leap into the crater, Empedocles cheers himself with the 
recollection that he has never been a slave of sense or betrayed his 
intellectual integrity. But it has been his fate to be uplifted with an 
austere and tragic exaltation at his insight into the ultimate truth and 
the intellectual isolation this entails. Clearly the course for humanity is 
not to follow the way of Empedocles to its logical conclusion, but to 
embrace the melioristic stoicism suggested to Pausanias. This solution can 
be deduced from the fact that the culminating effect of Empedocles f final 
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speech is an affirmation of faith in feeling rather than reason. In 
addition to that there is his special use. of myth as man's formulation 
2~ 
of his own experience. 
Now, one comes to the problem of suicide. Many critics have observed 
that after Act I Empedocles has changed his mind without sufficient cause 
assigned, and on a sudden impulse decides to end his life. Since nothing 
in the text supports this theory, it can only rest on the ingenuous 
assumption that no man who preached a philosophy to live by could be 
meditating his own death. 
Some other critics associate Empedocles's death with that of Christ 
and Socrates before him. To this effect, Walter H:m.£htOnwri tes: "Arnold 
must have known the five passages of Epictetus on the death of Socrates: by 
dying, 'he intended to preserve something else, not his poor flesh, but 
his fidelity, his honourable character! He would save, not his body, 
but 'that which is increased and saved by doing what is just, and impaired 
and destroyed by doing what is unjust"("Empedocles on Etna'~ p. 328). Professor 
Super writes "in fact, the inability of Empedocles, under the particular 
conditions of his life, to live up to his creed in no more a condemnation 
of the creed than is the inability of Christians to live up to theirs: the 
creed remains an ideal which it is better the world should have, should 
strive to live by. The founder of Christianity, like Socrates, died rather 
than repudiate his creed" (The Time-Spirit, pp. 21-22). Professor Allott 
writes that "so much in passing that one can not be sure how significant 
he thought the point ••• (Empedocles') ascent of the volcano ••• becomes a 
secular way of the cross that ends in self-crucifixion"("A Background for 
Empedocles on Etna', p. 99). 
Suicide can be viewed as an action and judged on these grounds. For an 
action to be good it must answer more or less to certain criteria - no 
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doubt connected with emotions, and might have answered to these criteria 
in such a way as to have been still better or not quite as good. For an 
action to be right it must satisfy some definite requirements, in the 
simplest cases some elementary moral principle, so that if the requirements 
are satisfied the action is right and if not it is wrong. 
As for the moral criteria, one can distinguish two traditions: firstly 
the idealistic tradition; secondly the utilitarian one - it gives morality 
a purpose outside itself. Kant, as an exponent of the idealistic 
tradition, argues that all moral concepts have their rest and origin wholly 
a priori in the reason. The essence of morality is to be derived from the 
concept of law; for, though everything in nature acts according to laws, 
only a rational being has the power of acting according to the idea of 
a law, i.e. by Will. The idea of an objective principle is called a 
command of the reason, and the formula of the command is called an 
imperative • 
There are two sorts, says Kant, of imperatives: the 'hypothetical' 
imperative which says "you must do so-and-so if you wish to achieve such-
and-such an end", and the categorical imperative, which says that a 
certain kind of action is objectively necessary, without regard to any 
end. To cut short this argument Kant expects one to "act only according to 
a maxim by which you can at the same time will that it shall become a 
general law" or: "act as if the maxim of your action were to become through 
your will a general natural law" (B. Russell, p. 737). One can in 
like manner show that suicide is condemned by the categorical imperative. 
The ethical part of the utilitarian doctrine says that man's desires and 
actions are good which in fact promote the general happiness. This need 
not be the intention of an action, but only its effect. It is 
impossible to imagine, in the light of this tradition, that Empedocles' 
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suicide will promote the general happiness. 
Empedocles' suicide can be taken as an act of condemnation. Suicide 
here, is a double-edged weapon. If one applies it to the first area of 
Arnold's interpretation of alienation, that is, "Hell is the other", 
Empedocles will stand as a martyr of sweetness and light, of lucidity of 
mind and largeness of temper. He departs in innocence, a sufferer and 
not a doer of evil; a victim, like Socrates and Christ, nO.t of laws, 
but of men. Humanity should bid him farewell, not with compassion for him, 
and not with excuses, but in confidence and pride. Slowly, very slowly, his 
ideal of lucidity of mind and largeness of temper conquers. In the end 
it will prevail. 
But if Callicles is right in his analysis "hell is ourselves" and 
that inner discord makes the time look black and out of joint, Empedocles' 
complaints would be entirely unconvincing. Hence he is condemned - that 
is his suicide is the result of his way of thinking. For Arnold writes: 
"the dramatic form exhibits, above all, the action of man as strictly 
determined by his thoughts and feelings" (CPd, I, p.34). 
In discussing the problem of Empedocles' suicide in the light of 
Arnold's third perspective of the phenomenon - the poet's vocation and 
his burden, the act is to be taken symbolically. It is in terms of a 
farewell to a period of one's life where he has been able to feel joy, the 
grandeur of life, spirit, and of animated life. "1 cannot conceal from 
myself", says Arnold "the objection ••• that the service of reason is 
freezing to feeling ••• and feeling and the religious mood are eternally 
the deepest being of man, the ground' of all joy and greatness for him" 
(Poems, 199). It is a period where "his spring and elasticity of mind are 
gone ••• to the utrter deadness to joy, grandeur, spirit, and animated life" 
(ibid., 198). 
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It is the price that is exacted from the aliens by their vocation as 
deliverers. It is the only feeling that arises as well from the writer's 
sense of commitment and its burden. Arnold, in a letter to his mother, 
writes III am not very well lately, have had one or two things to bother 
me ••• but I have so lately had a stronger wish than usual not to vacillate 
and be helpless, but to do my duty, whatever that may be and out of that 
wish one may always hope to make something" (Letters, I, p.41). And 
in another letter, he writes, "My great advantage is that everyone of the 
subjects I propose to treat is one that I have long reached in my mind, 
read and thought much about, and been often tempted to write of. The 
horrible thing must be to have to look about for subjects, and when this 
has to be done week after week, it must be enough to drive one mad" (Ibid., 
p. 187). In addition to that one has to penetrate himself with the 
subject for "no man can do his best with a subject which does not penetrate 
him: no man can be penetrated by a subject which he does not conceive 
independently" (CPW, I, pp. 39-40). 
The poet should have experience, this is Arnold's criterion of 
sincerity: III have been returning to Goethe's life, and think higher of 
him than ever. His thorough sincerity - writing about nothing that he had 
not experienced - is in modern literature almost unrivalled" (Letters, I, 
(May, 1848) p. 10). Arnold's experience is not derived from books, as 
some critics say, but it is a first hand experience. In his letter to his 
mother he shows that he does not live in an ivory tower and detached from 
people "I was in the great mob in Trafalgar Square (Riots in Trafalgar 
Square, March 6 and 7, 1848) yesterday, whereof the papers will instruct you; 
but they did not seem dangerous, and the police are always, I think, 
needlessly rough in manner" (Letters, I, (March, 1848) p. 4). 
In penetrating himself with these experiences, the poet is parting 
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from a way of life - the way of simple acceptance of life without thought 
of its anguish and pain. It is the way of seeing differently. There is a 
price for that, it is not just a matter of time and energy directed and 
dedicated, but of the artist's priestly isolation from his fellow men and 
the pain it entails. It concerns the kind of attention, of contemplation, 
analysis and recreation which the poet necessarily interposes between the 
experience which 'goes into' the art and the art which results. To this 
effect, Arnold, in a letter to his sister K, says: "Perfection of a certain 
kind may there be attained, or at least approached, without knocking 
yourself to pieces, but to attain or approach perfection in the region of 
thought and feeling, and to unite this with perfection of form, demands not 
merely an effort and a labour, but an actual tearing of oneself to pieces, 
which one does not readily consent to (although one is sometimes forced to 
it) unless one can devote one's whole life to poetry" (Ibid., 62-63). 
It is this standard of perfection, sincerity and the task of poetry 
that determines all the elements of Arnold's poetics. Hence, Empedocles 
is presented as a man who is: 
Wandering between two worlds, one dead, 
The other powerless to be born. 
He is a paradigm of the artist in his depressed moments, wrestling to 
create order from chaos, torn between ideal possibilities and transcience, 
tasting defeat. If he dies, it may be that the burden laid upon him is 
well-nigh greater than he can bear. But honour to the sages who have felt 
this, and yet have borne it. 
* * * 
One has been trying to show that to read Empedocles on Etna .is to 
find reflections and exploration of man in the modern world: the scepticism 
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of any ultimate truths, the search for some constructive outlook that 
can give man solid ground for self-integration; the acute self-consciousness, 
the sense of isolation and loneliness, the feeling of ennui, the suspicion 
of pure intellectualism, the search for a wholeness and integrity of man 
with himself, society, and the universe. A search which is necessary for man 
to be alive and active. 
But one may ask whether the malady which Arnold describes is actually 
the strange disease of modern life or the strange disease of Arnold himself. 
Arnold's relationship with his central character - Empedocles, is 
confessedly complex. This is due to his technique of djsinterestedness. 
In prose he uses irony and quotes authorities. In one of his letters to his 
mother, Arnold says "one can only get oneself really accepted by men by making 
oneself forgotten in the people and doctrines one recommends" (Letters, I, 
219-20). 
In addition to that, Arnold writes indirectly about his subject: 
"One is from time to time seized and irresisti.bly carried along by a 
temptation to treat political, or religious, or social matters, directly; 
but after yielding to such a temptation I always feel myself recoiling 
again, and disposed to touch them only so far as they can be touched 
through poetry" (Ibid., 233). 
Perhaps Arnold, in projecting himself into both Callicles and 
Empedocles, is employing a technique which Yeats has discovered in terms 
of Masks· "the 'mask' is worn for both attack and defence. By wearing 
the mask to prevent injury, the poet achieves a detachment from experience 
24 
that leaves him only superficially involved, whatever the outcome". 
The mask, in the case of Arnold, is necessary for he used to address the 
burning topics of his day - religion, politics, education etc., and at 
the same time Arnold has been aware of the limitation the Time-Spirit 
imposes on free disinterested criticism. 
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Undoubtedly, Arnold has exposed too much, in Empedocles, of his 
own times and his own situation. To this effect he writes about his 
poetry in general: liMy poems represent, on the whole, the main movement 
of mind of the last quarter of a century, and thus they will probably 
have their day as people become conscious to themselves of what that 
movement of mind is, and interested in the literary productions which 
reflect it" (Letters (June, l869J Vol. II, p. 4). In another letter of his, 
Arnold writes, what one considers a crucial statement, that "Traces of an 
impatience with the language and assumption of the popular theology of the 
day may very likely be visible in my work, and I have now, and no doubt 
had still more th~, a sympathy with the figure Empedocles presents to the 
imagination, but neither then nor now would my creed, if I wished or were 
able to draw it out in black and white, be by any means identical with that 
contained in the preachment of Empedocles ••• No critic appears to mark that 
if Empedocles throws himself into Etna his creed can hardly be meant to 
be one to live by. If the creed of Empedocles were, as exhibited in my 
poem, a satisfying one, he ought to have lived after delivering it himself 
of it, not died" (Commentary, p. 288). 
One is concerned here with the term 'sympathy', Arnold must have 
been aware of the critical implication of the term either through 
Coleridge who has used it on Shakespeare, or through its development by 
eighteenth-century associationists who use it as an ethical concept. The 
term has been used, in 19th century, to explain how a poet is able to 
annul space and the isolation of his individual nervous system and become, 
for the nonce, the personality he contemplates. Arnold, however, uses the 
term in his evaluation of Lucretius. 
In conclusion, what one has been trying to show is that Arnold has been 
interpreting a phenomenon which is typical of all committed artists in 
modern times. And that alienation is part and parcel of times characterised 
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by the advancement of thought - in Victorian Britain as well as Europe. 
On the whole, Arnold's interpretation of the spiritual state of his time, 
the subject of this chapter, and its slow fateful dissolution are clear 
and impressive. Their courageous directness, their monumental weight, 
and diamond-hard clarity, are reminiscent of the opening of the 
Beethoven "C 11inor Symphony". Thus destiny knocks at the door of a culture. 
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CHAPTER VII 
On Nature 
Paradise, and groves 
Elysian, Fortunate Fields - like those of old 
Sought in the Atlantic Main - why should they be 
A history only of departed things, 
Or a mere fiction of what never was? 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• 
For the discerning intellect of Man, 
When wedded to this goodly Universe 
In love and holy passion, shall find these 
A simple produce of the common day. 
W. Wordsworth 
What pitfalls there are in that "ford Nature. 
M. Arnold 
The term Nature belongs to a class of words whose inherent quality, 
is semantic ambiguity. In this way, it is capable of creating doctrinal 
or dialectical state , and hence causes emotional polarities. These are 
in fact, the three forces that operate, as Lovejoy has observed, as 
determining factors in the thought of both individual writers and ages. 
They are, according to Lovejoy, three kinds, corresponding to three levels 
of human thought: the semantic, the dialectical and the psychological. 
The first force is that inherent in the ambiguity of words, 
and especially of those large and peculiarly multivocal catchwords, 
like 'Nature', that have dotted the pages of philosophers, 
essayists, and poets in all periods ••• The second force is again ••• 
inherent in the materials: it is the capacity of particular unit-
ideas to attract or repel one another, often without the author's 
being aware of what is going on. The assumption here is that ideas 
themselves, apart from their particular uses in philosophical or 
literary discourse, are connected with other ideas by logical 
relations of 'simple congruity or mutual implication or mutual 
incongruity' and that this fact often gives rise to latent discords 
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or conflicts among the ideas compounded in a given system 
or piece of writing. The third force ••• is the internally 
conflicting forces, of temperamental predilection ••• 'the 
underlying affective factors in his (the writer's) 
personality. 1 
The history of ideas, in general, reflects the working of two fundamental 
and opposing biases of temperament, that have competed with each other 
for domination throughout the evolution of Western thought: For Lovejoy, 
these two basic moods are: "otherworldliness" and "this-worldliness"; for 
Arnold, they are: "Hebraism" and "Hellenism"; for william James: "tough-
minded" and the "tender-minded"; for Arnold Toynbee.: "retreat" and 
"expansion"; and for the writer of these lines: "Deism" and "Pantheism". 
Thus one sees that Romantic Nature, for example, is an invisible 
energy behind the things man sees. Classical Nature, whose relation to 
the Romantic one - in the history of literature - is like the systole and 
the diastole to the human heart, means the visible creation regarded as 
an orderly arrangement. In the course of time Nature changes its meaning 
in correspondence with the two concepts of God, explained in the introduction 
of this part: pantheistic and deistic, or immanence and transcendence 
respectively. But it is to be noted that in any single period more than 
one meaning for the word may be current. All theologies have, in fact, 
both immanent and transcendent elements in them, though' this or that 
element may be obscured or suppressed. What is true in theology is equally 
true in the case of a metaphysical concept like "Nature". The suggestion 
one is considering, here, is not that a purely immanent conception of God 
or Nature is replaced by a purely transcended one, but that a conception 
in which immanence is emphasised gives way to one in which transcendence 
is emphasised. 
Most significant thing of all, some of these concepts, as John F. Danby 
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has observed, will quarrel. "There are so many rivals committed to an 
internecine struggle. Quarrels over what 'Nature' really means are not 
merely verbal: weapons will out as often as words. People identify 
themselves with the fate of their meaning. The quarrel might be a matter of 
life or death. Thus Giordano Bruno was imprisoned in 1593 and burnt in 
1600. One reason for this was an unacceptable sense in which he used the 
word 'Nature,.,,2 The sorts of meanings men die for are structural frames 
by which they live, work, and think. A meaning is not a dictionary sense: 
It can be a programme of action. The human being who chooses such and such 
a meaning is deciding for such and such a course of behaviour among his 
fellows. And literary works do as much as philosophical works Cor more) to 
determine what meaning men find most appealing. 
"Nature", in its widest sense, can mean 'the totality of things', all 
that would have to appear in an inventory of the universe. It can also 
refer to the laws and principles of structure by which the behaviour of 
things may be explained. These two senses cannot be kept independent of 
each other at any advanced level of inquiry, for to state in any of the 
sciences what an entity is involves describing what it does, its patterns 
of activity or behaviour, and the activity of its constituent elements, as 
far as they can be known and subsumed under laws. The detailed study of 
natural fact is commonly called natural science; the reflection on 
principles, whether those of natural science or of any other department of 
thought or action, is commonly called philosoph~ under which literary 
criticism comes. The artist, should have a fair knowledge of the first, and 
be thoro~hly acquainted with the latter. For he deals with nature at 
both levels. To this effect Abrams writes: 
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Take what I have called the 'universe', as an example. 
In any theory (of art), the aspects of nature which an 
artist is said to imitate, or is exhorted to imitate, 
may be either particulars or types, and they may be only 
the beautiful or the moral aspects of the world, or else 
any aspect without discrimination. It may be maintained 
that the artist's world is that of imaginative intuition, 
or of common sense, or of natural science; and this world 
may be held to include, or not to include, gods, witches, 
chimeras, and Platonic Ideas. Consequently, theories which 
agree in assigning to the represented universe the primary 
control over a legitimate work of art may vary from 
recommending the most uncompromising realism to the most 
remote idealism. 
(Abrams,The Mirror and the Lamp, p. 7) 
Most critics find Arnold's ideas on nature confused and inconsistent. 
There are, however, four detailed treatments of Arnold's poems on nature: 
Joseph Warren Beach finds the poems "lacking in the warmth and richness 
that marked the romantic treatment of nature".3 L. Trilling argues that 
Arnold's concept of nature is "confused and inconsistent".4 J. Hillis 
Miller says "In Arnold's hands nature poetry becomes like descriptions in a 
botantical handbook - accurate, but superficial" (The Disappearance of God, 
p. 233). Stange, who disagrees with both Beach and Trillin~, defends 
Arnold's treatment of nature but has committed a serious mistake that 
undermines the whole chapter when he says that: "Arnold ••• had no interest 
in the pantheistic tendencies of Spinoza's thought" (The Poet as Humanist, 
p. 133). 
It is true that there are paradoxes in Arnold's concept of nature. The 
aim of this chapter will be to understand what these paradoxes mean. One 
hopes to show that if Arnold's nature poems are read patiently, there would 
be no difficulty in seeing what he is about: (1) he is attempting to clear 
away the anthropomorphic tendencies of thought that had filtered down from 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as well as (2) the mystical 
glorification of nature in the early nineteenth-century poets and, (3) 
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to recommend a modern concept of animism. 
I 
Arnold, in his interpretation of the phenomenon of alienation, locates 
its roots to the seventeenth-century: Man "entered the prison of puritanism 
and had the key turned upon its spirit there for two hundred years" ("Equalityll, 
CPW, VIII, p. 294). One, then, wonders what happened to man's attitude to 
nature. This is necessary, for to know the "what" of things one should know 
the "why" too. It has been shown, in the introduction to this part of the 
thesis, that behind the shift and drift of the concepts of God there is a 
correspondent shift and drift in the meanings of the term, nature - that is 
to say if God is conceived as a Transcendent Other Nature would appear as 
indifferent and make men feel lost in the empty spaces of the vast universe. 
Man will see his life on Earth as a short time spent in a physical world with 
inscrutable void on the other side. A life without inherent meaning or 
purpose. 
The sixteenth century bequeathed to the seventeenth century the 
concept of God as both Transcendent Othe~ and Immanent. But in the 
first half of the sixteenth century man felt himself to be part of the 
grand system of Nature in a real sense. Both his body and his mind were 
included. His attitude to nature would not therefore be that of observant 
analyst: Each creature, under God, was a self-maintaining intelligence 
observing its rightful place in a community. But this animis~ or hylozoism 
was a recessive factor. There was a tendency running counter to this, for 
in the early Renaissance cosmologies there was a tendency to separate the 
two: God and Nature. 
The idea of Nature as an organism was grad~a.lly giving way to the idea 
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of nature as a machine. The change from the organic to the mechanical 
view was chiefly the work of Copernicus. To this effect R.G. Collingwood 
writes: 
The Renaissance view of nature began to take shape as 
antitheticalto the Greek view in the work of Copernicus 
(1473-15~3), Telesio (1508-88), and Bruno (1548-1600). The 
central point of this antithesis was the denial that the 
world of nature, the world studied by physical science, 
is an organism, and the assertion that it is devoid both of 
intelligence and of life. It is therefore incapable of 
ordering its own movements in a rational manner, and indeed 
incapable of moving itself at all. The movements which it 
exhibits, and which the physicist investigates, are imposed 
upon it from without, and their regularity is due to 'laws 
of nature' likewise imposed from without. Instead of being 
an organism, the natural world is a machine: a machine in 
the literal and proper sense of the word, an arrangement of 
bodily parts designed and put together and set going for a 
definite purpose by an intelligent mind outside itself. The 
Renaissance thinkers, like the Greeks, saw in the orderliness 
of the natural world an expression of intelligence: but for 
the Greeks this intelligence was nature's own intelligence, for 
the Renaissance thinkers it was the intelligence of something 
other than nature: the divine creator and ruler of nature. 5 
The shift, in the concept of Nature, between the sixteenth-century and 
the seventeenth-century resembles that shift which took place in the history 
of Greek philosophy by the time of Socr~tes (479-399): From a general 
knowledge of pre-Socratic physics one could see that Greek thinkers take it 
for granted that mind belongs essentially to body and lives with it in 
the closest union. Socrates reversed this and concentrated his thought on 
ethics and logic; and from his time onwards, although the theory of Nature 
was by no means forgotten even by Plato, the theory of mind predominated, 
and the theory of Nature took the second place. At the end of the sixteenth-
century the very same movement was enacted: for Descartes (1596-1650), body 
is one substance and mind is another. Each works independently of the other 
according to its own laws. Just as the fundamental axiom of pre-Socratic 
thought about mind is its immanence in body, so the fundamental axiom of 
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Descartes is its transcendence. 
Poetry as well as other arts accompanied this movement and interpreted 
it. For example, the painting of Nicolas Poussin (Plate 1, about 1630) 
reflects a concept of nature which itself is a reflection to the age's 
concept of God: as both Immanent and Transcendent at the same time. The 
distribution of the figures, the idea that nature is something to be used, 
the authoritative relationship at work, all this could be read in that 
plate. This trend in its extreme could be found in the paintings of 
Jean-Francois Millet (Plate 2, 1855). In contrast to this concept, and as 
an interpreter of the early Renaissance concept of nature, there are the 
paintings of Giorgione (Plate 3, between 1508-1510). From poetry one 
can choose a short extract from The Faerie Queene: 
Then forth issewed (great goddesse) great dame Nature 
With goodly port and gracious Majesty, 
Being far greater and more tall of stature 
Then any of the gods or Powers on hie: 
Yet certes by her face and physnomy, 
Whether she man or woman inly were, 
That could not any creature well descry; 
For with a veil, that wimpled everywhere, 
Her head and face was hid, that mote to none appear. 
That, some do say, was so by skill devized 
To hide the terror of her uncouth hew 
From mortall eyes that should be sore aggrized; 
For that her face did like a Lion shew, 
That eye of wight could not endure to view; 
But others tell that it so beautious was, 
And round about such beames of splendor threw, 
That it the Sunne a thousand times did pass, 
Ne could be seene but like an image in a glass. 
(Bk. VII, viii, 5-6) 
This sort of doubt, as to what nature really was like, pervades the 
whole of King Lear. To this effect John F. Danby writes: "Thus two societies 
must be added to the two Natures and two Reasons. Because the play is an 
allegory of ethical systems and people, it must be also an allegory of 
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Plate (1) Uicolas Poussin (1594-1665), The Four Seasons: Summer 
(Ruth and Boaz) ,painted behTeen 1660-64.Nusee du Louvre. 
Plate (2) Jean-francois Nillet (1814-1875), Les Glaneuses, 18570 
Husee du ~ouvre, Paris. 
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Plate (3) Giorgione (1478-1510) painted between 1509-1510? 
Le concert champetre - ~u§~~. du _LQuyr~ 
~late (4) Edouard Manet (1832-1833) finished by May 1, 1863 
Le dejeuner SUT 1 'herbe - Louvre, M~see d~ l_'l~pressi0!lni~~ 
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community. For according to one of the systems at least we are all members 
one of another. This society is that of the medieval vision. Its 
representative is an old king ('Nature in you stands on the verge of her 
confine'). It is doting and it falls into errors. The other society is 
that of nascent capitalism. Its representative in chief is the New man -
and a politic machiavelli (Op. cit., p. 52). 
Thus, by the beginning of the seventeenth century Man, Nature, and 
God fall apart. The age come to conceive the orderly movements of matter as 
a dead movement: a world of dead matter, infinite in extent and permeated 
by movement throughout, but utterly devoid of ultimate qualitative 
differences and moved by uniform and purely quantitative forces. This is why 
in the seventeenth century there is a huge outbreak of dualism: (a) in 
metaphysics, between body and mind; (b) in cosmology, between nature and 
God; (c) in epistemology, between rationalism and empiriCism. This sort of 
dualism coupled with the sense of the vastness of nature produced two 
attitudes that filtered down to the nineteenth century: Anthropomorphic 
and Mechanistic. 
i 
Anthropomorphic. More generally, reference to man's place in nature, 
for instance to his minuteness, could be used to depreciate the quest for 
"unworldly" glory as a preparation for spiritual discipline. "Who can be 
great.," asked Drummond of Hawthornden, "on so small a Round as this Earth?" 
And Pascal asked: "Q,u'est ~ qu'~ homme dans l'infini?" (What is a man in 
face of infinity?).6 Another point in the same attitude towards nature can 
also be illustrated from sixteenth-and-seventeenth-century arguments about 
the alleged "cosmic .taII~ ·1f nature is inclement and hostile, this is 
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because nature participated in the effects of man's fall into sin. It 
follows that the proper God-intended destiny of man cannot be found in 
this fallen nature; it must be discovered in the revealed word of God. 
Inherent in the anthropomorphic attitude there is the possibility of 
taking nature as norm: where different philosophies tried to find answers to 
questions about the relation of nature to value: Can values be in any 
way derived from descriptions of nature? does nature contain any norms for 
man? can appeals to nature settle moral or aesthetic perplexities? 
Questions like these could give an unwarranted and distorting support to 
the anthropomorphic tendency in the nature of man. On this attitude, 
Arnold says: 
But will anyone say that the proposition, that the course 
of nature implies an operating agent with a will and a 
character, produces or can produce a like sense of satisfying 
conviction, and can in like manner be built upon? It cannot. 
It does not appeal ••• to what is solid. It appeals really, to 
the deep anthropomorphic tendency in man; and this tendency, 
when we examine the thing coolly, we feel that we cannot 
trust. 
("Bishop Butler and the Zeit-Geist", 
CPW, VIII, pp. 52~53) 
Arnold pursued this argument in a number 9f his poems such as "In Harmony 
with Nature", "Religious Isolation", and "Morality". The main idea behind 
these poems is the vital differences between Nature and Man. 
In the sonnet "In Harmony with Nature" (1844-47?), previously called 
"To an Independent Preacher", Arnold, denouncing rhapsodic sentimentalism 
and listing the vital differences between Nature and Man, writes: 
'In harmony with Nature' Restless fool, 
Who with such heat dost preach what were to thee, 
When true, the last impossibility -
To be like Nature strong, like Nature cool! 
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Know, man hath all which Nature hath, but more, 
And in that ~ lie all his hopes of good. 
Nature is cruel, man is sick of blood; 
Nature is stubborn, man would fain adore; 
Nature is fickle, man hath need of rest; 
Nature forgives no debt, and fears no grave; 
Man would be mild, and with safe conscience blest. 
Man must begin, know this, where Nature ends; 
Nature and man can never be fast friends. 
Fool, if thou canst not pass her, rest her slave! 
(Poems, p. 54) 
This poem attracted the attention of the critics because of the 
seeming contradiction to the main lines in Arnold's argument in other 
7 Albert Van Aver, in his comment, says that it expresses contradictory poems. 
attitudes concerning man's relationship to nature. The first quatrain 
suggests the monistic view that conformity to nature is a desirable if 
unattainable goal~ the following two quatrains imply man should surpass 
nature in his quest for spiritual values. This disunity, Aver continues, 
is seen also in the poem's conclusion, for the 12th line reflects the 
attitude of the first quatrain, while the last two lines reflect that of 
the second and third quatrains. And he concludes by saying that Arnold's 
inability to control his point of view indicates ambiguity about spiritual 
and intellectual issues. In my view, Mr Aver has complicated the matter 
by assuming something the sonnet form by its nature cannot contain: the 
sonnet form is too short to allow any room for a poet to manoeuvre with 
one idea much less with two contradictory ideas as Aver suggests. In 
the same vein, W.D. Anderson says "Among the poems of the first volume, 
'In Harmony with Nature' is an anomaly. It seems a direct attack on the 
central idea of Stoic ethiCS, the vita secundum natura or life in 
accordance with nature. For the Stoics, .~tur~ embraces all existence. 
Man cannot be alien to it: he is inseparable from the cosmic whole, the 
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We all of us like to go our own way, and not be forced 
out of the atmosphere of commonplace habitual to most of 
us ••• \.Je like to be suffered to lie comfortably in the old 
straw of our habits, especially of our intellectual habits, 
even though this straw may not be very clean andftne. But 
if the effort to limit this freedom of our lower nature finds, 
as it does and must find, enemies in human nature, it finds 
also auxiliaries in it. Out of the four great parts, says 
Cicero, of the honestum, or good, which forms the matter on 
which officium, or human duty, finds employment, one is the 
fixing of a monadus and an ordo, a measure and an order, to 
fashion and wholesomely constrain our action, in order to 
lift it above the level it keeps it left to itself, and to 
bring it nearer to perfection. Man alone of living creatures, 
he says, goes feeling after 'quid sit ordo, quid sit quod 
deceat, in factis dictisque qui modus - the discovery of an 
order, - a law of good taste, a measure for his words and 
actions.' Other creatures submissively follow the law of 
their nature; man alone has an impulse leading him to set 
up some other law to control the bent of his nature ••• 
This holds good, of course, as to moral matters, as well as 
intellectual matters: and it is of moral matters that we 
are generally thinking when we affirm it. But it holds 
good as to intellectual matters too. 
("The Literary Influence of Academies", 
CPW, III, pp. 235-36) 
And in "Literature and Science", Arnold writes: 
A certain Greek prophetess of Mantineia in Arcadia, 
Diotima by name, once explained to the philosopher Socrates 
that love, and impulse, and bent of all kinds, is, in fact, 
nothing else but the desire in men that good should for 
ever be present to them. This desire for good, Diotima 
assured Socrates, is our fundamental desire, of which 
fundamental desire every impulse in us is only some one 
particular form. 
( CP'vI, X p.6 3 ) 
The same idea, of the sharp distinction between Nature and Man, is 
found in Arnold's sonnet - "Religious Isolation", in which he warns a 
friend (Clough) against the anthropomorphism: the tendency to make 
nature share his thoughts, like a child imagining that 'some incurious 
bystander' has a common interest with him. Arnold urges upon that friend 
instead the Emersonian and traditionally humanistic doctrine of law for 
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This poem shows that Arnold is uncomfortably conscious of the problem 
involved in the position he takes: if, in order to refute those who 
claim that nature has a moral law and try to impose it on others, he 
argues that nature does not have a moral law, he would seem as if he were 
championing a mechanistic view of nature. And if he says that nature has 
a law he would seem as if he were arguing from an anthropomorphic stance. 
This is the paradox involved in the situation. 
The problem is further complicated by the fact that in seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries, a period dominated by religion, the law of nature 
meant a moral law, but in the nineteenth-century, religion, itself, 
seemed to be falling apart; and this law of nature came to be the law 
of evolution and the struggle for survival. On the level of social 
interaction it would generate a competitive and war-like individual. For 
if Darwin had elaborated on the philosophy underlying his biology he would 
have arrived at something like Schopenhauer's conception of the evolutionary 
process as the self-expression of a blind will, a creative and directive 
force utterly devoid of consciousness and of,the moral attributes which 
consciousness bestows on the will of man; "and it is some such ideas which 
we find floating everywhere in the atmosphere of Darwin's contemporaries, 
such as Tennyson" (cf. Maud,In Memorium} (Collingwood, Ope cit., p. 135). 
The whole problem amanates from the fact that the nineteenth-century 
is, like the sixteenth-century, an age of transition. Transition in a 
sense that God or Life-force were conceived both as immanent and transcendent. 
For the theory of evolution implies the philosophical conception of a 
life-force at once immanent and transcendent in relation to each and every 
living organism; immanent as existing only as embodied in these organisms, 
transcendent as seeking to realise itself not merely in the survival of the 
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individual organisms, nor merely in the perpetuation of their specific 
type, but as always able and always trying to find for itself a more 
adequate realisation in a new type. 
Arnold's definition of God betrays such a state for his concept 
is at once immanent and transcendent: "For the total man," he writes, 
"the truer conception of God is as 'the Eternal Power, not ourselves, by 
which all things fulfil the law of their being;' therefore, we fulfil the 
law of our being so far as our being is aesthetic and intellective, as 
well as so far it is moral" (Literature and Dogma, CPW, p. 409). Again, 
Arnold adds that God is "the stream of tendency by which all things fulfil 
the law of their being" (Ibid., p. 42). 
]y this, one comes to the other variety of man's attitude to nature 
in the Deistic concept of God: Mechanistic. 
ii 
Mechanistic. One of the most fascinating things about ideas is the 
phenomenon that the one and the same idea could be the source of diverse 
states of feelings. For instance, the vastness of nature could be taken 
to depreciate man as insignificant creature; it could equally well be taken 
as evidence of man's importance in God's eyes; for on independent theological 
grounds the whole of nature could be seen as primarily a dwelling place of 
man. As Pierre de la PrimaUdaye says " ••• 1 cannot marvel enough at the 
excellence of man, for whom all these things were created and are 
maintained ••• " (Encyclopaedia of Philosophy) 
Most of these arguments with their ingredients are capable of endless 
variations. For instance, if, as the fundamental thought of this teleology 
affirms, the whole order of nature exists only for the benefit of man, the 
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obvious moral application is that man should try all things with a view 
to the use he may derive from them, and act accordingly. This type of 
ethics finds its philosophical expression in the writings of Leibniz 
(1646-1716) whom Voltaire caricatured as Doctor Pangloss in Candide; and in 
the ethical philosophy of Enlightenmento In all these ways of thinking, 
nature is just a source of raw power which man, if he is only clever, can make 
her serve his purposes. This attitude applied to society means man can 
use other men, or one class can use another. Arnold rejected this teleological 
way of thinking, to this effect he writes: 
For a mind like Goethe's - a mind profoundly impartial 
and passionately aspiring after the science, not of men 
only, but of universal nature - the popular philosophy which 
explains all things by reference to man, and regards 
universal nature as existing for the sake of man, and even 
of certain classes of men, was utterly repulsive. Unchecked, 
this philosophy would gladly maintain that the donkey 
exists in order that the invalid Christian may have 
donkey's milk before breakfast; and such views of nature as 
this were exactly what Goethe's whole soul abhorred. 
("Spinoza and the Bible", CPW, 
III, p. 176) -
Arnold pursued this argument in a number of his poems such as "Self-
Dependence" and "A Wish". The main idea behind these poems is that nature 
not only has a separate existence and more ancient than man himself, but it 
also has qualities that man strives after. 
In "Self-Dependence" (1849-50?) the stars are invoked as sublime models, 
serene self-poised agents, undisturbed by the fevers of human egoism and 
discontent. Arnold, in contrasting man with these qualities, presents the 
speaker as weary with the effort to define himself and exposed as the 
victim of a delusion: 
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Weary of myself, and sick of asking 
What I am, and what I ought to be, 
At this vessel's prow I stand, -which bears me 
Forwards, forwards, o'er the starlit sea. 
And a look of passionate desire 
O'er the sea and the stars I send: 
lYe who from my childhood up have calm'd me, 
Calm me, ah, compose me to the end! 
'Ah, once more,' I cried, lye stars, ye water, 
On my heart your mighty charm renew; 
Still, still let me, as I gaze upon you, 
Feel my soul becoming vast like you!' 
(Poems, pp. 142-43) 
The lesson one learns from the poem is that passionate yearning impedes a 
significant relation with nature: Nature, thus, answers man: 
From the intense, clear, star-sown vault of heaven, 
Over the lit sea's unquiet way, 
In the resulting night-air came the answer: 
'Wouldst thou ~ as these are? Live as they. 
'Unaffrighted by the silence round them, 
Undistracted by the sights they see, 
These demand not that the things without them 
Yield them love, amusement, sympathy. 
'And with joy the stars perform their shining, 
And the sea its long moon-silvered roll; 
For self-poised they live, nor pine with noting 
All the fever of some differing soul. 
'Bound by themselves, and unregardful 
In what state God's other works may be, 
In their own tasks all their powers pouring, 
These attain the mighty life you see.' 
(Ibid., p. 143 ) 
In "A Wish" (1865), the very idea, that nature has a separate 
existence, recurs again: 
The world which was ere I was born, 
The world which lasts when I am dead; 
Which never was the friend of ~, 
Nor promised love it could not give, 
But lit for all its generous sun, 
And lived itself, and made us live. 
(Poems, p. 517) 
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To sum up. Deistic thinking itself is made in the structural 
image of social patriarchy "Then it regards the brain as the master, 
the nerves as the telegraph 'wires, and the organs as obedient 
executive subjects. At this point the mechanist l'TQulQ:stop and 
the an t:b...ropomorphis t vTould pick the argument up to say tl:1..a t behind 
the brain there is God, or reason, or purpose. 
II 
In the recoil fron a theory 1ilhich, by exaggerating it, becomes 
viytually dualistic, the tendency arises to a theory TIThich SYTamps the 
finite (man) in the infinite (God or Nature): In other "l'Tords, Pantheism. 
To see the difference in attitude be hreen Transcendence and Immanence, 
one takes hlO quotations from Alexander Pope and \'lordSl'lOrth r?spectively: 
Nature to all things fixed the limits fit 
And ,'Tisely curbed proud man's pretending I'Ti to 
(Lines, 52-53) 
o •• 
First follow nature, and your judgement frame 
By her just standard, l'ihich is still the same. 
~'Essay In Critic ism II , Lines 68-69) 
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the ,a05 version of 
And to quote from/llordSl'lOrth' s Prelude 
"I'llio through that bodily image hath diffused 
A soul divine i'lhich "l'le participate, 
A deathless spirit. 
(v, 15-17) 
"To follo"l'T", or lito imitate", and lito share", or lito participate". ~fith 
regard to the first, if one says that a thing folloT:Ts or imitates a..YJ. 
ideal or, to use the Platonic idea, a form, one implies that the form 
is not in the thing but outside it: And to say that a thing participates 
in a form, or shares in it, is to use a legal metaphor to imply a 
joint oHnership. In other 1iTOrds, 'participation' implies i!fu':lanence 
uhile 'imitation' implies transcendence. 
This difference of attitude tOi'lards nature shOl'led itself in 
the pre-romantic period, but by the last quarter of the eighteenth-century 
and the first one of the nineteenth-century, there emerged a strong 
pantheistic concept of nature "whose chief characteristics are: the 
feeling that there is a hidden meaning and significance lying behind 
external phenomena: the feeling of an underlying love upholding and 
permeating everything: and the unity of the knOTtIer and the kno"l'm: and, 
through it all, a feeling of intense joy, sureness, and serenity. 
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But the fact remains that in pantheism there are different varieties, 
and hlO poets could be seen as pantheists but this does not mean that 
they are the same. For pantheism, like deism, resolves itself into 
two main a tti tudes: lliysticism and Animism. 
i 
Pantheistic mysticism o The chief characteristics of this attitude 
are: 
(1) It has the quality of ineffability, that is, it defies expression 
in terms 'IThich are fully intelligible to one ,'Tho has not kno;!Jl some 
analogous experience. It thus resembles a state of feeling rather than 
a state of intellect. To this effect one can quote at random from 
·,iords1iTorth. For instance he says: 
Again he says: 
Possessions have I that are solely mine, 
Something vTithin vThieh yet is shared by none 
I had a ,wrld about me; I twas my ovm, 
I made it; for it only livId to me, 
And to the God who lookld into my mind. 
... 
(2) vihile mystical states are akin to states of feeling, they are also 
states of knmvledge: they have a noetic quality. Thus, Wordsw'orth, 
a t the end of "Home at Grasmere", announces, ~~e1~~,IJI.}~ his 
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discovery that he has been chosen to be a poet-prophet for his age. 
He has been granted 'an internal brightness' that is 'shared by none' 
and that compels him, 'divinely taught', to speak 'of l'1hat in man is 
huma.'1. or divine'. 
"I would impart it, I 'would spread it ,'Tide, 
Immortal in the iwrld ,lhich is to come." 
(3) r;Iystical states can seldom be sustained for long; they rarely 
last for any length of time o They have thus the Quality of transiency: 
there is invariably a speedy return to normality. And .. ,hen the mystical 
states occur, they invariably carry "\'Tith them a feeling of something 
given. They have the quality of passivity. The I:'lyst ic feels as if his 
mm ~'fill ,,,ere in abeyance, as if he ','1e::::e grasped and held by a pmier 
not his mill. Arnold, in fact, sees TliordSi"TOrth in these terms: for to 
him 'dordSlwrth' s superiority, 
is in the pOITer I'Ti th 1ilhich 'tlordSlwrth feels the 
resources of joy offered to us in nature, offered 
to us in the primary human affections and duties, 
and the pO'iTer vTi th vrhich, in his moments of 
inspiration, he renders this joy and makes us, too, 
feel it; a force greater than himself seeming to 
lift him and to prompt his tongue, so that he speaks 
in a style far above any style of Hhich he has the 
constar'~t command, and ,'Ii th a truth far beyond any 
philosophic truth of u,lich he has the conscious and 
asstITed possession o 
("Byron l1 , CPU, IX, pp. 230-31) 
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(4) A common characteristic of all mystical states is the presence of a 
consciousness of the Oneness of everything. All creaturely existence is 
exper ienced as a unity, as All in One and One in All. "In theistic 
mysticism," says F.e. Rappold, "God is felt to be in everything and 
everything to exist in God. ,,8 Bound up 1,'li th this sense of oneness, 
there is the conviction that the familiar phenomenal ~ is not the real 
1. "The soul is in itself regarded as numinous and hidden. The uncreated 
soul or spirit strives to enter not into communion with Nature or vri th 
God but into a state of complete isolation from everything that is 
other than itself 0 The chief object of man is the quest of his Olm 
self and of right knol'Tledge about it" (Ibid., p. 44). 
It has been rightly observed tl1..a.t "on the recurrent level of narration 
in which mind and nature must suffice to generate the plot of '1:he Prelud~ , 
a heavy requisition is placed on nature, but a still heavier one is placed 
on mind, vThich in I'Tords'l'Torth, as in the German Idealists, is the prior 
and preeminent pOI'Ter!' 9. To this effect Wordsworth writs: 
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when we look 
Into our Ninds, into the Mind of Han 
Ny haunt, and the main re gion of my song. 
Thus \'lordsvlorth, in fact, proceeds to a coda ''lhich is a gloria in 
excelsis not to nature but to the mind of man: for he will 
Instruct them how the mind of man becomes 
A. thousand times more beautiful than the earth 
On which he di'Tells, above this Frame of things 
Of substance and of fabric more divine o 
(XIII, 431-51) 
This situation ,'[ould produce a state at which individual souls, to 
use Plotinu8' ,'Tords, become 
partial 2J.'1d self-centred; i.YJ. a ,'leary desire of 
standing apart they find their way, each to a 
place of its very ovm. This state long maintained, 
the Soul is a deserter from the A.ll; its differen-
tiation has severed it; its vision is no longer 
set in the Intellectual; it is a partial thing, 
isolated, i'Teakened, full of care, i.YJ.tent upon the 
frs.gment; severed from the I'Thole 0.0 it nestles in 
one form of being; for this, it abandons all else, 
entering into and caring for only the one, for a 
thing buffeted about by a ~[Qrldful of things .••• 
It has fallen. ( Quoted by M.H.Abrams, Natural 
Supernaturalism, OPe cit., p.148) 
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This complex of ideas, especially of the inadequacy of Wordsworth's 
concept of nature, enters into a series of poems written around 1849-50. 
Among them is his poem "stanzas In Memory of the Author of 'Obermann'" 
(1849) in which he says: 
But Wordsworth's eyes avert their ken 
From half of human fate. 
(Poems, p. 132) 
For Arnold, Wordsworth's 'sweet calm' was insecurely founded, as he says 
in his lecture on Heine (1863): Wordsworth 'plunged himself in the inward 
life, he voluntarily cut himself off from the modern spirit'. However, 
this sweet calm of solitude might appeal to the poet: 
Ah! two desires toss about 
The poet's feverish blood. 
One drives him to the world without, 
And one to solitude. 
(Poems, p. 134) 
But for the committed poet there is no choice: 
I go, fate drives me; but I leave 
Half of my life with you. 
We, in some unknown Power's employ, 
Move on a rigorous line; 
Can neither, when we will, enjoy, 
Nor, when we will, resign. 
I in the world must live. 
(Ibid., p. 135-36) 
These Powers, in the context of Arnold's thinking, are synonymous with the 
Time-spirit; 
But we, brought forth and reared in hours 
Of change, alarm, surprise -
What shelter to grow ripe is ours? 
wbat leisure to grow wise? 
Like children bathing on the shore, 
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Euried a wave beneath, 
The second wave succeeds, before 
We have had time to breathe. 
Too fast we live, too much are tried, 
Too harassed, to attain 
Wordsworth's sweet calm. 
(Ibid., p. 133) 
"stanzas in Memory of the Author of 'Obermann'" has always been 
contrasted with Arnold's later poem "Obermann Once More" to show two 
contradictory stances of Arnold: alienation versus commitment respectively. 
The poem,_as one sees it, shows Arnold to be aware of his responsibilities 
as a poet: 
I go, fate drives me ••• 
I in the world must live. 
The poem does not show as well any inconsistency in Arnold's interpretation 
of his own situation for lines 69-79 are remarkably similar to lines 143-
146 in "The Scholar Gipsy": 
'Tis that from change to change their being rolls; 
'Tis that repeated shocks, again, again, 
Exhaust the energy of strongest souls 
And numb the elastic powers. 
(Poems, p. 339) 
In "Memorial Verses", the elegy of April 1850, Arnold, 'combining 
elegy and literary criticism', praises Wordsworth: 
And Wordsworth! - Ah, pale ghosts, rejoicel 
For never has such soothing voice 
Eeen to your shadowy world conveyed, 
Since erst, at morn, some wandering shade 
Heard the clear song of Orpheus come 
Through Hades, and the mournful gloom. 
Wordsworth has gone from us - and ye, 
Ah, may ye feel his voice as we! 
He too upon a wintry clime 
Had fallen - on this iron time 
Of doubts, disputes, distractions, fears. 
He found us when the age had bound 
Our souls in its benumbing round; 
He spoke, and loosed our heart in tears. 
He laid us as we lay at birth 
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On the cool flowery lap of earth, 
Smiles broke from us and we had ease; 
The hills were round us, and the breeze 
Went o'er the sun-lit fields again; 
Our foreheads felt the wind and rain. 
Our youth returned; for there was shed 
On spirits that had long been dead, 
Spirits dried up and closely furled, 
The freshness of the early world. 
(Poems, pp. 228-29) 
But now, ••• "few or none / Hears thy voice right, now he is gone." 
The abruptness of this statement is somewhat surprising because other 
poets have died and yet the values which they preached have remained. On 
this point, Culler writes: "This, indeed, is the crux of the elegiac 
form. The elegy especially in its pastoral version, has many conventions 
but non~so necessary to its structure as that whereby the poet, 
towards the end of his lament, suddenly discovers that the person whom he 
is mourning is not dead but in some sense lives on ••• Arnold with his 
classical education understands this, and in 'Memorial Verses' he is 
writing an elegy. But there is no reversal in that poem. Wordsworth is 
dead and he will not return - a finalism which is the more glaring because 
in the case of Goethe and Byron, who are associated with Wordsworth in the 
poem, there is a possibility of their return. 
"'Time may restore us in his course 
Goethe's sage mind and Byron's force; 
But where will Europe's latter hour 
Again find Wordsworth's healing power' ? 
"'Memorial Verses' is the only one of Arnold's elegies in which there is 
no reversal. All the others are marked by a sharp break, a kind of lyric 
peripeteia, in which the poet's attitude towards his subject is dramatically 
changed. But Arnold puts this break to a very different use from that 
found in conventional elegy. For whereas normally the elegy asserts that 
what has been lost here on earth will be recovered in another sphere, Arnold 
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asserts that what has been lost here on earth will be replaced - also 
on earth - by something different ••• It is purely naturalistic in its 
assumptions, and it is related to his philosphy of history" (Imaginative 
Reason, pp. 234-45). 
What I have been trying to show is that it is unfair to criticise 
Arnold from the point of view of Romantic poetry, for it is not Romantic 
poetry that Arnold is attempting to write. To ask Arnold to write poetry 
like that of Wordsworth is like asking Edouard Manet (Plate 4) to paint 
like Giorgione (Plate 3): For though their attitude to nature is the 
same, - pantheistic, Manet's works would not have been conceived without 
his knowledge of the latest findings in the scientific field of light in 
his own time. Now, since one knows why Arnold departed from the Romantic 
tradition, it is one's duty to find out what it is that Arnold is attempting 
to do. This brings the argument to the second variety of pantheism: 
Animism or Functionalism. 
ii 
The Animism or Functionalism that one has in mind as well as Arnold is 
similar to that found in early Greek mythology and pre-Socratic philosophers. 
For the early Greeks, and with some qualification for all Greeks whatever, 
nature was a vast living organism, consisting of a material body spreading 
out in space and permeated by movements in time; the whole body was 
endowed with life, so that all its movements were vital movements, and 
all these movements were purposive, directed by intellect. This living and 
thinking body was homogeneous throughout in the sense that it was all alive, 
all endowed with soul and with reason; it was non-homogeneous in the sense 
that different parts of it were made of different substances each having 
- 296 -
its own specialised qualitative nature and mode of acting. The problems 
which so profoundly exercise modern thought, the problems of the relation 
between dead matter and living matter, and the problems of the relation 
between matter and mind, did not exist. There was no dead matter, for no 
difference of principle was recognised between seasonal rotation of the 
heaven and the seasonal growth and fall of leaves on a tree, or between 
the movement of a planet in the sky and the movement of a fish in the 
water; it was never for a moment suggested that the one could be accounted 
for by a kind of law which did not even begin to account for the other. 
And there was no problem of the relation between matter and mind, for no 
difference was recognised between the way in which an Athenian conceives 
and obeys the laws of Solon, or a Spartan the laws of Lycurgus, and the 
way in which inanimate objects conceive and obey those laws of nature to 
which they are subject. There was no material world devoid of mind, and 
no mental world devoid of materiality. 
Thales, for example, conceived the world of nature as an organism, 
in fact, as an animal. Anaximander believed in a plurality of worlds; he 
appears to have called each of them a god. Anaximenes, following 
Anaximander, believed in an immanent God identical with the world-
creative process itself. It is even suggested that the conception of form 
as immanent was the original conception (the original Pythagorean conception 
in the case of mathematical forms and the world of nature, and the original 
Socratic conception, in the case of ethical forms and the world of human 
conduct). This seems likely on general grounds; for it would appear natural 
that when people first think about form and its relation to matter, they 
should begin by thinking of it as correlative to matter and as existing 
only in thin~which have a material element as well. And it may have been 
Plato who first abandoned this original conception and first propounded the 
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conception of form as transcendent. 
This immanence lent dignity to the natural world itself. From that 
early time in the history of man it led people to think of nature as self-
creative and in that sense divine, and therefore induced them to look at 
natural phenomena with a respectful, attentive, and observant eye; 
that is to say, it led to a habit of detailed and accurate observation, 
based on the postulate that everything in nature, however minute and 
apparently accidental, is permeated by rationality and therefore significant 
and valuable. In that state of Nature: 
"Pride then was not, nor arts that pride to aid; 10 
Man walked with beast, joint tenant of the shade." 
In other words there was a sort of spontaneous relationship between man 
and nature, a relationship that connects the individual with the world 
without eliminating his individuality. A kind of relationship whose 
foremost expressions are love and productive work. 
One understands the difficulty in convincing a scientifically oriented 
age of an argument like this. But if one presses deeper to the type of 
logic that runs through this argument one will see how reasonable it is. 
The Greeks, though they did not say so explicitly, evidently considered 
the power of movement a sign of life. To common-sense observation it 
seems that animals move themselves, while dead matter only moves when 
impelled by an external force. The soul of an animal, in Aristotle, has 
various functions, and one of them is to move the animal's body. The world 
of nature is thus, for the Greeks, a world of self-moving things. It is a 
living world: a world characterised not by inertia, like the world of 
seventeenth-century matter, but by spontaneous movements. This gave rise 
to another idea: nature as such is a proces~ growth, change. This process 
is a development - the changing takes successive forms a, b, y, ••• in which 
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each is the potentiality of its successor; "but", says Collingwood, "it 
is not what we call 'evolution', because for Aristotle the kinds of 
change and of structure exhibited in the world of nature form an eternal 
repertory, and the items in the repertory are related logically, not 
temporally, among themselves. It follows that the change is in the last 
resort cyclical" (Op. cit., p. 82). 
All this was permeated with the concept that the essence of life is 
to function. The etymology of the word nature is derived from, says Lovejoy, 
"'to beget, produce, give birth to' or more probably from the passive ••• 
'to be born or produced, or to come into being'; and its original 
meaning, which it had already largely lost in Classical Greek, was doubtless 
simply 'birth' or 'origin "' (Op. cit., p. 103). In other words, early man 
animated nature according to his own sensations; he animated them, but did 
not mysticise them, as did his successor several hundred years later. 
Mysticism here means, to use Reich's words, "a change of sensory impressions 
and organ sensations into something unreal and beyond this world lt • ll Or to 
use Arnold's words in his essay "Dante and Beatrice": to perceive the 
world supersensually and to reduce to nothing the sensible and human element. 
The Greek view of nature as an intelligent organism, then, was based on 
an analogy between the world of nature and the individual human being, who 
begins by finding certain characteristics in himself as an individual. By 
the work of his own sub-consciousness he comes to think of himself as a 
body whose parts are in constant rhythmic motion, these motions being 
delicately adjusted to each other so as to preserve the vitality of the 
whole. What has been said so far about animism is, in fact, an explanation 
of what Arnold himself thinks. For as he puts it: 
When we have noticed similar phenomena to man in provinces of the 
natural and spiritual world, we gladly place the two operations 
in juxtaposition; as to do so not only gives a livelier sense of 
the inward operation and graves it clearer in the memory; but also 
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awakens in us a pleasurable feeling of affinity and correspondence 
between ourselves and nature (illegible word) we never cease to 
apprehend the existence. 
(Quoted by .G. R.~Stange, Yale Ms., 
Ope cit., pp. 114-115). 
Man, then, can learn to understand and love nature inside and outside 
himself only if he thinks and acts the way nature functions, namely, 
functionally and not mechanically or mystically. From this functionalism 
one can deduce a complex of ideas in ethics, politics, aesthetic etc., 
for in functionalism, there is no higher centre and no lowex executive 
organ. "The nerve cells do not produce the impulses; they merely communicate 
them. The organism as a whole forms a natural cooperative of equivalent 
organs with different functions. If natural work democracy is biologically 
founded, we find it modelled after the harmonious cooperation among the 
organs. Multiplicity and variety are fused into unity. Function itself 
regulates cooperation" (W. Reich, Ope cit., p. 314). 
\Vhen in the seventeenth century the centre of gravity in philosophical 
thought swung over from the theory of nature to the theory of mind, the 
problem of nature stated itself in this form: how can mind have any 
connection with something utterly alien to itself, something essentially 
mechanical and non-mental, namely nature? This was the only question, at 
bottom, that the eighteenth-century bequeathed unsolved to the nineteenth-
century. It was the only question, concerning nature, that exercised the 
great philosophers of mind: Berkeley, Hume, Kant, and Hegel. "In every 
case their answer was at bottom the same: namely, that mind makes nature; 
nature is, so to speak, a by-product of the autonomous and self-existing 
activity of mind" (Collingwood, Ope cit., p. 7). Romantic poets follovled 
that line of thinking. Thus Wordsworth, follovling the instance of 
Coleridge's "Frost'at Midnight", says: 
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This efficacious spirit chiefly lurks 
Among those passages of life that give 
Profoundest knowledge to what point and how 
The mind is lord and master, outward sense 
The obedient servant of her will. 
(Bk. xiii) 
Arnold, contrary to what Johnson said,12 rejects, as Allan Brick has 
rightly observed, "the assertion that the 'outer world' (both as physical 
and as conceptual phenomena) exists only in relation to a transcendental 
power which focuses through a perceiving ego ••• He does not imagine, for 
example, that the appearance of the woods, hills, and animals in his poem(s) 
depends upon the perceiving consciousness of the hero ••• For Arnold the 
discovery of reality is the discov.ery of self vis.~.vis the outer world".13 
Arnold, in fact, has been trying to solve this problem of discovering 
some intrinsic connexion between nature and mind: some connexion which 
would preserve the special character of each, and yet make them genuinely 
and intelligibly parts of the same world. Two pitfalls, Arnold was aware 
of, had to be avoided: first, their essential difference and indeed 
opposition must not be denied - mind must not be reduced to a special kind 
of matter, matter must not be reduced to a special form of mind; secondly, 
while this difference and opposition are still asserted, they must not be ~o 
asserted as to deny an essential unity connecting the two. 
The fullest statement of this attempt could be found in two of Arnold's 
poems which, like so many of his poems about nature, are an explicit 
reconsideration of the Romantic doctrine of nature: "The youth of Nature" 
and "The Youth of Man". 
In "The Youth of Nature", the poet is rowing on a lake near' 
where Wordsworth lies dead, and musingly debates the relation between mind 
and nature. He begins by mourning the death of Wordsworth, who "lent a new 
life to these hills". He then goes on to ask the Berkeleyan question as to 
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whether nature lives itself or in the eye of the beholder: 
For, oh! is it you, is it you, 
Moonlight, and shadow, and lake, 
And mountains, that fill us with joy, 
Or the poet who sings you so well? 
Is it you, 0 beauty, 0 grace, 
o charm, 0 romance, that we feel, 
Or the voice which reveals what you are? 
Are ye, like daylight and sun, 
Shared and rejoiced in by all? 
Or are ye immersed in the mass 
Of matter, and hard to extract, 
Or sunk at the core of the world 
Too deep for the most to discern? 
Like stars in the deep of the sky, 
Which arise on the glass of the sage, 
But are lost when their watcher is gone. 
(Poems, p. 248) 
Then Nature intervenes and answers the young poet: 
'Loveliness, magic, and grace, 
They are here! they are set in the world, 
They abide; and the finest of souls 
Hath not been thrilled by them all, 
Nor the dullest been dead to them quite. 
The poet who sings them may die, 
But they are immortal and live, 
For they are the life of the world, 
Will ye not learn it, and know, 
When ye mourn that a poet is dead, 
That the singer was less than his themes, 
Life, and emotion, and I?' 
The argument in these lines clearly rejects the Romantic notion of the 
projective apprehension of nature: Arnold cannot say with Coleridge: 
"Ours is her wedding garment, ours her shroud". 
Nature goes on, in her address to the speaker, to indicate that 
man does not know himself so as to know accurately what lies outside 
himself: 
'More than the singer are these. 
Weak is the tremor of pain 
That thrills in his mournfullest chord 
To that which once ran through his soul. 
Cold the elation of joy 
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In his gladdest, airiest song 
To that which of old in his youth 
Filled him and made him divine. 
Hardly his voice at its best 
Gives us a sense of the awe, 
The vastness, the grandeur, the gloom 
Of the unlit gulf of himself. 
tYe know not yourselves; and your bards -
The clearest, the best, who have read 
Most in themselves - have beheld 
Less than they left unrevealed. 
'Ye express not yourselves; can you make 
With marble, with colour, with word, 
What charmed you in others re-live? 
Can thy pencil, 0 artist! restore 
The figure, the bloom of thy love, 
As she was in her morning of spring? 
Canst thou paint the ineffable smile 
Of her eyes as they rested on thine? 
Can the image of life have the glow, 
The motion of life itself?' 
The poem· provides a very subtle movement for it begins by praising 
Wordsworth, but as the poem progresses it gradually changes its tone into 
a questioning of Wordsworth's power to read the secret of nature who ends 
her discourse with the assurance that while, 
'Race after race, man after man, 
Have thought that my secret was theirs, 
Have dreamed that I lived but for them, 
That they were my glory and joy. 
They are dust, they are changed, they are gone! 
I remain.' 
So Nature's voice assures that the external world outlasts man and dominates 
him. This very theme is pursued in the "Youth of Man". 
"The Youth of Man", the companion-piece to "The Youth of Nature", deals 
with the individual's developing consciousness of the external world: The 
action, as is often the case with Arnold,· - partly dramatic and partly 
lyrical, takes place within the mind of the speaker and moves towards 
a moment of denouement in a form of revelation. In other words, the poem 
is an extended lyric of description and meditation in which the poet 
confronts a particular scene at a significant stage of his life, in a 
colloquy that specifies the present and evokes the past, and thereby 
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defines and evaluates what it means to have suffered and to grow older. 
The poem represents the poet as standing with an aged couple who, years 
before, had declared: 
'We are young and the world is ours: 
Man, man is the king of the world! 
Fools that these mystics are 
Who prate of l~ature! for she 
Hath neither beauty, nor warmth, 
Nor life, nor emotion, nor power. 
But man has a thousand gifts, 
And the generous dreamer invests 
The senseless world with them all. 
Nature is nothing; her charm 
Lives in our eyes which can paint, 
Lives in our hearts which can feel.' 
(Poems, pp. 251-252) 
These lines show that the poem is part of an argument with the Romantics, 
especially with their theory of knowledge and doctrine of Nature, for it is 
evident that these lines recall Coleridge's "Dejection" lines 47-54: 
o Lady! we receive but what we give, 
And in our life alone does Nature live: 
Ours is her wedding garment, ours her shroud! 
And would we ought behold, of higher worth, 
Than that in~~imate cold world allowed, 
To the poor loveless ever-anxious crowd 
Ah! from the soul itself must issue forth 
A light, a glory, a fair luminous cloud ••• 
But now, old and infirm, their eye is dim, and so come to know the 
lesson: 
We, 0 Nature, depart, 
Thou survivest us! this, 
This I know, is the law. 
Yes! but more than this, 
Thou who seest us die 
Seest us change while we live; 
Seest our dreams, one by one, 
Seest our errors depart; 
Watchest us, Nature! throughout, 
Mild and inscrutably calm. 
Well for us that we change! 
Well for us that the power 
Which in our morning-prime 
Saw the mistakes of our youth, 
Sweet, and forgiving, and good, 
Sees the contrition of age! 
(Poems, p. 251) 
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And in a moment of poignant revelation, 
••• ••• the mist of delusion, 
And the scales of habit, 
Fall away from their eyes; 
And they see, for a moment, 
Stretching out, like the desert 
In its weary, unprofitable length, 
The~faded, ignoble lives. 
(Ibid., p. 254) 
The poem ends, as W.S. Johnson has observed, with an echo of "Solomon's 
injunction, 'Remember now thy Creator in the days of thy youth'" (The Voices 
of Matthe\-T Arnold, Ope cit., pp. 30-31). 
? . 
While the locks are yet brown on thy head, 
While the soul still looks through thine eyes, 
While the heart still pours 
The mantling blood to thy cheek, 
Sink, 0 youth, in thy soul! . 
Yearn to the greatness of l~ature; 
Rally the good in the depths of thyself! 
The poem, being written while Arnold could not have reached his thirties, 
is marred by overexplicitness of statement, but the moral question it 
explores is a subtle one. The man and woman when young were involved in a 
self-delusion not unlike the kind of delusion Arnold warned against in 
"In Utrumque Paratus", to which the rest of this chapter is devoted. 
III 
"In Utrumque Paratus", opens a question of insistent importance for 
modern criticism: the relation of literature to ideas. Critics are divided 
on this question: Some deny that there is any idea in literature, some 
others argue that the idea is the work of art itself. One has shown, in 
the chapter on the poetic process, that Arnold's poetic process begins with 
the idea. For him literature is the mode of expression in which thought and 
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feeling are intimately united. This stance is adopted, in contemporary 
criticism, by many critics. Among them is L. Trilling who writes: 
The most elementary thing to observe is that literature is of 
its nature involved with ideas because it deals with man in 
society, which is to say that it deals with formulations, 
valuations, and decisions, some of them implicit, others 
explicit. 
(Liberal Imagination, p. 281) 
The question that poses itself in these circumstances is: What sort of 
ideas is literature concerned with? Are they scientific, religious, or 
philosophic? This is the question one would like to answer in connection with 
Arnold's poem "In utrumque Paratus". 
i 
To go back to Aristotle's definition of poetry, for it is the one 
that Arnold accepts: 
Tragedy is an imitation, not of men, but of an action and of 
life, and life consists in action, and its end is a mode 
of action, not a quality. Now character determines men's 
qualities, but it is by their actions that they are happy 
or the reverse. Dramatic action, therefore, is not with a 
view to the representation of character: character comes 
in as subsidiary to the actions. 
(CPW, I, p. 219n) 
Suppose, then, that one sets out from the observation that a poem is 
about a person who undoubtedly has ideas that represent his role as an 
agent among other agents. Ideas, by the rule of their being, are aspects 
of social action, competing and cooperating in a community of other ideas, 
among variegated groups of interests and men. What is necessary here is to 
recognise that in the field of meaning ideas can be principles of action too. 
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Conversely, man's action can have the force of ideas, implying a view 
of what man really is, and what kind of a world surrounds him. What one 
wants to show is that ideas, action, and literature are part and parcel of 
undifferentiated whole, and that the sort of ideas that a writer is concerned 
with are ethical. To this effect Arnold says: 
It is important, therefore, to hold to this: that poetry is 
at bottom a criticism of life; that the greatness of a poet 
lies in his powerful and beautiful application of ideas to 
life - to the question; How to live? (And again he says) ••• 
The question, 'how to live', is itself a moral idea; and it 
is the question which most interests everyman, and with which, 
in some way or other, he is perpetually occupied. A large 
sense is of course to be given to the term moral. Whatever 
bears upon the question how to live, comes under it. 
(QPW, IX, p. 45) 
The very sort of ideas occur in many writers among whom is Dante. He 
writes, in a letter to Can Grande, that his work is allegorical; its 
purpose "is to remove those living in this life" from misery to happiness; 
and its genus is ethical, "for the whole and the part are devised not for 
the sake of speCUlation but of possible actionll • 14 
Having established the gensis of ideas in literature as ethical, one 
now is in a better position to interpret Arnold's poem "In utrumque Paratus". 
The poem includes two philosophical ideas - Idealism and Materialism, that 
are the basis of conflict between religion and science respectively. Arnold, 
by an adroit control of tone and a disinterested manner of treatment, 
discusses these two doctrines not for their own sake but for their ethical 
implications for man. Yet, he chooses to leave the choice with the reader. 
jof 
Because the poem is elliptical in structure, it is thought~by many 
critics as obscure; and because it is obscure it has been unpopular, and 
jan 
inadequately interpreted. For instance, Charl~s Kingsley, in unsigned 
review, writes: "What, again, on earth do we want with a piece of obscure 
transcendentalism headed, 'In utrumque Paratus' (prepared for either 
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eventuality); the moral, or we should rather say immortality, of which 
seems to be that, if there is a God, the author knows how to get on, and 
knows equally well how to get on if there is none? We should like to see 
his secret, for he has not very clearly revealed it: merely, of course, 
as a matter of curiosity - we have not quite sufficient faith in it to steal 
it for our own use, for though such an alternative is 'a one to him', it is 
by no means a one to his humble reviewer, or, as we aspire, to various 
poor, hardworked bodies who take a somewhat deeper interest in heaven and 
earth than this new Phoebus Apragmon seems to do".15 All other critics 
have come to the same conclusion, namely, that the poem shows a certain 
confusion in Arnold'3 attitudes. 
The poem presents a fairly distinct either / or: First, a Neo-Platonic 
idealism that isolates man from the physical world, and makes him the 
spiritual king by virtue of his consciousness: 
If, in the silent mind. of One all-pure, 
At first imagined lay 
The sacred word; and by procession sure 
From those still deeps, in form and colour dressed, 
Seasons alternating, and night and day, 
The long-mused thought to north, south, east and west. 
Took then its all-seen way; 
o waking on a world which thus-wise springs! 
Whether it needs thee count 
Betwixt thy waking and the birth of things 
Ages or hours - 0 waking on life's stream! 
By lonely pureness to the all-pure fount 
(Only by this thou canst) the coloured dream 
Of life remount! 
Thin, thin the pleasant human noises grow, 
And faint the city gleams; 
Rare the lone pastoral huts - marvel not thou! 
The solemn peaks but to the stars are known, 
But to the stars, and the cold lunar beams; 
Alone the sun rises, and alone 
Spring the great streams. 
(Lines, 1-21) 
In one sense, the first stanza presents the reader with a progression 
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from the pre-natal silence of the One mind "all-pure" to the relative 
refraction of phenomenal existence where things are dressed in colour. 
The rhythm and imagery conduce to the sense of serene and harmonious 
development. By transforming the Platonic ladder to a mountain stream in 
the third stanza, Arnold suggests that man must follow the stream, mounting 
to the pure, high sources of life. 
The second alternative: if the scientific (materialistic) hypothesis 
is correct, then everything, including man, comes by chance from the same 
matter: animate and inanimate are brothers born of the obscure earth. If 
man accepts this scientific view, and here comes the ethical implication 
of this hypothesis, he must avoid the pride of thinking himself uniquely 
intelligent: 
But, if the wild unfathered mass no birth 
In divine seats hath known; 
In the blank, echoing solitude if Earth, 
Rocking her obscure body to and fro, 
Ceases not from all time to heave and groan, 
Unfruitful oft, and at her happiest throe 
Forms, what she forms, alone; 
o seeming sole to awake, thy sun-bathed head 
Piercing the solemn cloud 
Round thy still dreaming brother-world outspread! 
o man, whom Earth, thy long-vexed mother, bare 
Not without joy - so radiant, so endowed 
(Such happy issue crowned her painful care) -
Be not too proud! 
(22-35) 
Here, man is not on a mountain peak with a clear view of things, but 
in a cloud above which he may only seem to rise to the light of understanding. 
The universe, rather than issuing from the divine mind, is the product of the 
fitful and unending labour of nature. Then, man should not be "too proud". 
The concluding stanza expands this point by suggesting that if man is a 
part of this nature and endued with this moral consciousness, he must, in 
this case, not feel exalted over lesser forms of nature, but attempt to 
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understand it. Above all there is some thing in man that makes him yearn 
to be united with it: 
Oh when most self-exalted most alone, 
Chief dreamer, own thy dream! 
Thy brother-world stirs at thy feet unknown, 
Who hath a monarch's hath no brother's part; 
Yet doth thine inmost soul with yearning team. 
- Oh, what a spasm shakes the dreamer's heart! 
'I, too, but seem.' 
(36-42) 
The second line in that stanza is ambiguous for on one level it 
could be taken as questioning the Marxian notion that man should own his 
history. Twenty years later, in the collected Poems of 1869, Arnold 
replaced this stanza with one that shows that he was attempting to reconcile 
these two doctrines: 
Thy native world stirs at thy feet unknown, 
Yet there thy secret lies! 
Out of this stuff, these forces, thou art grown, 
And proud self-severance from them were disease. 
o scan thy native world with pious eyes! 
High as thy life be risen 'tis from these, 
And these, too rise. 
This stanza introduces the conception of a world of matter as "rising" into 
the conscious life of Nan. Arnold, here, seems to adopt the Hegelian idea 
of Nature to effect a reconciliation. This is plausible for in his theory of 
history, he adopted Goethe's idea of spiral movement to affect a 
reconciliation between the cyclical theory of history and the progressive 
one. Arnold, however, in the next edition (1877) returned to the earlier 
ending, and never reprinted this stanza again. 
The poem, in general, is probably Arnold's reaction to Robert Chambers' 
Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation (1844), the most important 
work on evolution published during the quarter of a century before Darwin o 
Arnold, especially after restoring the original final stanza, shows that 
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he does not attempt to solve the mystery of creation, he only exhorts man 
to be in utrumque paratus. And this is a moral question: However life 
originated man can count himself in a sense superior, but this superiority 
brings a sense of isolation. Yet man is less isolated than he thinks 
(see stanzas 3 and 6). 
One has been dealing so far with nature as a source of ideas in 
poetry, but this is not enough, for this in itself neglects another 
important aspect in Arnold's poetic: the affective aspect without which 
poetry would be devoid of emotion. That is why Arnold did not neglect the 
ways of handling nature for poetic ends in his criticism. This is the 
topic with which the remaining pages are concerned. 
ii 
I'iben Arnold speaks of nature he usually has in mind "the material 
world ••• with its commonest elements - sun, air, earth, water, plants" 
(CPW, III, p. 320). According to him there are many ways of handling nature 
so as to apply ideas to it and to generate the appropriate emotional 
response: peace (for the Romantics it is Joy) or melancholy. Of these modes 
of handling nature, Arnold, in his essay "On the Study of Celtic Literature", 
writes: 
These modes are many; I will mention four of them now: 
there is the conventional way of handling nature, there is 
the faithful way of handling nature, there is the Greek way 
of handling nature, there is the magioal way of handling 
nature. In all these three last the eye is on the object, 
but with a difference; in the faithful way of handling nature, 
the eye is on the object, and that is all you can say; in 
the Greek, the eye is on the object, but lightness and 
brightness are added; in the magical, the eye is on the 
object, but charm and magic are added. 
(p. 377) 
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In all these modes, however, the poet's function is rendering 
nature's beauty, and to make man feel it too. For, as Arnold quotes 
George Sand who asks, 'Does not this mysterious intuition of poetic 
beauty exist in him (man] already in the form of instinct of vague reverie?' 
It exists in him in the form of that nostalgia, that homesickness, which 
for ever pursues man if you transplant him. And of the artist attitudes 
to nature one can quote Arnold's words of George Sand who 
regarded nature and beauty, not with the selfish and 
solitary joy of the artist who but seeks to appropriate 
them for his own purposes, she regarded them as a treasure of 
immense and hitherto unknown application, as a vast power 
of healing and delight for all, and for the peasant first 
and foremost. 
("George Sand", CPW, VIII, p. 226) 
These lines seem to be an oblique criticism of the Romantics in general and 
\.fordsworth in particular "Those love of nature is sometimes taken as a 
form of self-glorification that leads to an anti-social habit of mind 
and producing the "egotistical sublime". Hazlitt remarked with bitterness 
that \.fordsworth himself could sympathise only with objects that could enter 
into no sort of competition with him. 
The poet should render nature's beauty if his intention is to 
generate joy: the great lifter of man, the great unfolder. For life to 
be fruitful, life must be felt as a blessing. From the poets who succeeded 
in creating joy one sees that they always spe~~ of nature as eternally 
young, bountiful. That she pours out beauty and poetry for all that live, 
she pours it out on all plants, and the plants are permitted to expand 
in it freely. That she possesses the secret of happiness, and no man has 
been able to take it away from her. And that the happiest man is the one 
who possesses the science of his labour and working with his hands, earning 
his comfort and his freedom by the exercise of his intelligent force, 
found time to live by the heart and by the brain to understand his o"m work 
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and to love the work of God. 
The artist has satisfaction of this kind in the contemplation and 
reproduction of nature's beauty; but when he sees the affliction of those 
who people this paradise of earth, says George Sand whom Arnold quotes, 
the upright and human-hearted artist feels a trouble gives him 'pain. 
Joy and pain, if they are juxtaposed will create a feeling of peace with a 
/more 
pleasing touch of melancholy. When the joyful impulse is powerful than 
the painful one, there is peace; and if the opposite there would be 
melancholy. Arnold's method is simple and clear: contrast. He contrasts 
two modes of living: city versus nature, and from this con~rast he generates 
either peace or melancholy. This, naturally, depends on the intensity and 
genuineness of the artist's feeling. And this depends on the degree of 
seriousness and sincerity of the artist. 
To begin with a poem where the sentiment of peace is predominant, 
one chooses Arnold's poem: "Lines Written in Kensington Gardens". It is 
one of his lyrics that comes closest to being a descriptive nature poem, 
where the beauty and meaning of nature is enhanced by the proximity of the 
city around it: 
In this lone, open glade I lie, 
Screened by deep boughs on either hand; 
And at its end, to stay the eye, 
Those black-crowned, red-boled pine-trees stand! 
Birds here make song, each bird has his, 
Across the girdling city's hum. 
How green under the boughs it is! 
How thick the tremulous sheep-cries come! 
Sometimes a child will cross the glade 
To take his nurse his broken toy; 
Sometimes a thrush flit overhead 
Deep in her unbroken day's employ. 
Here at my feet what wonders pass, 
What endless, active life is here! 
What blowing daisies, fragrant grass! 
An air-stirred forest, fresh and clear. 
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Scarce fresher is the mountain-sod 
Where the tired angler lies, stretched out, 
And, eased of basket and of rod, 
Counts his day's spoil, the spotted trout. 
(Poems, pp. 255-56) 
In conformity with his poetics, Arnold proceeds, in these twenty 
lines (half the poem), by means of the natural mode of interpretation. 
But in the last stanza he introduces the imagery of "the tired angler" 
to prepare the reader for the second mode of interpretation: moralistic. 
In the huge world, which roars hard by, 
Be others happy if they can! 
But in my helpless cradle I 
Was breathed on by the rural Pan. 
I, on men's impious uproar hurled, 
Think often, as I hear them rave, 
That peace has left the upper world 
And now keeps only in the grave. 
(Lines: 21-28) 
The idea of peace and calm are linked, in this poem, with that of freedom 
from strife or ambition: 
Yet here is peace for ever new~ 
When I who watch them am away, 
Still all things in this glade go through 
The changes of their quiet day. 
Then to their happy rest they pass! 
The flowers upclose, the birds are fed, 
The night comes down upon the grass, 
The child sleeps warmly in his bed. 
(Lines: 29-36) 
In the last two stanzas, Arnold prays, in the temple of nature, for 
peace, fortitude, and for a power of sympathy with others: 
Calm soul of all things! make it mine 
To feel, amid the city's jar, 
That there abides a peace of thine, 
Man did not make, and cannot mar. 
- 314 -
The will to neither strive nor cry, 
The power to feel with others give! 
Calm, calm me more! nor let me die 
Before I have begun to live. 
As for Arnold's capacity as well as his technique of generating 
feeli~gs of melancholy out of nature, one has nothing to add to what 
Professor Drew has already done: 
I 
Anyone acquainted with his (Arnold's) poetry must have 
noticed his extraordinary capacity for extracting a 
melancholy reflection from the landscape. So uniform is 
this habit that it is almost impossible to find in Arnold's 
poems a tract of countryside which is not in one way or 
another charged with emotion, the emotion being invariably 
grief or regret. Arnold has many routes to the same 
destination. First, Nature, being what man is not, implies 
the incompleteness of man, at which Arnold grieves. 'Rome-
Sickness', 'Self-Dependence', 'Youth of Nature' and 'Youth 
of Man' are examples of this technique. Specifically 
Nature is unchanging, but man grows old, at which Arnold 
grieves. This is illustrated in 'Growing Old', and many 
other poems, notably the first stanza of 'The River' ••• 
Thirdly Nature is unified, especially the sea, but man is 
isolated, at which Arnold grieves. For this use of natural 
imagery see the last two stanzas of 'The Terrace at Berne', 
'To Marguerite' ('Yes, in the sea of life'), and 'Obermann 
Once More' (lines 209ff.). Finally Nature was everything 
that noisy, pushful, urban Victorian Britain was not. This 
appears in poems such as 'Lines Written in Kensington Gardens' 
and 'On the Rhine': Arnold knew enough of the world to 
realise that Britain was certain to grow steadily more urban. 
The countryside thus represents the past, the 'old haunt', 
and is a symbol of the inexorable forces of time and a 
constant reminder of human powerlessness. Hence a further 
sort of grief. 
("The Passage of Time", Ope cit., 
pp. 205-6). 
Arnold is at his best when he succeeds in combining both peace and 
melancholy. On reflecting on the passages that communicate this 
combination, one has observed that Arnold's method is to make the finite 
flow into the infinite accompanied with a strong sense of relief. It is 
something of the sort that one finds in Dante's line: "In la sua volont§.de_ 
~ nos tra l?~". One finds ~his quality, for ins tance, Empedocles on Etna 
"where Helicon breaks down / In cliff to the sea" (lines: 423-24). The idea 
- 315 -
of the 'volontade' in Dante's line is more artistically conveyed by 
means of nature's commonest elements: earth and water. Another example is the 
end of Sohrab and Rustum: 
NOTES 
But the majestic river floated on, 
Out of the mist and hum of that low land, 
Into the frosty starlight, and there moved, 
Rejoicing, through the hushed Chorasmian waste, 
Under the solitary moon; he flowed 
Right for the polar star, past Orgunje, 
Brimming, and bright, and large; then sands begin 
To hem his watery march, and dam his streams, 
And split his currents; that for many a league 
The shorn and parcelled Oxus strains along 
Through beds of sand and matted rushy isles 
Oxus, forgetting the bright speed he had 
In his high mountain-cradle in Pamere, 
A foiled circuitous wanderer - till at last 
The longed-for dash of waves is heard, and wide 
His luminous home of waters opens, bright 
And tranquil, from whose floor the new-bathed stars 
Emerge, and shine upon the Aral Sea. 
(Poems, pp. 330-31) 
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CHAPTER VIII 
On Human Life 
A. General Life 
Arnold, in his poetic theory, argues that poetry is at bottom a criticism 
of life; that the greatness of a poet lies in his powerful and beautiful 
application of ideas to life - to the question: How to live. The question, 
how to live, is itself a moral idea; and it is the question which most 
interests everyman, and with which, in some way or other, he is perpetually 
occupied. A large sen~is of course to be given to the term moral. Whatever 
bears upon the question, how to live, comes under it. Then he gives an 
example of the moral idea from Milton's poetry: 
"Nor love thy life, nor hate; but what thou liv'st, 
Live well; how long or short, permit to heaven." 
"All people," says Arnold, "want to know life, above all the life which 
surrounds them and concerns them; and we come to the novel and to the 
stage-play to help us to what we want" ("An Old Playgoer on 'Impulse "', 
CPW, X, p. 135). 
But the term morality brings to the reader's mind the idea of religion. 
For, according to Arnold, religion is morality touched with emotion. That 
is exactly what Arnold was aiming at: "All roads," writes Arnold, "lead 
to Rome; and one finds in like manner that all questions raise the question 
of religion... Questions of good government, social harmony, education, 
civilisation, come forth and ask to be considered; and very soon it appears 
that we cannot possibly treat them without returning to treat of religion" 
("Irish Catholicism and British Liberalism," CPW, VIII, p. 321). In short, 
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the poet cannot treat the question, how to live, and of human life without 
a thorough knowledge of religious beliefs and their impact on life. 
On attempting to approach Arnold from this side - human life, one is 
confronted on one hand with Arnold's own elusiveness as a result of his 
circuitous method of argument, and on the other with serious charges made 
against him by his critics that carry too much weight to be easily 
dismissed. Professor George Watson, for instance, writes: "The plain fact 
is that we must stop assuming that the Victorian sages told the truth about 
their own SOCiety. In Arnold's case it is even probable that he knowingly 
and deliberately misrepresented the facts".l Geoffrey Carnall, to the same 
effect, says that Arnold's social criticism is often commonplace and 
platitudinous. 2 
This sort of criticism, along with T.S. Eliot's famous one,3 was 
accepted as a matter of fact. Keating, for example, says "It is futile to 
attempt to defend Arnold too rigorously against these charges, but it is 
equally futile to believe that such charges obliterate Arnold's claim to 
survival".4 Hence, in one's view, arises the real need to reinterpret 
Arnold afresh. 
By interpretation one does not mean just a commentary, it is the re-
creation of that impression Arnold intended. The task is to elucidate 
Arnold's meaning, method, and to restore the single direct impression that 
he intended. But the interpreter should be careful lest he should fall into 
the logical error of "insinuating the future",5 that is to say, of reading 
into Arnold's thoughts that did not become explicit until later. Such 
insinuation of the future is often a way of improving the author, of 
smoothing out his mistakes; and it is common both among those who wish to 
defend a writer and among those who wish to recommend a modern doctrine: 
This falls outside the scope of my plan in this study. To avoid this, I have 
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tried not to attribut~ to Arnold any inference that he does not make in so 
many words, or any abstraction that he does not have a name for, without 
giving a special reason for doing so. Most fundamentally of all, I have 
tried to show Arnold's line of development in his poetic career which, as 
this study will show, advanced by gradual variation rather than by sudden 
leaps or mutations as some of his critics suggest. The major poems 
one proposes to consider for elucidating Arnold's own interpretation of the 
condition of human life in nineteenth-century England as well as showing 
his line of development are, besides many minor ones - "The Forsaken Merman", 
"The Sick King in Bokhara" and "Merope". They represent Arnold's idea of 
human life and give conspicuously his method of applying ideas to life. One 
will try to show that these three poems reflect and interpret the society 
of Victorian England. The argument, in these three poems begins with 
the microcosm of the society - family life, and ends with issues pertaining 
to social harmony and good government. 
I 
The First Stage (1844-1849) 
Professor Kenneth Allott suggests that Arnold's "missionary impulse 
in social matters, so evident later when the poetic power had waned, was 
kept in check in late 1840's by his conception of the poet as detached 
spectator ('Resignation'), by some pessimism about the limits of possible 
social action ('To a Republican Friend,' 1 & 2), and perhaps by a certain 
coldness of temperament ••• ".6 In my view it is just a question of 
insufficient experience in the earlier stage of his career. 
To follow diachronically Arnold's own development one finds that in 
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the early stage the vision was not clear. In "Stagirius", written in 1844, 
Arnold sees the malaise of the age as, the lack of the clarity of vision: 
When the soul, growing clearer, 
Sees God no nearer; 
When the soul, mounting higher, 
To God comes no nigher, 
But the arch-fiend Pride 
Mounts at her side, 
Foiling her high emprise, 
Sealing her eagle eyes, 
And, when she fain would soar, 
Makes idols to adore. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• 
From doubt, where all is double; 
Where wise men are not strong, 
Where comfort turns to trouble, 
Where just men suffer wrong; 
Where sorrow treads on joy, 
Where sweet things soonest cloy, 
Where faiths are built on dust, 
Where love is half mistrust, 
Hungry, and barren, and sharp as the sea -
Oh! set us free. 
(Poems, p. 45) 
Despite the poetic weakneffiof the poem, its thought is profound. The 
thing worthy of notice is that the growth of kno't/ledge did not bring man 
nearer to God, on the contrary it brought doubt: "where all is double". The 
poem though subjective is not by any means personal. On reading Saint-Marc 
Girardin's Cours de Litt~rature dramatique i (1843) in March 1848, Arnold 
observed that "le demon de Stagyre" paralleled the romantic malaise: 
'" ••• il Y a eu une ;1.i tte'rature qui a exprime' l' etat de 
malaise et d'in~ui'tude que nous ressentons ••• la litt~rature 
des P~res de l'Eglise ••• voyons quel est le d~mon qui poss~de 
Stagyre ••• c'est la tristesse, ou plutot, c'est l'athumia ••• 
c'est le d(faut d'tnergie et de ressort, c'est l'abattement ••• 
c'est le n~ant de P~e"'. 
(Poems, p. 44) 
If one tests this stage of Arnold's career by the four queries mentioned in 
the introduction: first, Focus: alienated from what? Second;Replacement: what 
C' 
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replaces, if anything? Thirdly, Mode: how is the alienation manifested? 
And finally, Agent: 1Nhat is the agent of alienation? One will find that 
Arnold at this stage was concerned with the third and fourth questions 
only. In this poem Arnold pursues the problem of alienation through a 
number of its manifestations: beside doubt and lack of clarity of 
vision, there are the feelings of anguish, dullness, and apathy: 
From the world's temptations, 
From tribulations, 
From that fierce anguish 
Wherein we languish, 
From that torpor deep 
Wherein we lie asleep, 
Heavy as death, cold as the grave, 
Save, ohl save. 
(Poems, p. 44) 
"Horatian Echo", written in 1847, marks a further stage in Arnold's 
earlier career as a poet. Here, Arnold expresses a lighthearted indifference 
to the events of the day; 
Omit, omit, my simple friend, 
still to enquire how parties tend, 
Or what we fix with foreign powers. 
If France and we are really friends, 
And what the Russian Czar intends, 
Is no concern of ours. 
(Poems, p. 57) 
However, stanzas 2 and 3 register the hopes and fears associated with the 
rising Chartist agitation in 1847; 
Us not the daily quickening race 
Of the invading populace 
Shall draw to swell that shouldering herd. 
Mourn will we not your closing hour, 
Ye imbeciles in present poy{er, 
Doomed, pompous, and absurd! 
And let us bear, that they debate 
Of all the engine-work of state, 
Of commerce, laws, and policy, 
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The secrets of the world's machine, 
And what the rights of man may mean, 
With readier tongue than we. 
(Poems, p. 58) 
The events of 1848 caused Arnold to think more intensely about social 
and political problems than he had done before. When the Revolution broke 
out in France in February 1848, both Arnold and Clough were vastly excited 
though Clough much more than Arnold. But Arnold seems to have qualified his 
excitement with some doubt. On this account he was accused of aloofness 
and detac~~ent. J.A. Froude writes, in March 1849, to Clough: 
I admire Matt - to a very great extent. Only I don't see 
what business he has to parade his calmness and lecture us 
on resignation when he has never known what a storm is, 
and doesn't know what he has to resign himself to - I 
think he only knows the shady side of nature out of books -
still I think his versifying and generally his aesthetic 
power is quite wonderful ••• 
(CL, p. 127) 
Arnold adopted the philosophy of Bhagavad-Gita as a way to comprehend 
the events at that time. Aristotle writes in his Metaphysics: "There is 
no knowledge of things which are in a state of flux". 7 Things at that 
time were in a state of flux indeed. Arnold attempted to persuade Clough 
to read it and discover there the tranquilliser for his restless 
speculations: The Indians, says Arnold to him, distinguish between 
meditation or absorption - and knowledge. At that time, (Narch, 10, 1848) 
he writes in one of his letters: 
What agitates me is this, if the new state of things succeeds 
in France, social changes are inevitable here and elsewhere, 
for no one looks on seeing his neighbour mending without 
asking himself if he cannot mend in the same way; but, without 
waiting for the result, the spectacle of France is likely to 
breed great agitation here, and such is the state of our 
masses that their movements now can only be brutal plundering 
and destroying. And if they wait, there is no one, as far as 
one sees, to train them to conquer, by their attitude and 
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superior conviction; the deep ignorance of the middle 
and upper classes, and their feebleness of vision 
becoming, if possible, daily more apparent. 
(Letters, I, p. 5) 
What Arnold was trying to discover in the Bhagavad-Gita was a 
disinterested way of evaluating the situation. The method of his discovery 
was, in one's view, the Hegelian logic: thesis Caction), antithesis 
(thinking), and finally a synthesis Crjght thinking for right doing). The 
result was a series of poems in which he gives direct expression of his 
thought and feeling, either in reflective poems recommending stoic detachment, 
or in lyric poems expressing the pain and deprivation which the spirit 
of the time generates. In terms of number, the dominant genre is the sonnet, 
of which there are eleven. Of those, "To a Friend" and "Quiet Work" occupy 
positions of honour apart from the remaining nine. Both strike the stoic 
note which dominates the volume - 1849, as a whole. 
In the sonnet, "To a Friend" (1848) Arnold says: 
Who prop, thou ask'st, in these bad days, my mind? 
He much, the old man, who, clearest-souled of men, 
Saw The Wide Prospect, and the Asian Fen, 
And Tmolus hill, and Smyrna bay, though blind. 
Much he, whose friendship I not long since won, 
That halting slave, who in Nicopolis 
Taught Arrian, when Vespasian's brutal son 
Cleared Rome of what most shamed him. But be his 
My special thanks, whose even-balanced soul, 
From first youth tested up to extreme old age, 
Business could not make dull, nor passion wild; 
Who saw life stadily, and saw it whole; 
The mellow glory of the Attic stage, 
Singer of sweet Colonus, and its child. 
(Poems, p. 105) 
The sonnet, here, moves from the tortured syntax and diction of the opening 
line to the anxious mood of the auditor being addressed by the speaker, 
through an ascending series of statements praising in turn Homer, Epictetus, 
and Sophocles, in language that poetically expresses the balanced serenity 
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which the poem recommends. 
In "Quiet Work" Arnold tries to effect a synthesis: to reconcile the 
conflicting claims of involvement and detachment. This is evident from 
his frequent insistence that man should try to learn from nature the lesson 
of quiet work: 
One lesson, Nature, let me learn of thee, 
One lesson which in every wind is blown, 
One lesson of two duties kept at one 
Though the loud world proclaim their enmity -
Of toil unsevered from tranquillity! 
Of labour, that in lasting fruit outgrows 
Far noisier schemes, accomplished in repose, 
Too great for haste, too high for rivalry! 
Yes, while on earth a thousand discords ring, 
Man's fitful uproar mingling with his toil, 
still do thy sleepless ministers move on, 
Their glorious tasks in silence perfecting; 
Still working, blaming still our vain turmoil, 
Labourers that shall not fail, when man is gone. 
(Poems, pp. 106-107) 
Professors Kenneth Allott and Hiriam Allott, in their comment on the 
sonnet, say "the contrast developed in the octet (sic) of 'Quiet Work' 
between the unity, silence, and enduringness of nature's Iministers', and the 
multiplicity, noise and transiency of human life, is resolved in the 
elevated language of the sestet, with its subtle interplay of consonants, 
the even spread of the stress, the cae sural variation, and the biblical echo 
of 'labourers' ••• The repetitions of 'still', and its emphatic syntactical 
inversion in the penultimate line, carry the dual association of quiet and 
enduringness, embodying in the language itself the central lesson of 'two 
duties kept at one' elicited from nature by the speaker" (K. Allott, ed., 
Matthew Arnold, p. 50). 
Arnold, however, was not blind to the appalling condition of the masses 
and even of the economic theories that describe that state. In March 1, 
1848, he says in a letter to Clough, lIJ)on't you think the eternal relations 8 
between labour and capital -the Times twaddles so of have small existence for a 
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whole society that has resolved no longer to live by br3ad alone ll (CL, 
Pp. 68-69). In his sonnet liTo a Republican Friend" (1848) Arnold, to 
this effect, writes: 
If sadness at the long heart-wasting show 
Wherein earth's great ones are disquieted; 
If thoughts, not idle, while before me flow 
The armies of the homeless and unfed -
If these are yours, if this is what you are, 
Then am I yours, and what you feel, I share. 
(Poems, 102) 
This shows too that towards the end of this first stage he began to 
put his finger on the right spot of the illness. He saw it not as class 
struggle (a common theme in his age) or the lack of freedom. But a faulty 
attitude towards life in general. People do not know how to live. They, 
being extremists, sacrifice many aspects of their nature. He saw, poetically 
what he expounded in his prose writing, that the middle class,'fhich, 
IIdriven by its sense for the power of conduct, in the beginning of the 
seventeenth century entered ••• the prison of Puritanism, and had the ke,y 
turned upon its spirit there for two hundred years. They did not know, 
good and earnest people as they were, that to the building up of human 
life there belong all those other powers also - the power of intellect 
and knowledge, the power of beauty, the power of social life and manners" 
("Equalityll, CF1t1, VIII, p. 294). Thus he went on interpreting i:te middle 
class attitude to life in a series of poems of which the IIForsaken Herman ll 
is a central one. 
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Though most critics have admired "The Forsaken Merman" ever since its 
publication in 1849, it had not received any lengthy study so as to show 
its implication. Professor Allott, for example, says that the poem is 
an example of poems in which Arnold managed "to rise above his self-
consciousness to poetic expression as unimpeded as the best of Tennyson's".9 
Allan Roper, in his study which is mainly based on Fulweiler's, mistakenly 
says that "'The Forsaken Merman' records neither spiritual death nor moral 
resurrection, but only the inevitability of things" (Arnold's Poetic 
Landscape, Ope cit., p. 127). 
None of the critics so far has observed the religious connotation of 
the poem. This fact seems to emanate from a wrong idea that Arnold did 
not use poet~J as a vehicle for his religious ideas. To this effect Michael 
Thorpe writes: If Though Arnold became an important religious thinker in his 
day, he did not use poetry as a vehicle for his religious ideas. His 
religious thinking plays little part in his most memorable poetry, and is 
chiefly evident in such dry, abstract pieces ••• There was much reason 
in Arnold's religion, and poetry is not, on the whole, reason's place" 
(Op. cit. p. 81). The purpose of this study is to show that the poem is 
a rare example in which one of the most concrete religious doctrines is 
used as the basis of argument in poetry. The study shows that it is 
impossible to read the poem without being reminded of the Puritan doctrine 
of the calling and its consequences on the style of human life. 
The doctrine of calling in its essence, as Max Weber puts it, is: 
The valuation of the fulfilment of duty in worldly affairs 
as the highest form which the moral activity of the individual 
could assume. This it was which inevitably gave everyday 
worldly activity a religious significance, and which first 
created the conception of a calling in this sense. The 
conception of the calling thus brings out that central dogma 
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of all Protestant denominations which the Catholic 
division of ethical precepts into praecepta and cons ilia 
discards. The only way of living acceptably to God was 
not to surpass worldly morality in monastic asceticism, but 
solely through the fulfilment of the obligations imposed 
upon the individual by his position in the world. That 
was his calling. 
(Op. cit., p. 80) 
The consequences of this doctrine on the style of life were far 
reaching. To simplify a lot, it can be traced in the Puritan valuation of 
action and that negative attitude towards all sensuous culture. This 
rationalisation of conduct within this world, but for the sake of the 
world beyond, was one of the consequences of the concept of calling of 
ascetic Protestantism. This asceticism, as Weber puts it, "turned with 
all its force against one thing: the spontaneous enjoyment of life and all 
it had to offer. This is perhaps most characteristically brought out in 
the struggle over the Book of Sports which James and Charles I made into 
law expressly as a means of counteracting Puritanism, and which the latter 
ordered to be read from all the pulpits" (Ibid., p. 166). 
In this poem Arnold retells the story he has chosen from Hans Anderson 
(Via Mary Howitt's (1843) and George Borrow's (1826)]with the suppression 
of some original details and the invention of several new ones and shifting 
the emphasis from Greta or Agnete, as she~ variously called, to . the 
bereft husband and the father of children who are "wild with pain". 
The song tells that Agnete wandered solitarily along the shore, 
when a merman rose up from the waves and decoyed her by his 
speeches. She followed him to the bottom of the sea, 
remained there seven years, and bore him seven children. 
One day, as she sat by the cradle, she heard the church bells 
sounding down to her in the depths of the sea, and a longing 
seized her heart to go to church. By her prayers and tears 
she induced the merman to conduct her to the upper world 
again, promising soon to return. He prayed her not to 
forget his children, more especially the little onein the 
cradle; stopped up her ears and her mouth, and then led her 
upwards to the sea-shore. \ihen, however, she entered the 
church, all the holy images, as soon as they saw her, a 
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daughter of sin and from the depths of the sea, turned 
themselves round to the walls. She was affrighted, and 
would not return, although the little ones in her 
home below were weeping. 
(Commentary, pp. 129-130) 
This strong religious aspect of the story that suggests that the mother 
was right in leaving her husband and children in order to save her soul 
and eternal life must have attracted Arnold's attention. 
This story might bring to the reader's mind Bunyan's Pilgrim's Progress, 
by far the most widely read book of the whole Puritan literature: In the 
description of Christian's attitude after he had realised that he was 
living in the City of Destruction and he had received the call to take 
up his pilgrimage to the Celestial city, wife and children cling to him, 
but stopping his ears with his fingers and crying, "life, eternal life," 
and then staggers forth across the fields. 
The action of the poem begins with Mar~~ receiving her call: 
She said: 'I must go, for my kinsfolk pray 
In the little grey church on the shore today. 
'Twill be Easter-time in the world - ah me! 
And I lose my poor soul, Herman! here with thee.' 
(II. 56-59) 
The religious accent is very clear: How is she to save her soul? That 
was only possible by proof in a specific type of conduct unmistakably 
different from the way of the natural man: It was common to all denominations 
that impulsive emjoyment of life, whether in the form of seigneurial sports, 
or the enjoyment of the dance-hall or the public-house of the common man, 
which leads away both from work in a calling and from religion, was as 
such the enemy of rational asceticism. Work was seen as the only activity 
of religious value. 
The individual must work and produce in order to save himself. Work, 
however, is nothing general or abstract. \vork is always concrete 'Nork, 
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that is, a specific kind of work in a specific kind of economic system. 
To convey this connotation Arnold portrays Margaret at work, - at her wheel: 
She sits at her wheel in the humming town, 
Singing most joyfully. 
Hark what she sings: '0 joy, 0 joy, 
For the humming street, and the child with its toy! 
For the priest, and the bell, and the holy well; 
For the wheel where I spun, 
And the blessed light of the sun!' 
And so she sings her fill, 
Singing most joyfully, 
Till the spindle drops from her hand, 
And the whizzing wheel stands still. 
(n. 87-89) 
Fulweiler has rightly observed that Arnold skillfully employs the present 
participles to increase the effect of incessant and mechanical activity. 
"In the town there is monotonous and colourless whirring, whizzing, humming, 
murmuring, and praying behind walls and shut doors, and among grave stones. 
In the sea there is colour, imagination, life, love, and the hidden 
mysterious meaning of the world" 11 
• The description of the tOw"11 as "white-
walled" makes it clear that white stands for purity and hence it recalls 
the term: Puritanism; while " .... ralled" signifies the imprisonment and 
limitations imposed by the sentiment of religion. It is clear that the two 
images merge in Arnold's mind: it is a picture after all of a class that 
"entered ••• the prison of Puritanism, and had the key turned upon its 
spirit there for two hundred years" (CPW, VIII, p. 294). 
The Merman makes a call too: the call of Hellenism: 
Call her once before you go -
Call once yet! 
In a voice that she will know: 
'Margaret! Margaret!' 
Children's voices should be dear 
(Call once more) to a mother's ear; 
Children's voices, wild with pain -
Surely she will come again! 
Call her once and come away; 
This way, this way! 
'Mother dear, we cannot stay! 
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The wild white horses foam and fret.' 
Margaret~ Margaret! 
Come, dear children, come away down, 
Call no more! 
One last look at the white-walled town, 
And the little grey church on the windy shore, 
Then come down! 
(II. 10-27) 
The Merman's call is not powerful enough: Margaret is obeying her 
calling. The calling of dissenters that subscribes only work and the Bible: 
Through the narrow paved street, where all was still, 
To the little grey church on the windy hill. 
From the church came a murmur of folk at their prayers, 
But we stood without in the cold blowing airs. 
We climbed on the graves, on the stones worn with rains, 
And we gazed up the aisle through the small leaded panes. 
'Margaret, hist! come quick, we are here! 
Dear heart,' I said, 'we are long alone; 
The sea grows stormy, the little ones moan.' 
But, ah, she gave me never a look, 
For her eyes were sealed to the holy book! 
Loud prays the priest; shut stands the door. 
Come away, children, call no more! 
Come away, come down, call no morel 
(II. 70-84) 
Man was, thus, dominated by the idea of work as the ultimate purpose of 
his life. In the context of this conception of religion, Puritanism values 
action. Goethis remark in fact applied often enough to the Calvinist: 
"'The man of action is always ruthless; no one has a conscience but an 
observer'" ("<leber, p. 151). 
Arnold contrasts a life based on this type of ethic with the merman's 
free, colourful, lucid and magical world. The sea, in Arnold's poetry stands 
for freedom, beauty, love, and the deepest mysteries of life. The Merman's 
world is an open, timeless world. Paradoxically enough it stands too for moral 
responsibilities to others, as the care for family and children. The town, on 
the other hand, is a closed world of hard, confining objects J~\the white walls 
it t' 
of the town, the 
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narrow paved streets. It stands for imprisonment by convention, and 
monotonous, mechanical, incessant activity. It stands for faults which 
became more and more manifest as time went on; to the unprogressiveness of 
this spirit, to its stiffness, hardness, narrowness, prejudice, want of 
insight, want of amiability. ~ In contrast to this, Arnold recomends the 
~ 
world of the Merman: pleasure in life, that love of clear thinking and 
of fearless discussion, that gay social temper, that ease and lightness, 
that gracious flexibility, which are in men's nature. "Art refreshes us," 
says Arnold, "art liberates us, precisely by carrying us into such a 
world, and enabling us to find pleasure there" ("An Old Playgoer at the 
Lyceum", ~, X, p. 140). 
Puritanism, in its historical development, takes its start through 
the elimination of magical and ritual elements of religion. The genuine 
Puritan even rejected all signs of religious ceremony at the grave and 
buried his nearest and dearest without song or ritual in order that no 
superstition should creep in. England, in Arnold's view, has given herself 
to this trend: a fit of Evangelical piety. By that she has forfeited her 
ancient heritage of poetic beauty and poetic truth and has given herself 
to the prayer book and the spinning wheel. The Puritans, says Weber, 
repudiated the Apocrypha as not inspired, consistently with their sharp 
distinction between things divine and things of the flesh. But among the 
Canonical books that of Job had all the more influence. The Oriental 
quietism, which appears in several of the finest verses of the Psalms and 
in the Proverbs, was interpreted away. It is not without significance that 
Arnold tries to restore this element. 
Professor Miriam Al1ott, in her comment on the poem, has rightly 
observed that the movement between these two worlds is conveyed through 
the poem's rhythmical variations: lfThe movement of feeling, from the 
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wildness of the opening to the resigned melancholy of the close when the 
impossibility of reconciling the two world~has to be accepted, is reflected 
in the rhythmical variations of the Merman's irregular chant, which is 
probably Arnold's finest individual melodic invention" (Matthew Arnold, 
(Ibid., p. 92). L. Gottfried, admiring Arnold's performance, says "'The 
Forsaken Merman' ••• seems to indicate that Arnold had studied the metrics 
of Christabel and the sea-imagery of The Rime of the Ancient Mariner".12 
Charl~s Kingsley writes, in 1849, "though it reminds us in subject of 
poor Hood's exquisite poem of 'Hero and Leander', and also of Tennyson's 
'Merman and Mermaid', it surpasses them ••• in simple naturalness, and a 
certain barbaric wildness of meter and fancy, thoroughly appropriate to 
the subject".13 
Arnold, in one's view, has succeeded in conveying his message to 
his age: the misunderstanding of religion and the impact of this misinterpret-
ation on human life. The age did not miss that point. R. H. Hutton, in 
his comment on the poem, (April, 1872) says "'The Forsaken Herman' - a very 
delicate little poem of its kind - is again hardly in any sense a narrative 
poem. It is a pretty fanciful song full of picture, of which the living 
pulse is the innocent childish heartlonging of a bewildered, instinctive, 
unmasterful love conscious of the existence of a rivalry in the claims of 
religious feelings into which it cannot enter, and yet full of painful 
yearning" (Ibid., p. 227). 
One has so far spoken mainly of the Puritan distrust of feelings 
and love pervading the personality of the member of the middle class. This 
mistrust was rooted in the doubt concerning one's future after death. Almost 
no one stricken with this fear would be able to relax, enjoy life, and be 
indifferent as to what would happen afterwards. This has produced some 
other traits: hostility and resentment. Arnold has noticed this aspect. In 
Literature and Dogma he says: 
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ltlhen one thinks of the bitter and contentious 
temper of Puritanism - temper being, nevertheless, such 
a vast part of 'conduct' - and then thinks of st Theresa 
and her sweetness, her never-sleeping hatred of 'detraction', 
one is tempted almost to say, that there was more of Jesus 
in st Theresa's little finger than in John Knox's whole 
body. Protestantism has the method of Jesus with his secret 
too much left out of mind. 
( CPW, p. 352 ) 
This poetic vision was later substantiated in Arnold's demonstrative 
prose writings. Arnold's essays on "Equality" (1861) and "A vlord about America" 
are two of the most perceptive statements of his social doctrine, touching 
upon the same ideas that will continue to occur in his writings. One might 
take them as a footnote to one's interpretation of that poem. For Arnold, 
in his analysis of the structure of society and especially of middle class, 
says: "Let us see how the civilisation of these classes appears to a 
Frenchman, who witnessed, in his own count~J, the considerable humanisation 
of these classes by equality. To such an observer our middle class divides 
itself into a serious portion and a gay or ro\.[.::ly portion ••• With the gay or 
rOWly portion we need not much concern ourselves ••• the real strength of 
the English middle class is in its serious portion. And of this a Frenchman 
who was here some little time ago as the correspondent, I think, of the 
Si~cle newspaper, ••• writes as follows. He had been attending some of 
the l"Ioody and Sankey meetings, and he says: 'To understand the success of 
Messrs Moody and Sankey, one must be familiar with English manners, one must 
know the mind deadening influence of a narrow Biblism, one must have 
experienced the sense of acute ennui; which the aspect and the frequentation 
of this great division of English society produce in others, the want of 
elasticity and the chronic ennui which characterise this class itself, 
petrified in a narrow Protestantism and in a perpetual reading of the Biblell 
("Equality", CPW, VIII, pp. 293-94). 
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Arnold goes on and gives an example of middle class life: of the 
serious portion. The example he quotes from Miss Bird's book in which she 
describes the Chalmers family - a family with which, on her journey from 
Denver to the Rocky Nountains, she lodged for some time. 
"'Oh (she says), what a hard, narrow life it is with which I am now 
in contact! A narrow and unattractive religion, which I believe still to 
be genuine, and an intense but narrow patriotism, are the only higher 
influences. Chalmers came from Illinois nine years ago. He is slightly 
intelligent, very opinionated, and wishes to be thought well-informed, which 
he is not. He belongs to the straitest sect of Reformed Presbyterians 
••• He considers himself a profound theologian, and by the pine logs at 
night discourses 
divine decrees ••• 
to me the mysteries of the eternal counsels and the 
'Mrs Chalmers looks like one of the English poor women of our childhood -
lean, clean, toothless, and speaks, like some of them, in a piping, 
discontented voice, which seems to convey a personal reproach. She is never 
idle for one moment, is severe and hard, and despises everything but work. 
She always speaks of me as this or that woman. The fa~ily consists of a 
grown-up son, a shiftless, melancholy-looking youth, who possibly pines for 
a wider life; a girl of sixteen, a sour repellent-10oking creature, with 
as much manners as a pig; and three hard, unchildlike younger children. By 
the whole family all courtesy and gentleness of act or speech seem regarded 
as works of the flesh, if not of the devil. They knock over all one's 
things without apologising or picking them up, and when I thank them for 
anytLing they look grimly amazed. I wish I could show them a more excellent 
way. This hard greed, and the exclusive pursuit of gain, with the indifference 
to all which does not aid in its acquisition, are eating up family love and 
life throughout the West. I write this reluctantly and after a total 
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experience of nearly two years in the United states. Mrs Chalmers is 
cleanly in her person and dress, and the food, though poor, is clean. 
Work, work, work, is their day and their life. They are thoroughly ungenial. 
There is a married daughter across the river, just the same hard, loveless, 
moral, hard-working being as her mother. Each morning, soon after seven, 
when I have swept the cabin, the family corne in for worship. Chalmers 
wails a psalm to the most doleful of dismal tunes; they read a chapter 
round, and he prays. Sunday was a dreadful day. The family kept the 
commandment literally, and did no work. Worship was conducted twice, and was 
rather longer than usual. The man attempted to read a well-worn copy of 
Boston's Fourfold State, but shortly fell asleep, and they only woke up for 
their meals. It was an awful day, and seemed as if it would never come to 
an end. You will now have some idea of my surroundings. It is a moral, hard, 
unloving, unlovely, unrelieved, unbeautiful, grinding life. These people 
live in a discomfort and lack of ease and refinement which seem only 
I~ 
possible to people of British stock.' 
II1tlhat is this," says Arnold, "but the hideousness, the immense ennui, 
of the life on 'Thich we have touched so often, the life of our serious 
British Philistine, our Murdstone; that life with its defective type of 
religion, its narrow range of intellect and knowlecge, its stunted senses 
of beauty, its low standard of manners? Only it is this life at its 
simplest, rudimentary state" (II A Hord about America", CPW, X, pp. 15-17). 
Arnold, however, was not blind to middle class merits. For, as he says, 
by what they became, they gained, and the whole nation with them; they 
deepened and fixed for this nation the sense of conduct. But they created 
a type of life and manners, of which they themselves indeed are slow to 
recognise the faul ts, but 'Thich is fa tally condemned by its hideousness, its 
immense ennui, and against which the instinct of self-preservation in humanity 
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rebels. 
Partisans fight against facts, says Arnold, in vain. Mr Goldwin Smith, 
a writer of eloquence and power, although too prone to acerbity, is a 
partisan of the Puritans, and of the Nonconformists who are the special 
inheritors of the Puritan tradition. He angrily resents the imputation 
upon that Puritan type of life, by which the life of our serious middle 
class has been formed, that it was doomed to hideousness, to immense ennui. 
He protests that it had beauty, amenity, accomplishment. Let us go to facts: 
Charles the First, who, with all his faults, had the 
just idea that art and letters are great civilisers, 
made, as you know, a famous collection of pictures -
our first National Gallery. It was, I suppose, the 
best collection at that time north of the Alps. It 
contained nine Raphaels, eleven Correggios, twenty-
eight Titians. What became of that collection? The 
journal of the House of Commons will tell you. These 
you see the Puritan Parliament disposing of this 
Whitehall or York House collection as follows: 
'Ordered, that all such pictures and statues there are 
without any superstition, shall be forthwith sold ••• 
Ordered, that all such pictures there as rave the 
representation of the Second Person in Trinity upon 
them, shall be forthwith burnt. Ordered, that all 
such pictures there as have the representation of the 
Virgin Mary upon them, shall be forthwith burnt.'tI 
There, Arnold comments, we have the weak side of our parliamentary government 
and our serious middle class (CPW, VIII, pp. 294-95). 
ii 
The situation was further complicated: as a result of the individual's 
own anxiety about his fate, there developed a frantic activity to do 
something, and to be solely concerned about saving himself. Activity in this 
sense assumes a compUlsive quality: the individual has to be active in 
order to overcome this feeling of doubt and powerlessness. This kind of effort 
and activity is not the 
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result of inner strength and self-confidence: it is a desperate escape 
from anxiety. Man needed only a philosophical frame to rationalise his 
activity. 
Utilitarianism was that philosophical frame. It came on the scene as 
a social force in 1820's and 1830's and made a strong impact due to the 
fact that Evangelicalism, after all, had had from its beginning a large 
admixture of Utilitarianism. In addition to that, Utilitarian philosophy 
of self-interest, itself, - according to which all men were seeking a 
maximum realisation of their interests by means of a maximum utilization 
of the i r power had been reanimated by the spirit of Darwinism which 
envisaged the individual members of any given species competing against 
each other for the available resources - out of which competition the 
fittest individuals survived, perpetuated their kind and thus contributed 
to the betterment and evolution of their species. 
This spirit was applied to every aspect in society: "We are already 
suffering," says Arnold (1870), "from an excessive development of the 
competitive system. No one denies that it has its advantages within 
reasonable limits; but few thoughtful people will deny that we have lately 
been pushing a sound principle to ridiculous extremes. Education, instead 
of consisting in a careful and systematic development of the faculties, is 
in danger of reducing' itself to preparing children for a series of 
spasmodic efforts" ("Education and Competition", CPW, VI, p. 412). 
To sum up: on the stage there were, says Arnold, two philosophical 
theories - the first, a peculiarly British form of Atheism, the second, 
a peculiarly British form of Quietism. "The great promoters of these 
philosophical theories are our newspapers, which, no less than our 
parliamentary representatives, may be said to act the part of guides and 
governors to us ••• The first-named melancholy doctrine (Atheism) is preached 
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in the Times with great clearness and force of style; indeed, it is well 
known, from the example of the post Lucretius and others, what great masters 
of style the atheistic doctrine has always counted among its promulgators".15 
Arnold was not the only critic to have noticed the complexity of the 
situation. One may quote a passage from John Wesley who noticed it even 
before Arnold and his contemporaries. The passage shows that the leaders 
of these ascetic movements understood the seemingly paradoxical relation-
ships which Arnold was trying to interpret; 
I fear [~ays WesleyJ, wherever riches have increased, the 
essence of religion has decreased in the same proportion. 
Therefore I do not see how it is possible, in the nature of 
things, for any revival of true religion to continue long. 
For religion must necessarily produce both industry and 
frugality, and these cannot but produce riches. But as 
riches increase, so will pride, anger, and love of the 
world in all its branches. How then is it possible that 
tJlethodism, that is, a religion of the heart, though it 
flourishes now as a green bay tree, should continue in 
this state? For the fiIethodists in every place grow diligent 
and frugal; consequently they increase in goods. Hence 
they proportionately increase in pride, in anger, in the 
desire of the flesh, the desire of the eyes, and the pride 
of life. So, although the form of religion remains, the 
spirit is swiftly vanishing away. Is there no way to 
prevent this - this continued decay of pure religion? \-Ie 
ought not to prevent people from being diligent and frugal; 
we must exhort all Christians to gain all they can and to 
save all they can; that is, in effect, to grow rich. 16 
Arnold not only understood the situation and interpreted it but also 
went as far as to suggest a remedy for it: "We are often supposed, when we 
criticise by the help of culture some imperfect doing or other, to 
have in our eye some well-known rival plan of doing, which we want to serve 
and recommend" (Culture and Anarchy, CPtl., V, 234). Max Weber has 
rightly observed that the most important opponent with which the spirit of 
individualism and self-interest, in the sense of a definite standard of 
life claiming ethical sanction, has had to struggle, was that type of 
attitude and reaction to new situations which we may designate as 
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traditionalism. This is precisely what Arnold was trying to do: to 
counteract the spirit of self-interest with a doctrine that embodies 
the opposite values: renouncement, quietism, or stoicism. 
Arnold's concept of Quietism has nothing to do at all with pessimism 
or melancholy. He actually defined it negatively when he contrasted it 
with the doctrine of Atheism - in other words, it has nothing to do with 
the deep sense of defeat of Lucretius and all that this name stands for. 
Art, as Olson puts it, "above all other things is potent to avert [the 
spirit of individualism and self-interest]4 •• it inculcates moral attitudes; 
it determines our feelings towards characters of a certain kind for no 
other reason than that they are such characters.,,17 
Arnold pursued, in his career as poet-critic, his mission of 
inculcating the values of Quietism through intellect. It is true that 
many of his poems are not doctrinal, but to the extent that any doctrine 
pervades his poetry, it is stoicism. For example the main theme behind 
"The Sick King in Bokhara", "Fragment of an Antigone", and "Fragment of 
Chorus of a 'Dejaneria'" is the exaltation of primal law over self-selected 
good and self-assertion. The first of these poems,18 published in 1849, is 
complete in itself, and constitutes a ve~J sophisticated attempt to 
project the spiritual and social problems of Victorian England in terms of 
a story with an oriental setting. It develops an anecdote which in Arnold's 
source - Alexander Burnes' Travels into Bokhara (1834), exemplifies "the 
rigour of the Mohammedan Law" in telling of the fate of a certain :t<Ioollah. 
It is concluded by the statement that "to this day verses commemorate the 
death of this unfortunate ma~, whom we must either pronounce a bigot or 
a madman" (Commentary, pp. 85-89). 
Culler, in his comment on the poem, 1tTri tes "Doubtless it was this 
phrase [either bigot or a madman] that made Arnold's hackles rise and led 
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him to reinterpret the story so that it would not appear that everyone 
who believed in the existence of absolute values was either a bigot or a 
madman ••• In Burnes' the crime of the Moollah was not specified. Arnold 
took the crime of cursing one's mother from another anecdote because that 
was an act which although it violated a religious taboo, could not really 
be said to have done aDY harm in the Utilitarian sense. And then, since 
this curse had not been motivated in Burnes, be added the detail of the 
drought and the man's burning fever to provide him with every extenuating 
circumstance. In this way he devised a fable which would illustrate, 
even more neatly than Dostoevky's Crime and Punishment, the conflict between 
redemptive and sociological justice" (Imaginative Reason, pp. 105-6). 
But there is an aspect that is neglected by almost all critics: Man's 
idea of God and the consequences of that concept on human life. Arnold 
knows that everything depends on Nan's conception of God. From that 
concept a system of government as well as rulers can be generated. For 
example, the King here is likened to God: 
'How canst thou, ere thou hear, discern 
If I speak folly? but a king, 
Whether a thing be great or small, 
Like Allah, hears and judges all. 
lis of a 
Naturally if one's concept of God . being as 
(Poems, p. 78) 
arbitrary and merciless as 
Calvin's God, who destined part of m&~ind to eternal damnation without 
any justification or reason except that this act was an expression of 
God's power, one would be psychologically prepared to accept a tyrannical 
king. In the Calvinistic idea of God, the concept of the Father in Heaven 
of the New Testament, so human and understanding, is gone. His place has 
been taken by a transcendental being, beyond the reach of human understanding, 
who with His quite incomprehensible decrees has decided the fate of every 
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individual and regulated the tiniest details of the cosmos from eternity. 
God of Islam is like God of the Old Testament whom Calvin invoked: Deistic. 
There is no place for the very human cycle of sin, repentance, atonement, 
release, followed by renewed sin. 
Closely connected with the Calvinistic concept of God is the theory 
of predestination: one of the corner-stones, perhaps the central doctrine 
of Calvin's whole system. The theory has one implication which should be 
explicitly mentioned here for its importance to the interpretation of 
the poem: the principle of the basic inequality of men. For Calvin there 
are two kinds of people - those who are saved and those who are 
destined to eternal damnation. Since this fate is determined before they 
are born and without their being able to change it by anything they do or 
do not in their lives, the equality of mankind is denied in principle. Men 
are created unequal. This principle implies also that there is no 
solidarity between men, since the one factor which is the strongest basis 
for human solidarity is denied: the equality of man's fate. 
Arnold, rightly, does not accept Calvin's interpretation of this 
doctrine. 19 It is even one of the points on which he disagrees with 
Carlyle: 
Carlyle preached the dignity of labour, the necessity 
of righteousness, the love of veracity, the hatred of 
shame. He is said by many to be a great teacher, a 
great helper for us, because he does so. But what is the 
due and eternal result of labour, veracity? - Happiness. 
And how are we drawn to them by one who, instead of making 
us feel that with them is happiness, tells us that perhaps 
we were predestined not to be happy but to be unhappy? 
("Emerson", CPVl, X, p. 183). 
Arnold's interpretation of the crim~~~ follows: 
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'v!herefore hear thou? Thou knoH'st, how fierce 
In these last days the sun hath burned; 
That the green water in the tanks 
Is to a putrid puddle turned; 
And the canal, which from the stream 
Of Samarcand is brought this way, 
Wastes, and runs thinner every day. 
'Now I at nightfall had gone forth 
Alone, and in a darksome place 
Under some mulberry-trees I found 
A little pool; and in short space, 
vii th all water that was there 
I filled my pitcher, and stole home 
Unseen; and having drink to spare, 
I hid the can behind the door, 
And went up on the roof to sleep. 
'But in the night, which was with wind 
And burning dust, again I creep 
Down, having fever, for a drink. 
'Now meanwhile had my brethren found 
The water-pitcher, where it stood 
Behind the door upon the ground, 
And called my mother; and they all, 
As they were thirsty, and the night 
Nost sultry, drained the pitcher there; 
That they sate ",ith it, in my sight, 
Their lips still wet, when I came down. 
'Now mark! I, bein€, fevered, sick 
(11ost unblest also), at that sight, 
Brake forth, and cursed them - dost thou hear? 
One was my mother - NOi-l, do right!' 
(Poems, p. 79) 
These lines bring to the mind the spiritual aridity and the concern of 
the individual with his own personal salvation. Water is an appropriate 
image for faith 0'Dover Beach'Q, in addition to that the word 'fever' is 
usually used by Arnold to describe action. In this poem one can clearly 
identify the traces of the influence of religious doctrines in the 
elementary forms of conduct and attitude towards life even where their 
authority as a dogma was on the decline. The poem actually shows that the 
form of religion remains but the spirit is vanishing a,,'ay. 
'Nay but, I swear, from this thy path 
I will not stir till I be judged!' 
Then they who stood about the king 
Drew close together and conferred; 
Till that the king stood forth and said: 
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'Before the priests thou shalt be heard.' 
But when the Ulemas were met, 
And the thing heard, they doubted not; 
But sentenced him, as the lavl is, 
To die by stoning on the spot. 
(Poems, p. 80) 
It is not a secret that all religious movements in Victorian England 
placed the emphasis on those parts of the Old Testament which praise formal 
legality as a sign of conduct pleasing to God. They held the theory that 
the Nosaic Law [not unlike .the Islamic Law J had only lost its validity 
through Christ in so far as it contained ceremonial or purely historical 
precepts applying only to the Jewish people, but that otherwise it had 
always been valid as an expression of the natural law, and must hence be 
retained. Arnold attacked this position very clearly in Culture and Anarchy: 
'''He that keepeth the laVl, happy is he;' 'Blessed is 
the man that feareth the Eternal, that delighteth 
greatly in his commandments,' - that is the He bre'.v notion 
of felicity; and, pursued with passion and tenacity, this 
notion would not let the Hebrew rest till, as is knoVln, 
he had at last got out of the law a network of prescriptions 
to enwrap his whole life, to govern every moment of it, 
every impulse, every action". 
(CP~I., v.- 165). 
Arnold wanted to counteract this spirit with a more humane one: 
The poem echoes recognisably phrases from the NevT Testament: 
Now the king charged us secretly: 
'Stoned must he be, the law stands so. 
Yet, if he seek to fly, give way; 
Hinder him not, but let him go.' 
So saying, the king took a stone, 
And cast it softly; - but the man, 
With a great joy upon his face, 
Kneeled down, and cried not, ne~~her ran. 
(Poems, p. 80) 
Arnold, in these lines, changes Burnes's description of how the king 
"threw the first stone" into "cast it softlyll: an echo of the biblical phrase: 
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"He that is without sin among you, let him first cast a stone".20 
Alan Roper interprets the poem in terms of class conflicts: the 
arbitrary division of society into haves and have-nots. "A division 
widened by the harshness of climate and terrain. The prevailing drought, 
plague, and poverty make of the haves, those who successfully exploit 
the labour of others to create for themselves cool sanctunriestl(Ibid., p.lll). 
He sees that the Vizier's speech shows "the always latent reference of 
Bokhara to Victorian England. Bokhara with its commercial preoccupation, 
with its material and political aridity, is fully consonant with the 
familiar picture of the Victorian desert, the spiritual life stifled by 
economic individualism" (Ibid., p. 113). 
The key word for the poem is "sick". The nature of its importance 
becomes obvious when we, says Roper, recall that physical disorder has 
long been an acceptable metaphor for spiritual malaise. 'l'he Vizier uses 
a metaphor which associates the physical conditions of Bokhara with its 
political and economic system: 
And these all, labouring for a lord, 
Eat not the fruit of their own hands; 
Which is the heaviest of all plagues, 
To that man's mind, who understands. 
As Paul wrote to Timothy: "The husbandman that laboureth must be first 
partaker of the fruit ll • 21 
On a different plane, there is another conflict going on - that which 
arises out of the contrast between the young king's humanitarian sympathy 
and the Vizier's cold assessment of the situation. The king is advised by 
his aged Vizier that his grief is unwise, for the man was nothing to him 
and, if he is to grieve for those unrelated to him, he will have no end 
of sorrow. Such an advice is better understood in the light of the later 
development of Calvinism where warnings against friendliness towards the 
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stranger, a cruel attitude towards the poor, and a general atmosphere of 
. . ft d 22 susp~c~ousness 0 en appeare • 
But who, through all this length of time, 
Could bear the burden of his years, 
If he for strangers pained his heart 
Not less than those who merit tears? 
Fathers we must have, wife and child, 
And grievous is the grief for these; 
This pain alone, which must be borne, 
Makes the head white, and bows the knees. 
But other loads than this his own 
One man is not well made to bear. 
(Poems, p. 81) 
Allover the world people are suffering from sickness, poverty, slavery, 
and war: "Wilt thou have pity on all these?" 
In his note-book, Arnold writes: "Our concerning ourselves with other 
men ought only to be a result of our world-insight and objective prudence -
and must not be confounded with our duty of self discipline and self-
cultivation". Applying this to the present poem, one becomes aware that 
although on one level the poem is about ethical and social problems, on 
a second level it is about the poet. It is analogous to "The Strayed 
Reveller", and the young king is the type of the Romantic poet who projects 
himself into the sufferings of others, just as the Vizier is the type of 
the classical poet who remains detached, remote, and aloof. This, in one's 
opinion, shows to what extent Arnold's idea of poetry is closely connected 
with life. 
For all the complexity of its thought, the poem does not appeal to 
many critics: G. Saintsbury, for instance, writes "Nor am lone of those 
who think very highly of the much longer 'Sick King in Dokhara,,,.23 
H.W. Paul says that the poem "is almost prosaic".24 The poem, however, was 
well received in Arnold's time. R.H. Hutton, in his comment on the poem in 
1870, wrote: "Of the poems which are called narrative, this is in my opinion 
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the only one, rightly so called, that is perfectly successful" (Dawson, p. 
228). W.M. Rossetti, in his comment on Arnold's poetry, writes: "We know few 
poems the style of which is more unaffectedly without labour, and to the 
purpose, than this" (Ibid., p. 62). J.A. Froude writes: "'The Sick King in 
Bokhara" ••• there was genuine insight into life and whatever is best and 
noblest in it - but along with this, there was often an elaborate obscurity" 
(Ibid., p. 86). 
Though the poem does not rise, in its poeticality, to the level 
Arnold achieved in "Dover Beach" or "The Scholar Gipsy", it is in content, 
a step on the road to this standard. The poem is Arnold's experiment in 
the dramatic form too: lt is a combination of narrative and dramatic forms, 
yet Arnold gives it a permanent place among the Narrative poems in 1869. In 
other words it is a step towards his ideal of the classical objectivity of 
Art he was to attempt in Merope,which is the subject of my discussion in 
the following pages. 
II 
The Second Stage (1850-1860) 
Critics who are sympathetic with Arnold usually advise readers, who 
wish to become fond of Arnold's poetry, to postpone Merope - his last 
elaborate work, till they have acquired a decided taste for him. For the 
poem is generally regarded as an uninspired performance - perfunctory, 
cold, destitute of poetical beauty. To Arnold's contemporaries Merope came 
as a disappointment. The reviews, however, were not hostile. On the 
contrary, from the weeklies to the big quarterlies, the sentiment was 
regret: "Every reviewer applauded Arnold's commitment to literature, his 
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desire to improve the climate for poetry, and his dedication to a new 
medium of expression. What reviewers failed to credit him with, says 
Carl Dawson, "was a successful example and an adequate theory" (Critical 
Heritage, p. 16). Arthur Dudley, the reviewer in the Revue des deux Mondes,2 5 
had indicated that Arnold's real gifts were for prose, and had anticipated 
his shift to essays and prose works. 
The poem is not lucky with our critics either. H. Paul, for instance, 
writes "It is the form without the spirit, the body without the soul" 
(Op. cit., p. 54). E.K. Chambers, to the same effect, says that "it is 
rather an academic exercise".26 S.P. Sherman, in his comment on the poem 
says "If its production was a mistake, it was, however, a mistake that 
Arnold was doomed to make. The heavenly Muse was perhaps absent during its 
composition, but the critical spirit drove him to the task".26 W.D. 
Anderson says "Possibly the chief service Herope can render is to put us on 
our guard against the common view of its author as a reliable interpreter 
of Sopholces and Athenian tragedy" (Op. cit., p.lll). M. Thorpe, in his 
comment on the poem, says "like the historical plays of Tennyson, Swinburne 
and Browning, Merope is a dead imitation, devoid of the living 
'affinity' between the past and the present which Arnold required in his 
'Advertisment' of 1854 ••• in Merope he had not only once again evaded his 
time, he had committed the far greater crime of suppressing his true poetic 
impulse in the interests of a restrictive theory" (Op. cit., p.64). 
The purpose of this reading is to show that if the poem fails, it 
is because of the fact that Arnold was trying, not to evade his time as 
Thorpe argues but to meet the age with all its complexities and problems 
in one work. The poem in one's view is the bridgs between the Greeks' use 
of myth and the contemporary works of O'Neill, Giraudoux, Anouilh, and 
specially Brecht. In its own way, Merope has some arresting virtues. At 
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least it shows the artist at work: perhaps one could learn from it 
Arnold's method of composition. To appreciate the poem one may ask two 
questions, Arnold, himself, asked in his comment on Hamlet: what world 
did Arnold resolve to place the poem's action and characters in? Do they 
admit of being placed there? - in other words, do they lend themselves to 
his resolve? 
During the time of writing Nerope Arnold wrote to a friend 
describing himself as "full of a tragedy of the time of the end of the 
Roman Republic - one of the most colossal times of the world, I think ••• 
it won't see the light, however, before 1857" (Letters, I, p. 49). It never 
saw the light - though Arnold explored the characteristios of those 
'colossal times' in his essays as one has shown. During that time he was 
appointed as Professor of Poetry at Oxford. He wished to align theory with 
practice. r1erope exemplifies that line with the greatest clearness: .l. t is 
his attempt at the "grand style". Arnold's critics l most reasonable objection 
was that no true poetry could be written to a prescription, however admirable. 
On July 25, 1857, he wrote to his sister, I'1rs Forster: "I am well in 
the middle of my Merope, and please myself pretty well though between 
indolence and nervousness I am a bad worker. What I learn in studying 
Sophocles for my present purpose is, or seems to me, wonderful; so far 
exceeding all that one would learn in years' reading of him without such 
a purpose. And what a man! what works! I must read Merope to you. I 
think and hope it will have what Buddha called the 'character of F'ixi ty' 
that true sign of the law" (Letters, I, p. 57). Again he writes to her 
"The poem (Merope J is a tragedy according to the celebrated definition 
which has not yet, so far as I know, given place to a better - 'Tragedy is 
the imitation of some action that is serious and entire and of proper 
magnitude, effecting through pity and fear the purification of these feelings 
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of the soul'" (Unpublished letters, p. 41). 
"Generally speaking," says Arnold to his sister, K., "the history, 
topography and natural history of Merc~ are faithful - that is so far as 
anything about Greece from one who has not seen it can be faithful" (Ibid., 
p. 36). There is no point in disputing that: the note-book for November 
and December, 1856, shows him at Merope. In December he enters on his 
reading list Sophocles' Electra, Voltaire's Merope, Aeschylus's Choephorae, 
Goethe's Iphigenia, Alfieri's Merope, and Milton's Samson. His work 
lasted well into the following year, because in September he is still 
at Merope. His reading list for the year clearly shows his preparation, 
as Tinker and Lowry have observed, both for the play and for the preface. 
In January, for example, Goethe's Iphigenia, Milton's Samson, and Alfieri 
again appear on his list; in February, Voltaire's prefaces; in March, Grote's 
History of Greece; in May, Sophocles' Ajax and Alfieri. For June and the 
two following months there are no entries; but in September he is still hard 
at his task, reading The Woman of Trachis, Pausanias - on whom he drew, 
heavily for local colour - and Apollodorus; in October, Sophocles' Oedipus, 
Clinton on the ancient Greek poets, Callimachus, F~bricius on Sophocles, 
Rigault's Querelle des anciens et modernes, and Muller's History of Greek 
Li terature; in November, Muller andGrote are continued, along with Aristotle's 
Poetics. In December, he again studies the Poetics and Voltaire's prefaces -
doubtless in relation to his own introduction. 
At last the play came out with a long preface attached to it. It 
dwells upon three things: First, the physical arrangement of the earliest 
Greek stage, showing how, as the Greek theatre developed, it dictated the 
state of its drama: demanding broad and simple effects, a minimum of shades 
of tone or gesture, unity, and a balanced symmetry - in short, "distinctness 
and depth of impression". Secondly, the importance of choosing traditional 
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stories and following the tradition as closely as possible. Finally, the 
errors in dramaturgy made by his predecessors, Maffei, Voltaire, and 
Alfieri. :But the most important thing is that he gives his intention in:' 
writing the play: 
I desired to try, therefore, how much of the effectiveness 
of the Greek poetical forms I could retain in an English 
poem constructed under the conditions of these forms; 
of those forms, too, in their severest and most definite 
expression, in their application to dramatic poetry. 
( CPW, I, p. 39) 
Saintsbury, in his comment on the play, says: "It is rather curious 
that the story of Merope should have been so tempting as, to mention 
nothing else, Maffei's attempt in Italian, Voltaire's in French, and this 
of Mr Arnold in English, show it to have been to modern admirers and 
would-be practitioners of the Classical drama: and the curiosity is of a tell-
tale kind" (Op. cit., p. 61). One would rather say that Arnold could not have 
chosen a better story so as to embody his ideas about his society: "The 
events on which the action of the drama turns belong to the period of 
transition from the heroic and fabulous to the human and historic age of 
Greece" (Poems, p. 400). 
With minor variations, the story as generally dramatised is this: Merope, 
the widowed queen of the murdered Heraclid Cresphontes, has saved her 
youngest son from the murderer and usurper, Polyphontes, and sent him out 
of the country. When he has grown up, and has secretly returned to Messina 
~ 
to take vengence, Polyphontes is pressing Merope to let bygones be 
~ 
bygones and marry him, so as to reconcile the jarring parties in the State. 
Aepytus, the son, to facilitate his reception, represents himself as a 
messenger charged to bring the news of his own death; and Merope, hearing 
this and believing the messenger to be also the assassin, obtains access to 
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the chamber where he is resting after his journey, and is about to murder 
her own sleeping son when he is saved by the inevitable anagnorisis. 
The party of Cresphontes is then secretly roused. Aepytus, at the sacrifice 
which the tyrant holds in honour of the news of his rival's death, snatches 
the sacrifical axe and 'kills Polyphontes himself. 
It was a lost play of Euripides that served as the basis for Merope. 
The story bears certain resemblances to the Electra of Sophocles, especially, 
as Anderson has rightly observed, in its final developments, and Arnold 
takes this playas his model. In his comment on the play, Anderson says: 
"His choice of Sophoclean treatment for a Euripidean theme is another matter. 
The two Electra plays show how differently these poets could present the 
same story ••• The Electra was a singularly dangerous model. For contemporary 
critics of Greek tragedy it has proved the most difficult of Sophoeles' 
works to interpret ••• Given these facts, one might expect Merope to be 
a pastiche. In a sense it is, since its materals derive at various times 
from all three of the great Athenian dramatists" (Op. cit., pp. 108-109). 
Perhaps, Arnold's dilemma in composing this play would be clearly 
conceived if one compares the Oresteia of Aeschylus, the Electra of 
Sophocles and the Electra of Euripides. ~or it is clear that Arnold 
conceived his Merope with his mind running on all these works: In the 
Oresteia the emphasis is on the pollution of the house by the murder of 
Agamemnon; Electra greets Orestes not only as the cleanser but the unifier -
the son who carries, through the bitter difficulties of the action, the 
loving kinship relations of a disrupted household. The insoluble difficulty 
is the need to cleanse and re-establish the house by its own norms, and the 
relation of the inevitable matricide to these norms and to other conceptions 
of justice. In Sophocles, the emphasis is much more on the personal feelings 
of Electra and Orestes, the motive of Clytemnestra's murder of Agamemnon is 
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in the same way personalised - it is not only a chain of events in the 
history of a house, but a compounded husband-murder and adultery; the 
reaction is then of a son and a daughter, as well as of an avenging and 
cleansing generation. In Euripides, the emphasis has again shifted: Electra 
is married to a farmer, and the vengeance and murder come as if from a 
different dimension, a tragedy necessarily but with a degree of bitterness 
and malignity breaking into an apparently settled life. Thus by trying to 
incorporate all these experiences Arnold ran the risk of having no 
character as well as the dilution of the dramatic intensity: a risk he 
sought to avoid by aiming at a Sophoclean tone. This meant concentrating on 
oharacter, and he did so; but he failed to give his protagonists the inner 
strength that drives an Oedipus or an Antigone. 
To take the most relevant example of all, the Electra who lives for 
vengeance is replaced by a Merope who doubts and hesitates and counts the 
forces of conscience. Her problem is choosing between Polyphontes\ 
liberal pragmatic ethic of compromise and the older ethic of absolute 
values, in this case the primitive right of revenge or justice. In the first 
half of the play she is chiefly opposed to Polyphontes and in the second 
half to Aepytus, and the revolution in her views comes in the recognition 
scene. 
The play does embody morality, to be sure. The ways in which it does 
so show how far Arnold had gone along his own path, ignoring not only 
Sophocles but Aristotle. His delicacy of feeling in setting aside the 
mythographer's tradition that Merope had married Polyphontes caused the 
introduction of a subplot: Polyphontes vainly courts his victim's widow. 
On other matters he sticks to tradition. He tells in the preface to 
Merope that tradition is "an unspeakable support" to the poet: "It gives 
him the feeling that he is treading on solid ground.... Its importance I feel 
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so strongly, that, where driven to invent in the false story told by Merope's 
son ••• of his own death, I could not satisfy myself until I discovered 
in Pausanias a tradition, which I took for my basis, of an Arcadian hunter 
drowned in the lake Stymphabus, down one of those singular Katabothra, or 
chasms in the limestone rock, so well known in Greece, in a manner similar 
to that in which Aepytus is represented to have perished" (CPW, I, p. 53). 
Aepytus, on the other hand, embodies the older ethic of absolute 
values. He is confident that his plan of murder is righteous. These values 
assert that a crime must be atoned for no matter how much further 
suffering its atonement begets. So, his position is religious. ~ut this 
raises a problem, which Arnold gives to the second chorus (because 
this tragic poem is, unfortunately, so little read, it is worth quoting 
the passage): 
The most are bad, wise men have said 
Let the best rule, they say again. 
The best, then, to dominion hath the right. 
Rights unconceded and denied, 
Surely, if rights, may be by force asserted -
May be, nay should, if for the general weal. 
The best, then, to the throne may carve his way, 
And strike opposers ~own, 
Free from all guilt of lawlessness, 
Or selfish lust of personal power; 
Bent only to serve virtue, 
Bent to diminish wrong. 
And truly,in this ill-ruled world, 
Well sometimes may the good desire 
To give to virtue her dominion due~ 
Well may he long to interrupt 
The reign of folly, usurpation ever, 
Though fenced by sanction of a thousand years! 
Well thirst to drag the wrongful ruler down; 
Well purpose to pen back 
Into the narrow path of right 
The ignorant, headlong multitude, 
Who blindly follow, ever, 
Blind leaders, to their bane! 
But who can say, without a fear: 
That best, who ought to rule, am I; 
The mob, who ought to obey, are these; 
I the one righteous, they the many bad? 
Who, without check of conscience, can aver 
That he to power makes way by arms, 
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Sheds blood, impressions, banishes, attains, 
Commits all dee.ds the guilty oftenst do, 
Without a single guilty thought, 
Armed for right only and the general good? 
Therefore, with censure unallayed, 
Therefore, with unexcepting ban, 
Zeus and pure-thought Justice brand 
Imperious self-asserting violence; 
Sternly condemn the too bold man, who dares 
Elect himself Heaven's destined arm; 
And, knowing well man's inmost heart infirm, 
However noble the committer be, 
His grounds however specious shown, 
Turn with averted eyes from deeds of blood. 
(Poems, pp. 415-416) 
These lines echo Arnold's ideas about civilisation and the manifestations 
of progress. One of the manifestations of progress, according to Arnold, 
is'~he love of liberty". 
Polyphontes stands "upon the threshold of old age", afraid of becoming 
a tyrant, yet voicing a tyrant's threat in his final speech. Arnold 
makes his character a mixture of good and evil, and, in so doing, gave to his 
work a totally un-Greek character. In a Greek tragedy the values are 
relatively clear, and the effect depends upon the inevitable and foreshadowed 
working out of the catastrophe. But here the values are not clear, and the 
interest rather depends upon the working out of the problem, which side 
is right, Polyphontes or Aepytus. The theme of the play is the complexity of 
the moral situation and the difficulty in politics of choosing between a 
pragmatic and an absolutistic ethic. It seems that the absence of value 
judgement as far as action is concerned is precisely what Arnold meant: 
to see an action or a character from a multitude of points of view, each 
presented as neither more nor less valid than the rest. It is a discipline in 
disinterestedness. Such a method is considered as "Brecht's real 
originality". 
In his opening speech, Polyphontes says: 
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Peace, peace is what I seek, and public calm; 
Endless extinction of unhappy hates, 
Union cemented for this nation's weal. 
(Poems, p. 405) 
His aim is good but what makes him pragmatic is his means to that end: 
he murdered his rival and thus violated a taboo. He, however, does not 
lack ~ logic in defending himself: 
Murder! - but what is murder? 
When a wretch 
For private gain or hatred takes a life, 
We call it murder, crush him, brand his name. 
But when for some great public cause, an arm 
Is, without love or hate, austerely raised 
Against a power exempt from common checks, 
Dangerous to all, to be but thus annulled -
Ranks any man with murder such an act? 
With grievous deeds, perhaps; with murder no! 
Find then suoh cause, the charge of murder falls -
Be judge thyself if it abound not here. 
(Poems, pp. 406-7) 
His motive for the act is very significant too: 
What we found here were tribes of fame obscure, 
Much turbulence, a~d little constancy, 
Precariously ruled by foreign lords 
From the Aeolian stock of Neleus sprung, 
A house once great, now dwindling in its sons. 
Such were the conquered, such the conquerors; who 
Had most thy husband's confidence? Consult 
His acts! the wife he chose was - full of virtues -
But an Arcadian princess, more akin 
To his new subjects than to us; his friends 
Were the Hessenian chiefs; the laws he framed 
Were aimed at their promotion, our decline. 
And, finally, this land, then half-subdued, 
Which from one central city's guarded, seat 
As from a fastness in the rocks our scant 
Handful of Dorian conquerors might have curbed, 
He parcelled out in five confederate states, 
Sowing his victors thinly through them all, 
},Iere prisoners, meant or not, among our foes. 
(Poems, p. 407) 
These lines echo the other great manifestation of progress: "The love 
of equality". 
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Undoubtedly, immense inequality of conditions and property 
is a defeat to the instinct of expansion; it depresses and 
degrades the inferior masses. The common people is and 
must be, as Tocqueville said, more uncivilised in aristocratic 
countries than in any others. A thousand arguments may be 
discovered in favour of inequality, just as a thousand 
arguments may be discovered in favour of absolutism. And the 
one insuperable objection to inequality is the same as the 
one insuperable objection to absolutism: namely, that 
inequality, like absolutism, thwarts a vital instinct, and 
being thus against nature, is against our humanisation. 
On the one side, in fact, inequality harms by pampering; on 
the other, by vulgarising and depressing. A system founded 
on it is against nature, and on the long run breaks down. 
(CPW, VIII, pp. 371-72) 
In lines that, in one's view, are as good as that of Iago, he says: 
I his chief kinsman, I his pioneer 
And champion to the throne, I honouring most 
Of men the line of Heracles, preferred 
The many of that lineage to the one; 
What his foes dared not, I, his lover dared; 
I at that altar, where mid shouting crowds 
He sacrificed, our ruin in his heart, 
To Zeus, before he struck his blow, struck mine -
Struck once, and awed his mob, and saved this realm. 
Murder let others call this, if they will; 
I, self-defence and righteous execution. 
(Poems, pp. 407-8) 
Still he has his affection for the victim: 
It needs no yearly offerings at his tomb 
To keep alive that memory in my heart -
It lives, and, while I see the light, will live. 
(Poems, p. 405) 
Polyphontes might more successfully have been developed into the 
tragic centre- being of "twofold colour" as Merope puts it "I find worth 
in thee, and badness too ••• a two-fold colour reigns in all" - he is 
potentially a good tragic hero. But his conflict is developed too much 
vis.a.vis Merope, not within himself, and he is absent from the central scene, 
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where Aepytus is discovered to !1erope. Over his corpse, Merope makes a 
funeral speech in which she weighs his badness with his goodness: 
Over thy corpse - triumph not, neither mourn, 
For I find worth in thee, and badness too. 
What mOud of spirit, therefore, shall we call 
The true one of a man - what way of life 
His fixed condition and perpetual walk? 
None, since a twofold colour reigns in all. 
But thou, my son, study to make prevail 
One colour in thy life, the hue of truth; 
That justice, that sage order, not alone 
Natural vengeance, may maintain thine act, 
And make it stand indeed the will of Heaven. 
(Poems, p .. 443) 
The content of the poem meets Arnold's demand that _ a subject should 
speak: 
Of truth, of grandeur, beauty, love and hope, 
And melancholy fear subdued by faith, 
Of blessed consolations in distress, 
Of moral strength and intellectual power, 
Of joy in widest commonalty' spread. 
These lines can be said to describe the content of the poem except the 
quality of melancholy. Only once one hears the true full note of Arnoldian 
melancholy: 
o Merope, how many noble thoughts, 
How many precious feelings of man's heart, 
How many loves, how many gratitudes, 
Do twenty years wear out, and see expire! 
(Poems, p. 406) 
Concerning the poem's concept of Form one would not add much to what 
Arnold said in its preface. In the choruses he sought to make antistrophe 
match strophe, and devised lyric meters which he believed had an effect 
comparable with that of the Greek prototypes: 
Some of the measures used in the choric songs of my 
tragedy are ordinary measures of English verse: others are 
not so; but it must not be supposed that these last are 
the reproduction of any Greek choric measures. So to adapt 
Greek measures to English verse is impossible: what I have 
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done is to try to follow rhythms which produced on my 
own feeling a similar impression to that produced on it by 
the rhythms of Greek choric poetry. In such an endeavour, 
when the ear is guided solely by its own feeling, there is 
I know, a continual risk of failure and of offence. I believe, 
however, that there are no existing English measures which 
produce the same effect on the ear, and therefore on the mind, 
as that produced by many measures indispensable to the 
nature of Greek lyric poetry. He, therefore, who would obtain 
certain effects obtained by that poetry, is driven to invent 
new measures, whether he will or no. 
(CPW, I, pp. 62-63) 
Arnold wrote a good deal to his family and to others in defence of it, 
and at one time attempted to get Helen Faucit to produce it on the stage. 
In the summer of 1859, he was in Paris associating with that circle of 
French critics whose praise was for him the final crown. He wrote to 
his wife on August 21: "Villemain brought out Nerope, which he likes, 
naturally, more than the English do". As late as 1865 he still thought 
there was a certain solidity in its composition, which made it look as 
well as five years before. The poem, in my view, is interesting and a good 
example of the artist's sincerity and dedication to his art. It is, also, 
a fine example for the would-be-dramatist to emulate. 
III 
The Third Stage (1860-1888) 
The third phase in Arnold's development is characterised by its 
positiveness. After all, he was much more drastically brought face to 
face with the seamy side of life in England after he became an Inspector of 
Schools in 1851. From that time 28 signs of positiveness in 
his attitude to life began to appear. In a letter to Clough - 7 June, 1852, 
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he writes: "still nothing can absolve us from the duty of doing all we can 
to keep alive our courage and activity" (eL, p. 132). And by the year 
1861, it was not difficult to abstract specific reforms from such essays 
as "Democracy", "Equality", and "Falkland". However, it remains to be 
stressed that Arnold's ultimate significance does not lie in such matters. 
Arnold, undoubtedly, has had periods of intense doubt and despair. As 
one has shown, the old order was breaking down. The new situation was bound 
to create a deep feeling of insecurity, powerlessness, doubt, aloneness, 
and anxiety. It is particularly important, here, to understand the 
significance of doubt and the attempts to silence it, because this is not 
only a problem concerning Arnold but it has remained one of the basic 
problems of modern man. Doubt is the starting-point of modern philosophy: 
it had a most powerful stimulus on the development of modern philosophy 
and science. 
In point of theory, there are two types of doubt: rational and 
irrational. Rational doubt can be solved by rational answers: while the 
irrational one would not disappear as long as man does not overcome his 
isolation and as long as his place in the world has not become a meaningful 
one in terms of his human needs. In Arnold's Case the change from doubt 
to certainty, far from being contradictory, has a causal relation. By 
understanding the nature of Arnold's doubt this change will look less 
surprising: his was a rational doubt which was rooted in the freedom of 
thinking and which dares to question established views. This rational 
doubt can be cured by rational answers and more knowledge. But there are 
some questions that are difficult to answer either philosophically or 
scientifically. among these are: Man's fate and the questions pertaining to 
the problems of the absolute other (God). On this plane, Arnold's 
melancholy persists: 
,. 
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We, in some unknown POvier' s employ, 
Nove on a rigorous line ••• 
( llstanzas in Nemory of the Author 
of'Obermann''') 
"Line" is similarly used in "Too Late" as a symbol of the predestination 
of the life course: 
Each on his own strict line we move, 
And some find death exe they find love; 
So far apart their lives are thrown 
From the twin soul which halves their own. 
Again he writes that the earth 
Is on all sides o'ershadow'd by the high 
Uno'erleap'd Nountains of Necessity. 
("To a Republican Friend - Contd.") 
Man's freedom to act as well as to influence the course of the world is 
smaller than he thinks. Ideas of this category continued 'Nith Arnold as 
a permanent source of melancholy: the same with all great poets. For 
even if they speak in hopeful terms it is in the last analysis a sort of 
resignation: Ip la sua volontade ~ nostra pace. 
Or Shakespeare's 
• •• Nen mus t endure 
Their going hence, even as their corning hither; 
Ripeness is all. 
Arnold's vexation at the sort of unintelligent human behaviour that 
resulted in the great urban slums of Victorian Britain is another source 
of despair: 
Our minds 
Are confused as the cries which we hear, 
Changing and shot as the sights which we see. 
And we say that repose has fled 
For ever the course of the river of Time. 
That cities will crovld to its edge 
In a blacker, incessanter line; 
That the din will be more on its banks, 
Denser the trade on its streams, 
Flatter the plain where it flows, 
Fiercer the sun overhead. 
("Future", II. 55-56) 
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And of ilian in the new situation, he writes in "A Summer Night", 
For most men in a brazen prison live, 
Where, in the sun's hot eye, 
With heads bent o'er their toil, they languidly 
Their lives to some unmeaning task-work give, 
Dreaming of nought beyond their prison-wall. 
And as, year after year, 
Fresh products of their barren labour fall 
From their tired hands, and rest 
Never yet comes more near, 
Gloom settles slowly down over their breast ••• 
This picture might look pessimistic, but in my view, it is not an utterly 
hopeless picture of man. It is worthy of notice that Arnold, in speaking 
about the situation of man on the social level, defines it in terms of 
opposites rather than negatives. According to laws of logic - The Law 
of Excluded Middle, there is middle ground between opposites (ex. hope and 
despair). According to the same law, there is no middle ground between a 
term and its neg2tive (ex. hope and 'unhope'). 
Change was inevitable: new forces came into the stage of events. 
J.R. Newman, in a letter to Arnold, says: "Of course the existence of the 
Communists makes the state of things nOi'[ vastly different from what it 
was in the Ivliddle Ages" (Unpublished Letters, [December, 1871J, p. 61). 
Arnold knows that. In one of his essays - "Equality," Arnold says that "The 
well-being of the many comes out more and more distinctly, in proportion as 
time goes on, as the object we must pursue. An individual or a class, 
concentrating their efforts upon their own well-being exclusively, do but 
beget troubles both for others and for themselves also. No individual life 
can be truly prosperous, passed as Obermann says, in the midst of men who 
suffer; passte au milieu des gintrations qui souffrent. To the noble soul, 
it cannot be happy; to the ignoble, it cannot be secure. Socialistic and 
communistic schemes have generally, however, a fatal defect; they are content 
with too low and material a standard of well-being. That instinct of 
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perfection, which is the master-power in humanity, always rebels at this, 
and frustrates the work. ~lany are to be made partakers of well-being, 
true; but the ideal of well-being is not to be, on that accoUnt, lowered 
and coarsened" (CPW, VIII, [.1 861J , pp. 289-90). 
Arnold's aim, as one has shown, is the humanisation of man~ eivilisation 
is the humanisation of man in society. To be humanised is to comply with 
the true law of our human nature ••• "To keep our measure, and to hold 
fast our end. To be humanised is to make progress towards this, our true 
and full humanity. And to be civilised is to make progress towards this in 
civil society; in that civil society 'without which,' says Burke, '~an 
could not by any possibility arrive at the perfection of which nature is 
capable, nor even make a remote and faint approach to it'. To be the most 
civilised of nations, therefore, is to be the nation which comes nearest 
to human perfection, in the state which that perfection essentially demandsl\ 
(CPW, VIII, p. 286). He made it his task. To this effect Arnold says, in 
January, 1879: 
\·/hat interests me is English civilisation; and our politics 
in their present state do not seem to me have much bearing 
upon that. English civilisation - the humanising, the 
bringing into one harmonious and truly humane life, of the 
whole body of English society - that is what interests me. 
I try to be a disinterested observer of all which really 
helps and hinders that. Certain hindrances seem to me to be 
present with us, and certain helps to be wanting to us. An 
isolated observer may easily be mistaken, and his observations 
greatly require the test which other minds can exert upon 
them. 
("Ecce, Convertimur ad Gentes", 
CPW, IX, pp. 86-7) 
Again, he writes to the same effect in "The Future of Liberalism" (1880): 
\ 
And perhaps I may be allowed to compare myself with Cobbett 
so far as this: that whereas his politics were governed by 
a master-thought, the thought of the bad condition of the 
English labourer, so mine, too, are governed by a master-
thought, by a different one from Cabbott's. The master-thought 
by which my politics are governed is rather this - the thought 
of the bad civilisation of the English middle class. 
(CP1tl, IX, p. 137) 
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To concentrate on the English middle class is not surprising. In 
any society the spirit of the whole culture is determined by the spirit 
of those groups that are most powerful in that society. This is so partly 
because these groups have the power to control the educational system, schools, 
churches, press, theatre, and thereby to imbue the whole population with 
their own ideas; furthermore, these powerful groups carry so much prestige 
that the lower classes are more than ready to accept and imitate their 
values and to identify themselves psychologically. To this effect Arnold 
writes in July, 1881: 
In England, too, power is passing away from the now 
governing class. The part to be taken in English life by 
the middle class is different from the part which the middle 
class has had to take hitherto - different, more public, 
more important. Other and greater functions devolve upon 
this class than of old; but its defective civilisation makes 
it unfit to discharge them. It comesto the new time and to 
its new duties, it comes to them, as its flatterers will never 
tell it, but as it must nevertheless bear to be told and well 
to consider - it comes to them with a defective type of 
religion, a narrow range of intellect and knowledge, a stunted 
sense of beauty, a low standard of manners. 
(IX, p. 296) 
Arnold, in his attempt to realise this aim, has come to tvlO ne\oJ' 
ideas: first, that the most immediate issues in the question - how to live, 
are those that are most concrete. Second, the idea that all human values, 
as human emotions, are of social growth if not of social origin. Out of 
this conviction he says: 
I have felt convinced that for the progress of our 
civilisation, here in England, three things were above all 
necessary:- a reduction of those immense inequalities of 
condition and property amongst us, of which our land-system 
is the base; a genuine municipal system; public schools 
for the middle classes. 
( CPl,oj, IX, p. 7 ) 
Again he writes: 
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An acceleration of progress in the spread of ideas of 
this kind [common good], a decline of vitality in 
institutions where the opposite ideas were paramount, marks 
the close of a period. 
(CPW, X, p. 238) 
To begin with Arnold's idea of Equality, he argues in favour of it on 
the basis of "natural reason" and "practical experience": 
For modern civilisation some approach to equality is necessary, 
and that an enormous inequality like ours is a hindrance to 
our civilisation •••• If our inequality is really unfavourable 
to our civilisation, sooner or later this will be perceived 
generally, and our inequality will be abated. It will be 
abated by some measure far beyond the scope of our present 
politics, whether by the adoption of the French law of 
bequest, which now prevails so widely upon the continent, or 
as Mr JVlill thought preferable, by fixing the maximum of 
property which anyone individual may take by bequest or 
inheritance, or in some other manner. But this is not likely 
to corne in our time, nor, is it to be desired that such a 
change should corne while we are yet ill prepared for it. 
(CPW, IX, pp. 11-12) 
This is Arnold's social idea: 
The great men of culture are those who have a passion for 
diffusing, for making prevail, for car~Jing from one end 
of society to the other, the best knowledge, the best ideas 
of their time; who laboured to divest knowledge of all that 
was harsh, uncouth, difficult, abstract, professional, 
exclusive; to humanise it, to make it efficient outside 
the clique of the cultivated and learned, yet still remaining 
the best knowl~dge and thought of the time, and a true 
source, therefore, of sweetness and light. 
(Culture and Anarchy, ~PW., V, 113) 
As for the second point - a genuine municipal system, it arises from 
Arnold's conviction that the principal transforming force at work in 
Western society is the movement towards democracy. In his first published 
essay on a political topic, Bngland and the Italian Question (1859), he 
describes the time as one "when the masses of the European population begin 
more and more to make their voice heard respecting their country's affairs 
... when sovereigns and statesmen must more and more listen to this voice, 
can less and less act without taking it into account" (CPW, I, p. 81). 
But, 
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But still thinks that the masses are yet ill prepared for it: 
For the peasant, moreover, for the agricultural labourer, 
municipal life is a first and invaluable stage in political 
education, more helpful by far ••• than the exercise of the 
parliamentary franchise. 
(IX, pp. 12-13) 
The difficulty for democracy is, how to find and keep high 
ideals. The individuals who compose it are, the bulk of 
them, persons who need to follow an ideal, not to set one; 
and one ideal of greatness, high feeling, and fine culture, 
which an aristocracy once supplied to them, they love by 
the very fact of ceasing to be a lower order and becoming a 
democracy. Nations are not truly great solely because the 
individuals composing them are numerous, free, and active; 
but they are great when these numbers, this freedom, and 
this activity are employed in the service of an ideal higher 
than that of an ordinary man, taken by himself. Our society 
is probably destined to become much more democratic; who or 
what will give a high tone to the nation then? That is the 
grave question. 
("Democracy", CP\OT, II, pp. 17-18) 
Arnold's answer to this question is the state as defined by Burke: 
"Do not suffer yourselves, then, to be misled by declamations against 
the state, against bureacracy, centralisation, socialism, and all the rest 
of it. The state is just what Burke very \>lell called it, long before 
~I. Gambett~: the nation in its collective character. To use the state is 
simply to use co-operation of a superior kind" (IX, pp. 15-16). Arnold 
wished to make the State, as he puts it in a letter to Fontan~s, "the organ 
of the best self and highest reason of the community, rather than to reduce 
the State to insignificance, and to cultivate, in fact, the American ideal" 
(Letters, II, p. 150). \ In another letter to Fontanes, Arnold says: "I 
suppose your thoughts, in France, must turn a good deal upon the over-
meddling of the state, and upon the need of developing more the action of 
individuals. With us the mischief has, I am convinced, been the other way. 
The state has not enough shown a spirit of initiative, and individuals have 
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too much thought that it sufficed if they acted with entire liberty ••• 
action at once so resolute and so unintelligent" (Ibid., pp. 149-50). 
Arnold was convinced that the affairs of a country tend to be 
lit 
more democratic everyday, like England, vrill be taken up by the middle 
classes who are still unprepared for the new responsibilites. Hence, 
comes his insistence on the last point - schools for middle class: How 
lable. 
are, asks Arnold, they to be made avail YJell, schools are something. 
Schools are not everything; and even public schools, when you get them, 
may be far from perfect. Our public elementary schools are far from perfect. 
But they throw into circulation year by year among the 
working classes - and here is the greatest merit of Mr 
Forster's Act - a number of young minds trained and intelligent, 
such as you never got previously; and this must tell in 
the long run. Our public secondary schools, when vie get them, 
may be far from perfect. But they will throw into circulation 
year by year, &~ong the middle classes, a number of young 
people vlith minds instructed and enlarged as they never are 
now, when their schools are, both SOCially and intellectually, 
the most inadequate that fall to the lot of any middle class 
among the civilised nations of Europe. And the improvement 
so wrought must tell in the end, and will gradually fit the 
middle classes to understand better themselves and the world, 
and to taxe their proper place, and to grasp and treat real 
politics - politics far other than their politics of Dissent, 
when seem to me quite played out. This will be a work of 
time. Do not suppose that a great change of this kind is to 
be effected off hand. But we may make a beginning for it at 
once, and a good beginning, by public schools for the middle 
classes. 
("Ecce Convertimur ad Gentes", CPH, 
IX, pp. 17-18) -
Arnold's "great desire", as Le says to his sister Fan, "in education is 
to get a few good books universally taught and read" (Letters, II, p. 142). 
With the passage of time, Arnold came to learn the sense of the 
slovmess and of the natural growth of things, of their gradual evolution 
out of small beginnings: the sense that is expressed by Joseph de I1aistre' s 
maxim: "Aucune grande chose n'eut de grande commencements" - (Nothing 
great ever began great). To this effect he \vri tes to M.E. Grant Duff, 11P: 
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I more and more learn the extreme slowness of things, 
and that though we are all disposed to think that everything 
will change in our lifetime, it will not. Perhaps we shall end 
our days in the tail of a return current of popular religion, 
both ritual and dogmatic. 
(Ibid., p. 161) 
Time, however, did not fail Arnold. He lived to see a marked change 
in the Time-Spirit: the growing desire for amusement and pleasure. At that 
time [March, l881J he wrote to H. Fontan'es: "The growing desire, throughout 
the community, for amusement and pleasure, the wonoerful relaxation, in 
the middle class, of the old strictness as to theatres, danCing, and such 
things, are features which alarm many people; but they have their good 
side. They belong to this revolution of which I speak. The awakening demand 
for beauty, a demandso little made in this country for the last century 
and more, is another sign of this revolution, and a clearly favonrable Sign 
of it" (Letters, II, p. 140). 
Arnold's strong conviction that art and letters are great civilisers 
of nations as well as the two main landmarks by which one can assign to 
nations their place in the history of human intellect, made him to choose 
the state of the theatre to gauge the development in the time spirit: 
We are at the end of a period, and we have to deal with the 
facts and symptoms of a new period on which we are entering; 
and prominent among these fresh facts and symptoms is the 
irresistibility of the theatre (p. 791 ••. 1 see the emancipated 
youth of both sexes delighting in it· [modern drama of PariS]; 
the new and clever newspapers, which push on the work of 
emancipation and serve as devoted missionaries of the gospel 
of the life of Paris and of the ideal of the average sensual 
man, delighting in it. And in this condition of affairs I 
see the middle class beginning to arrive at the theatre again 
after an abstention of two centuries and more; arriving eager 
and curious, but a little bewildered. 
("The French Play in London", 
CPW, IX, p. 81 ) 
Arnold, in choosing theatre to measure the progress in the 'I'ime-Spiri t, 
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was right: the correlation between the flourishing of theatre and epochs 
of civilisation is, historically, an established fact (ex. Athens and 
the Elizabethan age). Theatre promotes, as well as flourishes in, the 
growth of a tolerant spirit; that spirit which is the offspring of an 
enlarged knowledge; a spirit patient of adversities of habits and opinions. 
It is, above all, an art whose essence is the dialogue technique: where 
two or more than one point of view are presented. This develops the 
people's critical spirit; the objective search for the law of things; 
to judge and choose by the rule of reason, not by the impulse of 
prejudice or caprice. The dialogue technique, because of its capacity of 
presenting an argument with complete disinterestedness, was used not only 
by philosophers [Plato and Hume] but also scientists [;alileoJ. Arnold 
used to think in these terms: 
We (says Arnold] know how the Elizabethan theatre had 
its cause in an ardent zest for life and living, a bold 
and large curiosity, a desire for a fuller, richer existence, 
pervading this nation at large, as they pervaded other 
nations, after the long mediaeval time of obstruction and 
restraint. But we know, too~ how the great middle class of 
this nation, alarmed at grave symptoms which showed themselves 
in the new movement, drew back, made choice for its spirit 
to live at one point, instead of living, or trying to 
live, at many; entered, as I have so often said, the prison 
of Puritanism, and had the key turned upon its spirit there 
for two hundred years. Our middle class forsook the 
theatre. 
(IX, p. 79) 
The English theatre reflected no more the aspiration of a great 
community for a fuller and richer sense of human existence: 
We have no modern drama. Our vast society is not at present 
homogeneous enough for this - not sufficiently united, even 
any large portion of it, in a common view of life, a common 
ideal, capable of serving as basis for a modern English drama. 
(Ibid., p. 78) 
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To sum up. Arnold in the first stage f" up to 1849J of his development 
has concerned himself with the manifestations of the phenomenon of alienation. 
In this stage, his poetry portrays states of loneliness, confusion, 
separateness, and incompleteness: "habits, ties, and associations [that] 
are broken". It shows emotions of loss, pain, grief, death, 'the transience 
of both glory and happiness, the abiding pathos of young death; the manifold 
sorrow of man; the pathetic vicissitude of man; the inward petrifaction 
caused by grief too deep for tears'; and, above all, the 'feeling of 
depression, the feeling of ennui'. 
In the second stage 5850-1860 J ' though overlapping with the first 
one, Arnold concerns himself with the why of things as well as the what 
of the first stage: the breakdown of faith as a result of a narrow and defective 
conception of religion; and the growth of the city that produced what is now 
described as 'the great urban slums of Victorian Britain'. 
"'For [says Arnold] without the knowledge of why, of the 
grounds or reasons of things, there is no possibility of 
not being deceived'. How countless are the deceived and 
deceiving from this cause~ Nay, and the fanatics of the 
what, the neglectors of the why, are not unfrequently men 
of genius; they have the temperament which influences, 
which prevails, which acts magnetically upon men. So 
we have the Philistine of genius in religion - Luther, the 
Philistine of genius in politics - Cromwell; the Philistine 
in genius in Literature - Bunyan". 
("Falkland", CPW, VIII, p. 206) 
Finally, the third stage of Arnold's development [1860-1886] is 
characterised by its positiveness. In it he addresses himself to the 
question: what replaces this situation? But Arnold, by addressing himself 
to the why of things, ran the risk of jeopardising the balance between the 
affective and cognitive aspects of his nature: there is much reasoning 
involved in the why of things. Thus gradually the poetic instinct gave way to 
the critical one and consequently poetry to demonstrative prose writing. "From 
this time 8867] forward [ArnOld] writes very little verse buj is increasingly 
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widely known for his controversial social and religious writings" (Poems, 
p. XX). The most important work, in my opinion, of this stage is 
Culture and Anarchy~with which the rest of this chapter is concerned. 
Culture and Anarchy among Arnold's ~rose writings is like his 
"Dover Beach" or "The Scholar-Gipsy" among his poetical works: both bring 
together Arnold's lines of thought on God, nature and human life. It grew 
directly out of the political restlessness of England in the mid-nineteenth 
century, a restlessness that came in part from the rapid industrialisation 
of the country with its consequent depression of the working class, and 
that brought the country, as many people believed, to the brink of 
revolution. Contrary to what mOOlfreaders suggest, Arnold argued from a 
definite stance: his idea of perfection: "What we want is a fuller harmonious 
development of our humanity, a free play of thought upon our routine notions, 
spontanei ty of consciousness" (Culture and Anarchy,.QE;i., V, 191). Arnold's 
search for authority in human affairs, his search for a central organising 
thesis for life, a holistic principle around which all sides of life can be 
organised, is based on this concept of the perfection: a harmonious 
development of man's humanity and his society. He arrived at the idea of 
perfection through his idea of history and that of human nature. 
For Arnold, the course of history is not mysterious, but neat and 
orderly, now one thing and now another, according to time and place. There 
are epochs of "expansion" or "Hellenism" and of "Concentration" or "Hebraism". 
"Hell£nism", the urgent need in Arnold's own time, would have been in the 
Dark Ages unsound at that particular moment of man's development. Different 
virtues and different measures require to be insisted on in different 
countries. 
I 
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No doubt, mankind makes in general its progress in a 
fashion which gives at one time full swing to one of these 
groups of instincts, at another time to the other; and 
man's faculties are so interwined, that when his moral side, 
or the current of forces which we call Hebraism, is 
uppermost, this side will manage somehow to provide, or 
appear to provide, satisfaction for his intellectual needs; 
and when his intellectual side, and the current of force 
which we call Hellenism, is uppermost, this again will provide, 
or appear to provide, satisfaction for man's moral needs. 
But sooner or later it becomes manifest that when the two 
sides of humanity proceed in this fashion of alternate 
preponderance, and not of mutual understanding and balance, the 
side which is uppermost does not really provide in a 
satisfactory manner for the needs of the side which is 
_undermost, and a state of confusion is, sooner or later, the 
result. The Hellenic half of our nature, bearing rule, 
makes a sort of provision for the Hebrew half, but it turns 
out to be an inadequate provision; and again the Hebrew 
half of our nature, bearing rule, makes a sort of provision for 
the Hellenic half, but this, too, turns out to be an inadequate 
provision. The true and sIDooth orderof humanity's development 
is not reached in either way. 
(Culture and Anarchy, ~., V, 177). 
Arnold has a doctrine of human nature which is the counterpart of this 
doctrine of history. Man, like the world itself and its history, is a 
complex of different elements which are readily brought together into a 
simple and natural unity. These are the facts not at all recondite, very 
far from it , touched upon above. We set ourselves to enumerate the powers 
which go to the building of human life, and say that they are the power 
of conduct, the power of intellect and knowledge, the power of beauty, and 
the power of social life and manners. Human nature is built up by these 
powers; we have the need for them all. In close analysis of these powers, one 
finds that they are but Hellenism, whose governing idea is spontaneity of 
consciousness; and Hebraism, whose governing idea is strictness of 
conscience. One might call this Arnold's discovery of the law of human 
development. 
Arnold takes his concept of perfection and tests the prevailing schools 
of thought, institutions, social and religious, against this concept. To 
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this effect he writes: "We are often supposed t when we criticise by the 
help of culture some imperfect doing t or other, to have in our eye some well-
known rival plan of doing, which we want to serve and recommend" (QE[.,V,2!4)~ 
"Culture tends always thus to deal with the men of a system, disciples, 
of a school; with men like Comte or, the late Mr Buckle, or Mr Mill" 
(Idid., p.111). "In the same way let us judge the religious organisations 
which we see all around us" (Ibid., P.102): 
And all we have been saying and indeed any glance at the 
world around us, shows that with us, with the most respectable 
and strongest part of us, the ruling force is now, and 
long has been, a Puritan force - the care for fire a.nd 
strength t strictness of conscience t Hebraism, rather than 
..• \,-.,,,,:-"';j~ 
the care for sweetness and lightt spontaneity of consciousness, 
Hellenism (p. 179). Puritanism was perhaps necessary to 
develop the moral fib-re of the English race t nonconformity 
to break the yoke of ecclesiastical domination over men's 
minds and to prepare the way for freedom of thought in the 
distant future; still culture points out that the harmonious 
perfection of generations of Puritans and nonconformists has 
been, in consequence, sacrificed (P.105). The Puritan's 
ideal of perfection remains narrow and inadequate (p.103). 
What, now, can be the reason of this undeniable provencialism 
of the English Puritans and Protestant nonconformists(-
provincialism which has two main types - a bitter type and 
a smug type - but which in both its types is vulgarising, and 
thwarts the full perfection of our humanit~ Men of genius 
and character are born and reared in this medium as in any 
other. From the faults of the mass such men will always be 
comparatively free, and they will always excite our interest; 
yet in this medium they seem to have a special difficulty in 
breaking through what bounds them, ~~d in developing their 
totality (p.238). I say that when our religious organisations -
which I admit to express the most considerable effort after 
perfection that our race has yet made- land us in no better 
result than this, it is high time to examine carefully their 
idea of perfection, to see whether it does not leave out of 
account sides and forces of human nature which we might turn 
to great use; whether it would not be more operative if it 
were more complete (P.i04) 
For the Ccm.tists, Arnold puts two rhetorical questions, in his work 
"Schools and Universities on the Continent", which come close to what is to 
be considered the starting-point of his argument against them in Culture and 
Anarchy. "Who will deny that England has life and progress? but who will also 
-373 -
deny that her course begins to show signs of uncertainty and embarrassment?tt 
Arnold, here, is clearly defending Hellenism, but with emphasis on its 
superiority to the kind of individuality so strongly advocated by Mill. 
"Freedom [says Arnold] was one of those things which we thus worshipped in 
itself, without enough regarding the ends for which freedom is to be desired" 
(Ibid., P.i??). This brings his argument to the problem of the relation 
of the individual as well as closer to the notion of the Sta.te of which he 
says: 
We have not the notion, so familiar on the Continent and to 
antiquity, of the State - the nation in its collective and 
corporate character, entrusted with stringent powers for 
the general advantage, and controlling individual wills in the 
name of an interest wider than that of individuals. We say, 
what is very true, that this notion is often made 
instrumental to tyranny; we say that a State is in reality 
made up of the individuals who compose it. (C1'lP", -V,117). 
Against the notion of State, Arnold tests the three classes - the aristocracy, 
the middle class and the working class: 
Our leading class is an aristocracy, and no aristocracy 
likes the notion of a State-authority greater than itself, with 
a stringent administrative machinery superseding the 
decorative inutilities of lord-lieutenancy, deputy-lieutenancy, 
and the posse comitatus, which are all in its own hands (PP.11'7-18) 
Our middle class, the great representative of trade and 
dissent, with its maxims of every man for himself in business, 
every man for himself in religion, dreads a powerful 
administration which might somehow interfere with it (Ibid.,118). 
The working-class ••• according to our definition (must) 
go with the Philistines, because it is its class and its 
class instinct which it seeks to affirm, its ordinary self, 
not its best self; and it is a machinery, an industrial 
machinery, and power and pre-eminence and other external goods, 
which fill its thoughts, and not an inward perfection (Ibid., 
p. 143). 
The guide which Arnold offers to his countrymen for escape from their 
difficulties is culture; in one of its essential meanings culture is for him 
the knowledge of the best that has been thought and said; in this best the 
Nicomachean Ethics has a high place; and it is tQ the Ethics that Arnold 
turns for the method of social analysis: 
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The whole scope of the essay (Culture and Anarchy) is 
to recommend culture as the great help out of our present 
difficulties; culture being a pursuit of our total 
perfection by means of getting to know, on all the matters 
which must concern us, the best which has been thought and 
said in the world; and through this knowledge, turning a 
stream of fresh and free thought upon our stock notions 
and habits, which we now follow staunchly but mechanically, 
vainly imagining that there is a virtue in following them 
staunchly which makes up for the mischief of following 
them mechanically. 
(Ibid., pp.233-34) 
'Culture, which is the study of perfection, leads us ••• to conceive of true 
human perfection as a harmonious perfection, developing all sides of our 
humanity; and as a general perfection, developing all parts of our society.' 
At this time we see 'the tendency in us to Hebraise, as we call it; that 
is, to sacrifice all other sides of our being to the religious side. This 
tendency has its cause in the divine beauty &~d grandeur of religion, and 
bears affecting testimony to them. But we have seen that it has dangers 
for us, we have seen that it lends to a narrow and twisted growth of our 
religious side itself, and to a failure in perfection (p. 111). 
Now the force which we have so much neglected, Hellenism, 
may be liable to fail in moral strength and earnestness, 
but by the law of its nature - the very same law which makes 
it sometimes deficient in intensity when intensity is 
required - it opposes itself to the notion of cutting our 
being in two, of attributing to one part the dignity of 
dealing with the one thing needful, and leaving the other 
part to take its chance, which is the bane of Hebraism. 
Essential in Hellenism is the impulse to the development of the 
whole man, to connecting and harmonising all parts of him, 
perfecting all, leaving none to take their chance. 
The characteristic bent of Hellenism, as has been said, 
is to find the intelligible law of things, to see them in true 
nature and as they really are. 
(Ibid., P70 184). 
Therefore, the true business of the friends of culture now is, 
to dissipate this notion of Hebraism and any other sort of fetish, to 
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spread the belief in right reason and to allow their thought and 
consciousness to play on their stock notions and habits disinterestedly 
and freely to get men to try, in preference to staunchly acting with 
imperfect knowledge, to obtain some sounder basis of knowledge on which 
to act: 
The sheer desire to see things as they are, natural and 
proper in an intelligent being, appears as the ground of 
it [Cul tureJ. There is a view in which all the love of our 
neighbour, the impulses towards action, help, and beneficence, 
the desire for removing human error, clearing human confusion, 
and diminishing human misery, the noble aspiration to 
leave the world better and happier than we found it -
motives eminently such as are called social - come in as 
part of the grounds of culture, and the main and pre-eminent 
part. 
(Ibid., p. 91) 
vfuat accounts for his power as intellectual deliver(~ of his age, 
in Culture ~~d Anarchy, however, is not his philosophic position but his 
strategies - his skill, as a man of letters, in marshalling the devices 
of language so as to viviWideas and to permeate the minds of their readers 
with them. The work falls in the category of rhetoric: meaning plus 
style, what plus how. Through the medium of rhetoric he mediates a view of 
the world as well as a habit of mind. Let us see how this is done. 
His method was to persuade his enemies into discussion and then to use 
irony to show that their position is absurd. Thus he vITites to his mother, 
in October, 1863, saying: "It is very animating to think that one at 
last has a chance of getting at the English public. Such a public as it is, 
and such a work as one wants to do with it! Partly nature, partly time 
and study, have also by this time taught me thoroughly the precious truth 
that everything turns upon one's exercising the power of persuasion, of 
charm; that without this all fU~J, energy, reasoning power, acquirement, 
are throvm away and only render their owner more miserable. Even in one's 
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ridicule one must preserve a SHeetness and good-humour" (Letters, 1-, p.20l). 
fiIany of Arnold's opponents went unaware into his trap. Among them 
were Harrison, Sedgwick and above all the dissenting middle class: "Now I 
have (says Arnold] to do a sort of pendant to 'Culture and its Enemies', 
to be called 'Anarchy and Authority'... It ... lill amuse me to do it, as I 
have many things to say; and Harrison, Sedgwick, and others, who have 
replied to my first paper, have given me golden opportunities" (Letters, I, 
p. 376). Again he writes to his mother saying "There are many attacks and 
answers about my lecture, but the great thing is to drag the dissenting 
middle class into the great public arena of life and discussion, and not 
let it remain in its isolation. All its faults come from that isolation" 
(Letters, (June l86t], I, p.368). 
Once his enemies took the bait and went into 'the public arena of 
life and discussion' Arnold starts to use his whip of irony as the most 
effective means. "For my part," he wrote on December 5, 1867, "I see more 
and more what an effective weapon, in a confused, loud-talking, clap-trap' 
country like this, where every writer and speaker to the public tends to 
say rather more than he means, is irony, or according to the strict meaning 
of the original Greek work, the saying rather less than one means. The main 
effect I have had on the mass of noisy clap-trap and inert prejudice which 
chokes us has been, I can see, by the use of this weapon." 
Of the weapon of irony Professor J. Holloway writes: 
Outright condemnation of essentials tends to sound indignant, 
partial condemnation of details to sound mildly disapproving, 
plain description to sound detached, praise to sound admiring. 
These are no more ttan tendencies, but they are tendencies 
strong enough to be inconvenient to writers who, for example, 
particularly desire not to sound indignant or benignant; 
and irony is a means whereby a writer may say something in a 
tone that normally Hould be inappropriate to it ••• 
Quintilinn says that to Hrite ironically is to praise by 
blaming, or to blame by praising; of ... rhich two the last, of 
course is the commoner. This is a method which Arnold uses 
fairly often ••• (ex) Mr Gladstone is 
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'that attractive and ever-victorious rhetoriciaro' 29 
It might be helpful to put Arnold's method of ridicule in a historical 
perspective. In neo-classical comedy the writer, as Bergson has observed, 
uses ridicule to protect the common ideals of society. He takes for granted 
many data, common to himself and his hearers, both with regard to the 
material in which he works with and with regard to the moral standard which 
he and they are equally supposed to accept. The writer and his readers 
find source of amusement in the weakness or eccentricities of individuals 
which make them unable to live up to the standards whose validity they do 
not deny. Arnold's mission is rather different. His aim is, seriously or 
by means of ridicule, to make his readers aware that what they accept as 
standard is a mere machinery and not rational. It is a matter of custom; 
the object of his criticism is not the frailty of human flesh and blood 
which will not let men live up to the standards they acknowledge, it is 
rather the tendency of the man in his age to go on living in outworn 
formulae, pushing them to extremes, dealing solemnly with 'musical banks whose 
values' are no longer operative. 
It is against the aridity of the aristocracies, the narrowmindedness 
of the middle class and the worn-out clap-trap of the newspapers, that 
Arnold, up to the end of his life, waged a ceaseless war, but with special 
emphasis upon the middle class, philistines as he called them. Arnold, in 
short, attacks the average, self-satisfied, practical Englishman, who is 
proud of his great industrial life, satisfied with education, obedient 
to the great daily press, complacent in his accumulating wealth, disregarding 
beauty, blind to the necessary for the application of intelligence to 
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private and public conduct, ignorant of the judgement of the outside 
world, all self-bound in his material pursuits and considerations. He 
criticises the other two classes as well, but, relatively, his criticisms 
of the upper class and of the working class are light and genial compared 
to the fire which he opens upon the middle class. 
Matthew Arnold knows his opponent very well. Culture and Anarchy, for 
example, begins with a review of those who have disagreed with him: 
M.r Bright, The Daily Telegraph, Frederic Harrison and many others. "My 
Countrymen" begins similarly with: The Saturday Review, Mr Bazley (M.P. 
for Manchester), Mr Miall, The Daily Telegraph, The Daily News, Mr Lowe, 
John Bright, The Morning Star, they are all there marshalled against 
Arnold by himself. In "Equality", Arnold begins with his opponents-
Disraeli, Erskine May, Gladstone, Froude, Lowe, Sir William Nolesworth. 
All of them, as one might have noticed, are influential policy-makers in public 
affairs. So tact a~d prudence are needed. This tact and prudence take the 
form, in Arnold's practice, of disinterestedness: it is a frame of mind. 
Arnold associates it with the state of aloofness, detachment, and solitude. 
It is a habit of mind by which one is to see with detached eyes the object 
as in itself it really is. Another name for disinterestedness, as 
Miller puts it, "is irony, the stylistic pose which separates itself from 
what it describes, and, holding it at a distance, hollows it out with subtle 
mockery •••• Irony, like the stance of disinterestedness, is for Arnold a 
way of not being swallowed up by the world".30 In this way irony could 
be defined as a mode of argument with two aspects dissociative and associative. 
The dissociation type is that which the author uses whenever he speaks 
about himself. In its most general sense, this type of argument separates, 
analyse, and makes distinctions among various ideas and phenomena by 
methods of a fortiori (arguing from an accepted conclusion to an even more 
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evident one), a contrario (arguing from an accepted conclusion to the 
rejection of its contrary), and the argument of authority (Arnold quotes, 
his quotation is introduced at the crucial stage, and his authority 
lof this method of argument 
constitutes the rock of his argument). Three examples will be sufficient: 
Arnold's accounts of the State, of Civilisation and of Human Nature. 
(i) 'The State - but what is the State? cry many ••• The full force of the 
----
term, the State ••• no one will master without going a little deeply ••• but 
it is possible to give in very plain language an account of it sufficient 
for all practical purposes. The State is properly just what Burke called it -
the nation in its collective and corporate character. The State is the 
representative acting-power of the nation ••• ' (ii) 'What do we mean by 
civilised? •• we will try to answer. Civilisation is the humanisation 
of man in society. To be humanised is to comply with the true law of 
our human nature ••• Says Lucan 'to keep our measure, and to hold fast our 
end, and to follow Nature' ••• to make progress towards this, our true and 
full humanity. And to be civilised is to make progress towards this in 
civil society'. (iii) 'When we talk of ••• full humanity, we think of 
an advance, not along one line only, but several ••• The power of intellect 
and science, the power of beauty, the power of social life and manners ••• 
the power of conduct is another great element'. 
The other type of argument that is associated with irony is associative 
arguments which Arnold uses in speaking about his opponents. This type 
of argument transfers the adherence from the preJlises to the conclusion, for 
example, the act-person association enables Arnold to pass from the fact 
that an act is silly to the consequence that the agent is a foolish person. 
This is how Arnold takes up the case made out for the deceased 1,vife' s 
Sister Bill: 
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Why must ideas on this topic (the deceased \'life' s sister 
bill] have to be incubated for years in that nest of 
spicery, as the divine Shakespeare says, the mind of Mr T. 
Chambers, before they can rule the world? For my part, 
my resolve is formed. This great question shall henceforth be 
seriously taken up in F'leet Street. As a sop to those 
toothless old Cerberuses, the bishops, who impotently exhibit 
still the passions, as Nick's French friends say, of another 
age, we will accord the continuance of the prohibition which 
forbids a man to marry his grandmother. But in other 
directions there shall be freedom. Mr Chambers' admirable 
bill for enabling a woman to marry her sister's husband 
will doubtless pass triumphantly through Committee tonight, 
amidst the cheers of the Ladies' gallery. The Liberal 
party must supplement that bill by two others: one enabling 
people to marry their brother's and sister's children, the 
other enabling a man to marry his brother's wife. 
(Friendship's Garland, CPW, 
V, p. 318). -
The argument, as one sees, takes the form of the reductio ad absurdum. 
Having in mind Arnold's main task in Culture and Anarchy - "our main 
business of the present moment is not so much to work away at certain 
crude reform~ ••. as to create ••• a frame of mind out of which the schemes of 
really fruitful reforms may with time grow" (Holloway, p. 203), the 'dork can 
be approached from the perspective of Professor Holloway's argument in 
The Victorian Sage. He suggests that, through the forms of his arguments 
Arnold does something to develop our notion of his opponents, as well as 
of himself. 
Of the forms of argument Professor Holloway writes: 
Perhaps the two forms of argument most distinctive of Arnold 
are distinguo arguments which keep the reader sensitised to 
his unrelaxing circumspection, and concessive (my italics] 
arguments which emphasise his modesty.' 'Let us distinguish,' 
replied the envious foreigners (who here are speaking for 
Arnold himself) 'Let us distinguish. We named three powers ••• 
which go to spread ••• rational human life ••• Your middle 
class, we agreed, has the first ••• But this only brings us 
a certain way ••• ' In A French EtoE he (ArnOld] distinguishes 
the quite contrasting needs of schools providing for the 
different classes of society: those for the aristocracy need 
'the notion of a sort of republican fellowship, the practice 
of a plain life in common, the habit of self-help;' while 
those for the middle classes need training in 'largeness of 
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soul and personal dignity', and those for the lower, 
in 'feeling, gentleness, humanity~ 
(pp. 211-12) 
And of Concessive argument he says: 
Concession in argument necessarily does little to advance 
the proof for one's own case ••• 'We ought to have no 
difficulty in conceding to Mr Sidgwick that ••• fire and 
strength ••• has its high value as well as culture', 
'Hellenism ••• has its dangers, as has been fully granted', 
'there are many things to be said on behalf of this 
exclusive attention of ours to liberty'. Sometimes [says 
Holloway) the concession is 'placed' as it wer~ by a 
subsequent distinguo argument: 'the final aim of both 
Hellenism and Hebraism ••• is no doubt the same: man's 
perfection or salvation ••• still, they pursue this aim 
by very different courses ••• so long as we do not forget 
that both ••• are profound and admirable ••• we can hardly 
insist too strongly on the divergence of line and of operation 
by which they proceed'. Sometimes, too, Arnold does 
something explicit to relate the concession he makes to his 
tone, and to our conception of himself: 'it is impossible that 
all these remonstrances and reproofs should not affect me, and 
I shall try my very best ••• to profit by the objections 
I have heard and read'. 
(Ibid., pp. 212-213) 
One might say here that the substantial significance of the concession 
is virtually nil - Arnold gives no hint of what it is he is disposed to 
agree with. 
One might add too that Arnold uses the argumentum ad hominem 
(speaking against the man rather than the issue] which is a part of 
rhetorical argument. This is evident when Arnold manages to give a slight 
stress of scornful intonations to names like Clutterbuck, or Cobbe, or 
Dodd, or Cattle, and seems gently to conduct the wearers of these names 
to a place outside the pale of humanity. Sometimes he uses it merely by 
repeating the name oftener than is necessary, as if it were something 
essentially absurd in the owner of such a name daring to hold opinions on 
things of moment. In all this Arnold tries to show that the ugliness of 
the name is but somehow an index of its bearer's opinions. 
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The desire to have distinctive names for whatever he is discussing 
is a feature of much of Arnold's work~ Arnold's personality behind his 
selection and presentation of these phrases, and behind their calm and 
genial reiteration, is clear enough to be ignored. One sees his opponents 
in the catch-phrases themselves, a little more clearly and a little more 
disastrously each time. Stung by his repeated ridicule of its enormous 
circulation and bombastic style,rl(The Daily Telegraph)sought with 
laborious irony to represent Arnold as equating the preservation of the 
Welsh language with the achievement of 'Geist'. And Arnold himself 
it depicted as 'the high-priest of the kid-gloved persuasion' who had 
a mission to perform: 'to preach the gospel of urbanity and to wage war 
against emphasis'''. 31 
Arnold was aware of the effectiveness of that technique and the 
power of his style. To this effect he wrote on the 5th of Feburary 1868 to 
his mother saying "I am glad you like the second part of my disquisition. 
I think Barbarian will stick; but as a very charming Barbarianess, Lady 
Portsmouth, expresses a great desire to make my acquaintance, I daresay the 
race will bear no notice. In fact, the one arm they feel and respect is 
irony, as I have often said; whereas the Puritan middle class, at whom 
I have launched so much, are partly too good, partly too gross, to feel 
it" (Letters, I, p. 387). Again, when on August 14, 18 67, the Daily 
Telegraph alluded to 'sweetness and light' in a leading article on the new 
Reform Law and on August 15 spoke of 'philistinism' in a leading article 
on lower middle-class education, Arnold wrote to his mother, "Hardly a day 
passes without the Telegraph having some fling at me - but generally 
in a way that is not at all vicious'. 'The merit of terms of this sort is that 
they fix in people's minds the things to which they refer fl. 
In Friendship's Garland, Arnold, as Professor Holloway has rightly 
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observed, uses the same device to escape the awkward tone implied by 
what he wants to say. This iSla very lengthy work discrediting the opinions 
of others; and in the main it proceeds by methods of irony. Here it is 
the mythical Prussian, Arminius von Thunder-den-Trone~ who delivers 
Arnold's attack direct. And Arnold, speaking in his own person, 
writes: 
In confidence I will own to you that he makes himself 
intensely disagreeable. He has the harsh, arrogant 
Frussian way of turning up his nose at things and 
laying down the law about them; and though, as a lover 
of intellect, I admire him, and, as a seeker of truth, 
I value his frankness, yet, as an Englishman, and a member 
of what the Daily Telegraph calls 'the Imperial race', I 
feel so uncomfortable under it, that I want, through your 
kindness, to call to my aid the great British public, which 
never loses heart and has always a bold front and a rough 
word ready for its assailants. 
(Victorian Sage, p. 238) 
Arminius himself is a likeable figure, with his pink face and blue eyes, his 
shaggy blond hair, his blue pilot-coat, and pipe belching interminable smoke. 
But although his personality may be likeable, it is very different from 
Arnold's and he can do, says Professor Holloway, what would be disastrous for 
Arnold himself. Arminius and his creator go down to Reigate by rail, and in 
the carriage is, as Arnold calls him, 'one of our representative industrial 
men (something in the bottle way)'. When the manufacturer begins to talk 
politics, Arnold tries to soothe the conversation with 'a few sentences taken 
from Mr Gladstone's advice to the RumanianJ. But - 'the dolt! The 
dunderhead! His ignorance of the situation, his ignorance of Germany, his 
ignorance of what makes nations great, his ignorance of what makes life worth 
living, his ignorance of everything except bottles - those infernal bottles!' -
that is Arminius's comment. On another occasion, Arnold 'runs' to appease 
him with a 'powerful letter' by Hr Goldwin Smith, published in the Daily News, 
and 'pronouncing in favour of the Prussian alliance ••• ' "At last I have 
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got what will please you", cries he. But Arminius only gives a sardonic 
smile, and puts it all down ungraciously to the Prussian needle-gun. 
'Your precious Telegraph,' he says bluntly; and of The Times, 'that 
astonishing paper!' Arnold contrasts Arminius and himself directly: 
"You make me look rather a fool, Arminius" I began, 'by what you primed me 
with ••• ' 'I dare say you looked a fool,' says my Prussian boor, 'but 
what did I tell you?' "Even Arminius himself is made to emphasise just the 
contrast Arnold wishes us to see. 'I have a regard for this Mr Matthew 
Arnold, but I have taken his measure ••• Again and again I have seed him 
anxiously ruminating over what his adversary has happened to say against his 
ideas; and when I tell him (if the idea were mine) that his adversary is a 
dummkopf, and that he must stand up to him firm and square, he begins to 
smile, and tells me that what is probably passing through his adversary's 
mind is so and so." 
* * * 
Arnold did not stop, as this chapter has shown,at the what.He explored 
the why of things and suggested productive solutions for the relationship 
of individuals with the world: his active solidarity with all men and his 
spontaneous activity: love and work. So far this chapter has dealt with 
"general life" - work. The next chapter will explore in some detail 
Arnold's idea of "love". For without love there would be no morality,or 
as Shelley puts it: 'The great secret of moral~is love'. 
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CHAPTER IX 
On Human Life 
The Emotions 
As it has been observed in the last chapter, it was common to all 
denominations that impulsive enjoyment of life, whether in the forms 
of seigneurial sports, or the enjoyment of the dance-hall or the 
public-house of the common man, which leads away both from work in a 
calling and from religion, was as such the enemy of rational asceticism. 
That sort of national asceticism must necessarily produce riches. But 
whenever riches have increased, the essence of religion has decreased 
in the same proportion. This would be replaced by hard greed, and the 
exclusi ve pursuit of gain, with the indifference to all '"hich does not 
aid in its acquisition. This would eat up the sentiment of love. 
Arnold sums up the situation as follows: 
"In an epoch of dissolution and transformation, such 
as that on which we are now entered, habits, ties, and 
associations are inevitably broken up, the action of 
individuals becomes more distinct, the shortcomings, 
errors, heats, disputes, which necessarily attend 
individual action, are brought into greater prominence." 
("Preface to Essays in Criticism", CP':l., III, 288) • 
At stake is the sentiment of love and in turn ideas like the "common 
good" and "justice". For justice is but love distributed. This chapter 
attempts to show Arnold's poetic interpretation of the sentiment of love 
in the Victorian England. 
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I 
Love as a concept enters philosophy through religion, particularly when 
the origin of the world is expressed as an act of procreation or the 
Creator is conceived of as loving his creation either as a whole or in part 
(i.e., the human race). Yet, ironically enough, it suffered at the hands of 
moralists more than anything else. Thinkers as well as philosophers, being 
aware of the importance of the sentiment of love, intervened to save it, 
and made the concept of love a subject for philosophic meditation in 
regard to ethical problems: Love, as one of the most powerful of human 
impulses, is seen to be much in need of control, especially if man as 
rational being is to be able to use his rational capacities. Much of the 
ethical writing on love is designed to suggest some means whereby the 
pleasures and other values of loving may be pursued without entailing the 
supposed evils of intemperate sexuality. 
Love, in its essence, is a desire to be related to the world outside 
oneself, the need to avoid aloneness: the necessity to unite with other 
living beings, to be related to them, is an imperative need on which man's 
well-being depends. But with the sharp juxtaposition of religion and 
sexuality alienation crept in. This sharp distinction is expressed, in 
ancient times, in the distinction between two Aphrodites - a transient, 
earthy love of body and an enduring heavenly love of soule Or the distinction 
which is vaguely recognised in Christian thinking between Christian 
love: Agape, and the sensual love: Eros. Agape is spontaneous and uncaused; 
it is aroused and directe::l wi thout regard to human merit"; rather than flowing 
toward goodness it creates goodness. It is, in short, theocentric. Eres is 
rooted in sexuality and physical passion. It is worthy of notice that this 
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sort of distinction is more clearly emphasised in times that have a deistic 
concept of God and monistic concept of authority. Under a pantheistic 
concept of God and pluralistic concept of authority, there is no such 
distinction. That is why one finds that in certain epochs, and under 
Christianity, love is not seen as a power that destroys man's reason, as 
the seventeenth century thinkers used to believe, but rather as an emotional 
attitude that can be voluntarily produced. It is praised in the First 
Epistle to the Corinthians and the First Epistle of John (I John416-20) 
and also in the Psalm (91.14). 
i 
In the Middle Ages, the ecstatic loss of self that accompanies sexual 
love was assumed to be one of the features of the beatific vision. It is 
apparent in mystical literature that erotic language is especially effective 
in communicating mystical experience, and the similarities between 
religion and sexual ecstasy are manifest in, for example, the Song of 
Solomon. Tolerance to the sexual life of man went even further to 
prostitution as a necessary evil (st Augustine, De Ordine ILiv.12). 
Thomas Aquinas reasoned that God allows it "lest certain goods be lost or 
certain greater evils be incurred" (Summa Theologica ii.2, Q.10. a.ll). 
The tolerance towards love, with all its aspects, continued till the 
end of the first half of the sixteenth-century. For exa~ple, when the 
civil courts in England, in 1533, took jurisdiction over sex sins and 
changed some formally into crimes, they were far more punitive than the 
church courts had ever thought of being. From that time onward, writers 
chose to treat love Platonically as an intellectual, nonsexual, or even 
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anti-sexual phenomenon. Marsilio Ficino, who first used the term 'Platonic 
love', and others after him, limit the concept of love to an intellectual 
love between friends based on the individual's love of God: ~e appetite, 
which follows senses other than sight, hearing, and thought, is not love, 
but lust or frenzy. Ficino's man, like Picots and later Bruno's, is torn 
by a dual impulse - his soul wishes to obey now the 'good demon', now the 
'bad demon' of Plato's Symnosiurn. "Ficino, Pico, Bruno and many others in 
the Renaissance," says John C. Nelson, "declare that man's soul hovers on 
the horizon of the spiritual and material worlds, ready to obey either 
of its contrary impulses." 1 
In the seventeenth-century there carne the shift of sensibility. The 
central generative concept of that phenomenon is the division between 
mind and body. A corollary of this thesis is the autonomy of the external 
world from its perceiver. In Christian thinking the union of body and soul 
was seen as an unnatural state imposed upon man as an evil or as a 
punishment for previous error. Descartes, on the surface, seems to disagree 
with this idea. But a trace of the idea that this union is responsible 
for sin, persists in his doctrine. Only it is not matter itself which is 
immediately regarded as evil; what Descartes tries to do is to explain 
the origin of divergence from the good psychologically, by a reference to 
the interaction of mind and body. The middle term which helps him out 
here is found in the emotions. 
Emotions, according to Descartes, are states at once of body and of 
soul, based on the interaction of the hJO. They do not proceed from the 
soul, as the older philosopheTs thought: they are originally affections 
of the body which are propagated to the soul through the animal spirits. 
Hence the soul's attitude towards them is passive, for which reason they. 
are called passions [passions de l'ame). Clear knowledge is disturbed by 
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them, so that we desire that which is not desirable. 2 Thus Descartes 
obtains a twofold interpretation, intellectual and emotional for the 
correlated ideas of the moral and the immoral. The moral coincides with 
clear knowledge and with the supremacy of the will over the emotions. 
Similarly, the immoral is identical with obsecure knowledge and with the 
slavery of will to the emotions. The conclusion these views give is that 
all disturbance of knowledge comes from the emotions. In other words, "the 
Cartesian theory regarded sin as the effect of obscured knowledge, which 
is necessarily involved in the finite nature of man".3 
One's next task is to follow out the results of the Cartesian theory 
in the field of re~gion, now that the above ~etch has attempted to 
show its philosophical foundations. One will show the impact of these 
ideas on the human character in the nineteenth-century with special 
emphasis on man's attitude to joie de vivre. This chapter may thus perhaps 
in a modest way form a contribution to the understanding of the manner in 
which ideas become effective forces in history. 
The religious life of the individual in the seventeenth century was 
directed solely towards a transcendental end - salvation. But precisely 
for that reason it was thoroughly rationalised in this world and dominated 
entirely by the aim to add to the glory of God on earth. "Never," says 
Weber, "has the precept omnia in majorem dei gloriam been taken with more 
bitter seriousness. Only a life guided by constant thought could achieve 
conquest over the state of nature,Descartes's Cogito ergo sum was taken 
over by the contemporary Puritans with this ethical reinterpretation.,,4 
This sort of asceticism turned with all its force against one thing: the 
spontaneous enjoyment of life and all it had to offer. Love is permitted 
only in marriage and only as a means willed by God for the increase of 
His glory according to the commandment, "Be fruitful and multiply". 
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In order to understand the connection between the fundamental 
religious ideas of ascetic Protestantism and its maxims for everyday 
conduct, it is necessary to examine with special care such writings as 
have evidently been derived from ministerial practice wrnch·~in fact only 
the most extreme form of that exclusive trust in God and preaching the 
corruption of everything pertaining to the flesh and emotion. These maxims 
"come out for instance in the strikingly freQuent repetition, especially 
in the English Puritan literature, of warning against any trust in the aid 
of friendship of men. Baxter, for instance, counsels deep distrust of 
even one's closest friend, and Bailey directly exhorts to trust no one 
and to say nothing compromising to anyone: Only God should be your 
confidant ll • 5 
Waste of time is thus the first and in principle the deadliest of sins. 
The span of human life is infinitely short and precious to make sure of 
one's own election. Loss of time through sociability, idle talk, luxu~J, 
even more sleep than is necessary for health, six to at most eight 
hours, is worthy of absolute moral condemnation. Time is infinitely 
valuable because every hour lost is lost to labour for the glo~J of God. 
Inactive contemplation is also valueless, or even directly reprehensible if 
it is at the expense of one's daily work. The moral conduct of the average 
man was thus deprived of its planless and unsystematic character and 
6 
subjected to a consistent method for conduct as a Hhole. Max Heber sums 
up the situation as follows: 
To put it in our terms: The Puritan, like eve~J rational 
type of asceticism, tried to enable a man to maintain and 
act upon his constant motives, especially those which it 
taught him itself, against the emotions. In this formal 
psychological sense of the term it tried to make him into a 
personality. Contrary to many popular ideas, the end of this 
asceticism was to be able to lead an alert, intelligent life: 
the most urgent task was the destruction of spontaneous, 
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impulsive enjoyment, the most important means was to 
bring order into the conduct of its adherents ••• On this 
methodical control over the whole man rests the enormous 
expansive power of both, especially the ability of Calvinism 
as against Lutheranism to defend the cause of Protestantism 
as the Church militant. 
(pp. 119-20) 
One has indicated the steps by which this situation came into 
existence. It remains to estimate the price paid for it. Sebastian Frank 
struck the central characteristic of this type of religion when he saw 
the significance of the Reformation in the fact that now every christian 
had to be a monk all his life. The Puritan's self-awareness and capacity 
to reflect upon his nature and destiny might inherently impair or at 
least modify his capacity for direct animal, childlike enjoyment of living. 
The question is: what did happen to these energies when they were not 
effectively discharged? OTIPanswer is that they would be experienced as 
anxiety which would transform itself into a sort of action and ambition 
(See Tristram and Iseult). 
ii 
As is always the case in the history of ideas, ancient beliefs do 
not die, they survive and take on new forms. This is as true of the idea 
of love as it is of other ideas. For though no one believes any longer in 
the myth of the two Aphrodites as anthropomorphic deities each of whom is 
accompanied by a special Eros, the distinction between the two still persists 
as a contrast between love and duty, or carnal and spiritual love. This 
sort of distinction could be found in stories of ambivalent love which are 
characteristic ones in nineteenth-century literature. Rousseau's Confessions 
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had laid the ground for the understanding of that emotional ambivalence: 
and from Pushkin to Clough and Arnold, poets tell of lovers separated not 
by difficult circumstances but by the inability of the man to understand 
the true tendency of his heart. The result was that man, though he 
desires love, could not love as deeply as he desires. Arnold, in his poem 
"Destiny", interprets this situation as follows: 
Why each is striving, from of old, 
To love more deeply than he can? 
Still would be true, yet still grows cold? 
- Ask of the Powers that sport with man! 
They yok'd in him, for endless strife, 
A heart of ice, a soul of fire, 
And hurl'd him on the Field of life, 
An aimless unallay'd Desire. 
And in "A Summer Night", Arnold says: 
Hast thou then still the old lmquiet breast, 
\fuich neither deadens into rest, 
Nor ever feels the fiery glo", 
That whirls the spirit from itself away, 
But fluctuates to and fro, 
Never by passion quite possessed 
And never quite benumb'd by the world's sway? 
Arnold, like Spinoza in his Ethics, emphasises man's need of 
perfection - the fulfilment of both his intellectual and emotional powers 
which are not existentially separate. He argued, very casually and very 
late in time, in favour of the average sensual man or to use his own 
phrase: l'homme sensuel moyen. But he did not push that argument very far, 
otherwise he would have been accused of corrupting the youth of Athens. 
Of the average sensual man Arnold says that he "has his very advantageous 
qualities. He has his gaiety, quickness, sentiment, sociability, rationality. 
He has his horror of sour strictness, false restraint, hypocrisy, 
obscurantism, cretinism, and the rest of it" ("Numbers", CPW, X, p. 158). 
"And, of course, the play and working of these qualities is altered by their 
beingno longer in combination with a dose of German seriousness, but left to 
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work by themselves. 1eft to work by themselves, they give us what we call 
the homme sensuel moyen, the average sensual man. The highest art, the 
art y/hich by its height, depth, and gravity possesses religiousness -
~ 
such as the Greeks had, the art of Pinaar and Phidias; such as the Italians 
had, the art of Dante and Michelangelo - this art, with the training 
which it gives and the standard which it sets up, the French have never 
had" (Ibid., pp. 157-58). 
Arnold, before prescribing the medicine, has studied very carefully 
the character of English people as thus: 
Among the Germans, Protestantism has been carried on into 
rationalism and science. The English hold a middle place 
between the Germans and Welsh; their religion has the exterior 
forms and apparatus of a rationalism, so far their Germanic 
nature carries them; but long before they get to science, their 
feeling, their Celtic element catches them, and turr.stheir 
religion all towards piety and unction. So ~nglish Protestantism 
has the outside appearance of an intellectual system, and the 
inside reality of an emotional system: this gives it its 
tenacity and force, for what is held with the ardent attachment 
of feeling is believed to have at the same time the scientific 
proof of reason. 
("On the Study of Celtic Literature", 
CPW, III, pp. 355-56) 
Arnold's cure for this situation is a French model of l'homme sensuel moyen: 
France is l'homme sensuel moyen, the average sensual man; Paris is 
the city of l'homme sensuel moyen. This has an attraction for 
all of us. We all have in us this homme sensuel, the man of the 
wishes of the flesh and of the current thoughts; but we develop 
him under checks and doubts, and unsystematically and often 
grossly. France, on the other hand, develops him confidently 
and harmoniously. She makes the most of him, because she knows 
what she is about and keeps in a mean, as her climate is in a 
mean, and her situation. She does not develop him with madness, 
into a monstrosity, as the Italy of the Renaissance did; she 
develops him equally and systematically. And hence she does not 
shock people with him but attracts them; she names herself the 
France of tact and measure, good sense, logic. In a way, this 
is true. As she develops the senses, the apparent self, all round 
in good faith, without misgivings, without violence, she has 
much reasonableness and clearness in all her notions and 
arrangements; a sort of balance even in conduct; as much art and 
science, and it is not a little, as goes with the ideal of 
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l'homme sensuel moyen. And from her ideal of the average 
sensual man France has deduced her famous gospel of the Rights 
of Man, which she preaches vlith such an infinite growing and 
self-admiration. France takes 'the wishes of the flesh and of 
the current thoughts' for a man's rights; and human happiness, 
and the perfection of society, she places in everybody's being 
enabled to gratify these wishes, to get these rights, as 
equally as possible and as much as possible. 
(CPW, VI, pp. 390-91) 
French theatre is the expression of that ideal. It, for Arnold, 
represents the life of the senses developing themselves all round without 
misgiving; a life confident, fair and free, with fireworks of fine 
emotions, grand passions, and devotedness - or rather, perhaps, we should 
say de~ouement - lighting it up when necessary ••• 
I see our community turning to the theatre with eagerness, and 
finding the Eng::'ish theatre '!Ii thout organisation, or purpose, or 
dignity, and no modern English drama at all except a fanatical 
one •. ~d then I see the French company from the chief theatre of 
Paris showing themselves to us in London - a society of p"ctors 
admirable in organisation, purpose, and dignity, with a modern 
drama not fanatic at all, but corresponding with fidelity to a 
very palpable and powerful ideal, the ideal of the life of the 
homme sensuel moyen in Paris, his beautiful city. I see in 
England a materialised upper class, sensible of the nullity of 
our own modern drama, impatient of the state of false constraint 
and of blank to which the Puritanism of our middle class has 
brought our stage and much of our life, delighting in such drama 
as the modern drama of Paris. I see the emancipated youth of both 
sexes delighting in it; the new and clever newspapers, which push 
on the work of emancipation and serve as devoted missionaries of 
the gospel of the life of Paris and of the ideal of the average 
sensual man, delighting in it. 'And in this condition of affairs I 
see the middle class beginning to arrive at the theatre again 
after an abstention of two centuries and more; arriving eager 
and curious, but a little bewildered. 
("The French Play in London", CPW, 
IX, pp. 77-78, 81) 
But the fact remains that to think is one thing and to accommodate one's 
feelings to that way of thinking is something else. In other words, Arnold 
may have stepped beyond the cultural frame of his age, but in questions of 
feelings he is the son of his own time. This state of ambivalence is revealed 
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in one of his letters to Clough (September, 23, 1849): "What I must tell 
you is that I have never yet succeeded in anyone great occasion in 
consciously mastering myself: I can go thro: the imaginary process of 
mastering myself and see the whole affair as it would then stand, but at 
the critical point I am too apt to hoist up the mainsail to the wind and 
let her drive" (LC, p. 110). This was written in the middle of his love 
experience to whom the rest of this chapter is devoted. 
Arnold's love poems fall into three groups: those relating to 
Nargueri te, those relating to Frances Lucy Wightman ''ihom he later married, 
and a semidramatic seminarrative poem that combines these two love 
experiences - Tristram and Iseult. 
II 
i. Switzerland Series 
Arnold grouped the poems that take Narguerite as a subject under 
the heading - Switzerland. That Vlarguerite is an actual person is a fact 
that is definitely proved by the letters Arnold wrote to Clough around that 
time. On 29 September 1848 he wrote from the Bath of Leuk: "Tomorrow I 
repass the Gemmi and get to Thun: linger one day at the Hotel Bellevue 
for the sake of the blue eyes of one of its inmates: and then proceed by 
slow stages down the Rhine to Cologne, thence to Amiens and Boulogne and 
England". However, the evidences are not enough to make an inference about 
her exact personality or social status. 
From the above evidence, I shall take ~[arguerite as a real woman in 
the life of Arnold. 7 Among the readers who hold that view are Tinker and 
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Lowry who write: "acquaintance \-Ii th Arnold's method of composition 
inevitably leads the student to inquire after sources and the facts which 
lie at the root of the poems, for it was not Arnold's way to dispense 
with facts as a point of departure, however much purely imaginary material 
might be added later" (Commentary, pp. 155-156). Arnold's attitude towards 
such a matter may be found in his essay on "Dante and Beatrice", where, 
in spite of the fact that Dante's Beatrice is more etherised and 
spiritualised than Marguerite, Arnold did not hesitate in affirming that 
there was a real Beatrice. 
There are nine poems which are written around Marguerite - all but 
one names her in text or title: The complete series would be as follows: 
(1) "A Memory-Picture", (2) "Meeting", (3) "A Dream", (4) "Parting", 
(5) "A Fare,vell", (6) "Isolation-to Marguerite", (7) "To Narguerite-Continued", 
(9) "The Terrace at Berne". Eight of them were gradually issued from 
1849 to 1857; "The Terrace at Berne", which appeared in 1867, was presumably 
an epilogue, written after an interval of ten years. All nine, at one time 
or another, found a place in the group: Switzerland. Two, "A Memory Picture" 
and "A Dream", are nOl-1 separated from the rest, and put among the Early 
Poems. Setting aside the hvo lighter pieces, If A Memory-Picture" and 
"A Dream", the seven poems present an almost plotted sequence with a 
definite progression through which Arnold moves towards a clearer and clearer 
understanding of the situation. The series, as Arnold himself left them, 
is put as folloy,s: 
i. "Meeting" ("The Lake", 1852, 1853, 1854, 1857, 1864) 
ii. "Parting" (1852, 1853, 1854, 1857, 1869) 
iii. "A Farewell" (1852, 1854, 1857, 1869) 
iv. "Isolation. To l"Iarguerite" ("lde \-,ere apart") (1857, 1869) 
v. "To Marguerite-Continued" ("Yes! in the Sea") (1852, 1853, 1854, 1857 
1869) 
vi. "Absence" (1852, 1853, 1854, 1857, 1869) 
vii. "The Terrace at Berne" (1867, 1869) 
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In "IVleeting", the first poem of the series, }largueri te makes her 
first appearance. One learns that Arnold had met her the surr~er before and 
. . h . 8 ~s now see~ng er agaln; 
Again I see my bliss at hand, 
The town, the lake are here; 
My IVlarguerite smiles upon the strand, 
Unaltered with the year. 
(Poems, p. 116) 
I know that graceful figure fair, 
That cheek of languid hue; 
I know that soft, enkerchiefed hair, 
And those sweet eyes of blue. 
(Poems, p. 116) 
But from the very beginning she represents for him a dilemma of choice: 
all for love or all for duty. The last choice wins: 
Again I spring to make my choice; 
Again in tones of ire 
I hear a God's tremendous voice: 
'Be counselled, and retire.' 
However, stanza 4 seems to suggest that he does not feel the dilemma very 
keenly: 
1e guiding Powers who join and part, 
What would ye have with me? 
Ah, warn some more ambitious heart, 
And let the peaceful be! 
(Ibid., p. 117) 
In "Parting", a companion piece to "Heeting", Arnold gives an expression 
to the tendency in the period which Kristian Smidt points to as he speaks 
of the Victorian poet's desire "to expand his personality by identifying 
himself as closely as possible with humanity".9 It was in fact a 
characteristic desire of the Victorians to establish abiding human relation-
ships, which often reflected their need for warmth, certainty and consolation 
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in face of the isolation engendered by the uncomfortable discoveries of 
the scientists. But, as Arnold puts it, 
And what heart knows another? 
Ah! who knows his own? 
Arnold, in this poem, assumes a characteristically Arnoldian stance: as in 
"Dover Beach", he is at a window looking out confronting the world beyond. 
The poem is divided into two parts and a conclusion. 
The first part develops, with vividly contrasting imagery, the theme 
of hopeless separation. Here, they are suddenly in Autumn: the holiday 
season is over, love is threatened by winter: 
Ye storm-winds of Autumn! 
Who rush by, who shake 
The window, and ruffle 
The gleam-lighted lake; 
Who cross to the hill-side 
Thin-sprinkled with farms, 
Where the high i-100ds strip sadly 
Their yellO'..,ring arms -
Ye are bound for the mountains! 
Ah! with you let me go 
Where your cold, distant barrier, 
The vast range of snow, 
Through the loose clouds lifts dimly 
Its white peaks in air -
How deep is their stillness! 
Ah, would I were there! 
These lines stand in sharp contrast with the smooth pentameter couplets 
where the voice of Harguerite breaks in: 
But on the stairs what voice is this I hear, 
Buoyant as morning, and as morning clear? 
Say, has some wet bird-haunted English lawn 
Lent it the music of its trees at dawn? 
Or was it from some sun-flecked mountain-brook 
That the sweet voice its upland clearness took? 
This shift, coupled with the poem's metrical changes, as Allott has rightly 
observed, 'represents Arnold's wavering between the desire to give free 
play to emotion ('storm-winds of Autumn') and the desire for peace' as well 
as fixity (stillness of the 'white peaks in air'). Arnold realising that 
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his pursuit is hopeless, turns to Nature which, to him, brings freshness and 
openness of heart: 
To thee only ~od granted 
A heart ever new -
To all always open, 
To all always true. 
(Poems, p. 120) 
In the next poem of the series, "A Farewell", one finds Arnold again 
split between his desire to love and his knowledge of the absurdity of 
such a desire. In this poem Arnold shows a philosophic-elegiac strain for 
which he is to become well known. The theme is a reflection upon what 
divides him from Marguerite: 
I blame thee not! - this heart, I know, 
To be long loved was never framed, 
For something in its depths doth gloYl 
Too strange, too restless, too untamed. 
And women - things that live and move 
Mined by the fever of the soul -
They seek to find in those they love 
Stern strength, and promise of control. 
They ask not kindness, gentle ways 
These they themselves have tried and knovm; 
They ask a soul which never sways 
With the blind gusts that shake their own. 
I too have felt the load I bore 
In a too strong emotion's sway; 
I too have wished, no woman more, 
This starting, feverish heart away. 
I too have longed for trenchant force, 
And will like a dividing spear; 
Have praised the keen, unscrupulous course, 
~mich knows no doubt, which feels no fear. 
The poem culminates with some hope that in the future they might be able 
to achieve their hopes and find fulfilment in love: 
Yet we shall one day gain, life past 
Clear prospect o'er our being's whole; 
Shall see ourselves, and learn at last 
Our true affinities of soul. 
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We shall not then deny a course 
To every thought the mass ignore; 
We shall not then call hardness force, 
Nor lightness wisdom any more. 
Then, in the eternal Father's smile, 
Our soothed, encouraged souls will dare 
To seem as free from pride and guile, 
As good, as generous, as they are. 
(Poems, pp. 126-128) 
The two poems that mark the climax of the Switzerland group most 
amply, and with great intensity, are "Isolation: to Marguerite" and 
"To Marguerite-Continued". In the first, the poet is left with his deep 
sense of isolation which he takes as a law of existence for himself and his 
generation. It is important to note that he is talking about his own 
generation as far as this point is concerned. As he turns away, with that 
typical Victorian consciousness of his own nature and vocation, he comes to 
the realisation that his own lot in life is a sterner style of life than 
that of his alluring dream: 
Fare\Ole 11! - and thou, thou lonely heart, 
Which never yet without remorse 
Even for a moment didst depart 
From thy remote and sphered course 
To haunt the place where passions reign -
Back to thy solitude again! 
Back! with the conscious thrill of shame 
Which Luna felt, that summer-night, 
Flash through her pure immortal frame, 
When she for30ok the starry height 
To hang over Endymion's sleep 
Upon the pine-grown Latmian steep. 
Yet she, chaste queen, had never proved 
How vain a thing is mortal love, 
Wandering in Heaven, far removed o 
But thou hast long had place to prove 
This truth - to prove, and make thine own: 
'Thou hast been, shalt be, art, alone: 
Then, the poem concludes with the following wistful reference to the 
experience, 
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Of happier men - for they, at least, 
Have dreamed two human hearts might blend 
In one, and were through faith released 
From isolation without end 
Prolonged; nor knew, although not less 
Alone than thou, their loneliness. 
(Poems, p. 122) 
In the course of his reshufflings of Switzerland series, Arnold 
finally linked "Isolation. To Marguerite" to the poem, which most readers lO 
have rightly thought to be Arnold's finest achievement - "To Narguerite-
Continued". The poem, in fact, is a continuation of Arnold's ref13ction on 
the loneliness of man and on the powerlessness of thought to overcome it: 
The subject of the poem is human life in general. To this effedProfessor 
K. Tillotson writes: 
The exclusion of 'I' and 'you' •.• points its impersonality; 
in this it is unique in the series. 'The unplumb'd, salt, 
estranging sea' belongs nearly as much, and as little, to 
Arnold and Clough, Arnold and his sister, even ~ossibly to 
Arnold and Fancy-Lucy, as to Arnold and Harguerite; quotations 
from the letters and other poems near in date show that the 
inevitability of estrangement was playing upon his mind from 
more than one direction (RES, ibid., p. 360). 
Thus the theme of the impossibility of true love is emblematical of cultural 
and historical transition of which the first half of the nineteenth century 
is an example. 
Yes! in the sea of life enisled, 
With echoing straits between us thrown, 
Dotting the shoreless watery wild, 
We mortal millions live alone. 
The islands feel the enclasping flow, 
And then their endless bounds they know. 
!lit when the moon their hollows lights, 
And they are swept by balms of spring, 
And in their glens, on starr;;,' nights, 
The nightingales divinely sing; 
And lovely notes, from shore to shore, 
Across the sounds and channels pour -
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Oh! then a longing like despair 
Is to their farthest caverns sent; 
For surely once, they feel, we were 
Parts of a single continent! 
Now round us spreads the water plain 
Oh might our marges meet again! 
Then comes the most revealing statement of reason behind the situation: 
v~o ordered, that their longing's fire 
Should be, as soon as kindled, cooled? 
Who renders vain their deep desire?-
A God, a God their severance ruled! 
And bade betwixt their shores to be 
The unplumbed, salt, estranging sea. 
(Poems, pp. 124-25) 
"A God" referred to in this way is an ambiguous figure. This confirms my 
point in the prologue to this part: that man's concept of God determines 
his own intellectual and emotional activities, in other words, his entire 
life. 
In "Absence", which in all editions of the poems served as one of 
the concluding poems, Arnold's growing away from Marguerite is seen as a 
struggle towards the light, where passion is seen as a dark storm: 
I struggle towards the light; and ye, 
Once - longed - for storms of love! 
If with the light ye cannot be, 
I bear that ye remove. 
However, the final admission of ambivalence, as R. Stange has rightly 
observed, saves the poem from being a manifesto of intolerable moral 
superiority (Op. cit., p. 246). 
I struggle towards the light - but oh, 
While yet the night is chill, 
Upon time's barren, stormy flow, 
Stay with me, Narguerite, still! 
(Poems, p. 139) 
Finally, "The Terrace at Berne" rightly serves as a concluding poem 
for the series, Switzerland. Arnold revisited the place ten years after 
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the love affair with Marguerite was over. Looking out from the terrace 
of his hotel at Thun, Arnold reflects on what may have happened to 
Ivlargueri te in the intervening years: 
Ah, shall I see thee, while a flush 
Of startled pleasure floods thy brow, 
Quick through the oleanders brush, 
And clap thy hands, and cry: 'Tis thou! 
Or hast thou long since wandered back, 
Daughter of }Tance! to France, thy home; 
And flitted dOvffi the flowery track 
Where feet like thine too lightly come? 
Doth riotous laughter now replace 
Thy smile; and rouge, with stony glare, 
Thy cheek's soft hue; and fluttering lace 
The kerchief that enwound thy hair? 
Or is it over? - art thou dead? 
Dead! - and no warning shiver ran 
Across my heart, to say thy thread 
Of life was cut, and closed thy span! 
Could from earth's Ylays that figure s.light 
Be lost, and I not feel 'twas so? 
Of that fresh voice the gay delight 
Fail from earth's air, and I not know? 
Or shall I find thee still, but changed, 
But not the !V~rguerite of thy prime? 
With all thy being re-arranged, 
Passed through the crucible of time; 
With spirit vanished, beauty waned, 
And hardly yet a glance, a tone, 
A gesture - anything - retained 
Of all that was my Marguerite's own? 
I will not kn0 1/l! For wherefore try, 
To things by mortal course that live, 
A shadow durability, 
For which they were not meant, to give? 
Like driftvlOod spars, which meet and pass 
Upon the boundless ocean-plain, 
So on the seas of life, alas! 
Man meets man meets, and quits again. 
I knew it when my life was youn?; 
I feel it still, now youth is 0 er. 
- The mists are on the mountain hung, 
And Marguerite I shall see no more. 
(Poems, pp. 480-481) 
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To sum up. The poetic theme of Narguerite's love is isolation - the 
emotional isolation that separates two souls': the woman is the gay, 
romantic life of Paris and of Switzerland - la femme sensuelle moyenn~ the 
man is in the austere service of Faith. The whole affair is a failure 
because neither of them is sufficiently moved. From the earliest stage of 
the affair, Arnold was evidently fearful lest submission to her spell 
would deprive him of the power of self-direction and lead him astray amidst 
the dizzying cross-currents of the senses. The Yale Manuscript carries an 
entry for the year 1849 indicative of Arnold's intention to write a poem 
on the refusal of limitation by the sentiment of love. 
The story ends as Arnold had foreseen. Professor Garrod rightly 
thinks that Arnold's "colder academic character and training may well 
have been the chief alienatine- influence".ll Arnold , followed,as Sir 
Edmund Chambers puts it, the practical Hay of life: 
Certainly the parting with a blue eyed girl became for 
Matthew Arnold something more than itself, a parting with 
the whole world of passionate romance Hhich he put behind 
him. The Narguerite poems are not merely poems of 
isolation, but of renunciation, of self-dedication ••• He 
turned back to his 'sphered course', to the rigorous 
teachers YTho had seized his youth ••• and incidentally to 
the routine, which he often (in the beginning) found irksome, 
of the Education office. 12 
But after the affair was over, it was still difficult to forget. In 
January 1851, the year of his marriage, Arnold wrote to his sister K: 
liThe aimless and unsettled, but also open and liberal state of our youth 
we must perhaps all leave and take refuge in our morality and character; 
but with most of us it is a melancholy passage from which we emerge shorn 
of so many beams that 1tle are almost tempted to quarrel with the layT of 
nature which imposes on us" (Letters, I, p. 14). 
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ii. Faded Leaves 
In sharp contrast to the Switzerland series, Faded Leaves sequence 
has no such complicated publishing history. All the poems except 
"Separation", which was first published in 1855, appear in the 1852 volume. 
Opinion is divided as to whether the Faded Leaves poems also refer to 
Marguerite or to Frances Lucy, who became his wife on 10 June 1851. 
Mrs Sells, for example, follo\1s Professor Hale in regarding all the poems 
as referring to Marguerite, but the members of Arnold's family have always 
been confident that these poems, like "Calais Sands", were inspired by 
the poet's passion for Miss Wightman. Indeed, since Professor K. Allott 
published the earliest version of the first poem in the series, "The River", 
and showed that the river there is the Thames and not the Aar, one kno\1s 
that the poem is hers. 
That the two series, S\1itzerland and Faded Leaves, refer to two 
different women is a fact, for the physical descriptions of the two women 
are different: Marguerite's eyes are blue, her smile 'sweet' but 'arch', 
her hair 'soft, ash-coloured', the latter lover's eyes are 'blue-grey', her hair 
'soft brown', her eyes are 'arch' and her mouth 'mocking'. Another contrast 
could be found in the fact that, says M. Thorpe, "The Switzerland sequence, 
as we have seen, gives us both the romantic conflict and the poet's 
'quarrel with himself', hardly separable from each other, whereas the 
Faded Leaves poems have a single thread throughout, of love thwarted, 
anxious, doubtfully requited by turns; above all, in the latter case, the 
poet has no divided feelings about the value of this love" (Op. cit., p. 39). 
So, Faded Leaves as a group are emotionally less intense and poetically less 
impressive than Switzerland ones. They express a more conventional, and 
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more domesticated love. The lyric impulse in this sequence has a purer 
single line than that in the }'!arguerite's poems. 
The order of the poems in Faded Leaves is apparently chronological: 
"The River", "Too Late", "Calais Sands", "On the Rhine". All were composed 
in August-September, 1850. But "Longing" was composed a little later. 
In "The River", which begins the series, Arnold is not ambivalent in his 
atti tude to\vards love: 
My pent-up tears oppress my brain, 
My heart is swollen with love unsaid. 
Ah, let me weep, and tell my pain, 
And on thy shoulder rest my head! 
This is actually the verbal expression of the sense of fulfilment in love, 
and this is all that Arnold asks for: 
Before I die - before the soul, 
1Nhich now is mine, mus t re-a ttain 
Immunity from my control, 
And wander round the world again; 
Before this teased o'erlaboured heart 
For ever leaves its vain employ, 
Dead to its deep habitual smart, 
And dead to hopes of future joy. 
(Poems, pp. 231-32) 
In "Too Late", the second poem in the series, Arnold observes that: 
Each on his own strict line we move, 
And some find death ere they find love; 
So far apart their lives are thrown 
From the twin soul which halves their own. 
And sometimes, by still harder fate, 
The lovers meet, but meet too late. 
Thy heart is mine! - True, true! ah, true! 
- Then, love, thy hand! - Ah no! adieu! 
(Poems, p. 232) 
"Calais Sands", the third poem in the series, is a favourite with most 
critics ever since its publication. Isidore G. Ascher, in a review of 
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Arnold's poetry published in st James's Hagazine (1868) wrote: 
\fhen Mr Arnold descends to love lyrics, he can be as 
gay and sparkling as a troubadour, and as musical as the 
author of The Irish Melodies. The poem called 'Calais 
Sands' is quite a gem in this way. Its beauties are not 
loosely strung, nor set at random; it is like all our 
author's compositions - studied, elegant, and chaste. Of 
course we should like the glow of earnestness, the 
fervour of passion, the warmth of spontaneousness in a 
love lyric; but the absence of these things still does not 
detract from the beauty of 'Calais Sands', which has its own 
qualities to recommend. 
(C. Dawson, The Critical Heritage, 
p. 190) 
In the last two poems, "On the Rhine" and "Longing", there is a slight 
rise of feeling: Arnold manages to end the series on a note of faint and 
wistful hope just reflecting on the hard realities of life: 
Vain is the effort to forget. 
Some day I shall be cold, I know, 
As is the eternal moonlit snow 
Of the high Alps, to which I go -
But ah, not yet, not yet: 
For the moment he wishes to banish this type of thought and rest mindlessly 
in the gaze of his beloved's 'deep soft eyes': 
Awhile let me with thought have done. 
And as this brimmed unwrinkled Rhine, 
And that far purple mountain-line, 
Lie sweetly in the look divine 
Of the slow-sinking sun; 
So let me lie, and, calm as they, 
Let beam upon my inward view 
Those eyes of deep, soft, lucent hue -
Eyes too expressive to be blue, 
Too lovely to be grey. 
Ah, Quiet, all things feel thy balm: 
Those blue hills too, this river's flo',l, 
Were restless once, but long ago. 
Tamed is their turbulent youthful glow; 
Their joy is in their calm. 
(Poems, pp. 235-36) 
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In the last poem of the series, "Longing", Arnold begs his beloved to 
come to him in his dreams so that by day he will be well again: 
For then the night will more than pay 
The hopeless longing of the day. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• 
Come noVl, and let me dream it truth; 
And part my hair, and kiss my bro\.J', 
And say: My love! why sufferest thou? 
(Poems, p. 236) 
iii. Tristram and Iseult 
On reflecting on his own love experience, Arnold must have realised 
that there is a difference between the two types of love associated with 
the tvlO 'fIOmen involved: one vrhich is tantalising, vivid, and marked by the 
intensity of feelings (this is the type of love associated with Marguerite), 
and another type of love which is steady, quiet, calm, and offers fixity 
without the excitement of passion (this is the type of love associated vrith 
Francis Lucy Wightm~. It is clear, too, that he must have seen his life 
as a pendulum that swings between these two types of love: 
There were two Iseults who did sway 
Each her hour of Tristram's day; 
But one possessed his waning time, 
The other his resplendent prime ••• 
To mention one small possible link, the arrival of Iseult of Ireland is 
heralded by the lines: "ltihat voices these on the clear night-air? / What 
lights in the court - what steps on the stair?" (1.372-73). The lover in 
"Parting" (September, 1849) asks: "But on the stairs what voice is this 
I hear, /Buoyant as morning, as a morning clear?" 
One can say that the poem, on the internal evidences only, shows that 
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Arnold is a kind of Tristram at the apex of love triangle, \.,ri th Nargueri te 
as a kind of Irish Iseult and rvIrs Arnold as Iseult of white hands. The 
form of the poem as half-dramatic, half-narrative shows that it is but the 
combination of the two series of love: Switzerland and Faded Leaves. For 
it is to be noted that the first series has a dramatic movement in each' 
poem, the second series is straight in its address. In other words they 
represent three different lyrical phases. 
The comments on Tristram and Iseult, if often unfavourable,13 are 
extensive. J.A. Froude says, in Westminster Review (1854), "Among the best 
of the new poems is 'Tristram and Iseult'. It is unlucky that so many 
of the subjects should be so unfamiliar to English readers, but it is their 
own fault if they do not know the 'Norte d'Arthur'" (The Critical Heritage, 
p. 89). Eut readers in the thirties of this century have put the emphasis 
on the autobiographical significance of the poem: E.K. Chambe~ in 1932, 
detects the Nargueri te affair in the theme of the poem. H. ~1. Garrod 
calls the 1852 volume Marguerite's book, Tristram and Iseult in particular, 
as a tale of separated lovers, being written for her. F.L. Lucas sees 
in the poem Arnold's struggle of renunciation, the triumph of his puritanism. 
And what emerges from the poem for L. Trilling is not the suffering of 
any of its three characters, but the despair of the poet himself. Bonnerot 
finds exact biopraphical parallels: Tristram is Arnold, Iseult of Ireland is 
Marguerite, Iseult of Brittany is Lucy Wightman. Iseult of Ireland 
represents youth, passionate love, and the lyric impulse in Arnold's 
poetry. Iseult of Brittany represents domesticity, Arnold prosaic life, 
and the suppression of his lyric impulse. 
Among modern English-speaking poets Arnold is the pioneer in treating 
the tragic romance of Tristram and Iseult. Historically, the legend 
originated in the late eighth-century Pictish Kingdom in Scotland, whence it 
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may be traced through Welsh, Cornish, and Breton sources to two poets of the 
late twelfth century: the Frenchman, Beroul, and the Anglo-Norman, Thomas. 
Beroul's Tristram lacks the conclusion, but Thomas's does not. From 
Thomas' Tristram a condensed version, Sir Tristram, was composed in 
middle English a century later. "This latter romance, whose conclusion is 
lacking because," as J.R. Russ has found out, lIa final leaf or two are 
missing from the manuscript, is the only treatment of the poem in middle 
English outside Malory.,,14 Sir Walter Scott edited the manuscript in 1804 
and added his own short conclusion, which does not materially depart from 
the facts of Thomas' version: 
The dying Tristram's message was to display a white sail on 
his return from Cornwall if Iseult of Ireland had agreed to 
come to his master's aid, and a black sail if she had refused. 
Iseult of Brittany had overheard this arrangement for a 
signaling device, and when asked by Tristram what the colour of 
the returning ships' sail was, she lied in replying that it 
was black. Tristram died of grief almost immediately, and 
Iseult of Ireland, arriving too late for a final meeting, threw 
herself upon his corpse and died too. 
Arnold does not know that ending. In a letter (5 November, 1852) to 
Herbert Hill, he writes: 
I read the story of Tristram and Iseult some years ago at Thun 
in an article in a French Review on the romance literature: I 
had never met with it before, and it fastened upon me: when I 
got back to England I looked at the Morte d'Arthur and took 
what I could, but the poem was in the main formed, and I could 
not well disturb it. 15 
The story that Arnold came across occurs in a paragraph of Theodore de 
la Villemarque's article for the Revue de Paris of 1841 on "Les Poemes 
gallois et les romans de la Table Ronde" which recounts how Tristram 
was sent by his uncle, King Mark of Cornwell, to bring home from Ireland 
'La Belle Yseult' to be the King's bride; how he and Iseult drank 
together the love-potion which made them fall passionately in love; and 
how though Iseult married Nark and Tristram eventually married another Iseult -
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Iseult of Brittany - this love remained at the centre of their lives. 
Arnold's poem is based on this selective use of La Villemarque with 
some additional details from J'lIalory.J especially from Books VIII-IX and 
Book XII, which Malory calls the First and Second Books of Tristram. In 
all, it has' been found that Arnold must have consulted five sources of 
the story but only used three of them. For in addition to what one has 
mentioned, Arnold used Vulgate Merlin which he consulted after his return 
to England. 
Tennyson once said that when he used an old legend he made sure that 
there was something modern about his interpretation. Having this in mind 
as a common Victorian practice, one is looking for Arnold's interpretation 
of the Victorian sensibility. So it would be very helpful to see Arnold's 
own recasting of the work's spirit and meaning. 
Part I. The poem from the point of view of form, is Arnold's most 
adventurous and original one. The most notable feature of this in part 
one, is the impression it gives of intense stylisation: an effect which is 
produced by both metre and the method of narration. For instead of telling 
a consecutive story, Arnold chooses to begin just before the crisis and 
to bring in the past by way of flashbacks: in the opening scene the 
delirious Tristram, near death and watched over by his silent wife, is 
longing for his first love, Iseult of Ireland. This method, flashbacks, 
was the source of the complaint about the lack of clarity in the story line. 
Contrast is another aspect in Arnold's treatment of the legend: a 
balanced opposition, a contrast between two kinds of love. To contrive 
this, Arnold has to make some changes: In the narratives which Arnold 
has consulted, Iseult of Brittany is quite insignificant: in Malory, for 
example, she barely appears, ~~d when she does, her one salient action is 
wicked: she betrays Tristram at the end by lying to him about the arrival 
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of the other 1seult, and thus hastens his death. Arnold introduces her 
first and elaborately emphasises the pathos of her position. He dresses 
her in silk, gives her golden ringlets but 'sunk and pale' cheeks, and 
describes her as a lonely orphan, 'a sweet flower': 'the sweetest 
Christian soul alive' with a 'fragile loveliness'. 
Who is this snowdrop by the sea? 
1 know her by her mildness rare, 
Her snow-white hands, her golden hair, 
1 know her by rich silk dress, 
And her fragile loveliness -
The sweetest Christian soul alive, 
1seult of Brittany. 
(1.49-55) 
Towards the end of this part, the narrator tells that Tristram, being 
unable to find fulfilment in love, turned to domestiCity for peace, seeking 
it in, 
the quiet hours 
Pass'd among these heaths of ours 
By the grey Atlantic sea; 
Hours, if not of ecstasy, 
From violent anguish surely free! 
(1. 229-233) 
But such a state "Tould not last for long: Tristram is entirely disabled 
from living a family life. He tries to find relief, '"hich from a psychological 
point of view is correct, by joining his fellow knights in chivalrous 
adventures, fighting with Arthur and ths Roman emperor against the heathen 
Saxons: 
There's many a gay knight where he goes 
Will help him to forget his care; 
The march, the leaguer, Heaven's blithe air, 
The neighing steeds, the ringing blows -
Sick pining comes not where tt~se are. 
(1.256-260) 
But still, tl:ere is no escape, for everywhere Tristram sees the form of 
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Iseult of Ireland 'glide through the crossing spears' (1,241). 
Arnold, also, adds ti-IO children, nowhere mentioned in any other 
version, for the sake of the domestic touch in part one of the poem and in 
preparation for part three. His characterisation of the Irish Iseult 
as proud and petulant is likewise his own, to point the contrast with her 
long-suffering rival. 
Part II. The portion of the poem that troubled Arnold most was this 
part. "I am by no means satisfied with 'Tristram' in the second part 
myself", Arnold writes to Hill. Desiring to expand this portion of 
the story, and departing widely from the traditional treatment of the 
death of the lovers, Arnold was thrown back upon his own resources. For 
the meeting of the lovers at Tristram's deathbed is his own invention. 
Most readers are dissatisfied with this part too: K. Allott, for example, 
says that Arnold "had little talent for direct dramatisation, and the 
choice of trochaic rhythm for the rhymed dialogue was perhaps an 
unsuccessful attempt to distance and to give an air of ritual to the scene" 
(Poems, p~ 208). However, the part opens with lines that shows Arnold's 
understanding of human nature: 
Tristram: Raise the light, my page! that I may see her 
Thou art come at last, then, haughty Queen! 
Long I've waited, long I've fought my fever; 
Late thou comest, cruel thou hast been. 
Iseult of Ireland: Blame me not, poor sufferer! that I tarried; 
Bound I was, I could not break the bond. 
Chide not with the past, but feel the present! 
I am here - we meet - I hold thy hand. 
(n. 1-8) 
At the end of this part, Arnold introduces a passage that shows his 
concept of the triad relation between life, time and art. The passage 
describes, in the narrator's eyes, the flapping tapestry on the wall of 
the room where the dead lovers lie: 
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And on the arras wrought you see 
A stately Huntsman, clad in green, 
And round him a fresh forest scene 
On that clear forest-knoll he stays, 
With his pack round him, and delays. 
He stares and stares, with troubled face ••• 
(II, 152-157) 
"The arras," say 'l'inker and LO'nTY in their comment on the poem, " ••• 
represents the youthful Tristram hunting the boar." It is of course not 
found in any preceding version of the Tristram legend. It may well have 
been suggested to the poet, consciously or unconsciouly, by Byron's 
lines in The Siege of Corinth, in which Francesca appears before Alps on the 
eve of the battle ••• (lines 62)ff). This passage we know to have been a 
favourite with Arnold, since he later incorporated it, together with the 
incident of which it is a part, in his 'Selection from Byron' in the 
Golden Treasury Series (1881). Hunter and hound also figure on the 
tapestry in 'The Eve of St. Agnes' and in Tennyson's 'Palace of Art' ••• 
(commenta~, pp. 114-115). 
In Part III, Arnold gives two factors that could destroy man's 
appreciation of normal life. It is, strangely enough, not pain or suffering: 
But, 
••• it is not sorrow, as I hear, 
Not suffering, which shuts up eye and ear 
To all that has delighted them before, 
And lets us be what we were once no more. 
No, we may suffer deeply, yet retain 
Power to be moved and soothed, for all our pain, 
By what of old pleased us, and will again. 
( III, 112-118) 
••• 'tis the gradual furnace of the wor1d, 
In whose hot air our spirits are upcurled 
Until they crumble, or else grow like steel -
Itlhich kills in us the bloom, the youth, the spring -
Which leaves the fierce necessity to feel, 
But takes away the power - this can avail, 
By drying up our joy in everything, 
To make our former pleasures all seem stale. 
(III, 119-126) 
- 418-
It is to be noted that the 'furnace of the world' is not a cosmic 
phenomenon, but it is what man builds for himself just by being obsessed 
with one single thought: action or love: 
This, or some tyrannous single thought, some fit 
Of passion, which subdues our souls to it, 
Till for its sake alone we live and move -
Call it ambition, or remorse, or love -
This too can change us wholly, and make seem 
All which we did before, shadow and dream. 
(III, 127-132) 
Arnold, then, gives his interpretation of what happens if one gives himself 
entirely to passion: 
••• it angers me to see 
How this fool passion gulls men potently; 
Being, in truth, but a diseased unrest, 
And an unnatural overheat at best. 
Hm.; they are full of languor and distress 
Not having it; which when they do possess, 
They straightway are burnt up "lith fume and care, 
And spent their lives in posting here and there 
1Nhere this plague drives them; and have little ease, 
Are furious with themselves, and hard to please. 
(III, 133-42) 
Similarly, men who give themselves to action are ambitious by nature. They 
are hard to please and their souls grow like steel: this kills in them 
the capacity to feel, in other words, it dries up their 'joy for 
everything' : 
Like that bald Caesar, the famed Roman i'light, 
Who wept at reading of a Grecian knight 
Who made a name at younger years than he; 
Or that reno"med mirror a f chivalry, 
Prince Alexander, Philip's peerless son, 
Who carried the great war from Macedon 
Into the Soudan's realm, and thundered on 
To die at thirty-five in Babylon. 
(III, 143-150) 
In part three too, Iseult, on 'one bright winter's day,' relates to 
her children the story of Jvierlin and Vivian. The real source is, as Tinker 
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. and Lowry have pointed out, another essay by La Villemarque in the Revue de 
Paris, "Visite au Tombeau de Merlin". But though Arnold followed the 
outlines of the narrative: he completely altered the implications of the 
tale. 
Since the story of Nerlin and Vivian' is not directly connected with the 
story of Tristram, it has perlexed many readers. Herbert Hill was the 
first to give air to his dissatisfaction. Arnold, in his attempt to clarify 
,_-:( ... 
the matter, wrote to him " ••• the story of Nerlin of which I am particularly 
/'. 
fond, was brought in on purpose to relieve the poem which would else I 
thought have ended too sadly: but perhaps the new element introduced is 
too much.,,16 Arnold, by closing vlith this story of fatal love, has 
managed to comment obliquely on his main story. For Merlin is to be 
equated roughly to Tristram, and Vivian to Iseult of Ireland, despite Vivian's 
fai thlessness. The downfall of Nerlin represents the PU,ri tan's attitude 
to passion and the untrustworthiness of women. Technically, the device is 
one which Arnold used several times: for instance, in "The Scholar-Gipsy" 
and "stan~as from the Grande Chartreuse" Hhich are concluded by symbolic 
statements of the poem's main theme in the form of a new episode that 
parallels the central action of the poem and emphasises its meaning. 
The poem shows as well a double movement in opposition: for while the 
life movement of Tristram and Iseult of Ireland, in the poem, comes to 
a close, there is another movement opening up simultaneously. Arnold 
conveys this message by the symbol of children which is his invention: 
In Part I, the children are asleep. In Part III, they are wide awake 
under a winter sun, gathering stones on the dormant heath. Children have 
always been the storehouse of hope for Arnold. He worked for them as 
inspector of schools and reformer of the system of education. They are, 
for Arnold, the generation that will carry the torch of the Har of 
liberation. Thus he addresses them in itA French Eton": 
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Ghi1dren of the J.'1xture! \"11 c:,; (; da,y h~M3 no t yeJG da-wGt:ci, ,you, 
y:ben that day arrives, ,1'3,11 h,s,rdly 1::e1ie78 y,ha,t obstructioDs 
"rere long slJffcY·ecl. to preverd; i t8 Goming! YOll "rho, Hi til 2111 
your faults, have nei t112:C th:-:) a.,-1:'id.i 1jY of a:dstocT8.cies, no:r: 
the narrow-mindedness of middle classes, you, whose power of 
Gimple enthusiasm is yonr gift, ,;i1] :101; comp;.'enend hml 
progI:ess to\<wTds !!lan I s best pe:cfec l;:Lon - the adoring and 
ennobli!1g of his ,3piri -I; .. should have L)C;en :r:elueii2,ntJy 
undertaken; 00\·[ it should have 'Deen for years 2-:1d years 
retarded by barren c.o:m<1onplaces •• , You \>iil1 Hondor at the 
labour of i is friends in provJng the r,elf-proving; you vill 
knm·, nothing of th6 dou'bts, the feEJ-l:'.s $ the prejudices the;)' 
had t.o disp81; nothing 0/ the outce.? they had to encounter; 
of the fierce protestat~)ns of life f~om policies which were 
dead and did. not komi it s ,~nd thR sr:r:i11 qye::::,ulouB upbraiding 
from pt;.blici3GS i.n tbei:r~ dotage. But ;'iCU, in 'Jour turn, Hi 1;(1 
difficul ties of your O'.·m I Ylj.l,l 'then 'Je mounting some De,. step 
in JGhe ard.uous lO,Qcier: -,·io aroby man climb3 +'oi·!ctrds his 
perfection; tm·l8.rcls tba -1; nnattainabie but irr8sti b] e lode-sta:c I 
gazed after \'Ii th earnest longing, and invoked ,·Ii th bi tte:r 
tears; the longing of thousanda of hearts, the tears of many 
generations. 
Perba.ps the conclusion that \you1d best establish the unity and 
coherence of all the 8-spects in this part is by quoting Arnold himself: 
The Sea of Faith 
\'las once, too, at the full, 8.nd round earth's shore 
Lay like the folds of a bright gird1E~ furled. 
But nOvf I only bGaT' 
Its melancholy, long~ 'wi thd:caYling roar, 
Retreating, to the breath 
Of the night-'..rind, down the vast edf~8s drear 
And naked shingles of the world. 
Ah, love, let us be true 
To one another! for ijbe YiOrld, which seems 
To lie before us like a land cf dreamB, 
So various, so beautiful, so new, 
Ha.th really neither joy, nm: love, nor lIght, 
Kor certitude, nor peace, nor help fer pain. 
(llDover Beach, 11 Po~§., p. 242) 
Tvro qll.8S hons pose thl~llisel vas here ~ fix·s t, why is love the answer 
to the problem of faJth? Second, did the Victor.ians succeed? In the 
present chapt,,'r I offered my anSvie:c t:J ".;he second question. Concerning 
the first, as I have observsd before! the loss of faith by itself makes 
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the individual an isolated being, and his relationship to the world 
becomes distinct and distrustful. He becomes an isolated atom, and then 
his doubt concerning himself and the meaning of life thwarts his life. 
Arnold does not deny that his age was 'rich in ideas and knowledge: 
it was an age "So various, so beautiful, so new," but "Hath re~lly neither 
joy, nor love, nor light,/ Nor certitude, nor peace, nor help for pain." 
This brings to one's mind some lines of Socrates: 
'I want to know,' asks Socrates, 'whether anyone of 
us would consent to live, having wisdom and mind and 
knowledge and memory of all things, but having no 
sense of pleasure or pain, and wholly unaffected by 
these and the like feelings?' 
(Philebus, 21d.) 
This question is substantiaily the same as that which is presented in 
dramatic form in the tragedy of Faust, and the answer given by Arnold 
harmonises also with Plato's as well as Goethe's conception. Mind is 
not the ultimate good, and the life of thought is not happiness: "Mind is 
the spell which governs earth and heaven." Love is one of the ways in 
which man could overcome the terror of aloneness without sacxificing 
the integrity of his self. 
If the individual overcomes the basic doubt concerning himself 
and his place in life, if he is related to the world by embracing it in 
the act of spontaneous living, he, according to Arnold, gains happiness. 
The problem is to discover the meaning of life, to determine the principles 
which can co-ordinate all its acts. For Arnold the central question of 
life is how to live? Arnold addressed himself to this question and made 
it his life's career by taking as his chief subject the difficulties of 
his fellow-men in understanding the age they live in, and proposing a 
method of reintegration. One can find no better words to sum up Arnold's 
achievement than his own lines on Goethe: 
NOTES 
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He took the suffering human race, 
He read each wound, each weakness clear; 
And struck his finger on the place, 
And said: Thou ailest here, and here! 
He look'd on Europe's dying hour 
Of fitful dream and feverish power; 
His eye plung'd down the weltering strife, 
The turmoil of expiring life --
He said: The end is everywhere, 
Art still bas truth, take refuge there! 
And he was happy, if to know 
Causes of things, and far below 
His feet to see the lurid flow 
Of terror, and insane distress, 
And headlong fate, be happiness. 
1 John C. Nelson, 4'_"_~ ___ U __ -"--~,1 __ Love (New York: Columbia University 
Press, - --, -
2 Les passions de It ame , especially parts i and ii. Also Discourses on 
Method, iii and iv. 
3 Wilhelm Wundt, Ethical System (London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1897), p.91. 
4 Quoted from Charnoch's Self-examination, p. 172 by Max Weber, The Protestant 
Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (Op. cit.), p. 118. 
5 Baily, Praxis Pietatis (Leipzig, 1724), p. 187. 
who adopts a similar stance in, 
1712). Quoted by Weber (Ibid.,) 
See also P.J.Spencer, 
Thelogiche Bedunken (Halle, 
p. 106. 
6 It is no accident that the name of Methodists stuck to the participants in 
the last great revival of Puritan ideas in the eighteenth century just as 
the term Precisians, which has the same meaning, was applied to their 
spiritual ancestors in the seventeenth century. 
7 G.R. Stange, in Matthew Arnold: the Poet as Humanist (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1967), sees the poems as an exercise in 
the craftsmanship of poetry and nothing more: liThe comparison 
of Arnold's love poems with the Liedensykles is principally 
useful in suggesting that Switzerland is not so much a record 
of the poet's amatory experience as it is an exercise in 
conventionalised literary forml! (P. 224). 
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8 There is a hint of the existence of some prearrangement of this meeting 
in the words attributed to Narguerite in "A Nemory Picture", where she 
light-heartedly says that: "Some day next year, I shall be,/ Entering 
heedless, kiss'd by thee". 
9 K. Smidt, "Points of View in Victorian Poetry", English Studies Vol. 38 
(1957), 9. 
10 K. Tillotson, in her article '''Yes: in the Sea of life,'" The Review of 
English Studies '3 ~(1952), has called it "the finest 
and perhaps indeed the greatest of Arnold's lyrics." 
11 Quoted by Iris E. Sells, Matthew Arnold and France (Cambridge: Columbia 
University Press, 1935), p. 293. 
12 Quoted by Paull F. Baum, Ten Studies in the Poetry of ~~tthew Arnold 
(Op. cit.), p. 75. 
13 Even the best and most appreciative recent readers have oversimplified 
the intellectual subtlety of the vlork, concluding that its formal 
complexity is artistically false. Alan H. Roper, for eX2~ple, writes 
that the poem is Ita rejection of passion on the basis of "hat it brings 
to man ••• Indeed, so concerned Was Arnold to make his point that he was 
\'lilling to sacrifice his poem's artistic unity for its sake". See 
"The IvIoral Landscape of Arnold's Poetry," H'1JJA, 77 (June, 1962), 295. 
1tl. Stacy Johnson, in The Voices of fiIatthew Arnold (Ne'", Haven, Yale 
University Press, 1961), details many beauties of the poem which have 
never before been pointed out, but also finds that it displays "some 
characteristic Heakness" (P. 95). 
14 Jon R. HUSS , "A Possible Source for the Death Scene in Arnold's Tristram 
a.."1d Iseult", Victorian PoetrYr9 (1971), 337. 
15 Printed by R.E.C. Houghton, TLS, 19 t'jay, 1932. 
16 Ibid., 368. Quoted in Commentary, p. 124. 
CHAPrER X 
Epilogue 
The true is its ovm becoming, the circle 
that presupposes its end as its aim and 
thus has it for its beginning. 
- Hegel 
The common end of all narrative, nay, of 
all Poems is ••• to make those events, 
which in real or imagined History move 
on in a strait line, assu~e to our 
understanding a circular motion - the 
snake ',o/i th its Tail in its [Ifouth. 
- Coleridge 
Though the Huse be gone away, 
Though she move not earth to-day, 
Souls, erewhile who caught her Vlord, 
Ah! still harp on vlhat they heard. 
M. Arnold 
vlhat VIe call the beginning is often the end 
And to make an end is to make a beginning. 
The end is where i.,e start from ••• 
We shall not cease from exploration 
And the end of all our exploring 
Will be to arrive where we started 
And know the place for the first time. 
T.S. Eliot 
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In July of 1867, Arnold published his New Poems. From that time 
forward, Arnold wrote very little verse but was increasingly ividely known 
for his controversial social and religious writings. Almost without 
exception, the memorable poems of this volume could be called elegiac, 
either in the customary sense, as celebrations of the dead - such as 
,II Rugby Chapel", "Stanzas from Carnac", "A Southern Night", "Haworth 
Churchyard", "Heine's Grave", and "Westminster Abbey", or they are elegiac 
in a wider sense: serious meditation upon the fate of man who feels the 
cross-currents of history in a period of transition - such are "Stanzas 
from the Grand Chartreuse", which Arnold himself does designate as elegiac, 
and "Dover Beach", which he places among his lyric poems. 
The most appropriate poem to begin with is "Dover Beach", for the 
follO\.ring reasons: firs t, almost everything that one has been saying is 
drawn together and summarised in this poem - it connects the fate of the 
individual with society &~d religion: It is 
The thread ',.,hich binds it all in one 
And not its separate parts alone. 
Second, it bridges the years between 1852 and 1867: it was conceived 
early and written as well as published late. The occasion of the poem is 
Arnold's short stay with his wife at Dover during their honeymoon in 1851. 
"It is generally thought that it must have been composed, in the main, in 
the early 1850's: a pencilled draft of lines 1-28 exists on the back of a 
sheet containing notes for 'Empedocles'" (Thorpe, Natthew Arnold, pp. 87-88). 
Anyhow, at whatever point he finished it, it was a poem Arnold lived with 
for a long time. 
"Dover Beach" consists of four sections and opens out both in space 
and time to reach across Europe to the Aegean Sea and ancient Greece. The 
first section gives the setting (1-14): 
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The sea is calm to-night. 
The tide is full, the moon lies fair 
Upon the straits; on the French coast the light 
Gleams and is gone; the cliffs of England stand, 
Glimmering and vast, out in the tranquil bay. 
Come to the window, sweet is the night-air! 
Only, from the long line of spray 
Where the sea meets the moon-blanched land, 
Listen! you hear the grating roar 
Of pebbles which the waves draw back, and fling, 
At their return, up the high strand, 
Eegin, and cease, and then again begin, 
With tremulous cadence slow, and bring 
The eternal note of sadness in. 
(~, pp. 240-41) 
J.D. Jump, in his comment on these lines, says: "Examining these lines more 
closely, we can cite 'grating roar' as admirably conveying the two 
distinguishable but inseparable sounds made by waves breaking on shingle; 
we can acknowledge the almost physical stress given to the verbs 'draw 
back' (long vowels) and 'fling' (short voy/el); 'de can analyse up to a 
point the combination of syntactical and metrical means by which the 
ebbing and flowing motion of the waves is made actual."l The sea-rhythm 
reflects the world's rhythm in general and also of the poet~s soul. "And 
with the word 'listen' at the beginning of line 9, wej' says Murray Krieger, 
"are to be shocked out of our happy lethargy even as the poet is shocked 
out of his. The sharp trochaic foot and the long caesura which follows 
re-enforce this emphasis.,,2 The word 'listen' makes the poem dramatic, 
for although there is only one speaker, there are two characters: the 
speaker and the woman he addresses as his love. 
The second section invokes Sophocles as a poet who witnessed, like 
Arnold, in his own time a period of transition: 
Sophocles long ago 
Heard it on the Aegean, and it brought 
Into his mind the turbid ebb and flow 
Of human misery; we 
Find also in the sound a thought, 
Hearing it by this distant northern sea. 
(15-20) 
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In the first section, Arnold moves the re~der from the sense of sight to that 
of hearing. In this second section of the poem, the movement is repeated 
but in terms of human history - from the present to the past. A 
historical idea which Arnold must have taken from his father who held a 
cyclical theory of history, according to which nations pass through 
various phases of progression till, if they evolve correctly, they achieve 
the ideal society. A nation, if it wishes to profit by the course of 
history, must be capable of catching its tide at the full: "we, standing 
for a few years on the shore of time, can scarcely tell whether the 
particular movement which we witness is according to or against the general 
tendency of the whole period" (T. Arnold's Christian Life, p. vi). 
Arnold, by bringing in the character of Sophocles, made critics 
search for a verbal parallel from Sophocles' plays. Trilling, for 
instance, says that "\o[hen Arnold speaks of Sophocles hearing the roar of 
the pebbles on the beach under the receding Have and of its having brought 
'into his mind the turbid ebb and flow/ Of human misery', he is almost 
certainly making reference to the opening of the third chorus of 
Sophocles' Antigone".3 P.F. Baum, as if anticipating Trilling's remark, 
says: 
As illustration that the note is eternal Arnold instances 
Sophocles, his favourite tragic poet. This same wash of the 
sea against the shore had made the same impression on 
Sophocles: it had reminded him, even as it reminds us in 
the north, of 'the turbid ebb and flow of human misery'. 
Here one must be cautious. Arnold does not say that 
Sophocles compared the vicissitudes of life to the ebb 
and flow of the Aegean tides, nor has anyone ever found in 
the seven extant plays or in the numerous fragments any 
such comparison; nor VIas Sophocles likely to have made such 
a comparison, because there is little tide in the Aegean. 
The alleged parallels simply do not meet the case; they 
are irrelevant. 
(Ten Studies, p. 88) 
And more recently, Culler Ylrites that "To Sophocles in the classical age 
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it spoke in a humanistic sense, of the turbid ebb and flow of a purely 
human misery. But to Arnold in the waning of the Christian age it speaks 
in a religious sense, of the slow withdrawal of the Sea of Faith" 
(The Imaginative Reason, p. 40). In my view, Arnold instances Sophocles 
because he witnessed a transitional period in human history. It was a 
passage from an immanent concept of God to a time where the Platonic idea 
of god as an "absolute other" began to assert itself. To be more accurate, 
it was a period like that of the second half of the sixteenth-century. 
The third section of the poem (lines 21-28) extends ihe parallel 
between the Sea of Faith and the sea at Dover: 
The Sea of Faith 
Was once, too, at the full, and round earth's shore 
lay like the folds of a bright girdle furled. 
But now I only hear 
Its melancholy, long, withdrawing roar, 
Retreating, to the breath 
Of the night-wind, down ine vast edges drear 
And naked shingles of the world. 
Thus, by the allegorisation of the retreating waters into a "Sea of Faith", 
the poem moves from sight to sound and finally from sound to thought. 
In the fourth section (29-37), there is only one resource suggested: 
Ah, love, let us be true 
To one another! for the world, which seems 
To lie before us like a land of dreams, 
So various, so beautiful, so new, 
Hath really neither joy, nor love, nor light, 
Nor certitude, nor peace, nor help for pain; 
And we are here as on a darkling plain 
Swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight, 
Where ignorant armies clash by night. 
"By two routes, then, through nature and through history," says Culler, 
"the poem has brought us to the reality of the darkling plain. For this is 
where the reader is finally placed, not in any religion of nature, which 
is an illusion, or of Christianity, which is gone - not, indeed, in any 
world which 'seems' to lie before us like a 'land of dreams', but here in 
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this harsh, bitter actuality of our ••• present" (pP. 40-41). The image 
of the ignorant armies with "lhich the poem ends has attracted much 
attention, and efforts have been made to find .the inspiration for it in 
Arnold's reading. The likeliest possibility is the account of the battle 
of Epipolae given by Thucydides in his History of the Peloponnesian War 
(Book VII, Chapters 43-44). 
Readers have sometimes complained that the imagery of the poem is 
not unified, that there is no sea in the last section and no darkling 
plain in the first. In fact, the poem's unity is achieved by a consistent 
distinction between sound and sight imagery. The poem itself moves from 
light to darkness,paralleling its thematic movement as a whole from faith 
to disillusionment, from past to present. 
Formally, the poem is a lyric consisting of four unequal verse 
paragraphs irregularly rhymed. Lines vary between hlO and five stresses, 
but more than half the lines are five-stressed. P.F. Baum notes that the 
variations in rhythm, irregularity of line-lengths, and the interweaving 
of shorter and longer lines produces something of the effect of waves 
breaking and retreating, of 'ebb and flow', and that the fourth section 
is 'the most regular and goes some think like the octave of a sonnet: 
abba cddc, plus the last rime, c, repeated with a kind of coda effect' 
(PP. 94-95). The poem brilliantly fuses narrative and drama, and the 
tradi tional mode of reflection. With the possible exception of "The 'tlaste 
Land", no other poem of the nineteenth or the twentieth century depicts 
the alienation of modern man as does "Dover Beach". It will remain 
notable as an authentic expression of Victorian sensibility. 
As the proverb goes, light comes after the darkest hour, so after the 
darkling plain situation, there emerged a relatively clearer pattern of 
the spiritual state of England. The reason is that Arnold, by this time, has 
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put the problem of faith in its historical context. This does not undercut 
the value of his previous interpretation. On the contrary, it is an 
objective diagnosis of the situation, to do away with it or to dismiss 
it as a subjective analysis of Arnold's own personal dilemma is to miss 
the point. So, one can say, for instance, that Empedocles on Etna is a 
synchronic analysis of the spiritual state - the state of faith in the 
mid-nineteenth century; "Dover Beach" and "stanzas from the Grande Chartreuse" 
are representative of the transitional state of faith, the new element here 
is the more or less historical perspective; and finally, a diachronic 
analysis of the problem of faith in general and the role of the poet-
philosopher in that stage in his "Obermann Once More", and "Rugby Chapel" 
respectively. 
The date of composition of "stanzas from the Grande Chartreuse" is 
unknown. Hm.,rever, it must be between the 7th of September 1851, the date 
of Arnold's honeymoon visit to the place, and l"iarch 1855, the date of its 
publication. But from some inaccuracies about the service (lines 40-42), 
one can suggest the idea that the poem was composed around 1855. This, in 
. 
itself, poses a question: why did Arnold choose to write about it after 
this lapse of time? What is the significance of the place itself? There 
is a historical significance. 
The Carthusian Order, an austere sect, was founded by St Bruno of 
Cologne in 1084. The eleventh century was, in many ways, similar to the 
seventeenth century where, as Arnold puts it, man entered the prison of 
puritanism and had the key turned upon its spirit there for two hundred 
years. It was a time marked by a strong religious mania: many various 
ascetic orders were founded by reformers. Romuald, an ascetic hermit, 
founded the Cama1do1ese Order in 1012, the CarthUSians, who never ceased 
to be austere, were founded in 1084. And in 1098, the Cistercian Order 
was founded, and in 1113 it ,.,ras joined by st Bernard. 
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The Time-Spirit favoured this trend of asceticism. It was an 
environment in which ideas like that of st Peter Damian could thrive 
well (he is the author of a treatise On Divine Omnipotence, which maintained 
that God can do things contra~J to the law of contradiction, and can 
undo the past. It sounds like the Calvinistic concept of grace]. The 
eleventh century witnessed, like the beginning of the seventeenth century, 
an intellectual revival - Anselm, Roscelin, Peter Damian, and Berenger of 
Tours, who is interesting as being something of a rationalist. All were 
monks connected with the reform movement. 
In the last quarter of the thirteenth century, not unlike the end of 
the eighteenth century, the Niddle Ages reached a culmination. The Pope 
dafini tely triumphed over the Emperor: the rise of free cities is "'That 
proved of most ul tim8,te importar:.ce in this long struggle. The DOI{er of 
the city gre'tl as a result, too, of economic progress, and it beca'Tle a 
source of new political forms. But the beginning of the fourteenth century, 
not unlike the beginning of the nineteenth century, brought, as B. Russell 
has rightly observed, a dissolution of institutions and philosophies. 
Wycliffe (ca. 1320-84) illustrates, by his life and doctrine, the diminished 
authority of the papacy, in the nineteenth century it is the Bible's 
authority itself. 
Having this background in mind, the Grande Chartreuse is, then, 
the symbol of a thought and an ascetic set of beliefs that are no longer 
possible -
For rigorous teachers seized my youth, 
And purged its faith, and trimmed its fire, 
Showed me the high, white star of Truth, 
There bade me gaze, and there aspire. 
Even now their whispers pierce the gloom: 
~fuat dost thou in this livinv, tomh? 
I. 
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Forgive me, masters of the mind! 
At whose behest I long ago 
So much unlearnt, so much resigned -
I come not here to be your foe! 
I seek these anchorites, not in ruth, 
To curse and to deny your truth; 
Not as their friend, or child, I speak! 
But as, on some far northern strand, 
Thinking of his own Gods, a Greek 
In pity and mournful awe might stand 
Before some fallen RUl1ic stone -
For both were faiths, and both are gone. 
(Poems, p. 288) 
The doom of the Old has long been pronounced, and it is irrevocable; 
but the New appears not in its stead, and man is 
Wandering between two worlds, one dead, 
The other powerless to be born, 
',.fi th nowhore yet to rest my head, 
Like these, on earth I wait forlorn. 
And towards the end of the poem, Arnold bri~gs in a note of heavily 
qualified hope: 
Years hence, perhaps, may dawn an age, 
Hore fortunate, alas! than we, 
Vfhich without hardness \.,rill be sage, 
And gay without frivolity. 
Sons of the world, oh, speed those years; 
But, while we wait, allo".r our tears! 
(Poems, p. 292) 
Just as years later, he will have Senancour offer, in a vision, 'Hope to 
a ,"orld new-made'. 
"Obermann Once More" is a companion piece, a re-echo of those closing 
reflections in the 'Grande Chartreuse'. It was accorded the place of honour 
at the end of New Poems: It is Arnold's poetic exposition of the spiritual 
history of man. As the first line suggests, it must have been composed 
near the date of its publication, 1865-66. In this poem Arnold reviews the 
world's history in optimistic terms Hhich he puts into the mouth of Obermann. 
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The world of the nineteenth century is compaired to the Roman world 
just before the birth of Christ, when life seems to have lost all 
significance: 
'Perceiv'st thou not the change of day? 
Ah! Carry back thy ken, 
What, some hro thousand years! Survey 
The world as it was then! 
'Like ours it looked in outward air. 
Its head was clear and true, 
Sumptuous its clothing, rich its fare, 
No pause its action knew; 
'stout was its arm, each thew and bone 
Seemed puissant and alive -
But, ah! its heart, its heart was stone, 
And so it could not thrive! 
(Poems, pp. 522-23) 
These lines are a development of a rough outline contained in the Yale 
Nanuscript: 
The Roman \ororld perished for having di.sobeyed reason and nature. 
The infancy of the world was rene'ded ,.,ri th all its illusion but 
infancy and its illusion must for ever be transitory, and we 
are again in the place of the Roman world, our illusions 
past, debtors to the service of reason and nature. 
o let us beware how we again are false to them: we shall perish, 
and the ... rorld will be renewed: but we shall leave the same 
question to be solved by a future age. 
I cannot conceal from myself the objection which really wounds 
and perplexes me from the religious side is that the service 
of reason is freezing to feeling, chilling to the religious moods. 
And feeling and the religious mood are eternally the deepest 
being of man, the ground of all joy and greatness for him. 
(Commentary, p. 270) 
Then came the birth of Christianity and its effect on Rome: Christ's 
gospel of love was an inspiring reality, 
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'Ay, ages long endured his span 
Of life - 'tis true received -
That gracious Child, that thorn-crowned filan! 
- He lived while we believed. 
'While we believed, on earth he went, 
And open stood his grave. 
Men called from chamber, church, and tent; 
And Christ vias by to save. 
But the saving quality of Christianity faded: 
'Now he is dead! Far hence he lies 
In the lorn Syrian town; 
And on his ~ave, with shining eyes, 
The Syrian stars look down. 
'In vain men still, with hoping new, 
Regard his death-place dumb, 
And say the stone is not yet to, 
And wait for words to come. 
• •• ••• ••• ••• ••• ••• • •• 
'But slow that tide of common thought, 
Which bathed our life, retired; 
Slow, slO\·[ the old ,.,orld wore to nought, 
And pulse by pulse expired. 
'Its frame yet stood without a breach 
When blood and warmth were fled; 
And still it spake its wonted speech -
But every word was dead. 
(Poems, pp. 526-28) 
Then Arnold follows a very logical argument: If man is 
Unduped of fancy, henceforth man 
Must labour! - must resign 
His all too human creeds, and scan 
Simply the way divine. 
The next movement deals with the French Revolution -
'And oh, we cried, that on this corse 
Might fall a freshning storm! 
Rive its dry bones, and with new force 
A new-sprung world inform! 
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'- Down came the storm! O'er France it passed 
In sheets of scathing fire; 
All Europe felt that fiery blast, 
And shook as it rushed by her. 
But it lost its unifying fire and disintegrated: 
"'That glow of central fire is done 
vlhich with its fusing flame 
Knit all your parts, and kept you one -
But ye, ye are the same! 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 
"'The millions suffer still, and grieve, 
And what can helpers heal 
With old-world cures men half believe 
For woes they wholly feel?'" 
(Poems, p. 529) 
N0W, the time of destruction has passed and a new hour has come. A 
new sun has risen and Obermann bids the poet to reject despair and solitude: 
'The world's great order da'NIls in sheen, 
After long darkness rude, 
Divinelier imag:ed, clearer seen, 
-VI i th hapnie r zeal pursued.' 
The type of logic behind this poem is not dissimilar to the hypothesis 
one has expounded in the prologue to this part of the thesis: the movement 
of history as a huge pendulum that moves between two poles. In 
"Obermann Once Nore" , it is alternating beh/een epochs of scepticism and 
others of faith. 1t1ith this procedure, Arnold distinguishes four 
different historical epochs: the pagan world in the first century B.C., the 
new age of faith initiated by Christ; the gradual withdrawal of faith 
during the modern period; and the new order that is now about to be born. 
Arnold's point is to draw the parallel between the first age and the 
third and beh/een the second and the fourth. 
i,>Ii th this spirit, Arnold wrote one of his mos t memorable poems: 
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"Rugby Chapel". On Arnold's own testimony, it was written as a; reply 
to a criticism of Dr Arnold, for after the appearance of the volume in 
1867 which contains the poem, Arnold wrote to his mother (August 8, 1867): 
I knew, my dearest mother, that the Rugby Chapel Poem would give 
you pleasure: often and often it had been in my mind to say it to 
you, and I have foreborn because my own saying of things does 
not please me. It was Fitzjames Stephen's thesis, maintained 
in the Edinburgh Review, of Papa's being a narrow bustling 
fanatic, which moved me first to the poem. I think I have done 
something to fix the true legend about Papa, as those who knew 
him best feel it ought to run: and this is much -
(CL, Appendix I, p. 164) 
The whole poem seems to echo themes of Dr Arnold's Rugby sermons, 
remembered or read, and in the latter half the religious tone and the 
character of the man are heightened by parallels with lVloses' leading the 
Israeli tes through the "rilderness. But the poem is of interest to the 
reader for the light it throws on Arnold's own concept of the vrould-be-
deliverer of his age. To this effect he writes to his mother (November 18, 
1865): "But this is just vrhat makes him great - that he was not only a 
good man saving his soul by righteousness, but that he carried so many 
others with him in his hand, and saved them ••• along with himself ••• (and) 
papa's greatness consists in his bringing such a torrent of freshness 
into religion by placing history and politics in connection vii th it" 
(Letters, I, p. 311). 
Arnold is always charged vrith the accusation being an alienated poet 
who disowned his cultural heritage as British - "unEnglish in his tastes 
and that he invariably condemned everything that vras characteristically 
British"o4 Yet some more lines of Arnold's writings might be helpful to 
clear up the real stance of Arnold. It is worthy of notice that Arnold 
is the first to use English as a medium for his lectures at Oxford. He 
has been avrare of his country's achievement and was proud of it. "A Pole", 
says Arnold, "does not descend by becoming a Russian, or an Irishman by 
i .. 
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becoming an Englishman. But an Englishman, with his country's history 
behind him, descends and deteriorates by becoming anything but 
an Englishman" ("The Italian Question", CPW, I, p. 73). 
Let an Englishman (says Arnold) ••• sincerely ask himself what it 
is which would make it intolerable to his feelings to pass, or 
to see any part of his country pass, under foreign dominion. 
He will find that it is the sense of self-esteem generated by 
knowing the figure which his nation makes in history; by 
considering the achievements of his nation in war, government, 
arts, literature, or industry (Ibid., p. 71). 
In answering the charge of alienation, I quote Arnold himself from 
lines on Socrates, for they represent my view of Arnold and his attitude 
towards society: 
And I suppose it was despair at this sort of thing, in his own 
time and commonwealth, which makes Socrates say, when he was 
reproached for standing aloof from politics, that in his O"ffi 
opinion, by taking the line he did, he 'das the only true politician 
of men then living. Socrates saw that the thing most needful was 
'to disDose the peoDle to a better sense of their condition', 
and that the actual politicians never did it. And serious 
people at the present day may well be inclined, though they have 
no Socrates to help them, at any rate to stand aside, as he did, 
from the movement of our prominent politicians and journalists, 
and of the rank and file 'tlho appear to follow, but "rho really do 
oftemst direct them:- to stand aside, and to try whether they 
cannot bring themselves, at all events, to a better sense of 
their own condition and of the condition of the people and 
things around them. 
("The Incompatibles", IX, p. 268) 
Arnold follo"s that line ,lithout any attempt, unlike Socrates, at self-
assertion in the face of his age5institutionalised authoritarian discipline: 
religious, civil, or academic. "I mean,N Arnold writes to his mother 
(February 16, 1864), "to deliver the middle class out of the hand of their 
Dissenting ministers. The mere difficulty of the task is itself rather 
an additional incentive to undertake it" (Letters, I, p. 227). In another 
place he writes: "after all, my present business is ••• to exhort my 
countrymen to ••• an attractive form of civilisation. And if one's 
countrymen insist upon it, that fotmd to be sweet and attractive their form 
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of civilisation is, or, if not, ought to be, then we who think differently 
must labour diligently to follow Burke's injunction, and to 'dispose 
people to a better sense of their condition" (Ibid., p. 285). 
And how did Arnold, that deliverer and dissolvent of old institutions 
proceed in his task of dissolution, of liberation of the middle class from 
the old routine? At the beginning he tried to secure the ear of his society 
by influencing men of letters. After that he tried to influence the 
people who direct the affairs in his country. Time has not refuted Arnold's 
well-known vlords to his mother (June 5, 1869): 
My poems represent, on the whole, the main movement of mind of 
the last quarter of a century, and thus they will probably have 
their day as people became conscious to themselves of what 
that movement of mind is, and interested in the literary productions 
which reflect it. It might be fairly urged that I have less 
poetical sentiment than Tem1yson, and less intellectual vigour 
and abundance than Brovming; yet because I have perha~s more of a 
fusion of the tV/o than either of them, and have more regularly 
applied that fusion to the main line of modern development, I am 
likely enough to have my turn, as they have had theirs. 
(Letters, II, p. 9) 
We do not know Arnold unless we feel the spirit which goes through 
his work as a whole. Simply speaking, it is the sentiment of the ideal 
life, which is none other than man's normal life. The normal life \.,rhose 
ruling thoughts, on the personal level, are love, work, and kno",ledge. 
And on the social level, the ruling thoughts are justice, liberty and virtue. 
They are the same, for they lead to each other; "For to arrive at a full 
and right conception of things, to know one's self and the world - which is 
knO'.·,rledge; then to act firmly and manfully on that knowledge - which is 
virtue; this is the native, the indestructible impulse of the spirit of 
man" ("Ecce, Convertimur ad Gentes", CPtI, IX, pp. 4-5). The interrelationship 
of love and ,justice is generally accepted for "love and justice are the same, 
for justice is love distributed nothing else." 5 The more \.,re study him, the 
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more these :ruling ideas "'ill be ours ~ and the higher "rill be our esteem 
for the power of his mind, the width of his interests, the largeness of 
his knowledge, the freshness, fearlessness, and strength of his jUdgements. 
However, he is not one of these saints who arrived at perfect s",eetness 
and calm, steeped in ecstasy; there is something indomitable in him, which 
he governs indeed, but which chafes, '"hich gives that impression of 
profound melancholy. That is because he felt the ar.xieties, doubts, and 
pessimisms that gnaw underneath the superstructure of Victorian optimism. 
Arnold did not succumb in spite of his own miseries: the death of his 
children while they are young and his awareness that he inherited his father's 
heart troubles. From thes~ miseries he was preserved by that quality in 
him "rhich this word expresses - his inborn, his constant amenity. l.ve see 
him vrise, just, self-governed, tender, thankful, blameless; yet vrith all 
this there is in the deuths of that strong nature a struggle, an inquietude, 
an ennui, which endures to the end, aIld which leaves the reader vri th that 
impression of melancholy. He lived till the year 1888. On the 15th of 
April in that year he died, as most men would "rish to die, suddenly, \olithout 
pain, and at the height of his fame, at the age of sixty-six. 
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